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Abstract 
Narratives of Troubled Journeys                                                    
Personality disorder and the medicalisation of moral dilemmas 
Raymond Paul Middleton  
Keywords: Personality Disorder, Recovery, Dialogue, Narrative, Mental 
Health, Moral order, Trauma 
 
This thesis examines the interaction of the medical and moral in the historical 
evolution of “personality disorder” starting with the relationship between 
Prichard’s (1835) diagnosis of “Moral Insanity” and an anti-modern religious 
text (Hancock, 1824) describing disorder of the moral faculty. Moral insanity is 
traced through to Psychopathic Personalities and the military’s Medical 203 to 
Personality Disorder in DSM I (1952) through to DSM 5 (2013). The extent to 
which DSM medicalises everyday moral categories is examined by building on 
the works of writers theorising moral orders and moral selves, such as Harré 
(1993), Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986) and Taylor (1989). This thesis moves from 
macro-level concerns to the micro-level using dialogical narrative methodology 
(Sullivan, 2012) alongside Bakhtin’s conceptual tools to examine how medical 
and personal narratives of "Personality Disorder" interact in lived experience 
by analysing a triangulation of my psychiatric clinical notes, contemporary 
diary entries and an autobiographical account. An analysis is undertaken of 
several diverse autobiographical accounts of ‘successful’ recovery from mental 
health crisis already available in the public sphere. Consideration was given to 
how concepts developed throughout this study might be used in future work, 
concepts such as “dialogical search for a new narrative”, the dialogical ethics 
of “habitual excess and insufficiency” and “authoritative narrators”. This 
thesis’s originality is in linking DSM 5’s diagnosis of personality disorder to anti-
modern moral discourses on disorder of the moral faculty, and in revealing 
complex genre relationships between literal/medical and literary/moral 
understandings of emotional and mental crisis and recovery. 
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Introduction 
 
Whilst managing a personality disorder service in 2007 I became aware of a 
wide variety of conflicting ‘voices’ reacting to patient’s challenging habitual 
ways of thinking, feeling and/or acting. I reflected on my experiences as 
someone who had also received a diagnosis of “Personality Disorder” in the 
1990’s, and thus considered writing this thesis from the position of an “expert 
by experience” of severe mental distress in addition to someone who has 
managed mental health services. The recent growth in influence of ‘expert by 
experience’ voices on mental health discourses is discussed in chapter 1, and 
further in chapter 3. I had read the diagnostic descriptions of personality 
disorder in the DSM IV-TR (2000) and become aware that many of them 
referred to moral issues or dilemmas, such as lack of forgiveness or too much 
anger, and this led me to the literature on morality once I had started my PhD.  
 
In particular I was drawn to the work of Charles Taylor on the fundamentally 
moral nature of human life and also to the work of Rom Harré, for whom the 
study of human life and psychology is inescapably a moral project. As an 
undergraduate student I had become aware of the work of Michel Foucault and 
his historical studies of madness, especially his critical approach to psychiatry 
that attempts to show how understandings of, and various treatments for, what 
came to be known as insanity, are social and historical constructs. This along 
with my critical reading of the DSM led me to frame the project within the wider 
epistemological critique of the Western ‘medical model’ in respect of mental 
health, and to take a more humanistic approach to those who face troubled 
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journeys through life. Thus this study is primarily a theoretically driven piece of 
work, with the empirical analysis undertaken in chapters 5 and 6 developing 
later as a way to balance the macro-level historical and social concerns 
addressed in chapters 2 and 3 with a micro-level narrative analysis. Here I 
identified a gap in the literature in terms of a critical and moral framework being 
used to understand the experiences of individuals who have troubled journeys 
through life, and also to understand some of the many and varied routes to 
recovery. I use the phrase ‘troubled journeys’ as a way to investigate how 
those who find themselves in crisis, or whose lives and relationships become 
problematical for prolonged periods of time, might attract a mental health 
diagnosis of disorder, such as personality disorder or something similar, but 
without making the assumption to begin with that the core of the problem is 
medically located ‘in’ the patient as an ‘illness’. 
 
Thus reflecting on how habits can be problematised in more than one way 
motivated me to undertake this study. This curiosity about different medical 
and moral understandings within people’s narratives developed into my key 
research questions, which are: 
1. What is the historical evolution of medical and moral categories of 
personality disorder? I address this directly in chapter two. 
Following on from chapter two, chapter three asks, 
2.  How do the moral and medical categories of personality disorder 
currently interact? 
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This macro-level exploration highlighted a gap in the academic literature 
around the moral take on micro-level individual narratives of ‘mental health’ 
crisis and recovery, which led me to undertake an empirical study with two 
further research questions in mind, which are;  
 
3. How do the medical and the personal narratives of "Personality 
Disorder" interact in lived experience? I address this directly through 
chapter five. 
 
Curiosity about the relationship between the moral and medical was then 
broadened in the final research question to ask,  
  
4. What narratives aid recovery in troubled journeys involving mental 
health crisis?, with an interest in contrasting how medical and non-
medical genres might be used in recovery narratives. 
 
Chapter Overviews: 
 
In chapter 1 the philosophical and academic framework underlying this 
enquiry is outlined as I begin to explore moral/medical differences around 
disorder by reviewing contemporary critical literature on morality and 
Personality Disorder. Theoretical approaches that will allow me to investigate 
these questions further are also discussed. The interlinked ontological and 
epistemological positions I am taking are explained and justified clearly, by 
building on the works of established writers who have theorised moral orders 
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and moral selves, such as; Erving Goffman (1990), Kenneth Gergen (2009), 
Rom Harré (1993), Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1993), Charles 
Taylor (1989) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981). This involved considering 
subjectivity to be positioned (Harré, 1993) dynamically within powerful 
discursive practices and local moral orders.  
 
Chapter 2 takes the emerging themes of chapter 1 and looks through a macro 
historical lens in order to gain a perspective through a significant time-frame 
from the early 19th century to the early 21st century, in part because it became 
apparent that critiques of DSM (e.g. Szasz, 1970) tend not to focus attention 
on texts published prior to the 20th century. This chapter examines the medical 
literature that originally brought morality into the modern definition of madness, 
namely Prichard’s (1835) Treatise on Insanity which introduced the novel 
diagnosis of “Moral Insanity”. Through this examination the extent to which the 
DSM assumes certain everyday moral categories, which it then medicalises, 
is investigated to its historical roots within early 19th century space-time. From 
the emergence in the 19th century of the notion of moral insanity the complex 
routes are traced through “Psychopathic Personalities” in the 1920’s, and 
through the military’s Medical 203 (1946/2000) to “Personality Disorder” in 
DSM I (1952). Further iterations of Personality Disorder definitions are traced, 
including the significant success of the neo-Kraepelinian movement in 
influencing DSM III (1980).  
 
Chapter 3 then turns to the current context to explore in more detail the extent 
to which the DSM 5 (2013) medicalises everyday moral categories. This 
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chapter explores the notion that the expanding DSM project may be increasing 
disorder in society, and reviews feminist, poststructuralist and 
phenomenological critiques of DSM. The DSM categorical approach to mental 
disorder is put into context as one of a variety of possible approaches 
available, including dimensional models of holistic normal human variation. 
Social functioning, as a key component of a Personality Disorder diagnosis, is 
examined as unavoidably interlinked with moral values, such as an efficient 
and productive work ethic. Current critiques of DSM 5 are considered, such as 
Livesley (2012) and the research Livesley draws on (Kellert, Longino and 
Waters, 2006, Widiger, 1993) to critique political power relations influencing 
DSM 5.  Alternative conceptualisations are also considered, such as viewing 
personal moral habits as a set of skills with potential for excess and 
insufficiency, with all human being having the capacity for combinations of 
skills and excess/insufficiency. Experiential validity is also considered through 
examples of ‘expert by experience’ perspectives. Finally Foucault’s concept of 
the practice of a foreign knowledge is brought into the discussion as potentially 
useful when thinking about changes to subjectivity which may alter habits of 
excess/insufficiency and skills. Thus chapters 2 and 3 dialogises DSM 5’s 
diagnosis of Personality Disorder by demonstrating it is historically and socially 
dependent on its other, namely non-medical moral discourses.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 go further than current critiques of DSM in arguing that 
pathological personality traits used to diagnose personality disorder are 
predominantly moral habits of excess and insufficiency formed within everyday 
genres of local moral frameworks, re-worked into a medical/scientific 
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professional genre as symptoms of mental illness/disorder. This historical 
examination showed there were gaps in the academic literature, in that not 
enough research has been undertaken on the personal take on morality in 
relation to experiences of mental health crisis and recovery, and I address this 
directly though my analysis chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Chapter 4 then turns from these macro-level historical and social concerns to 
consider micro-level individual narratives of lived experiences by describing a 
systematic dialogical narrative methodology, which will be used to investigate 
the final two key research questions through the subsequent analysis chapters 
5 and 6. A theoretical justification for narrative methodology is outlined 
followed by a discussion of current examples of narrative and autobiography 
research, which focus on mental health crisis and recovery. Ethical dilemmas 
for this study’s data collection are then addressed, followed a description of 
steps I took for my data analysis. The systematic methodological approach 
used for my data analysis is described involving five steps, which are;  
 
Step 1: Reading and Re-Reading all the transcripts/accounts; 
Step 2: Looking for and selecting key moments; 
Step 3: Identifying the major genres; 
Step 4: Looking for the material features of narration (formal, informal, 
diegetic, intra-diegetic), chronotopic genre shifts, use of metaphor.  
Step 5: Evaluation and validation of interpretations through dialogue with 
supervisors  
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This dialogical narrative methodology draws on the work of Sullivan (2012), 
Mishler (1995), Reissman (1993) and Bakhtin’s (1981) Dialogism. The purpose 
of taking a dialogical narrative approach is in part to value micro-level individual 
stories and illustrate that alternative ways of understanding ‘madness’ are 
valid. 
 
Chapter 5 uses a top-down analysis (Sullivan, 2012) to analyse how medical 
and moral genres play out in the lived experience of someone diagnosed with 
a Personality Disorder in order to answer the research question, 'how do 
the medical and the personal narratives of "Personality Disorder" interact in 
lived experience?’. I use my own data for this, comprised of my medical notes 
and diary entries from the early 1990s contrasted with an autobiographical 
account written during the course of the PhD research. This analysis focuses 
on my own journey through a period of troubled life experience. A dialogical 
narrative analysis us undertaken in relation to the subjective experience of 
having ‘a very troubled journey’ through life. The three data sets analysed are;  
 Contemporary Diary entries [Text D] 1993 - 1994 (Appendix I)  
 An autobiographical account [Text A] 2012 (Appendix II)  
 Clinical psychiatric notes [Text C] 1993 - 2000 (Appendix III)  
 
Attention is drawn to the different genres within which the self-self-other 
relationship is constructed. The analysis explores how differing subjectivities 
emerge within complex genre interactions involving shifting chronotopes, 
hybridised dilemmatic identity and changing authorial power via narration. 
Extradiegetic (outside-in) narratives re-accentuating intradiegetic (inside-out) 
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utterances are analysed using Sullivan’s (2012) dialogical method for 
analysing commentaries on subjectivity. This includes exploring the emotional 
orientation of the author to their hero and consideration of how chronotopic 
genre shifts allow different subjectivities to emerge. This chapter identifies the 
major literal/medical genres, such as medical dramas involving DSM 
diagnosis, and literary/non-medical genres encountered, such as 
philosophical, religious and self-help, bringing them into a dialogue with each 
other by comparing the chronotopic genre shifts and other material features of 
narration to analyse the different subjectivities that are enabled to emerge.  
 
Chapter 6 takes these findings forward to focus on recovery chronotopes, by 
analysing several diverse autobiographical accounts of ‘successful’ recovery 
already available in the public sphere on The Scottish Recovery Network 
(2018) in order to answer the last research question: ‘what narratives aid 
recovery in troubled journeys that involve some kind of mental health crisis?’ 
Recovery narratives analysed were broadened from focussing only on 
someone receiving a formal diagnosis of personality disorder to people self-
identifying they had recovered from a serious mental health crisis which they 
may or may not choose to describe in medicalised ways.  The chapter is 
organised into two halves; Part 1 focusses on recovery narratives that resist 
medical genres and Part 2 focusses on recovery narratives where mental 
health genres are partly internally persuasive. This chapter broadens the 
analysis to look at other stories of how people have made sense of having their 
own ‘very troubled journey’ through life. I analysed this data to understand how 
people drew on both mental health genres and genres outside of mental health 
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discourses when making sense of their own troubled journeys. ‘Key moments’ 
(Sullivan, 2012) were selected for analysis in terms of content reflecting a 
chronotopic genre shift moving into recovery and descriptions involving 
significant discourses (such as medical, trauma-informed, religious, 
psychotherapeutic, philosophical, self-help, etc.).  
  
Chapter seven then discusses conclusions from the whole study and 
considers some pragmatic themes such as how the key findings might be 
applied to benefit people currently experiencing a very troubled journey 
through life and how an ethical narrative dialogue might help staff and services 
attempting to help this group of people, who are often disempowered and 
marginalised from mainstream society and services.  
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Chapter 1: 
 
The philosophical and academic framework for this enquiry 
   
1.1 Literature review of existing critical work 
The context of this work draws on the concept that people are ‘positioned’ 
within discursive moral orders where some patterns of behaviour, emotions 
and thoughts are socially valued whilst others attract negative moral 
judgements within the local social context. This concept of ‘positioning’ was 
developed (Davies and Harré (1990), Harré (1993)) within linguistically 
orientated social-psychological analysis as a way to overcome some of 
limitations of the concept of ‘role’ (as too static/formal) and allow consideration 
of the more the dynamic nature of selfhood positioned within local moral 
orders, where discursive practices exert varying powers to ‘position’ people 
and generate subjectivity. Discursive moral orders appear active around 
diagnostic practises for “Personality Disorder” from the very start of people’s 
journeys into psychiatric services. Current interest in Personality Disorder 
being a concern of moral order can be seen reviewing the academic literature.  
 
For example, Shaw and Proctor from a feminist perspective (2005) examine 
how a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) pathologises 
women’s experience of surviving sexual abuse. They highlight BPD as a 
gendered diagnosis with 75% of those diagnosed being women, with 70% to 
80% of those diagnosed reporting experiences of childhood sexual abuse. 
They argue the label of BPD is a diagnostic distraction from the aetiological 
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significance of traumatic childhood sexual abuse in psychological distress. 
They view high rates of sexual violence towards women diagnosed with BPD 
within a moral framework of sexual violence being an “unacceptable” reality, 
which they would like to see changed. They challenge the established 
psychiatric power structure to see psychological distress of survivors in the 
context of wider gender power relations in society. They agree with Wilkins 
and Warner’s (2001) argument that habits pathologised as symptoms of BPD 
are better understood as habitual relational reactions to traumas and 
understandable adaptations developed to cope with oppression. They argue 
BPD diagnosis serves a dual role of pathologising women’s response to 
traumatic sexual violence and distracting from the aetiological reality of morally 
unacceptable traumatic sexual violence.  
 
Critically reframing the pathologising diagnosis of Borderline Personality 
Disorder within a moral discourse of sexual violence as an unfair social 
injustice brings to light the importance of four interlinked themes, namely, the 
role of; 
1. Power-relationships (both interpersonally and within wider society) 
2. The formation of habits of thought, emotion and action as 
understandable reactions to cope with abusive oppression 
3. The experience of trauma and abuse 
4. The moral context in which both traumatic abuse and different reactions 
to it are understood 
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From a feminist Bakhtinian point of view Hodge and Bryant (2017) also 
examine the damaging role of pathologising medical discourses in under-
playing the aetiological significance of childhood sexual abuse. Interviewing 
seven women with lived experience of trauma and eating disorder they found 
a common narrative theme emerged of masking of the emotion of shame, an 
emotion inextricably linked to local moral orders, value-systems and self-
evaluations. The women felt disempowered combined with the need to 
reshape their bodies to mask their shame. Their study demonstrates how 
listening to the narratives of marginalised women with lived experience can 
disrupt authoritative discourses that describe sexual abuse as permanently 
damaging the personality. Drawing on Warner (2009) they critique 
authoritative self-harm discourses for erasing its social production through 
pathologising self-harm as a symptom of an underlying personality disorder. 
They argue there is a need to develop ways to uncover unarticulated 
experiences of trauma, sense-making and responses/resistances outside of 
powerfully pathologising medical model narratives such as The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM) (2000, 2013).  Thus the theme of power-relations on 
this subject needs to consider the relative power of different discourses such 
as DSM as well as alternative discourses people may draw on to make sense 
of their troubled journey through life. 
 
Hodge and Bryant (2017) argue medicalising misery and suffering constructs 
it as individual pathology and erases its social and moral status as a response 
to social injustice. Reflexively drawing on Lash (2003) they consider the 
possibilities and limitations of their vision as researchers as always influenced 
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by their ethics, their privileged and/or marginalised situatedness and their 
images of the world. This current thesis also approaches the subject of the 
medicalisation of moral issues associated with personality disorder, but from a 
different situatedness of power relations by examining the experience of a 
male diagnosed with BPD who is a survivor of sexual abuse by a woman. 
Although each individual ‘small story’ of someone’s experience is different the 
hope is that these themes of power-relations, habits, trauma and moral context 
will prove a fruitful analytic lens.  
 
DSM diagnostic practices have also been critiqued from a different perspective 
as genre-systems, for example Burkenkotter (2001) critiques DSM IV-TR 
(2000) as an institutional genre system or professional genre that works by 
mediating individual communication and institutional structural properties 
through a process of rhetorical recontextualisation. This approach sees the 
context of any micro level unit of analysis as a genre-mediated 
multidimensional activity system. She showed how the initial mental health 
assessment by a therapist creates multi-voicedness and inner-contradictions 
as a conflict is generated between the therapist wanting to listen to individual 
narratives of distress as a healer/consultant as at the same time she is looking 
through the DSM genre to fit people into its grid of nosology for bureaucratic 
and economic purposes in order to be seen as a professional cost-efficient 
producer within the mental health institutional context. For Burkenkotter DSM 
acts as a meta-genre organising several other professional genres (psychiatry, 
psychology, finance departments, psychotherapy, academic research, etc.) 
Thus the mental health assessment is a micro-level site of multiple genre-
14 
 
systems at play, but DSM is the most powerful organising meta-genre because 
its categories are ultimately organisationally systemically linked to financial 
payment. She argues the process of diagnosing the client using the DSM 
meta-genre with its coded grid of categories meets the needs of institutional 
and economic bureaucracies but at the cost of reducing the person’s identity 
into the clinical picture of their disorder. She argues genre theory, drawing on 
Bakhtin (1981, 1986), is a useful lens to study the influence of DSM on patients 
and mental health practices as it allows a micro-macro level shifting of 
perspective between micro-level narratives of distress and reactive 
professional activity embedded within macro-level traditions of organisations, 
institutions and texts organised through powerful historically conditioned 
genres.  
 
Crowe (2000) used critical discourse analysis to explore the theoretical 
assumptions underpinning DSM-IV’s categories of disorder by examining how 
the construction of disorders also implicitly constructs ‘normality’. He found 
what clinicians consider ‘normal’ is based on their culturally bound beliefs, 
ethics and values ‘veiled in scientific objectivity’. He found the DSM text to be 
an authoritative discourse, basing definitions of disorder on its authors’ 
unarticulated assumptions about what counts as normal in terms of social 
values around productivity, rationality, moderation and unity. He argues the 
authoritative image of normality embedded within the DSM’s diagnostic 
definitions pathologises people’s understandable reactions to difficult life 
events. Crowe argues mental health professionals’ beliefs and values are 
significant factors in the diagnosis of disorders because clinicians are given 
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the authority to exercise ‘clinical judgement’ in diagnostic practice. Such 
clinical judgement is in turn informed by the dominant discourse of DSM. Thus 
he challenges the key assumption underlying DSM that disorders occur in the 
individual through faulty individual functioning. He argues this ignores the 
discursive, social and cultural context in which distressing experiences are 
taking place and highlights failures of DSM to acknowledge assumed social 
and institutional values underlying diagnostic definitions in relation to lack of 
moderation, unproductivity and irrationality. Thus he argues professionals are 
exercising moral judgements when they claim clinical judgements supported 
by the authoritative discourse of DSM, which is itself masking moral 
judgements within its clinical definitions of disorder. However, Crowe (2000) 
doesn’t explore Personality Disorder’s iterations in previous editions of DSM 
or its historical predecessors, considering how social change has impacted on 
its development, and I will examine this question directly in chapter 2.  
 
Through a Bakhtinian lens we can see the genre of DSM has developed 
through different iterations (DSM I, DSM II, DSM III, DSM IV, DSM IV-TR and 
DSM 5 (2013)) and been influenced by non-medical discourses in the wider 
culture. Although always presenting itself as scientifically objective it has been 
shown that social changes in the political and moral cultural context influences 
the development of which disorders it legitimises or discredits through its 
authoritative discourse. For example, Kutchins and Kirk (1997, p. 55-99) 
demonstrate how the diagnosis of “homosexually” as a mental disorder in DSM 
was only eliminated after an organised protest campaign targeting the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) annual conventions between 1970-
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1974. Similarly the removal of Masochistic Personality Disorder (MPD) from 
DSM-III-R followed a sustained feminist campaign between 1985 -1994, which 
included arguing MPD criteria were understandable reactions to male violence 
rather than personal pathology (Kutchins and Kirk (1997, p. 126-175)). The 
moral, political and social context influences the creation and inclusion of new 
categories in DSM as well as their elimination, for example, an organised 
political campaign by Vietnam veterans targeting the APA to add a new 
diagnostic category of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) to DSM-III was 
successful, where they believed a categorical diagnosis would both validate 
their suffering from trauma and give access to health care (Kutchins and Kirk 
(1997, p. 100-125)). These social campaigns influencing DSM disorders 
support the argument that the moral context and social power-relations within 
which trauma and habitual reactions to it are conceptualised are significant 
themes worth considering in this thesis.  
 
Additionally a number of studies of mental health professional practice found 
they routinely make negative moral judgements about patients diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), such as judging them to be 
‘manipulative’ and ‘bad not mad’ (e.g. Ross et al (2009), Black et al (2011)). In 
an attitudinal study of mental health professionals Bodner et al. (2015) found 
the highest rates of negative attitudes towards people diagnosed with BPD 
was amongst nurses and psychiatrists when compared to social workers and 
psychologists. Making sense of medics’ moral judgements towards their 
patients the authors say they agree with Sansone and Sansone (2013) that, 
“...the attitudes nurses present simply reflect a very human reaction to the 
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complex and pathological behaviours of these patients.” (Bodner et al. 2015, 
p. 9). These studies find in practice professional negative moral judgements 
always circulate around patients diagnosed with BPD within the local moral 
orders of both the outpatient clinic and the inpatient ward. These findings 
support the value of exploring the local moral context and power-relationships 
within which people experiencing a troubled life-journey interact with 
professionals.  
 
Crowe (2000) argues moral judgements masquerade as professional clinical 
judgements in the space opened up by DSM’s failure to be clear where the 
lines lie between ‘normal’ habits and pathological habitual excess and 
insufficiency. Potter (2011) explores this issue further to demonstrate how both 
the context and the subject’s situatedness within unequal power relations will 
affect whether a pathologised habit associated with DSM disorder will be 
viewed as a vice or a virtue. She argues personality disorders are moral and 
not medical, and uses the personality trait of defiance against authority as an 
example where the nosology of psychiatry is unclear around where they draw 
the line between normal and pathological defiance. She highlights that social 
norms around gender and ethnicity are not taken into account by psychiatry 
when assessing personality traits as excessively pathological or normal. She 
argues unjust and unequal oppressive power relationships between social 
groups can mean being defiant against authority is a virtue resisting 
oppression but this virtue of the oppressed may be pathologised by the 
powerful and medicalised through a powerful authoritative discourse such as 
DSM-IV (2000).  She argues an individual’s relative position of power within 
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the social structure will affect whether their defiance is seen as a reasonable 
response to oppression or pathological excess. Potter claims habitual 
personality traits which are pathologised by authoritative medical discourses 
can actually be moral virtues, such as defiance. In addition the lines are 
unclear about where the expression of such traits becomes excessive because 
the relative position of the defiant or defied person judging the situation will be 
affected by their relative privilege or oppression in terms of gender, ethnicity, 
occupation, disability, etc. In a society intersected with social injustice the 
oppressor may see habitual defiance as pathological whilst the oppressed see 
it as a vital moral virtue. By viewing DSM’s medicalised pathological traits 
through a moral lens of virtue and vice Potter challenges DSM’s claim to 
scientific objectivity in its formation of nosological lists of symptoms of 
disorders.   
 
In addition to studies showing symptoms used to diagnose personality disorder 
are moral not medical, other studies examine treatment options and argue 
successful treatment of these difficulties is moral treatment masquerading as 
medical treatment. For example, Charland (2006) argues Personality 
Disorders are moral rather than medical conditions. He analysed the language 
used in Personality Disorder diagnostic definitions in DSM-IV (2000) to show 
the criteria uses moral terminology, calling this critique an argument from 
identification. He supports this analysis through an argument from treatment 
where he claims successful outcomes from treatment of Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD), such as through Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) 
involve a change in the moral character of the client.  However, Horne (2014) 
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strongly refutes Charland’s moral claim by looking at the evidence around 
treatment outcomes for Dialectical Behavioural Treatment (DBT) for patients 
with BPD. In his analysis Horne concedes that the treatment goals for DBT are 
in fact moral and successful treatment does in fact involve improvement in 
moral behaviour. However, he perseveres in holding that personality disorders 
are medical conditions and not moral by arguing that despite the moral nature 
of the goals and outcomes of DBT the treatment is a “clinical” treatment of 
cognitive and “non-moral emotional deficits” which once treated allow the 
expression of an intact moral character. Horne distinguishes between moral 
character and moral behaviour. He argues moral character relates to 
underlying personality traits involving values, beliefs and desires which may or 
may not produce moral behaviour.  Thus he argues, 
“Successful treatment of BPD, then, requires moral behaviour change, 
but not necessarily moral character change” (Horne, 2014) 
Horne argues that although DBT treatment and outcomes are moral this does 
not necessarily mean the causes of BPD are moral. Horne’s explanation of 
BPD, drawing on Linehan (1993) is that non-moral emotional dysfunction in an 
individual is the cause of emotional overload which then leads to immoral 
behaviour. However Horne appears to concede much in arguing against 
Personality Disorder being a moral concern by admitting its treatment and 
outcomes are moral in nature, and fails to explain the cause of the underlying 
non-moral emotional dysfunction which he positions in the individual as the 
cause of immoral behaviour symptomatic of Personality Disorder. He fails to 
analyse the local moral context in which some habitual traits are problematised 
morally, instead he assumes an implicit universal agreement on “moral 
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behaviour” and does not define what he understands by “an intact moral 
character” that can express itself after treatment. Given the very high rates of 
reported experiences of childhood sexual abuse amongst those diagnosed 
with Borderline Personality disorder he also fails to address this aetiological 
issue or consider the role power-relationships may play in DBT treatment 
producing moral behaviour change. He also fails to address the feminist 
concern raised that problematic habits may be understandable reactions to 
trauma developed in order to cope with oppression. This critique is relevant for 
my empirical study in chapters 5 and 6 as this specifically uses narrative 
dialogical methods (outlined in chapter 4) to consider the range of major 
genres (including medical) within which habitual reactions to traumas are 
made sense of by individual narrators of successful recovery stories.    
 
From a different perspective analysing the moral philosophy of institutional 
practices Matravers (2011) argues the authors of DSM-5 are always 
embedded in moral dilemmas as their definitions of disorder determine which 
people with what types of mental distress receive treatment. This could include 
harm from ‘false positives’ – people receiving potentially harmful treatment that 
they do not need, and ‘false negatives’ – people in mental distress not covered 
by DSM-5 who need help to get better but which will not be paid for by systems 
of care driven by DSM’s authorised categories. Thus Matravers argues, in 
addition to DSM 5’s authors’ moral responsibilities, current and potential 
patients in mental distress have a moral claim on the textual content of DSM-
5’s diagnostic definitions because it directly affects their life chances and 
treatment options. An example of this could be war veterans successfully 
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campaigning for treatment as a social justice right by arguing for Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder to be added to DSM.  
 
Thus from different theoretical perspectives there are multiple concerns raised 
in the academic literature around DSM as an authoritative discourse 
medicalising moral issues through its definitions of mental disorder. Morality 
has been shown to be an issue not only in the pathologising of personality 
traits defining the diagnostic threshold, but moral issues also emerge around 
personality disorder in its aetiology (e.g. reactions to high levels of childhood 
sexual abuse), treatment (Charland, 2006), treatment outcomes (e.g. Horne, 
2014), overtly in professional practice (e.g. Bodner et al., 2015) and 
communicated covertly through ‘clinical judgement’ (e.g. Crowe, 2000). This 
thesis will develop these themes that run through these differing arguments, 
which are the significance of the moral context and power relationships within 
which trauma and habits reacting to trauma are conceptualised within.  
 
Building on these findings the focus of this study is the radical questioning of 
how some very troubled people in society who meet the diagnostic threshold 
for “Personality Disorder” are conceptualised and treated within psychiatric 
discursive practices and an exploration of what alternative understandings 
may be available to aid recovery from mental health crisis. 
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1.2 The theoretical approaches underpinning this thesis 
This chapter now outlines the broader philosophical and academic framework 
underpinning and guiding this enquiry, drawing and building on a number of 
established thinkers, including the work of the social psychologist Rom Harré 
(1993), the philosopher and theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1984, 1986), the 
moral philosophers Charles Taylor (1989) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) as 
well as the academic works of Erving Goffman (1990) and Kenneth Gergen 
(2009). 
 
Reflecting on Wilkins and Warner’s (2001) argument that habits pathologised 
as symptoms of personality disorder are better understood as habitual 
relational reactions to traumas, often developed to cope with oppression, 
shows how habits can be conceptualised in more than one way. However, how 
any habit is assessed will depend on the local moral order it is thought about 
within. I take a Bakhtinian dialogical theoretical lens to the concept of habits. 
Thus in this thesis when I use the term “habit” I am defining it as any repeatable 
habitual way of thinking, feeling and/or acting that can be thought about at the 
same time in more than one discourse (such as a medical or moral discourse). 
To be clear, I am not defining habits as moral or medical but by defining it 
simply as any habitual way of thinking, feeling and/or acting it allows this thesis 
to analyse how any habit is simultaneously seen as a symptom of disorder or 
thought about in a variety of different ways within different discourses, such as 
morally as a virtue or a vice, or as a ‘skill’ in a discourse around ‘competency’.  
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The philosopher and theorist Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) usefully conceptualises 
the experience of these multiple positioned voices as ‘polyphony’. I noticed 
these differently positioned voices within, and in-between, mental health 
professionals as they drew on several different narrative discourses (popular, 
professional, moral, medical, etc.) alternatively resonating and conflicting with 
each other. Bakhtin (1981) conceptualises such multiple conflicting narrative 
discourses as heteroglossia. Using a Bakhtinian conceptual lens there is a 
polyphony of voices around personality disorder which provides clues to the 
conflicting context of the social heteroglossia in contemporary culture. That 
heteroglossia has a social history that can be traced out, not only to help 
understand the present but also to anticipate possible future directions of the 
dialogical practices that continuously form and re-form around people who 
attract the diagnosis personality disorder. However the discourses drawn upon 
to make sense of people experiencing a very troubled life-journey have 
disproportionate amounts of power in relation to each other and the subject so 
the theme of power-relations between genres can be introduced through this 
Bakhtinian lens. Hodge and Bryant (2017) use a Bakhtinian feminist lens to 
highlight the difficulty of giving a voice to people with lived experience of trying 
to mask the feeling shame in reaction to trauma outside of the powerful 
dominant genre of DSM. Whilst managing a personality disorder service my 
curiosity about these conflicting genres and multiple voices took me on a 
journey into this current study.  
 
Human beings tend to form both helpful and unhelpful habits. Many habitual 
ways of thinking, feeling and/or acting (for example; violence, being reliable, 
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lack of self-control, etc.) are usually either positively or negatively valued as 
moral issues within everyday narrative discourses. Thus an effective human 
science should be able to integrate the fact that human beings are moral 
beings into its theories of being human in a social world. When viewed within 
psychiatric discourses these human habitual ways of thinking, feeling and/or 
acting become objects of medical science, reformed and re-conceptualised as 
“mental health issues”. For example, Hodge and Bryant (2017) noted women 
reporting habitual feelings of guilt and shame. Shame and guilt are moral 
problems because it relates to thoughts and feelings provoked when people 
believe they hold moral responsibility for something they have done ‘wrong’ 
within their believed in local moral order.  
 
Over the last two centuries habitual moral feelings, like guilt, around human 
habits have been worked into the diagnostic criteria for a variety of psychiatric 
disorders through the social/historical practices of psychiatry. Guilt and shame 
are now embedding within authoritative medical mental health texts such as 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: DSM-5 (2013). Thus common habitual 
ways of thinking, feeling and/or acting can be seen simultaneously within both 
popular moral discourses and professional medical discourses.  
 
This way human habits are viewed as moral and medical has not come about 
by accident but has developed over time within certain social spaces through 
a very particular social history of the relationships between discourses and 
their powerful practices. This social history of the dialogue between discourses 
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and the narratives contained within them is open to examination, but not by 
using positivist modernist techniques for looking. To do so would be to use the 
ways of looking peculiar to one participant in the polyphonic dialogue (i.e. 
modern positivist methods) which makes it difficult to see the wider dialogue 
of discourses within the heteroglossia. Burkenkotter (2001) articulates how 
genre theory drawing on Bakhtin can be a way to undertake a critical 
examination of DSM by seeing it as a meta-genre organising other medical 
genres. This DSM meta-genre can then be seen alongside other non-medical 
genres and their effect on the ‘micro-level’ individual stories of distress can be 
critically compared.  
 
As human beings we are social subjects whose habitual ways of thinking, 
feeling and/or acting are either held in high social esteem (such as working 
hard or being honest) whilst other habits are estimated negatively and 
problematised (such as lying or getting drunk). Although moral and medical 
discourses differ in conceptualising these habits as ‘morally wrong’ or 
pathologising them as ‘symptoms of a disorder’ both discourses have in 
common the process of problematising some habitual ways of thinking, feeling 
and/or acting whilst valuing others. Whilst changing through historical time 
discourses on the human subject tend to practice this dual process of both 
problematising a group of habitual ways of being in the world as excessive or 
insufficient whilst at the same time valuing different habits. For example, 
mental health professionals are trained and encouraged to be “non-
judgemental” whilst simultaneously making “clinical judgements” assessing if 
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patient are habitually impulsive, excessively guilty, intoxicated or overly 
mistrusting of others? 
  
All human beings have these habitual ways of thinking, feeling and/or acting. 
Some of these habits, in certain social contexts and at particular times in 
history, help people to function socially and ‘get on’ in their world.  Functioning 
socially may involve performing roles in society and achieving tasks like 
shopping, maintaining employment, securing accommodation, finding a 
partner, etc. Whilst some habits like listening and working hard may help 
people function socially, other habits are problematised within discourses 
because they cause people to not function well in a particular society. 
 
These two key features are related in the DSM diagnostic definition of 
personality disorder in that:  
1. The development of problematical long standing habits of thought, 
emotion and/or behaviour is linked to  
2. Not functioning well socially.  
However the social and historical context influences how all habitual ways of 
thinking, feeling and/or acting are viewed. The social context defines which 
habits attract attention and mediates the social reaction, such as whether 
people become subjects of the criminal justice system or the psychiatric 
system, put in the workhouse or sent on a rehabilitation course, etc. It is only 
the difference in time of our reading position that make some words seem 
reasonable or unreasonable, words like ‘moral insanity’ or ‘personality 
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disorder’. Kutchins and Kirk (1997) demonstrated how the historical social 
context mediates what counts as mental disorder by showing how it was only 
after a political campaign in the 1970’s that homosexuality was removed from 
the DSM.  
 
Discourses on the mad subject develop from observations of those who 
happened to be already contained and observable within mental health 
services (in the 21st century) or within mad houses (in the 18th century). Current 
discursive practices and narratives around ‘personality disorder’ have 
developed historically from discourses on the mad subject formed from 
observations of those residing in ‘mad houses’. All the inmates of mad houses 
were human beings, so there was always the risk that common problematic 
human habits might be observed and ascribed to madness rather than to 
simply being human.  
 
My curiosity about how personality disorder developed historically led me to 
reflect on my personal experiences. Prior to working delivering mental health 
services I had personal experience of severe and enduring mental distress, 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s, and personally used mental health services. In 
the 1990’s I was given various diagnoses including anxiety, psychotic 
depression, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), bi-polar affective disorder, 
substance misuse disorder and borderline personality disorder (BPD). 
Alongside these diagnosis came various discursive practices (‘treatments’) 
such as hospitalisation, psychotherapy, psychopharmacology (anti-
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psychotics, anti-depressants and mood stabilisers) and occupational therapy. 
Eventually I got better through a set of practices I found outside of the range 
of mental-health discursive practices on offer in Britain in the 1990’s. Thus both 
my professional experiences delivering mental health services and personal 
experiences being diagnosed with mental health disorders motivated my 
interest in undertaking this study.  
 
What might be called ‘very troubled’ people habitually develop a biographical 
trajectory within every society. People who function better socially also develop 
social trajectories which form their biographical stories. Attempts are usually 
made by powerful social institutions to subject those not functioning socially to 
various narratives and discursive practices such as; imprisonment, 
banishment, torture, therapy, refrigeration, physical surgery, 
psychopharmacology, submersion, electrocution and/or hospitalisation. These 
practices are embedded within socially accepted narratives which justify them, 
such as; “criminals must be rehabilitated”, “the mad must be treated”, “the sick 
must be quarantined”, etc. As history shows us, any practice can be made to 
sound reasonable by the powerful practitioners of it. It is only the different 
perspective enabled by changes in social space and time which allows it to be 
seen as unreasonable, which is an important point because Reason rules the 
modern world. Whether someone not functioning socially is electrocuted, 
operated on (lobotomised), plunged into icy water, euthanised, drugged or 
dialogued with will depend on what is currently considered reasonable and 
valued by those with relatively more power in society. What is considered 
reasonable will depend on the subject’s location and co-ordinates in (historical) 
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time and (social) space within the perpetually circulating powerfully productive 
social orders. For example, when I came under the authority of psychiatric 
practices I could have been ‘treated’ with a lobotomy if it was the 1950’s but I 
instead I was prescribed anti-psychotics (haloperidol, chlorpromazine) 
because of my time/space location living in England in the 1990’s. 
 
Although every social grouping and age has its obviously troubled members 
who do not function well in relation to that society’s norms and expectations it 
is only in relatively recent times that modern medicine and psychology have 
claimed almost monopolistic authority to do paid work on those considered to 
be a ‘thorn in the side’ of the social body, that is, society’s more troubled and 
troubling members.  
 
For the purpose of this study I reframed and re-named “Personality Disorder” 
as someone experiencing a “very troubled journey” in life because society is 
made up of numerous competing discursive practices and only some people 
during their biographical trajectory become subject to the powerful narrative 
discursive practices of psychiatry. Thus the phrase ‘very troubled journey’ 
attempts to validate the serious, life limiting and life-threatening, chronic 
distress of people who attract the label Personality Disorder without minimising 
or denying that distress. The phrase attempts to acknowledge that their 
experiences are at the more extreme end of the range of experiences of being 
human in a social world without using a diagnostic label. People living 
biographical social trajectories attracting the label personality disorder 
experience, and cause, serious distress to those people who are in 
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relationships with them. Their journeys through life often involve stays in 
institutions (such as the hospital, prison, the workhouse, etc.) In addition to 
physical morbidity, people attracting this diagnosis also experience high rates 
of premature death, both accidentally during chaotic and self-destructive 
lifestyles and sometimes deliberately through suicide. The Consensus 
Statement for People with Complex Mental health Difficulties who are 
diagnosed with a Personality Disorder (Allister et al., 2018) reviewed data 
which shows on average men diagnosed with Personality Disorder die 18 
years younger than other men, and women with the diagnosis die 19 years 
earlier than other women.  
 
The biographical trajectory of someone experiencing a very troubled journey 
through life will be affected both by their habitual ways of thinking, feeling and 
acting as well as the wider social response to them by powerful institutions 
(such as being diagnosed with a disorder, experiencing stigma, or being 
sectioned into a psychiatric hospital). The novel use of the phrase ‘very 
troubled journeys’ attempts to avoid unreflectively adopting the clinical 
language of psychiatry, the use of which, like so many modern mainstream 
discourses, limits what is thinkable by implying mental-health discursive 
practices are the only authoritative way to make sense of, and therefore, 
escape from, these extreme experiences of being chronically mentally 
distressed in relation to their social world. The concept of ‘very troubled 
journeys’ also allows space for significant social events, such as trauma and 
abuse, to be integrated into the sense-making about why someone’s 
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biographical trajectory is difficult without pathologising problems exclusively 
within the individual.  
 
Thus the subject of this study has been outlined as the very troubled subject 
whose biographical trajectory could attract a diagnosis of “personality 
disorder”. A key question being asked of that subject are; what habits of 
thought, feeling and/or actions are being problematised through which 
discourses and are these habits usefully understood as reactions to trauma? 
Consideration will be given as to whether local moral orders are influencing 
the way in which habits are problematised. The role of power-relationships will 
be considered when analysing whether moral habits are being medicalised by 
the discursive practices of psychiatry. This thesis will also explore what 
alternative genres are available to subjects for ‘making sense’ of their habits, 
and what effects different discursive practices have on people and those in 
relationship with them who have troubled biographical trajectories. 
 
However, to ask these question of that subject within the human sciences is 
challenging because it does not sit easily within the traditions of discourses 
like medical science or the relatively limited thinkable-space permitted by the 
powerful regulating authorities of mainstream psychology. Given the relatively 
narrow discursive space opened up and then regulated by the dominant 
monological discourses of psychiatry and psychology the question arises as to 
where this study can position itself within current discursive practices in order 
to take a critical perspective on the subject? Fortunately there are already 
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established positions within the human sciences from where these critical 
questions can be asked and answers begun to be worked out.  
 
1.3 Moral Selves and Moral Orders 
 
Rom Harré, in his book Social Being (1993), proposes a framework for 
understanding ways of being human in four dimensions; a relationship with our 
selves, a relationship with others, a relationship with the physical natural world 
and physical body, and people’s relationship with something “super-natural” 
(such as a relationship with a personal God or alternative spiritual beliefs). 
Harré argues as spirituality is very important to the majority of human beings 
on the planet a credible non-discriminatory human science needs to be able to 
consider relationships in this dimension as well. For Harré human psychology 
is best understood as developing within a social network of discourses and 
related practices. He argues the central task of social psychology could be 
defined as “the work of making the tacit, practical knowledge of a community 
explicit by representing it discursively.” (1993, p.14). Human identity is formed 
and reformed in relation to these networks of social relations within which the 
individual is thinking, feeling and acting, as; 
 
“The self is a location, not a substance or an attribute. The sense of self 
is the sense of being located at a point in space, of having a perspective 
in time, and of having a variety of positions in local moral orders.” (p.4) 
and ultimately, “…human beings become persons by acquiring a sense 
of self” (p. 4).   
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From this perspective power-relations are important to consider because the 
relationships where people are positioned within any social network are 
unequal in a number of respects. People are located on several axes of power 
relationships (ethnicity, age, gender, class, etc.) simultaneously. If power is 
thought about in relative and relational ways resistance to its effects is always 
possible. Harré argues human social groups tend to be hierarchical and 
therefore human relationships need to resolve issues of power relations, such 
as who is relatively dominant and who is relatively submissive. However, 
power is not just prohibitive but is also productive. Social networks are made 
up of these differing power relations which positively and negatively affect 
people’s identity. In addition to the expression of interpersonal power relations, 
Harré argues people are capable of receiving and exerting power in relation to 
nature, the supernatural and in relationship to themselves.  
 
Harré argues that the discipline of psychology ought to study how we acquire, 
maintain and practice the discursive and practical skills required to be 
effectively in each area of his four dimensional framework. This conceptual 
lens will be relevant because lack of skills leading to ineffective social 
functioning is a central concept in diagnosing a personality disorder within a 
health narrative. The repetitive nature of developing skills means they can be 
thought of as a habit, a habit that is valued socially. As habits and social 
functioning are central theme being considered in this thesis, the way Harré 
conceptualises some habits as morally valued skills which enable social 
functioning will prove analytically useful. Harré says,  
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“These skills must be learned from others and they can be employed 
more or less expertly. If to be a person consists in having and using 
such skills, people are artefacts. We are the product of all sorts of 
processes and procedures of people making. These processes and 
procedures are also the exercise of skills and so can be done well or ill. 
We can apply them to ourselves.” (Harré, 1993, p.2) 
 
Humans have general capacities to develop both helpful and unhelpful habits 
of thought, emotion and behaviour. As Harré puts it in relation to helpful habits 
or skills,  
 
“All human beings have certain generic capacities to acquire skills, 
which, though they differ in their specific forms from tribe to tribe, are 
nevertheless of the same general kind.” (Harré, 1993, p. 3) 
 
This study will consider how both unhelpful and helpful (or skilful) habits 
develop from a social psychological point of view by drawing on Harré’s idea 
of ‘local moral orders’. This analytical approach accepts that human beings 
develop as moral beings, whilst acknowledging we differ greatly as to which 
habits are valued as skills or devalued and problematised.  
 
People can practice habits that they consider morally problematic. This affect 
the relationship they have with themselves and can lead to feelings of guilt. 
This issue is particularly pertinent to personality disorder studies as people 
attracting the diagnosis are acting in ways that tend to be judged by wider 
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society as not fitting into social norms and expectations (for example, harming 
themselves, not in employment, frequent arguments in public or social 
withdrawal from the world). A vicious circle can develop where the awareness 
of public moral judgments on habitual behaviour can drive feelings of guilt and 
shame which cyclically then lead to more problematic habits. Local moral 
orders defining the limits of habitual excess and insufficiency may play a 
significant part in maintaining or escaping vicious and virtuous habitual circles 
in relation to social functioning. Harré’s argues human beings in groups form 
moral frameworks and local moral orders of the valued and devalued, including 
the promotion of role model biographies, hence, 
 
“Lives are lived according to the local patterns of exemplary 
biographies, creating moral careers, ups and downs, in reputation in the 
eyes of others.” (p. 32).  
 
Thus moral frameworks are created and maintained socially within which 
people act and hold a sense of themselves and others. However there are 
numerous conflicting moral orders in contemporary society, and people can 
always choose not to conform to the local moral order:  
 
“Human beings can distance themselves from any of the rule systems 
that underpin their culture, but only if they are prepared to pay the social 
and practical costs.” (Harré, p. 32) 
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The habitual excess and insufficiencies attracting a diagnosis of personality 
disorder do appear to exert this “social and practical cost” on people, even if 
they have formed, as Warner (2009) argues, in reaction to social injustices and 
oppression such as sexual abuse.  As not everyone agrees with the local moral 
order they develop and form a sense of identity within, “Disappointment and 
resentment encourage some to search for other icons of alternative social 
orders.” (Harré, p.32) So it is possible for the disappointed to search within 
other discourses and communities for different local moral orders to re-
orientate within, including health and illness discourses. Harré emphasises 
that the moral judgements of others play an important part in our social life and 
a powerful motivator for people in general is the respect and / or contempt that 
they may be held in by others as they try to achieve goals in public. People’s 
behaviour and achievements can be judged by others to either have failed 
(attracting contempt) or succeeded (attracting respect (see Harré, p. 28)). He 
argues people act and risk distain publically because they seek the respect or 
esteem of others in their group. Linked to this is the idea of public social 
reputation, referred to as “a public character”.  
 
The idea that local moral orders are important is highlighted in Hodge and 
Bryant’s (2017) argument that medicalising socially caused habitual distress 
as individual pathology erases its moral status as a response to social injustice. 
Additionally Crowe’s (2000) argument supports the significance of local moral 
orders by showing how mental health professionals’ moral values are factors 
in the diagnosis of disorders through the exercise ‘clinical judgement’ in 
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diagnostic practice, particularly their moral judgements on where to draw a line 
between moderation and excess.  
 
Ervin Goffman (1990) calls the acquiring of character, in small incremental 
steps, a “moral career”. Public character can be lost as well as gained. When 
considering whether habits are esteemed and encouraged or problematised 
and discouraged this study will make use of Goffman’s concepts of public 
character and moral careers in addition to Harré’s concept of local moral 
orders. I will consider the local moral orders the authors of DSM draw upon as 
a professional class when developing their authoritative texts.  
 
This study will build on Rom Harré’s position, citing Goffman’s work (1990), by 
focusing on the practice of discursive skills which people use to relate with 
others in joint activities to create the ‘dramas of character’ of their everyday life 
(Goffman, 1990, p.24-25). People build both skilful and unhelpful habits as 
they engage in joint problem solving and so create these ‘dramas of character’. 
Conflict and cooperation are common types of social activity associated with 
problem solving as many problems necessitate negotiating and working with 
others towards mutually acceptable solutions in the pursuit of shared and 
agreed goals.  
 
The question of creating, re-forming and maintaining identity is of central 
importance to this study because human beings are more than the set of skills 
and problematic habits they have developed. People hold ongoing core beliefs 
about themselves and others in relation to being part of wider groups. 
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Belonging to a group can be called social functioning as it is achieved by 
performing a role in the dynamic life of the group, such as in a family, 
community group or an employing organisation.  
 
1.4 Ontology and Epistemology 
 
Every discourse on the human subject is shaped by its authors’ beliefs about 
ontology and epistemology: ‘Ontology’ refers to the basic assumptions being 
made about what it is to be a human being, whilst ‘epistemology’ refers to the 
fundamental ways in which truth claims are being produced and accepted 
within a discourse (Smith, 2007). The human sciences and some discursive 
practices outside of the human sciences take as the object of their knowledge 
“human beings”. Thus human beings hold a double position simultaneously 
being both the producers of and the subject of discourses on ‘being a human’. 
This is problematical because we are what we are also observing (human 
beings) which unavoidably affects our observations in ways that examining a 
non-human subject (like a rock) would not.  
 
The human sciences often silently imply, whilst not making explicit, their 
underlying assumptions about what it is to be human and what capacities they 
assume humans have (called ontological assumptions). Within human 
sciences such as psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis there are lots of 
different conflicting and competing ontologies. Confusion often breaks out 
because these ontological assumptions are not made plain to the reader. As 
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Rom Harré points out, many differing ontologies compete within academic 
psychology:  
 
“As editor of an encyclopaedia of psychology I have been very much 
aware of the multiplicity of ontologies that are alive amongst 
practitioners, long after their weaknesses have been exposed.” (Harré, 
p. 13). 
 
Therefore this study will question the implicit underlying ontological 
assumptions within any given discursive practice and attempt to bring to light 
unarticulated ontology. This study’s ontological assumptions include believing 
human beings are moral beings capable of forming habits of thought, emotion 
and/or behaviour and that whether these habits are valued as skills or 
problematised and pathologised will depend on the local moral order an 
individual is situated within. Ontologically people tend to orientate towards a 
future ideal self which can motivate them to practice both problematic and 
skilful habits. People are in relationship with others who are in a similar 
ontological position, and so people in groups may help or hinder each other on 
their quests to solve problems and achieve social goals. Although the pursuit 
of social goals partly involves the exercise of will-power, Bakhtin usefully points 
out that ‘our will’ travels through zones where it is modified by being subject to 
the power of ‘other’s will’ (Bakhtin, 1986). 
 
This study will also ask questions about the epistemological assumptions of 
discursive practices on the human subject. That is to ask what the grounds 
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and processes are on which a discourse claims to produce the “truth” about its 
subject. Epistemology is important because a truth claim is related to the 
authority a discourse claims to promote and justify its practices. A common 
modern truth claim is “scientific research evidences this is the most effective 
treatment”, for example, Rosen et al (2007) use this format to argue Assertive 
Community Treatment (ACT) is an effective approach in psychiatric treatment 
of severe mental illness. However more broadly in the history of psychiatry 
such statements could make surgical solutions, such as lobotomies, sound 
very reasonable ‘evidence based’ solutions to serious mental health problems 
without the epistemology of the truth production being rigorously investigated. 
 
Epistemological questions consider how any “knowledge” of the human 
subject has been acquired and constructed. What are the grounds for believing 
a particular discourse is true? Our social identity is temporal and spacial and 
so the coordinates our location affects what we are likely to believe as true 
and, in turn, these issues raise historically contingent epistemological and 
ontological considerations. As Kutchins and Kirk (1997) found, it was not the 
dispassionate internal epistemological workings of DSM’s ‘scientific’ approach 
to discovering disorders that removed homosexuality from DSM but an 
external political campaign by those who believed it was not true. The 
campaign attracted press coverage in the media which risked the public social 
reputation of the APA and the psychiatric establishment, which may suggest 
Goffman’s concepts of the rise and fall of public social reputation and moral 
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careers may be applicable to organisations and institutions such as the 
psychiatric establishment as well as to individuals. 
 
Part of the task of social psychology is to uncover ontological and 
epistemological illusions and by so doing reveal the unstable ground some 
influential authoritative discourses, such as DSM, have been built on. Although 
histories of the concept of personality disorder exist (e.g. Livesley and 
Larstone, Ch. 1, 2018) there appear to be gaps in the academic literature 
around a detailed historical tracing of the concept which consistently consider 
the moral context, including the moral journeys of individuals and the non-
medical moral context of the early 19th century. This study will seek to trace 
back the historical contingency of discursive practices relating to subjects who 
experience very troubled journeys through life by examining the ontology and 
epistemology of authoritative discourses.  
 
Our identities develop in the dialogue of different regimes of narrative 
discursive practices. My chapter 2 will place discourses on personality disorder 
within a historical process of development and in so doing reveal how 
historically contingent some assumptions are about people whose mix of skills 
and problematic habits does not enable them to function well within a particular 
society. To historicise something assumed not to have a history can be one 
way to effectively question its authority over the subject. Discursive practices 
of power producing humans will not be examined in isolation. Consideration 
will be given to the variety of containers and maintainers of these discursive 
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practices, such as professional regulatory organisations. From this overall 
context my empirical study in chapters 5 and 6 will use dialogical narrative 
methods (chapter 4) to analyse micro-level small scale individual narratives of 
successful recovery stories. 
 
This enquiry would assume that there is no “free subject”, living in a vacuum 
away from language, power relations, other people and their physical body. 
That is to say there is no social identity free from being subject to particular 
discourses and practices of the self. To have an identity with a subjective 
position is literally to subject oneself to (and within) a narrative discourse, or 
more often to be subject to a hybrid combination of several competing 
discourses. Narrative discursive practices are powerfully productive of 
subjectivity. The primary vehicle for becoming the subject of a discourse is by 
believing it. People can only free themselves from the subjectivity of a 
discourse by stopping believing in it. However, people cannot believe in 
nothing. People need to become the subject of an alternative discourse and 
practice in order to free themselves from a kind of subjectivity that they do not 
like. Kuhn (1962) refers to this as particular kinds of scientific epistemology will 
not be given up in a vacuum – they need an alternative paradigm to believe in 
prior to abandoning attachments to a particular epistemology. To free 
ourselves from what we currently think we need to dialogue with our other. 
  
Thus reviewing the academic literature and linking emerging themes to the 
analytical approaches of Harré, Goffman and Bakhtin, it would seem 
reasonable to undertake this study exploring how the habits of those 
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experiencing very troubled life-journeys may be linked to social factors, such 
as reacting to trauma, and how the moral context and power-relations of 
different discourses influence these experiences.   After setting the scene for 
the interplay of morality and psychiatric science in chapters 2 and 3, I will look 
at how these issues emerge in small stories, albeit in a different form, namely 
an individual account of someone diagnosed with personality disorder and 
other individual “small story” narrative accounts of recovery from mental health 
crisis. This would include an examining the crucial relationship between 
forming (and reforming) habits and how these relate levels of social 
functioning. I plan to examine through narrative analysis my own account of 
being diagnosed with personality disorder and supplement the data set to be 
analysed with contemporary diary entries from the 1990’s and my psychiatric 
medical notes obtained under the data protection act. 
 
Expert by experience social activism has gained significant momentum in 
recent years influencing the current debates around the diagnosis of 
“Personality Disorder”. There are a diverse range of views within the experts 
by experience social activists, from those campaigning for the disorder to be 
abolished, those wanting it renamed to reflect personality difficulties 
associated with complex trauma and those wanting to keep the label but 
improve the quality of mental health services offered.  Their influence is 
evidenced by the publication of The Consensus Statement for People with 
Complex Mental health Difficulties who are diagnosed with a Personality 
Disorder (Allister, et. al., 2018). This is a consensus statement agreed between 
experts by experience and mental health professionals. Whilst acknowledging 
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a range of views exist, and that access to services is currently dependant on 
getting the label, their agreed consensus statement included that people 
diagnosed are likely to have experienced system failures in addition to past 
trauma and “The label of Personality Disorder is controversial and needs to 
change” (p. 4). I am a member (in a professional capacity and not as an expert 
by experience) of the Personality Disorder Strategic group for the mental 
health trust in the North East of England (NTW). Further evidence of expert by 
experience campaigning influencing current debates was that the group 
meeting on 14/02/2018 discussed (and agreed) whether to change its name to 
be more inclusive, in the light of concerns raised about the label, to “The 
Personality Difficulties associated with Complex Trauma (PACT) strategic 
group”.  
 
From a philosophical perspective MacIntyre (1981) argues that the human 
being in society cannot be understood without consideration of the morality of 
social issues. He argues in favor of local communities having shared moral 
values where members engage in practices towards shared valued goals. He 
sees the need for local communities to defend themselves against the big 
institutions of the Enlightenment, such as capitalism, which he sees as lacking 
any meaningful historically routed moral framework (MacIntyre, 1981). Another 
philosopher, Charles Taylor views ways of being human as inescapably 
embodied within moral narrated worlds. As moral beings we have strong 
evaluations (moral views) of what are fair and just ways to be treated and to 
treat others (Taylor, 1989). The high rates of moral judgements by medical 
professional towards people diagnosed with personality disorder found in 
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studies would support this assertion that despite a professional role human 
beings are moral beings who habitually make strong evaluations of each other 
(e.g. Sansone and Sansone (2013), Bodner et al. (2015)).  
 
For Bakhtin, a number of conflicting narrative discourses exist in society called 
‘heteroglossia’. Psychiatry is a modern example of a monological discourse 
that tries to silence the polyphony of alternative discourses around it, the less 
powerful voices that can offer different interpretations and meanings. 
Dialogization is a process where awareness is raised of the competing 
discourses available in society for defining meaning. This process shows 
monological discourses, such as psychiatry, to be relative, contingent and 
lacking in the ‘absolute’ authority it claims over human beings. This process 
makes resistance to monological discourses easier through practicing some 
alternative discursive practices from the polyphony of discourses surrounding 
a monological discourse. Micro-level resistances are always possible, such as 
individual journaling in a diary their experience of being in a psychiatric hospital 
which may be different from the professional justification for placing them 
there. Bakhtin’s dialogue is relevant to personality disorder as it is 
predominantly conceptualised within the monological medical model genre 
(DSM 5, 2013). Micro-level resistances to medical discourses through 
alternative genres may be expressed in individual narrative accounts as 
people may draw on a polyphony of genres to make sense of extreme life 
experiences. 
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Bakhtin describes a dialogical world where final meaning is never reached but 
multiple readings and interpretations increase and are therefore 
epistemologically meaning is ultimately always “unfinalisable”. Discursive 
practices like medical-science (e.g. DSM 5) that produced general categories 
such as “personality disorder” to fit people into would be seen dialogically as 
an “authoritative discourse”. That means a privileged, powerful discourse that 
does not allow any play with its wider frame, which holds great power over its 
subjects. Authoritative discourses are contrasted by Bakhtin to ‘internally 
persuasive discourse’ where we retell a text in our own accent and make subtle 
changes. Becoming “conscious” for Bakhtin is a constant struggle between 
these two: authoritative and internally persuasive discourses. We free 
ourselves from, or assimilate into ourselves authoritative discourses into 
internally persuasive ones by believing or disbelieving them as we find 
credible, trustworthy, believable stories to orientate ourselves within (Bakhtin, 
1981, p. 424).   
 
The sense of time/space we are in can be unconscious and then be brought 
to our attention through some processes. Our social identity has co-ordinates 
in time and space (social history) from which we dialogue with others (who 
have their own co-ordinates of existence) and the relationship between these 
co-ordinates can be analysed, as long as we hold in mind that both coordinates 
are moving relative to each other through space and time through their 
biographical trajectories. We analyse the trajectory of someone’s time/space 
coordinates from our own trajectory.  
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Considering the representations of time and space in a narrative accounts is 
helpful because ways of perceiving the world have both general elements 
(such as a common plot (for example, a quest to escape to a better place)) 
and elements unique to a person’s location in time/space (e.g. wanting to 
escape from a psychiatric hospital in the 1990’s, or from a prisoner of war camp 
in the 1940’s). The teasing out of this general / specific relationship of 
emplotted time/space through narrative methods allows for insight. This study 
will make use of such Bakhtinian analytic concepts at both the macro-level (the 
relationship of mental-health genres to other genres) and at the micro-level 
when analysing the emplotted narratives individuals orientate within in order to 
get better from severe mental distress.  
 
The dialogue can be analysed between the actual chronology of events and 
their distortion into a typical plot or genre (e.g. an adventure novel of everyday 
life, a scientist discovering a truth). For example Burkenkotter (2001) drew on 
Bakhtinian analytic concepts to examine the DSM text as a professional genre 
that reprocesses individual narratives into a coded nosology of disorder. The 
distortion of actual sequence of events into an emplotted story is for the 
purpose of communicating something of value to others, such as a diagnostic 
moment within a health narrative. This can illuminate social forces at work 
because the desire to tell the story (and to ‘read’ the story in a particular way) 
within pre-existing conventional plots or genres is socially and historically 
conditioned. Too much uniqueness in a story and the narrative risks not being 
understood, but too much conventional plot risks sounding formulaic and 
“made up”. Thus in narrative accounts there is always “...a constant dialogue 
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between uniqueness and generality” (ibid, p. 146). Literary devices like plot 
and metaphor allow narrative meaning to be communicated and the genre, or 
relatively stable and general set of expectations, shapes what can be said and 
understood.  
 
Conclusion  
This introductory chapter has outlined the philosophical and academic 
framework for this enquiry. Ontologically I am taking up a position against 
positivism, amongst the moral philosophers MacIntyre and Taylor and the 
social psychologist Rom Harré, by considering human social beings to be 
moral beings that attribute strong evaluations to the habits of thinking, feeling 
and behaving formed in relation to each other in society. From a macro 
perspective a dialogical analysis will be undertaken of the key text that 
introduced difficulties in interpersonal relationships and regulating emotions 
into the medical literature defining madness, namely Prichard’s (1835) Treatise 
on Insanity which expanded the definition of madness significantly by 
introducing the novel diagnosis of “Moral Insanity”. Chapter 2 addresses the 
research question ‘what is the historical evolution of medical and moral 
categories of personality disorder?’ Chapter 3 then addresses the research 
question ‘how do the moral and medical categories of personality disorder 
currently interact?’ and identifies any gaps in the academic literature. In 
chapter 4 I then turn from these macro level historical concerns to outline a 
dialogical narrative methodology which will be used to investigate the two key 
research questions that have emerge from my enquiry through chapters 2 and 
3, namely; 
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1. How do the medical and the personal narratives of "Personality Disorder" 
interact in lived experience? and,  
2. What narratives aid recovery in troubled journeys involving mental health 
crisis? - with an interest in contrasting how medical and non-medical genres 
might be used in recovery narratives. 
  
From a micro-perspective of ‘small stories’ this thesis will undertake, in chapter 
5, a narrative analysis of my own psychiatric medical notes triangulated with 
my contemporary diary entries from the time and an account recalling that 
period of time a decade later. Chapter 6 then analyses other narrative accounts 
from ‘experts by experience’ of mental health crisis and successful recovery. 
Key themes will be considered, which have been drawn from reviewing the 
academic literature, specifically habits of thinking, emotion and/or behavior, 
the role of trauma, power-relations and the dialogical moral context within 
which sense is being made of the habits of people experiencing very troubled 
life-journeys.    
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Chapter 2 
 
The Historical transformation of moral habits into madness: 
from Pritchard to the DSM 
 
“History is written by the victors” 
(Attributed to Winston Churchill, 1945) 
 
In this quotation attributed to Winston Churchill at the end of the Second World 
War he was referring to who would write the future histories of that conflict. 
When it comes to the histories of systems of thought and their epistemic battles 
it would perhaps be more accurate to say, “History is written within the 
epistemology of the victors”.  
 
Introduction: 
This chapter answers the research question ‘what is the historical evolution of 
medical and moral categories of personality disorder?’ by examining how, 
historically, everyday moral issues of excess and insufficiency became 
embedded within the mental health diagnostic criteria for personality disorders 
within the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM I (1952) to DSM 5 (2013)) in order to trace the origins of 
Personality Disorder.  In contrast to other critics of the DSM, such as Szasz 
(1970), I am doing this via a tour through pre-DSM history. The role of morality 
will also be examined in the treatment of madness by examining Moral 
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Treatment, the reform movement and The Retreat at York as social 
movements around madness originating outside of medical science at the 
beginning of the 19th century, which were subsequently taken over by scientific 
medicine during their incremental monopolisation of the mad subject. The 
professionalization process is examined as a process for de-legitimising non-
medical voices speaking on the mad subject as the medical model legitimises 
the emerging profession of psychiatry and symbiotically psychiatry legitimises 
the medical model. The history of the rise of scientific approaches to madness 
can be traced through medieval, renaissance, classical and modern historical 
time periods. Increasingly over the last 200 years madness has been seen in 
the remote context of professionalised medicine which creates its own 
nomenclature and new categories of madness. In this historical context 
Prichard’s (1835) influential text, which originated the diagnosis of Moral 
Insanity, will be dialogically examined using Bakhtin’s concept of inter-
illumination, by considering its inter-textual contact with an anti-modern text 
(Hancock, 1824). This will demonstrate the origins of Personality Disorder lay 
in the diagnosis of “Moral Insanity”, with its habitual moral excesses, whose 
origins lay outside medical science within modernity’s other of religious and 
ethical discourses. 
 
2.1 The History of the Rise of Scientific Approaches to Madness 
 
Legitimised definitions of madness and what counts as treatments are 
constantly shifting within the wider power relations of relatively stable, but 
competing, sets of ideas at play within each transforming historical period. 
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Whilst I am focussing on diagnostic practices, it is worth noting that whilst 
diagnosis and treatments are separate practices there is a reciprocal inter-
relationship between the two, as the content of any currently accepted 
diagnosis of disorder will affect the range of ideas around what treatments will 
restore order. A number of writers, such as (Porter 2002) Foucault (2006) and 
Scull (1991, 1993) have articulated how differing historical periods influence 
the complex ways in which madness is thought about and treated. Scull shows 
that in the middle ages the mad were mostly a domestic responsibility 
supported in local communities and helped by a wide variety of people 
including astrologers, folk medicine, clerics, medics and apothecaries (Scull, 
1993). Porter claims the medieval mad were kept mainly within the family 
home, although often shameful to the family and occasionally restrained within 
the attic, cellar or outhouses (Porter, 2002). Foucault (2006) argues that since 
these medieval times there are broadly three historic periods in Europe which 
produce differing conceptualisations of madness and its relationship to 
Reason. These are; the Renaissance, the Classical Age and Modernity.  
 
Foucault argues that up until the early 1600’s in the Renaissance madness 
was predominantly thought about as a kind of foolishness, or lack of wisdom. 
Here the literary figure of the fool influenced thinking about madness. The 
‘mad/fool’ had what Bakhtin (1981) would call a dialogical relationship with 
Reason in literature where they become a kind of mirror of, or reflection on, 
what counts as Reason (Bakhtin, 1981: 379). For Foucault, writers in this 
period presented the mad/fool as having a relationship with Reason where the 
person experiencing madness can have value by revealing the truth through 
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their madness. The specific details of their madness can lead someone on a 
journey where they eventually return to Reason;  
 
“……in the literature of the early 17th century its [madness’s] preferred 
place is median, forming the core of the action rather than an ending, 
and is an adventure rather than the ultimate immanence. Displaced in 
the structures of novels and plays, it now allows both a manifestation of 
truth and a calm return to reason.”  
(Foucault, 2006, p. 36) 
 
Foucault argues that thinking about madness shifts from the early 17th century 
period to the end of the 18th century, during the Classical Age, to be defined 
less as a mirror to reflect on Reason, and more as a separate, distinct threat 
to reason, as unreason. However, in the 18th century the predominant world 
view remained that, “…a madman was not sick.” (Foucault, 2006, p. 146).  
 
The philosopher Descartes had argued the only thing we can know for certain 
is that we think, and therefore reliable knowledge is achieved only through 
rational activity. This philosophical position has had numerous critics (Husserl 
1970: 75-84). However, despite his critics, Descartes influenced the dialogical 
context by increasing the social valuing of the realm of Reason which meant 
madness was more and more defined and devalued in opposition to the 
ascending Reason, as “unreason”, without value. The mad became perceived 
as social outcasts alongside other undesirable groups thought to be a threat 
to the industrial growth of the well-functioning capitalist/industrial city. Those 
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who could not govern themselves well enough to function socially in an 
increasingly capitalist urban society (the idle, disabled, poor, criminals and the 
mad) were now seen through a particular lens as needing to be put in well 
governed institutions for the health of society. Consequently this period saw 
the growth in prisons, workhouses and asylums. Thus the mad increasingly 
become confined in institutions rather than a domestic responsibility. 
 
According to Foucault around the end of the 18th century another historical shift 
occurs, into Modernity, where madness becomes increasingly the exclusive 
object of science and medicine and is redefined monopolistically as an illness 
or disease. This shift in the definition of madness was associated with a wider 
shift in Western societies known as the Enlightenment. Religious, spiritual and 
supernatural understandings reduced in influence as the power rose of 
scientific, secular and materialistic explanations based on a way of looking 
involving what could be observed physically, speculated about (hypothesised) 
and measured scientifically.   
 
Descartes and Newton had influenced this shift in world views from the 
supernatural immaterial to the material, measurable and observable. Cartesian 
dualism grew in influence as the idea, originating from Descartes, that creation 
is divided into mind (including rational thoughts) and matter (including the 
physical body) became widely accepted. Descartes said the mind was 
connected to the body via the mid-brain pineal gland (Porter, 2002: 57-8). 
Consequently from a Cartesian dualism perspective madness was a problem 
originating physically, from within the body (matter), like any other physical 
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illness, an idea that can be traced through to contemporary discourses of bio-
psychiatry (Insel, 2013). This philosophical dualism (mind/body) underpinned 
the broader movement of medicine separating from the Religious institutions 
of the Church and forming its own professional identity. Foucault argues the 
materialist knowledge produced by science and medicine that locates 
madness in the physical body, succeeds in silencing the mad and positioning 
them in the social space lepers used to hold in society, as potentially 
contagious outcasts, to be feared as a threat, and not to be tolerated within 
free society. 
  
Medics began to use their scientific reason to conclude that the mad were to 
be treated as unreasoning animals. Because their madness originated in their 
physical body there was no value in reasoning with them, nor was there any 
value in giving them a voice in a dialogue. This historical period, developing 
from the late 18th century onwards, sees the emergence of, and rise to power, 
of psychiatry as the dominant way to think about madness. During the modern 
era medicine and science produce knowledge and sets of practices which 
created and defined the mad subject. In addition to creating a modern 
profession they produced scientific/technological treatments (physical, 
chemical, electrical, mechanical, etc.) and built social institutions such as 
asylums.  
 
Foucault refers to this period of incarcerating the mad as the great confinement 
of Western Europe. Bakhtin would describe the way psychiatry comes to 
dominate our thinking about madness as a monological discourse (Bakhtin, 
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1981) because it claims monopolistic authority to author its subject of the mad 
person. However, Bakhtin argues alternative, less powerful, voices are always 
present in the polyphony of the wider culture in resistance to a monological 
discourse’s attempt to totally define its human object to form it as its subject. 
In relation to the rise of psychiatry, alternative voices with the potential to resist 
and critique psychiatry within the wider dialogical context include service-user 
perspectives, philosophical, religious, and self-help discursive practices. Peter 
Good’s work examines psychiatry through a Bakhtinian lens and observes 
psychiatry as a powerful monological, unitary language which, in defence of 
power over its subject, views diverse alternative language genres surrounding 
it as irritants who must be kept at a distance and whose power to influence 
must be severely limited (Good, 2001). An example of the medical model genre 
distancing, disempowering and delegitimising alternative discourses can be 
seen in the medical profession’s response to Moral Treatment.  
 
2.2 Moral Treatment of the mad: The Reform movement and The Retreat at 
York 
 
At the end of the 1700’s a reform movement around madness started led by 
Philippe Pinel in France and Samuel Tuke in England. Samuel Tuke was part 
of a Quaker Christian community in York which had been traumatised by the 
death of a young woman in the local lunatic asylum in York who had been one 
of their congregation (Tuke, 1813). The treatment of the mad was thought to 
be barbaric in the asylum and her family had been refused access to visit her 
shortly before her death. The Retreat and Moral Treatment is seen as a turning 
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point in reforming treatment of the mentally ill because it offered an alternative, 
more humane model of treatment than the traditional one of beating and 
shackling the mad (e.g. Shotter, 1993, Scull, 1993, Porter, 2002). It was also 
seen as significant in the moral context of the time because it was an amateur, 
Christian, non-medical approach which opposed the growing centripetal forces 
of the modern Enlightenment movement towards increasing 
professionalization, secularism and scientific management of social groups 
deemed to be problematic to society. There was interest in Moral Treatment in 
the early 19th century because ‘judicious kindnesses’ claimed to produce better 
results in terms of recovery than the traditional medical physical treatments 
such as; ice-baths, rotating, and bleeding (Tuke, 1813, p. 190 – p. 212). 
 
The treatment involved maximising the comfort of patients and focussed on 
the moral habits that the staff demonstrated towards the patients, such as staff 
treating patients with kindness, compassion and building up the patient’s self-
esteem. It also involved providing them with occupational activity such as 
gardening and, controversially, not using corporal punishment or chains, which 
was the standard approach in private asylums. This combination of techniques 
became known as “Moral Treatment” and was central to the reform movement 
around madness. The perceived relatively good outcomes of Moral Treatment 
in terms of recovery rates (Tuke, 1813) was a challenge to medical ideas of 
madness as a biological/physical illness, because, if madness had a biological 
cause it ought not to respond at all to moral treatments of compassion, 
kindness and comfort and ought to respond to physical treatments, such as 
bleeding, operations, psychopharmacology, etc.  
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The relative success of Moral Treatment can be partly understood by 
considering it in the light of Rom Harré’s (1993) concept of local moral orders. 
The staff deliberately used the esteem of self and others within “the family” of 
The Retreat to increase people’s self-control. Thus, mindful of their moral 
career within the Retreat, patients come to feel valued and want to be valued 
as members of the community. For example, Tuke says, 
 
"I can truly declare, that by gentleness of manner, and kindness of 
treatment, I have seldom failed to obtain the confidence, and conciliate 
the esteem, of insane persons; and have succeeded by these means.” 
(Tuke, 1813). 
 
Contemporary writers on the history of madness agree it did appear to have 
better recovery rates in terms of rates of discharge (e.g. Scull, p. 102-108). 
However whereas Porter (2002), Scull (1993) and Shotter (1993) saw Moral 
Treatment in a relatively positive light of humanitarian reform away from 
brutalizing physical treatments, Foucault (2006) differs by being very critical of 
Moral Treatment, referring to it as, “...that gigantic moral imprisonment that 
became known, ironically perhaps, as Pinel and Tuke’s liberation of the mad.” 
(Foucault, 2006, p. 515). 
 
Foucault is very critical of Moral Treatment and the claim that The Retreat was 
part of a positive reforming movement around treatment of the mad. He argues 
the fear of physical corporal punishment is merely replaced by fear of being 
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judged through a moral discourse in Moral Treatment. Additionally the idea of 
giving patients occupational activities Foucault criticises as positioning patients 
in a system of responsibilities around promoting the work ethic in a time of the 
rise of industrial capitalism. Foucault also criticises the recreation of a family 
structure in the community at The Retreat where pastoral paternalistic power 
is exercised over patients through the way they will be judged by staff in a 
system of rewards and punishments. For Foucault power over the mad did 
transform through Moral Treatment, but in a sinister and oppressive way from 
a treatment relationship based on violence to a treatment relationship based 
on discipline, involving the work ethic, fear of being judged and the ‘gaze’ of 
the staff (Foucault, 2006). Although born in the non-medical, local and amateur 
context of The Retreat, Foucault argues these techniques of disciplinary power 
were quickly adopted by medics involved in the Enlightenment project and 
incorporated into public asylums during the 19th century as the twin disciplinary 
techniques of surveillance and judgement.  
 
A more nuanced reading of Tuke’s Moral Treatment than Foucault’s can be 
found from Bracken and Thomas’s study, “Postpsychiatry” (2005): 
 
"…if the care of mad people had remained a moral issue, the disasters 
of the asylum era may well have been avoided. With the ethics of care 
to the fore, attention is focussed on the behaviour of the care givers and 
the sort of environments constructed by them. With medical logic in 
ascendance, these move to the background and only the disturbed 
behaviour of the patient is visible…We continue to believe we have 
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much to learn from the tea merchants of York…Foucault is overly 
negative in his writings about the Tukes.” 
(Bracken & Thomas, 2005, p. 189) 
 
Post-psychiatrists such as Thomas and Bracken (2005) have argued that 
Foucault is excessively and unfairly critical of the moral treatment reformers 
because Moral Treatment did shift practices away from focusing on the 
physical body to focus on practices aimed at changing the non-physical; 
thinking, emotions, desires, passions and will of the mad - their character or 
personality traits. However, practices against the physical body of the mental 
health patient constantly re-emerge and resurface as treatment options 
throughout the history of psychiatry, right up to the present day, such as 
psycho-surgery, electro therapy and psycho-pharmacological treatments.  
 
For Foucault, during the 19th century, as the modern era developed, the 
medical science of madness grew in power over its subjects, partly in a 
symbiotic relationship with the growth in asylums to incarcerate the mad. 
Pragmatically incarceration in asylums allowed increasing observation of the 
mad enabling the generation of scientific knowledge and practices on a captive 
audience of asylum inpatients. In addition to separating out the mad as a 
distinct category from other problematised populations (such as the poor, 
disabled, criminals etc.) modern medical science increasingly judged and 
divided madness into a range of sub-categories of madness, creating new 
diagnoses for patients to be given and organised by under the medical gaze. 
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Thus the genre of medical science increasingly monopolised the mad 
business, or the ‘trade in lunacy’ as it was called in the 19th century. 
 
The reform movement eventually led to the Lunatics Act of 1845, which 
decreed Asylums were to be erected throughout England. The model for this 
was The Retreat and Moral Treatment, which was perceived to be more 
successful in producing recovery and less brutal than privately run ‘mad-
houses’ (Scull, 1993: 148). However The Retreat was a small scale, amateur, 
local church outreach in York with high staff to patient ratios, low numbers of 
patients, artist rooms, galleries, music rooms and gardens. All of these were 
seen as unnecessary expenses when the State came to reproducing Asylums 
on an industrial scale to accommodate mainly poor lunatics. Instead of 
reproducing the experience at the Retreat, asylums were built for large 
numbers of patients with poor accommodation and were more like prisons, but 
run by professional medics (Scull, 1993: 67). Once Moral Treatment had been 
medicalised and began objectifying patients as mentally ill, its ability to 
produce recovery and cures dramatically declined and the modern experiment 
in producing large scale asylums led to them filling up with patients who did 
not get better and recover, resulting in what Bracken and Thomas called “…the 
disasters of the asylum era” (2005, p. 189). 
 
The increasing numbers of private and state asylums put the medics who 
managed them in a powerful position to define and monopolise the growing 
economic market for dealing with the mad. Turner (1995) argues professional 
groups such as psychiatry developed in such a context where the medics who 
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managed asylums claimed specialist technical knowledge over their subject, 
the ‘mad’. The claim to specialist technical knowledge built the social status of 
these medics and was used in the professionalization process to exclude non-
medics from having authority to speak on the subject. Through this 
professionalization process psychiatry was born as a professional body where 
the medical model genre legitimises psychiatrists and reciprocally psychiatrists 
legitimise the medical model (Turner, 1995). 
  
However, in terms of monopolising the mad business an obvious difficulty to 
overcome was the perceived success of Moral Treatment as it had been 
developed and delivered by non-medics as a common sense application of 
judicious kindness and building self-esteem. To monopolise madness as an 
economic business medics needed to eliminate the non-medical competition 
and build public confidence and trust in them as professionals, to such a point 
where the general public would consider it common sense to think that only 
psychiatrists ought to deal with madness, because everyone else, including 
relatives and friends, lacked the skills to do so (Scull, 1993: p 186). 
  
However at the start of the 19th century many influential public figures and 
politicians had concluded medicine had little to offer in the treatment of the 
mad (Scull, 1993: 194-6). Having initially dismissed Moral Treatment as 
amateur, the medical profession changed its strategy to claim authority and 
monopoly over administering and regulating the techniques of moral treatment 
amongst a wider range of medical physical treatments for madness (Scull, 
1993: 260). The medical profession then influenced changes in legislation to 
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say medics had to be in charge of every asylum and in addition each asylum 
had now to be offering ‘medical treatments’ (Scull, 1993: p. 229-231). Thus the 
professional power of psychiatrists over their patients grew stronger as they 
increased their production of specialist technical knowledge, including novel 
nosologies.  
 
As the problem of madness became thought about as physical or moral 
disorder the goal of treatment became restoring physical and moral order to 
the patient. This raises a question about definition, about whether this would 
be a modern moral order, defined by medics and ruled by reason. For example, 
Robert Castel (in Cohen and Scull, 1983) quotes Dr. Girard, a leading mid 19th 
century expert on madness declaring, 
 
“The most salient feature of madness being physical and moral 
disorder....the most uniform therapeutic tendency must be the re-
establishment of order in the exercise of the functions and in that of the 
faculties.” (p.253). 
 
Having reviewed the literature Robert Castel argues that the moral treatment 
movement in its discursive practices had set itself a clear goal, to restructure 
personality to cure mental illness. Their stated aim was, “...to annul the 
disorder of mental illness through a restructuring of the personality of the 
insane.” (in Cohen and Scull, 1983: p. 254). 
 
By 1862 Mr. Delasiauve writing of moral treatment methods says, 
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“If you wish to reduce the number of lunatics, to supply them if need be 
with arms against their blind instincts, pay attention to the formation of 
their morals, the tempering of their characters.” (Quoted by Castel, in 
Cohen and Scull, 1983: 255). 
 
Thus by the second half of the 19th century the social context had shifted to a 
general acceptance that identifying and treating people’s madness on behalf 
of the State was the legitimate business of medical science, and the goal of 
treatments became the restructuring of personality into a new moral order 
where reason would rule over disorders of excess and insufficiency. Reflecting 
the modern times this assumed reason to be very powerful.  
 
Bakhtin’s concept of understanding something “in a remote context” is useful 
here (Bakhtin, Ch. 6, 1986) as the experiences of patients considered mad are 
re-contextualised by medics claiming expertise in an increasingly remote 
context of professional medical technical terminology, where medics are 
perceived to be in possession of knowledge of disorders the patient is not 
expected to understand, and consequently ill equipped to resist. The growth of 
a specialist nomenclature of madness outside the patient’s language genre of 
ordinary life would increase the dialogical imbalance of power relations 
between professional and patient, when discussing their difficulties. 
  
Evidence exists (e.g. Digby, 1985) that by the 1850’s medical science had 
reversed its initial opposition to Moral Treatment and began to claim it as its 
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own, stating now only professional medics, not amateurs, could administer this 
“moral treatment”.  For example, the first edition of the Asylum Journal, stated, 
“The moral system of treatment can only be properly carried out by the 
continuous assistance of a physician.” (Asylum Journal, 1853, quoted in Digby, 
1985, p. 113). Modern medical science’s reversing its initial rejection of Moral 
Treatment in order to claim monopolistic medical power and rights to practice 
it appears to support Good’s (2001) Bakhtinian assertion that monological 
discourses will defend power over its subject by distancing and disempowering 
alternative language genres surrounding it. As the medical science of madness 
became increasingly concerned throughout the 19th century with the 
restructuring of the personality it began to focus on moral issues in terms of 
treatment, in addition to its clinical tradition of physical treatments. However, 
as Bracken and Thomas (2005) noted, medics turned Moral Treatment’s gaze 
away from including the ethics of the behaviour of staff, towards exclusively 
observing the patient. Moral concerns not only influenced discourses on 
possible treatments, but, as we shall examine in the next section, morality also 
became integrated into diagnostic practices.  
 
2.3 The construction of Moral Insanity from moral habits of excess and 
insufficiency  
 
The historical context of the early 19th century was of emerging modernity 
where positivistic science was growing in power and establishing itself as the 
dominant genre claiming authority to organise and order society and its 
citizens (Docherty, 1993). It is in this dialogical moral context that madness 
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was becoming re-defined by medical science as a disorder, illness and disease 
of the Reasoning faculty. An individual who firmly held beliefs which the 
majority thought unreasonable (such as they were made out of glass) were no 
longer defined in a pre-modern genre, such as foolish, but as a distinct 
disease/disorder that could be medically diagnosed and treated. Psychiatry as 
a branch of medicine steadily grew in power over the 19th and 20th centuries to 
monopolise the mad business, into what Bakhtin (1981) would call a 
monological discourse.  
 
To make these general points more tangible and to clarify where these were 
influential in forming assumptions around diagnosis there are some examples 
worth reflecting on and discussing in more depth. An early influential modern 
scientific text on Madness is James Prichard’s “Treatise on Insanity and Other 
Disorders Affecting the Mind” (1835). In this he draws on ideas of how the 
Moral Faculty functions in excess and insufficiency outlined in Thomas 
Hancock’s “Essay on Instinct” (1824). Hancock and Prichard had been friends 
at medical school in Edinburgh as undergraduates training to be Doctors 
together. They had also attended the same Church community of Christian 
Quakers in Edinburgh. However, in the 19th century advancement in the 
medical profession was restricted if you were a member of the Quaker 
Christian denomination as Quakers were viewed with suspicion as too radical 
by the establishment, because they were involved in anti-establishment social 
reform movements, such as the anti-slavery movement. In this dialogical moral 
context James Prichard converted to the Church of England, which as the 
established church had no restrictions on professional advancement, whilst 
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Hancock remained a Quaker, but did practice as a General Practitioner (GP) 
in Edinburgh. 
 
Hancock’s published “Essay on Instinct” (1824) is not about madness at all, 
but an argument against the group of writers he refers to as “the moderns” who 
were promoting the modern Enlightenment project. His book is a warning 
about the dangers to individuals if society takes an epistemological shift into a 
positivistic modernity. The central tenant of his argument is that scientists and 
medics, like himself as a General Practitioner, are human beings and as such 
have natural desires for power, wealth, self-esteem and the esteem of their 
peers which will unavoidably influence their Reasoning powers. He says 
modern positivistic science is effective at observing non-human objects (like 
trees and rocks) but an ineffective epistemology for looking at other humans 
because scientists are human beings looking at other humans through their 
scientific lens and so will be influenced by their own desires for esteem, power 
and wealth (their moral emotions and affections (social relations)) in what they 
observe and hypothesise about (Hancock, 1824). So there is evidence (e.g. 
Hancock, 1824) of early dissenters to the modern project of creating a medical 
nosology of personality traits, partly born out of a concern that medics will have 
their own challenges around moral excess and insufficiency whilst looking 
through their modern medical lens. 
 
To advance his argument Hancock describes a faculty theory of how humans 
beings are organised internally and socially in terms of the self-system being 
interconnected discrete areas of; instinctual desires, moral emotions, relations 
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with others, conscience and reasoning ability. Hancock describes human 
ontology operating through different “Faculties”, separating the Reasoning 
Faculty from the Moral Faculty and the Will. He argues that ‘the moderns’ are 
in error as they desire to put the Reasoning Faculty in charge of the Moral 
Faculty and create a modern new ordering of both society and the human 
subject. He argues scientist and medics producing knowledge about human 
beings will inevitably be biased by their natural desires for excess of money, 
power and esteem from peers and so in the pursuit of progress through 
science they will create “moral disorder”. He argues some actions modern 
scientists promote as reasonable may not be moral, because humans have 
the creative capacity to find reasonable arguments for any actions they desire, 
even if it harms others. More recently Thomas Szasz has also developed this 
argument through his critique of the rise of pharmacracy (rule by medicine and 
the doctors) and the therapeutic state (Szasz, 1994). In 1824 Hancock argued 
the new moral ordering of the self the moderns want to impose is not a healthy 
moral “order” but actually disorder ruled by Reason, a criticism that finds 
resonances with Taylor’s (1989) argument that modern positivism is a 
reworking of ancient Greek narrative from Stoicism of ‘self-mastery through 
Reason’. 
 
Hancock’s core argument is that non-medical moral disorder occurs when 
there is a lack of self-control to govern our natural desires (for power, sex, 
wealth, self-esteem, etc.) within morally moderate levels. Hancock argues the 
Moral Faculty, where ontologically he locates people’s moral emotions, social 
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relations and conscience (moral sense), has significantly more power than the 
weak Reasoning Faculty to self-regulate and control powerful natural desires. 
  
Hancock uses an explicitly Christian epistemology for his anti-modern 
argument, looking through a moral / religious lens he quotes scriptural 
passages from the Bible in support of his argument and also quotes secular 
poetry to support his claims to truth. He sees himself as a medic and scientist 
and values scientific observation but argues against the emerging modern 
version of science. He uses scientific observation of animals to support his 
thesis, observing animals, such as crows, are able to reason but are not able 
to be moral. He says the modern scientific Enlightenment movement desires 
to put scientific Reason in sole charge of the self-system of Faculties, which 
will cause people to develop cold-hearted, calculating, selfish and emotionally 
numb or emotionally excessive habits of character as they try to rule 
themselves and society solely through modern science and the Reasoning 
Faculty (Hancock, 1824). 
 
For Hancock the Moral Faculty needs to be in authority over the Faculty of 
Reason. This explains his concern that ‘the moderns’ will reverse the natural 
ontological order of the self-system, thus increasing moral disorders of excess. 
He says the modern project cannot succeed in progressing humans and 
society through Reason because the human ontological order involves moral, 
emotional, relational, social, pleasure-desiring beings, and humans are not 
solely rational/reasoning beings. For Hancock the capacity to be moral and 
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make ethical judgements distinguishes social humans from animals, and not 
our capacity to reason, as even crows can reason. 
 
This anti-modern argument is significant for this study because in 1835 James 
Prichard wrote “Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind” 
which accepts and adopts the basic human ontology outlined by Hancock and 
problematises in the same way its moral excesses and insufficiencies as 
indicative of disorder. He praises Hancock’s philosophical insights into how 
human beings are organised ontologically, but makes no reference to the anti-
modern nature of Hancock’s publication, perhaps because Prichard is writing 
a modern medical scientific book on disorders of the mind and so he is part of 
the modern scientific movement Hancock is warning against.  Prichard adopts 
the basic ontology of Hancock and assumes it is correct, with the Moral 
Faculty, Reasoning Faculty and the Will constituting the main interrelated 
components of the self-system for being human. Prichard then describes the 
ways in which the Moral Faculty becomes disordered in the same way as 
Hancock does – as lack of self-control producing moral habits of excess and 
insufficiency of moral emotions and interpersonal relationships. Thus through 
his 1835 publication Prichard dialogically transports the Moral Faculty, and its 
functioning of order and disorder, from an anti-modern moral/religious 
discourse into a scientific/medical discourse, thus transforming moral disorder 
of excess and insufficiency of poor self-control into a scientific category of 
Moral Insanity of medical disorder/disease.   
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2.4 Prichard creates “Moral Insanity” using the medical model genre 
In contrast to Hancock’s (1824) explicit Christian epistemology, Prichard 
(1835) is a medic who claims to only use the modern positivist scientific 
epistemology of outward observation, hypothesis and reasonable reflection. 
Prichard takes Hancock’s conception of order and disorder in the Moral Faculty 
in relation to people’s lack of self-control over natural desires leading to excess 
or insufficiency and re-contextualises it within a medical model genre of 
madness mimicking how physical illnesses are seen as a discrete syndrome 
of symptoms with underlying cause. He says it is already accepted amongst 
medics that when the Reasoning Faculty becomes disordered people believe 
in something untrue (a delusion) and madness can be diagnosed. Prichard 
builds on and expands this argument by claiming to have observed and 
discovered an entirely new ‘type’ of disorder of madness where the Reasoning 
Faculty is unaffected but the Moral Faculty has become disordered. The 
medical model genre of madness borrows concepts from physical medicine 
where disorder and disease become interchangeable concepts. Thus Prichard 
argues habitual moral excess of emotion and interpersonal relations due to 
lack of self-control are symptoms of “Moral Insanity”. In order to diagnose the 
disorder medics should look out for habitual moral excess in patients as 
symptomatic indicators of the syndrome of Moral Insanity. For example, he 
observes; 
 
“Not infrequently persons affected by this sort of disease [Moral 
Insanity] become drunkards; they have an uncontrollable desire for 
intoxicating liquors. They are occasionally “brought under control” by 
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confinement in a lunatic asylum, but they demand their release, and 
once free...at the first opportunity resort to their former excess, though 
perfectly aware of the consequences that await them.” (Prichard, 1835: 
p. 19) 
 
Prichard argues Moral Insanity can be identified by observing habits of moral 
excess which affect the healthy orderly functioning of the system of Faculties 
by creating a pathological disorder. In defining Moral Insanity Prichard 
criticises “the German writer’s” on Madness, exemplified by Heinroth, who 
argue, “..moral depravity is the essential cause of madness.” (Prichard, p. 
236).  
 
The main difficulty for Prichard, writing as a modern scientist, is Heinroth, like 
Hancock, writes from within a Christian epistemology and says the mad who 
have problems with self-control over moral issues, like anger and violence, 
need to confess and repent (turn away) from their excess (‘sin’). This approach 
does not fit with a modern scientific epistemology so Prichard distances 
himself by criticising Heinroth’s use of “dogma”, but says Heinroth still has 
some useful ideas (Prichard, p. 236).   
 
Prichard assumed his readers would accept the ontology of the self, with three 
Faculties of Reason, Will and Morality, which he uses in his text (Prichard, 
1835), without arguing evidence to justify his ontological assumptions. He does 
not argue he has discovered this particular ontological ordering the Self using 
scientific epistemology, instead he refers briefly to other writers, such as 
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Hancock (1824), and praises their philosophy for the authority to assume this 
ontology is correct and usable as a basis for developing definitions of Madness 
(Prichard, 1835: p. 189). Prichard does not address the fact that Hancock’s 
ontological arguments for the ordered and disordered workings of the Moral 
Faculty are based on a Christian epistemology and are articulated in a 
publication which argues against adopting modern scientific positivism in 
relation to governing human beings (Hancock, 1824). Thus modernity reflected 
on its other and absorbed moral disorder into its medical/science discourse. 
This raises a question about whose moral order will treatment work to establish 
if medics are defining the diagnosis of moral disorder? This is particularly 
interesting if medial science is borrowing definitions of moral excess from anti-
modern writers such as Hancock who problematises issues like un-
forgiveness, guilt and pride (excess self-esteem) from a Christian ontology and 
epistemology. 
 
Prichard (1835) argues that medical writers on madness before him have 
defined madness too narrowly. He criticises Locke for defining insanity only in 
the form of a false conviction or erroneous notion. He also criticises Cullen for 
excessively narrowing the definition of madness to unreasonable thoughts and 
false beliefs (Prichard:  p.iii) because he has observed a kind of madness 
where, “..the disorder is manifested principally or alone, in the state of the 
feelings, temper or habits.” (Prichard, 1835, p. iv) 
  
Prichard argues Pinel is the modern medical writer on madness who has come 
closest to observing this distinct category of madness when observing 
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“madness without delirium”. However, he criticises Pinel for illustrating this 
type of madness too narrowly with examples of “fits of anger” and “rage” as 
the true disorder affects the full range of moral emotions, including fear, self-
esteem and guilt, as well as social relationships (affections), all located within 
the Moral Faculty. Prichard says he will define the mental disease of Moral 
Insanity for the first time in history and in doing so he will be the first modern 
scientist to define the pathological manifestations of this moral disorder fully. 
He decides to create a general category of Moral Insanity rather than sub-
dividing into varieties as he say “In fact, the varieties of Moral Insanity are 
perhaps as numerous as the modifications of feeling or passion in the human 
mind.” (p. 17). Prichard claims to have discovered Moral Insanity through his 
scientific observations, defining it as; 
 
“In cases of this description the moral and active principles of the mind 
are strangely perverted and depraved; the power of self-government is 
lost or greatly impaired; and the individual is found to be incapable, not 
of talking or reasoning on any subject proposed to him, for this he will 
often do with great shrewdness and volubility, but of conducting himself 
with decency and propriety in the business of life.” (Prichard, 1835, p. 
4)  
 
Prichard outlines the key symptoms for medics to observe in order to diagnose 
Moral Insanity as insufficient or excessive habits in; interpersonal power-
relations (p. 14), social attachments (‘moral affections’) (p.15), moral emotions 
(such as sadness, fear, anger and excitement (p.18)) and self-esteem (p. 17). 
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As we shall examine further in the next chapter, insufficiencies and excesses 
in these key areas of moral insanity are defined as pathological personality 
traits in the 21st century and are specifically included in the DSM-5 (2013) 
diagnostic criteria for personality disorder.  
 
Prichard highlights an obvious diagnostic problem for medics will be where to 
draw the line between normal and excessive moral habits. Although he thinks 
it ‘perhaps impossible’ to determine where this line lies (p.18) it may be obvious 
to a medic if they are expressed “...beyond the limit that belongs to natural 
character.” (p.19). The dilemma of defining the line between acceptable 
habitual moderation and excess can still be observed in contemporary 
personality disorder literature (e.g. Livesley & Larstone, 2018, Potter, 2011). 
 
In terms of aetiology Prichard (1835) says habitual excess and insufficiencies 
may develop through a gradual ‘increase of peculiarities’, or may be in reaction 
to some specific traumatic incident, such as being deeply affected by some 
“reversal of fortune” (p.12) or the loss of a relative (p.13). Prichard concludes 
the prognosis for moral insanity is worse than for other forms of madness, and 
recovery “can scarcely be expected” when connected with a strong natural 
disposition, but if it is caused in reaction to an external cause, then if the 
negative influence is removed then a gradual recovery is possible. Prichard 
says that whilst reversing adverse circumstances can produce recovery in 
some cases of moral insanity, to produce such a reversal of circumstances 
“…the art of medicine affords very inadequate resources.” (p.26). 
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Thus Prichard created the new category of Moral Insanity in 1835 expanding 
the nosology of madness by reframing the Moral Faculty from a religious/moral 
discursive genre into the hybrid meta-genres of positivist science and the 
medical model which grow to monopolise discursive practices around the mad 
subject. It is useful to conceptualise this process through a Bakhtinian lens 
where the dialogical context was a tension between the growing centripetal 
forces of modernity forming a monological discourse of positivist science and 
centrifugal forces opposing its formation. Hancock’s (1824) anti-modern text 
can be seen as representative of centrifugal forces, whilst Prichard’s (1835) 
text is representative of the modern centripetal forces gathering momentum. 
When Bakhtin wrote some brief notes Towards a Methodology for the Human 
Sciences (in Bakhtin, 1986) he describes the problem of understanding in a 
remote context. Using this conceptual lens we can see the dialogical 
interaction between Hancock’s and Prichard’s texts enabled the ontological 
framework and orderly/disorderly functioning of the Moral Faculty to be 
transported into the relatively remote context of understanding of the medical 
model genre in order to construct a new disease/disorder of moral insanity. 
Thus Prichard’s treatise in 1835 expanded the medical gaze to insist that 
attention should be paid to possible disorders of excess and insufficiency of 
self-control in the moral faculty, foreshadowing the description of Personality 
Disorder in DSM I (1952) though to DSM 5 (2013).  
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2.5 The 20th century’s routes of DSM’s Personality Disorder develop from 
Moral Insanity  
2.5.1 The 1920’s - Psychopathic Personalities  
Both Berrios (1993) and Livesley (Livesley & Larstone, Ch 1, 2018) identify 
Kurt Schneider (1923/1950) as the writer who influenced the transformation of 
Prichard’s 19th century disorder of Moral Insanity in the 1920’s into the concept 
of “psychopathic personalities” in the 20th century, through his publication of 
“Psychopathic Personalities” (Schneider, 1923/1950). However, before 
Schneider the idea of psychopathy of the personality can be found as early as 
1845 in the writings of Baron Feuchterslaben. He popularised the concept of 
psychopathy and psychopathic as an interchangeable ways for medics to 
describe any mental disorder in the 19th century. Specifically Feuchterslaben 
(1845) talks of the psychopathies of the personality as disharmony or disease 
in the harmonious relations of feeling, reason and will in the personality of the 
patient, stating; 
“Everything, therefore, which helps to form, to determine and to restrict 
the personality of man, is to be considered only as a cause of the 
psychopathies, and the change taking place in the midst of his 
(empirical not metaphysical) personality itself, is to be considered as 
psychopathy.” (Feuchterslaben, 1845, p. 243). 
Late in the 19th century, during the 1890’s, Julius Koch proposed renaming 
Moral Insanity as Psychopathic Inferiority defined as a weakness in the moral 
faculty, arguing psychopathic habitual criminals should be treated less harshly 
than mentally healthy criminals due to diminished responsibility (Berrios, 
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1993). Schneider (1923/1950) argued Koch’s attempt to redefine Moral 
Insanity as Psychopathic Inferiority was misinterpreted as too moral in its 
definitions. He says Koch was not intending to be moralistic, but he thought 
some of Koch’s illustrative phrases categorising character types may be seen 
as moral judgements, such as; over-scrupulous, tactless, lounger and 
gossiper, highly-strung, vain and dandified, trouble-maker, bad lot, obstinate, 
and the ‘fanatic for justice’ (Schneider, 1923/1950, p. 20-21). Instead 
Schneider proposed his description of “Psychopathic Personality” as a more 
‘scientific’ description of disorders of the personality as a distinct category to 
the mental health nosology. Schneider criticises the ‘old concept of moral 
insanity’ (Schneider, 1923/1950, p.130) for being too generous in covering too 
broad a range different types of psychopathic personalities within one concept 
(Prichard had said there were simply too many to sub-classify), whereas his 
new concept will have sufficient sub-categorisations to differentiate different 
‘types’. He argued whilst there are extreme abnormal variations from the 
healthy average functioning personality there is a clinically significant sub-
group which can be distinguished where extremes of personality cause the 
person to suffer or the community around them to suffer, this sub-group he 
called psychopathic personalities. He defined ten ideal types of psychopathic 
personality as; attention-seeking, explosive, affectionless, weak-willed, 
asthenic, depressive, hyperthymic, insecure, fanatical and labile.  
Scientifically, not morally, he argued abnormal and psychopathic personality 
are statistical deviations from the average normal personality in current 
society. Dialogically distancing moral insanity from morality to be 
conceptualised more scientifically Schneider stresses, 
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“The variation may be expressed as an excess or deficiency of certain 
personal qualities and whether this is judged good or bad is immaterial 
to the issue…Our own definition of psychopathic personality remains a 
clinical one and non-moral…we wish the topic as a whole to be entirely 
removed from the sphere of moral judgement.” (Schneider, 1923/1950, 
p. 3-4). 
 
Schneider defines psychopathic personality but argues this should not be seen 
an “illness”, even when used in psychiatry as a metaphor. He questions 
whether a failure to meet the moderate requirements of society can be called 
an illness (p. 8). He shares with Pelmann (1893) an anxiety that if psychopathic 
personalities become defined as an illness then this would risk every “rascal” 
in court being labelled as morally insane, and eventually no sane person in 
court will be seen as “a sane rascal.” This concern can still be seen in current 
debates about mental health, diminished moral responsibility and crime (e.g. 
King & May, 2018). In 1923 Schneider warns of the potential misuse of 
“psychopathic personality”, stating there is a danger of harm if they are used 
as “diagnostic categories” and not merely as “types” (as he intends) because, 
 
“The human personality cannot be labelled diagnostically as we label 
mental or physical symptoms.” (Schneider, 1923/1950, p. 51). 
  
However subsequent psychiatric nosologies, such as DSM I (1952) (discussed 
below) broadly use his definitions of psychopathic personality whilst choosing 
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to simply ignore his warning not to use them as diagnostic labels of 
illness/disorder, perhaps as Schneider predicts, due to entrenched clinical 
tradition. He warns some psychiatrists may abuse these types as ‘labels’ to 
diagnose people and then withdraw, without looking to the work of 
psychotherapeutic influence to moderate the excesses and insufficiencies of 
personality types (Schneider, 1923/1950, p. 56). On the other hand he says 
psychotherapists often overlook un-psychological factors like the innate 
hereditary biological disposition behind some personality characteristics and 
are mistaken in looking for explanations solely in terms of early childhood 
conflicts. He says the aetiology of excess and insufficiency is partly biological, 
but partly in early childhood conflicts and also modified by social contextual 
factors. 
 
Examples of excess and insufficiency within Schneider’s definitions of 
psychopathic personality include; over-confidence, overestimated self-
esteem, inadequate self-esteem, over-optimistic, overly-pessimistic, 
alcoholism, insecure feelings, overly anxious, overly high moral standards, 
harsh self-judgements, over-compensatory activity to hide inferior feelings, 
guilt, excessive shame, insufficient shame, insufficient remorse or conscience, 
lack of compassion, overly-combative fanatics (his illustrative example being, 
“Leaders of the early feminist movement in England..” (p. 101)), weak-willed, 
too easily led, overly labile mood changes, short-tempered explosive 
personalities, defiance and bitterness (p. 69-144). He stresses these habits 
are to be thought about by professionals scientifically, and not in moral terms.  
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2.5.2 The 1930’s and 1940’s 
The wider dialogical context of the 1930’s and 1940’s experienced a power 
struggle between bio-psychiatry emphasising the genre of the medical model 
and a categorical approach (assuming biological aetiology) and the rise of 
psycho-analytic psychosocial/psychosexual explanatory discourses around 
‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ sexual development. Freud’s theories of conflicted 
psychosexual childhood stages of development influenced ideas in 
psychoanalytic discourses as the idea developed (through writers such as 
Reik) that relatively stable personality patterns or character types may develop 
from each psycho-sexual conflicted state, such as obsessive/compulsive 
character types (e.g. Reik, 1932/1959). It was in this competitive context that 
DSM I (1952) was created. 
 
2.5.3 The 1940’s and 1950’s - DSM I (1952)  
By the end of World War II in 1945 psychiatry had been heavily influenced by 
exposure to the general population in contrast to the pre-war context of mainly 
seeing patients in insane asylums. This was due to military psychiatrist’s 
involvement in the recruitment, discharging and treating of both combatants 
and veterans, which increased their awareness of adverse reactions to trauma. 
During World War II US army psychiatrists had developed its own psychiatric 
nomenclature to guide their practice and published guidance called “Medical 
203 - War Department Technical Bulletin” (1946/2000). This text drew 
on the historical context of existing mental health literature and applied 
it to recruiting and discharging civilian populations into military personal. 
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Medical 203 divided psychiatric states into categories of mental 
disorder, sub-classified into “reaction types” due to the influence of 
psychodynamic discourses. Medical 203’s general categories of 
disorders included; simple personality reaction, psycho-neurotic 
disorders, somatisation reactions, character and behaviour disorders, 
immaturity reactions, disorders of intelligence, psychotic disorders, 
paranoid disorders, affective disorders and organic psychosis.  
 
Medical 203’s Character and Behaviour disorders are described as 
pathological developmental defects/trends in the personality structure, 
sub-classified as disorders of pathological personality types, 
acknowledged in the text as often being synonymous with the earlier 
definitions of psychopathic personality types. These disorders are 
defined as; schizoid, paranoid, cyclothymic, inadequate, anti -social, 
asocial and sexual deviate (transvestitism, homosexuality, fetishism, 
sadism, etc.). There is an additional sub-classification of addiction (to 
alcohol or drugs). The nosology of individual pathological personality 
types is changed from Schneider’s original list, but the reader is often 
informed the new “…term is synonymous with the former diagnosis of 
psychopathic personality…” (Medical 203, 1946/2000, p. 929/930). The 
genre of excess and insufficiency is maintained and the symptomatic 
character/personality traits of concern remain largely the same, such 
as; insufficient sociability, suspiciousness, envy, jealousy, 
stubbornness, sadness, elation, poor judgement, inadaptability, social 
incompatibility, disregard for social codes and amoral habits/trends. 
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Medical 203’s general disorder of Immaturity Reactions are also 
described as replacements for the former diagnosis of psychopathic 
personality types, and are sub-classified as; Emotional Instability 
reaction, Passive-Aggressive reaction, Passive-Dependency reaction, 
Aggressive reaction and Immaturity with symptomatic habit reaction. 
Symptoms include strong and poorly controlled guilt, anxiety and 
aggression, inefficiency, procrastination, resentment and temper 
tantrums. 
 
After the war ended, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
published its psychiatric nosology, the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual, DSM I (APA, 1952). DSM I’s stated aim was to address the 
deteriorating confusion around psychiatric nomenclature (p. Vii). DSM-I’s 
nosology drew heavily on the US Army’s Medical 203 document including 
descriptions of the disorders of pathological personality types. DSM I claimed 
its members (of the APA) had demanded more information on diagnosing 
personality disorders (p. Vii). DSM I adopted the general concept of “disorder” 
of personality pathology. However it substituted the word “disorder” for the 
word “type” to re-describe Medical 203’s pathological personality types as 
diagnosable “Personality Disorders”. Although now called Personality 
Disorders, it largely used the list of individual problematic personality traits that 
medical 203 claimed medics should be looking out for. Although an apparent 
subtle substitution of “disorder” for “type” of personality pathology, arguably 
reasonable as Medical 203 already had placed personality pathology in a 
general category of mental disorder, the historical effect is profound in ignoring 
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Schneider’s original intention and warning that personality “…cannot be 
labelled diagnostically” (Schneider, 1923/1950, p. 51). 
 
In the post war context DSM I was influenced by psychoanalytical discourses 
in explaining the excess and insufficiencies of personality as reactions. 
Personality Disorder emerges from ideas around excess and insufficiency 
linked to psychopathic personality types, but is deployed as a diagnosable 
mental disorder, rather than a non-diagnostic type on a dimensional spectrum 
linked to normal personality. Thus in the 1950’s Personality Disorder emerges 
in DSM I to include symptoms of poor self-control leading to habitual excesses 
and insufficiency (APA, 1952). However, departing from a strict medical 
model genre, DSM I explains excessive habits of personality in psychoanalytic 
terms as defensive reactions protecting the ego. 
 
DSM I described Personality Disorders as developmental pathological 
defects/trends in the personality structure and exaggerated 
personality/character patterns. Frequently it clarifies that the new term 
is superseding but synonymous with a type of psychopathic personality 
(p. 36-38).  DSM I groups Personality Disorders into three clusters and a 
“Personality trait disturbance, other” category allowing for any excessive 
personality trait not covered elsewhere, to permit a ‘greater latitude in 
diagnosis’ for Personality Disorders. DSM I’s first group of Personality 
Disorders is described as resistant to any restructuring of the personality 
through therapy, these are; Inadequate (with traits such as; lack of emotional 
stamina, social incompatibility, poor judgement), Schizoid (with traits of; 
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avoidance of social relations, inability to express aggression, eccentricity), 
Cyclothymic (with traits of persistent euphoria or depression) and Paranoid 
(with traits of; envy, extreme jealousy, suspiciousness, stubbornness, 
exquisite sensitivity in interpersonal relationships). DSM I’s second cluster of 
Personality Disorders include; Emotionally Unstable (including traits of; 
fluctuating emotional attitudes, strong and poorly controlled guilt, anxiety and 
hostility), Passive-Aggressive (traits may include; pathological resentment, 
over-dependency, indecisiveness, inefficiency, passive obstructionism, 
procrastination, irritability, temper tantrums) and Compulsive (with traits of; 
excessive adherence to standards of conscience, inordinate capacity for work, 
lacking normal capacity to relax, over-conscientiousness). 
 
DSM I’s third cluster is called sociopathic personality disturbance who, “…are 
ill primarily in terms of society and of conformity to the prevailing cultural 
milieu…” (p. 38). This grouping is sub-categorised into; Antisocial reaction 
(including; callousness, irresponsibility, hedonistic, rationalising anti-social 
acts), Dyssocial reaction (including disregard for usual social codes due to 
living life in an ‘abnormal moral environment’ and adherence to values/codes 
of criminal or other social groups), Sexual Deviation (including homosexuality, 
fetishism, transvestism, sadism) and Addiction (to Alcohol or to Drugs). 
Schneider referred to the ‘old term’ of moral insanity being incorporated within 
his new term of psychopathic personality (Schneider, 1923/1950, p. 130). In a 
similar discursive move, DSM I explicitly acknowledges that Personality 
Disorder is a new term synonymous with, but now superseding psychopathic 
personality types, incorporating its concern with personality patterns of excess 
86 
 
and insufficiency (of conscientiousness, emotionality, social dependency, 
etc.). Thus Moral Insanity can be linked to Psychopathic Personality and then 
Personality Disorder through this series of superseding discursive 
manoeuvres.   
 
2.5.4 DSM II (1968) 
Towards the end of the 1960’s DSM II (APA, 1968) was published. This 
reduced the 12 categories of Personality Disorder to 10 as they decided to 
separate Addiction (to Alcohol or Drugs) and Sexual Deviation from their 
original list and give them their own codes as distinct disorders. Relatively 
minor changes were made to the descriptions of the remaining Personality 
Disorders; Dyssocial is dropped in favour of keeping Anti-Social, 
Compulsive is re-named Obsessive-Compulsive, Emotionally Unstable is 
renamed Hysterical with the addition of the habits of being seductive, attention 
seeking, vain, and self-centred, Paranoid is kept but adds a trait apportioning 
moral responsibility of ‘blaming others’, Cyclothymic, Schizoid, Passive-
aggressive and Inadequate are all kept (DSM II, 1968). In addition two of 
Schneider’s original list of types of psychopathic personality are introduced as 
new Personality Disorders, namely; Explosive (for those with outbursts of 
rage) and Asthenic (for those over-sensitive to stress and unable to enjoy life). 
 
2.5.5 DSM III (1980) - The neo-Kraepelinian influence   
The dialogical context in which DSM III was produced was one where the 
authority of the APA and the medical model of psychiatry was being challenged 
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from a number of different directions including the anti-psychiatry movement 
(e.g. Szasz, 1970, 2009), psychoanalysis (e.g. Collier, 1977) and sociology 
(e.g. labelling theory (see Scheff, 1974)). A dialogical analytic lens would see 
these challenges as centrifugal forces challenging the centripetal forces of 
medical science claiming monological authority over the mad subject. In a 
dialogical reaction to these challenges a group of prominent psychiatrists 
formed the neo-Kraepelinian movement asserting the legitimate authority of 
psychiatry and the medical model over the mad subject including mental 
disorders as discrete syndromes with predominantly a biological aetiology. 
This movement heavily influenced the text of DSM III, removing the 
psychoanalytical explanations of personality disorder, and the descriptions of 
disorders as “reactions”, which had been present in DSM I, whilst retaining the 
authoritative claim to a categorical (not dimensional) medical diagnosis as 
distinct psychopathic Personality Disorders. DSM III introduced a new model 
of five Axes, with each axis potentially influencing the others. It placed major 
clinical syndromes (such as depression and schizophrenia) in Axis I, 
Personality Disorders in Axis II, physical problems in Axis III, psychosocial 
stressors in Axis IV and Axis V estimated the patient’s level of adaptive social 
functioning. 
  
DSM III kept Schizoid, Paranoid, Antisocial and Passive-aggressive 
Personality Disorder largely unchanged. Obsessive-Compulsive is returned 
to its original Compulsive, and Hysterical becomes Histrionic. 
Cyclothymic, Inadequate, Explosive and Asthenic are dropped and five 
new categories were added; Narcissistic, Borderline, Schizotypal, 
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Dependent and Avoidant. Although introducing some new sub-categories 
DSM often re-introduces older psychopathic traits which had appeared in 
Medical 203 into these new disorders, such as emotional instability (in 
Borderline) or passive dependency (in Dependent). The option was retained 
for other, mixed or atypical Personality Disorder to allow professionals 
diagnostic latitude to diagnose Personality Disorder in their clinical judgements 
(Coolidge and Segal, 1998). 
 
The text was revised in 1987 (DSM III-R, 1987), keeping the eleven categories 
but proposing two new ones for further study, Sadistic and Self-Defeating. 
Compulsive reverted back (again) to DSM I’s original Obsessive 
Compulsive. DSM IV was published in 1994. As described in chapter one, a 
feminist campaign succeeded in preventing Self-Defeating Personality 
Disorder entering the official nomenclature and Sadistic was also dropped. 
The rest were retained apart from Passive-Aggressive which was put into the 
appendix, which has left 10 consistent categories relatively unchanged and 
authorised for use in clinical practice for over 30 years, from DSM III (1980) 
through to DSM 5 (2013). The controversial decision by the APA to reject its 
own scientific working group’s recommendations for evidence-based change 
and retain identical DSM IV-TR (2000) diagnostic definitions for Personality 
Disorder in DSM 5 in 2013 will be explored in more depth in the next chapter. 
 
Thus Moral Insanity developed within medical scientific discourse to keep its 
symptoms of moral excess and insufficiency by developing through 
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psychopathic personality (Schneider, 1923/1950) and Medical 203 into 
Personality Disorder in DSM I (1952) through to DSM 5 (2013). This helps to 
explain why most of the excessive moral habitual traits which make up 
Prichard’s definition of Moral Insanity in 1835, such as lack of self-control and 
intoxication (in DSM 5’s Borderline Personality Disorder) or too high self-
esteem (in DSM 5’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder) are in current use in the 
definitions of Personality Disorder provided by The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5, 2013). The next chapter will 
examine in more depth the dialogical political context of the early 21st century 
in which DSM 5 (2013) was produced. 
 
Once a monological modern episteme establishes its power over its subject it 
adapts and amends its knowledge over that subject within its own 
epistemological rules. It was Prichard’s establishment of Moral Insanity in 1835 
as a legitimate category within modern medical scientific discourse (Augstein, 
1996) which allowed it to develop with relatively minor changes through 
Schneider’s psychopathic personalities into DSM’s Personality Disorder 
currently used in the 21st century (see Tyrer, 2015). In the history of systems 
of thought one text leads to another within the limitations of the epistemology. 
Once a diagnostic category is established funding by powerful mental health 
institutions tends to be offered for research around these categories which 
creates more knowledge justifying the category. A variety of attempts at 
treatments of the illness/disorder of Moral Insanity were developed or dropped 
and relatively minor changes to the definition have been made over the 180 
years since Prichard’s 1835 definition. What is of interest to note concerning 
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the inter-linkage of the moral and the medical is that Prichard originally 
developed the concept of Moral Insanity and its workings from outside of the 
modern scientific epistemology within the dialogical moral context of the rise 
of the epistemology of positivist modernity and the medical model genre and 
those who opposed it. For the truth of this knowledge was not simply produced 
as Prichard claims, by the scientific method of ‘outward observation’ and 
‘speculation’ but in a dialogical relationship with modern medical science’s 
other(s) in opposition to it, such as Hancock (1824). 
 
This historical dialogical context explains how everyday moral issues became 
absorbed into medical disorders as practices on the mad subject became 
organised by the meta-genres of modernity’s medical model and positivist 
science. However as will be explored in the next chapter, the medical model 
has experienced a narrative failure to come up with the basic generic 
expectations of its narrative, such as evidence for discrete categories of 
personality disorder (as opposed to a dimensional models), clear unitary 
aetiological causes of the disorder/syndrome, or an effective medical treatment 
which cures and heals, which are the minimal plot elements to reasonably 
expect from a modern scientific medical narrative genre. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed my first research question investigating the 
historical evolution of medical and moral categories of personality disorder by 
examining historically how everyday moral dilemmas became embedded 
within psychiatric diagnostic criteria within DSM. This has traced Prichard’s 
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Moral Insanity into ideas around Psychopathic Personality types, through 
Medical 203 and the emergence of Personality Disorder in DSM I and on 
through its further iterations. Comparing the texts in detail has allowed the 
consistent theme to emerge of habitual moral excess and insufficiency. It has 
examined how the creation of the hybrid moral-medical nosology occurred 
within a wider historical context of an epistemic shift into modernity. Prichard 
(1835) established the Moral Faculty, with its potential for disorder of excessive 
moral habits, to be legitimately part of defining the mad subject, partly by 
praising Hancock’s (1824) philosophy and borrowing his Christian ontology 
where excessive habits lead to non-medical disorder of the Moral Faculty. 
Hancock had problematised habitual moral excess as disorder within a 
religious / moral discourse where habits such as resentment, pride and 
unforgiveness were, for him, problematic due to Christian ideas, justified by 
drawing on biblical quotations. Prichard then looked at habitual insufficiencies 
and excesses within the Moral Faculty with a modern medical/scientific lens 
and saw Moral Insanity/Disorder within patients in asylums in the early 19th 
century. The dialogue around moral disorder between anti-modern and pro-
modern scientific discourses led to an adoption of habits such as pride, 
resentment and unforgiveness into the medical science of madness creating a 
hybrid moral-medical nosology. Examples of habitual moral excess and 
insufficiency, such as lack of self-control and excessive self-esteem (pride), 
have been traced in this chapter through to DSM 5’s (2013) diagnostic criteria 
for Personality Disorder. 
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After Prichard (1835), future modern discursive developments occurred within 
the relatively narrow epistemic range of perspectives known as scientific 
modernity with disorders of moral excess and insufficiency being changed in 
name from Moral Insanity to Psychopathic Personality (with additional sub-
classifications) and then into Personality Disorders. Epistemologically modern 
medical science claims to have clinically observed the symptoms of certain 
disorders of the mind by outward observation and speculation (hypothesis) 
about “mad” patents. As it developed, medical science in the second half of 
the 19th century viewed their mad subjects through the lens established by 
early modern writers on madness, such as Prichard (1835), and made the 
relatively minor adjustments available through the relatively limited range of 
truth producing techniques available within a modern epistemology 
(observation and hypothesis). 
  
Thus this chapter has established that attention should be paid to habitual 
moral excess and insufficiency because these lie at the heart of the historical 
roots of DSM’s Personality Disorder criteria. Showing these problematised 
habits originated outside of the medical model genre (e.g. Hancock, 1824) 
demonstrates that such habits can travel between different narrative 
understandings. This opens up the possibility of analysing how habitual moral 
excess and insufficiency is made sense of within differing (and hybridised) 
narratives within contemporary auto-biographical accounts from people 
experiencing mental health crisis. Having examined the historical context of 
the emergence of Personality Disorder the next chapter addresses my second 
research question, ‘how do the moral and medical categories of personality 
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disorder currently interact?’, drawing on contemporary critiques of DSM and 
Personality Disorder. In light of the themes emerging from the historical 
examination, particular attention will be paid to how habitual excess and 
insufficiencies are conceptualised within deferent genres. Such an approach 
resonates with a post-psychiatry position which argues legitimate space ought 
to be opened up and valued for a variety of non-medical perspectives on 
madness alongside traditional psychiatry by valuing a variety of voices such 
as; service user/survivor, philosophical, self-help, faith and spiritual 
perspectives on madness (e.g. Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  
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Chapter 3 
 
Contemporary critical perspectives on the DSM and personality disorder 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the question ‘how the moral and medical 
categories of personality disorder currently interact?’ The diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is published by the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA), a professional organisation formed to promote 
the interests of its membership of over 36,000 psychiatrists. The APA’s 
mission statement says it exists to “serve the professional needs of its 
members” and to “represent the profession of psychiatry” (APA website, 2016). 
In 2013 the APA published its fifth edition of its handbook of diagnosis, DSM-
5 (2013). 
 
DSM-5’s content has been highly contested and critiqued from a wide 
spectrum of viewpoints; from within academia (e.g. Hornstein, 2013), from 
practitioners (e.g. Livesley, 2012), from service user groups (see Allister et al., 
2018) and the media within the wider public sphere (e.g. Pickersgill, 2014). 
DSM’s authoritative categorical approach to mental and emotional distress is 
understandably contested because diagnosis exerts multi-dimensional power 
over its subjects. The legitimisation of diagnosis in DSM-5 is used to justify 
specific institutional practices and its categorisations affect the economic 
vested interests of specific  groups, such as; mental health professionals, the 
psycho-pharmaceutical industry, the medical insurance industry and 
institutional research agendas. Diagnosis also effects people as diagnosed 
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patients, in terms of; their social identities, stigma, benefit entitlements and 
treatment entitlement options. Diagnosis also constructs a boundary between 
what counts as normal and pathological, influencing the ways in which people 
think about themselves and others. 
 
Prescribed treatments and clinical guidance intending to heal and cure are 
authorised in connection to specific diagnosis. To be treated and cured from a 
mental disorder involves being transformed into a “mentally ordered” individual 
who no longer meets the diagnostic threshold for a DSM-5 disorder. A variety 
of practices are authorised to restore order; physical treatments, such as 
chemical (e.g. anti-depressants, anti-psychotics, mood stabilisers, chemical 
castration), electrical (e.g. ECT), surgical (e.g. lobotomy), hospitalisation, 
verbal treatments (e.g. Talking Therapies; Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, 
Systemic Family Therapy, etc.) and visual treatments (e.g. EDMR for post-
traumatic stress disorder) and occupational therapy. 
 
3.1 DSM increasing disorder in society? 
A considerable degree of DSM-5 criticism has come from within the mental 
health industry itself, for example an influential critic is Allen Frances. He is 
significant because of his authoritative speaking position as the psychiatrist 
who chaired the APA workforce which produced the previous edition to DSM-
5, namely DSM-IV (1994). He criticises DSM-5 for excessively expanding 
diagnostic definitions to unnecessarily increase the medicalisation of ‘normal’ 
human experiences. Though not focussing on morality specifically, in part he 
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is concerned future DSM iterations will medicalise normal moral dilemmas of 
excess, such as turning temper tantrums into “temper dysregulation disorder” 
(Frances, 2013a, p. 149) or intermittent over-eating into “binge-eating disorder” 
(Frances, 2013a, p. 142). Frances argues DSM-5’s increasing medicalisation 
is not science based but serves a number of powerful interested parties 
including the pharmaceutical industry (Frances, 2013a, Ch. 3). He argues 
DSM-5 increases the pharmaceuticalisation of society that increases the 
profits of the pharmaceutical industry by shrinking the definitions of “normal” 
human experiences. 
 
However Frances is not anti-diagnosis or anti-psychiatry but argues instead 
for a more conservative use of less, more tightly defined psychiatric diagnosis, 
applied more cautiously over longer time frames in gradual diagnostic steps, 
starting with the least harmful diagnosis. He argues this would allow scarce 
resources to be concentrated on a smaller number of people who experience 
the most severe and enduring emotional and mental distress rather spreading 
limited resources towards the “worried well” (Frances, 2013b). I would agree 
with Frances’s broad argument that DSM is unnecessarily expanding reach 
into ‘normal’ everyday issues, a criticism that could have been levelled at 
Prichard (1835). In particular, I would agree with Frances’s main argument - 
the influence of the pharmaceutical industry on psychiatric expansion – as this 
has supporting evidence elsewhere (see Whitaker, 2010, 2017). However I 
disagree with Frances in that the smaller group of diagnosis he wishes to retain 
as legitimate within the medical model include the Personality Disorders, which 
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I argue are better conceptualised dialogically within a wider range of genres 
other than a neo-Kraepelinian medical model narrative. 
 
Expansion of DSM’s diagnostic reach into normality is particularly questionable 
as the diagnostic categories it has already created, established and claims as 
true/real have longstanding criticisms in terms of their lack of scientific validity 
(e.g. Livesley, 2012). An example of these challenges to DSM-5 being a 
credible valid diagnostic toolkit fit for use in mental health is in a blog post in 
2013 from Thomas Insel, the Director of the National Institute for Mental Health 
(NIMH), who wrote; 
 
“The weakness [of DSM-5] is its lack of validity. Unlike our definitions of 
ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are 
based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any 
objective laboratory measure.” (Insel, April 29th, 2013) 
  
Although questions have been raised for decades around DSM’s validity, 
Insel’s publically voiced doubts entered the public sphere attracting the 
attention of journalists asking if there was a crisis of confidence in psychiatric 
authority (e.g. Stevenson, 2013). Attention from the media was due to Insel’s 
powerful authoritative speaking position as the director of the National Institute 
for Mental Health. Insel and NIMH had responded to academia’s long held 
doubts about DSM’s diagnostic validity by launching a project called the 
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC), a bio-science project with the aim of 
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changing psychiatric diagnosis by using more biologically based technology 
(such as genetics, cognitive science, and brain imaging) to create a new 
classification system to rival and replace DSM-5’s categories. Indeed Insel 
makes it clear that one of the assumptions NIMH are making in their RDoC 
programme is: “Mental disorders are biological disorders involving brain 
circuits that implicate specific domains of cognition, emotion, or behaviour” 
(Insel, April 29th, 2013). 
  
This shows APA and NIMH are rival powerful institutional players competing 
for the finite business, authority and power that can be exercised over the 
mental health subject, with APA claims in DSM-5 competing with NIMH’s 
biologically based RDoC programme. Insel’s blog weakened the credibility of 
DSM-5, bringing longstanding concerns about validity to mainstream media 
attention, however APA and NIMH have a shared interest in maintaining public 
confidence in professional institutional practices in mental health, so they 
came together after DSM’s credibility had been weakened by NIMH, to make 
a joint public statement of mutual support for each other’s institutions (see 
Pickersgill, 2014). In addition to exemplifying serious doubts about the validity 
of DSM’s diagnostic categories, such institutional power struggles sensitises 
us to the need to pay attention to individual micro-level accounts of people with 
lived experience and not just macro-level conflicts. Micro-level analysis is one 
way to broaden the range of perspectives worth considering to resist solely 
focussing on these important, but relatively narrow macro-level powerful 
institutional disputes. I will address this micro-level of analysis in chapters 5 
and 6, whilst holding in mind that these wider macro-level discursive battles 
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will influence and attempt to regulate the available ways in which individual 
experience can be thought about. 
 
3.2 Feminist, poststructuralist and phenomenological critiques of DSM 
From a different viewpoint feminist critiques of DSM have been sustained for 
over 40 years. A recent example is Cosgrove (2013) arguing psychiatry, as 
expressed in DSM-5, needs an epistemic shift from its medical reductionism 
into a holistic, gender informed, social, political and legal model. She argues 
DSM-5 is not “objective” science, highlighting the financial influence the 
pharmaceutical industry holds on individual APA members of DSM task forces. 
This creates a conflict of interest for those who powerfully create diagnostic 
categories for psychiatric practice (Cosgrove, 2013). This criticism was 
developed into a more substantial critique of DSM-5 lacking credibility because 
the APA has been corrupted through its relationship with the pharmaceutical 
industry (Whitaker & Cosgrove, 2015). This shows the institution of psychiatry 
has become corrupted by the economies of influence of the psychiatric 
profession’s member interests of APA (behaving as a guild) and the substantial 
income from the pharmaceutical industry. A small and growing number of 
psychiatrist and mental health professionals are now finding a voice for 
criticising current psychiatric practice, including its relationship with the 
pharmaceutical industry by organising around Robert Whitaker’s website 
madinamaerica.com.  
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Many poststructuralist arguments also critique DSM, for example, Guilfoyle 
(2013) argues DSM-diagnosed people are trapped in a subject position by the 
power/knowledge practices of psychiatry. People become recruited into this 
way of thinking about themselves (e.g. self-identifying as “borderline 
personality disorder”) becoming complicit in their own subjectification. 
Guilfoyle argues this lack of resistance to DSM labels may be partly explained 
by diagnosis giving some temporary subjective relief from anxiety, feelings of 
containment of uncertainties and the hope of “treatment” for ill health. He uses 
poststructuralist thinkers such as Foucault to argue people are always 
unfinalisable and power is relative, so people always have the potential to 
resist the current constraining and controlling power of DSM. Using narrative 
therapy concepts developed by White (2000) he problematises DSM 
knowledge practices by arguing diagnosis damages the diagnosed by closing 
down their access to alternative narratives within which they could reimagine 
themselves (Guilfoyle, 2013). This is relevant to the analysis in chapters 5 and 
6 as consideration will be given to the extent to which people find DSM 
diagnosis helpful or unhelpful in making sense of emotional distress and the 
extent to which people access alternative narratives to the medical model to 
help them get better. 
 
Another range of criticisms of DSM-5 comes from the phenomenological 
perspective, an example of which is Hornstein (2013). She critiques DSM-5 
using subjective lived experience through people’s autobiographical accounts 
of experiencing severe mental and emotional distress. Based on her research 
into over 1000 autobiographical accounts, she argues DSM-5 categories are, 
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 “…so far away from lived experience as to have little clinical use” with 
categories “…that turn out to have little relation to anyone’s actual 
experience.” (Hornstein, 2013, p. 31).  
This would resonate with Bakhtin’s concept of understanding in a remote 
context, raising the question that if the context has become so relatively remote 
as to not be useful, then maybe the dialogical context needs to change? This 
theme will be explored in the analysis in chapters five and six by considering 
how relevant and relatively close/far people find diagnostic explanations are 
from their everyday lived experience. 
 
3.3 DSM’s categorical approach to mental disorder  
DSM-5 (2013) defines 20 broad categories of Mental Disorder as pathological 
mental illnesses/diseases, exercising a dividing practice which separates the 
mentally ordered from the disordered, with the disordered further divided 
through sub-categorisation. To varying degrees professional practitioners 
recognise that categories are a convenient way for the industry to divide up its 
business, however the boundaries between constructed categories are not 
neatly maintained within real individual patient’s lived lives (Frances, 2013, b). 
Personality Disorder is one of these 20 broad diagnostic categories which 
DSM-5 divides into 10 distinct sub-categories (DSM-5, p. 645), namely; 
 Paranoid Personality Disorder 
 Schizoid Personality Disorder 
 Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
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 Antisocial Personality Disorder 
 Borderline Personality Disorder 
 Histrionic Personality Disorder 
 Narcissistic Personality Disorder 
 Avoidant Personality Disorder 
 Dependant Personality Disorder 
 Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder, and 
 Other Specified and Unspecified Personality Disorder (DSM V, p.645) 
 
3.4 DSM and Social Functioning  
DSM-5 (2013) describes the general diagnostic criteria for personality 
disorder (p. 645-6) as the existence of pathological personality traits that 
negatively affect the individual’s ability to function socially, which can be 
traced back to Schneider’s (1923/1950) concept of pathological personalities 
causing suffering either to self or society. Several studies of social institutions 
(such as prisons and psychiatric hospitals) find over two thirds of their 
population meet the diagnostic threshold for personality disorder irrespective 
of the actual diagnosis (Livesley, 2003). Thus the estimated 15% (DSM-5, p. 
646) of the population who meet the diagnostic threshold for personality 
disorder are not evenly distributed throughout society but are 
disproportionately located outside of mainstream, employed society within 
what could be called the socially excluded under-class, located predominantly 
within populations who are poor, homeless and unemployed, revolving in and 
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out of social institutions such as prisons, homeless hostels, addiction services 
and hospitals. In contrast psychiatrists are located within relatively privileged 
speaking positions economically and culturally within the local moral orders of 
the middle classes. 
 
DSM examples of Social Functioning are; gaining and maintaining paid 
employment, forming and maintaining friendships and/or an intimate 
relationship, performing adequately in family or social roles and the ability to 
maintain accommodation and honouring financial responsibilities. Thus DSM-
5 defined pathological personality traits need to be causing relationship 
breakdowns, repeated dismissal from employment, prolonged unemployment, 
repeated homelessness and/or problems of offending leading to prison, in 
order to meet the diagnostic threshold for Personality Disorder. 
 
Whatever position the reader takes in relation to the psychiatric category of 
personality disorder it is apparent that large amounts of tax revenue is spent 
by governments trying to control and/or transform this socially excluded 
minority into socially functioning personalities (e.g. spending on criminal justice 
rehabilitation, psychiatric services, employment services, homeless services, 
supported accommodation, substance misuse services, etc.). Whilst 
diagnostically significant, what counts as “social functioning” is historically and 
socially contingent, constantly changing as social expectations change 
throughout the 20th and 21st century. Therefore the personality disorder 
diagnosis relies on the concept of social functioning which is not an objective 
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static criteria but one varying over time as society changes (e.g. rates of and 
types of employment available, skills required, etc.). This raises questions 
about the extent to which people value social functioning (or lack of it) in their 
narrative accounts of recovery, which will be considered in the following 
analysis chapters. 
  
3.5 Pathological Personality Traits 
Once a mental health professional identifies a link between pathological 
personality traits and impaired social functioning (or clinically significant  
distress) a “personality disorder” can be diagnosed as they have been given 
authority by the mental health institutions, professional governing bodies 
(APA) and published texts (DSM-5) to practice this type of knowledge on their 
patients. Thus the semantic lens through which someone searches for a 
personality disorder is constructed by the DSM-5 text which guides the 
professional to assess pathological personality traits during the dialogue 
between professional and the patient undergoing a mental health assessment. 
The professional lens the subject is viewed through varies historically through 
each iteration of DSM, with more attention being paid to inefficiency and 
procrastination in the 1950’s (in DSM I) whilst in the DSM II (1968) era 
clinicians were looking, amongst other traits, for over-sensitivity to stress and 
outbursts of rage.  In reality the dialogue between professional and patient is 
always a unique encounter between two unfinalised subjective personalities, 
where both the psychiatrist and the patient always express a range of 
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personality traits in order to have a meaningful dialogue (anxious listening, 
annoyance, guilt, evaluative judgements on both sides, etc.). 
 
Personality traits are defined as habitual ways, or patterns, of thinking 
(cognition), emotion (affectivity) and acting (behavioural). To count as 
pathological traits these habits of thinking, emotion and action need to be;  
“…stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least 
to adolescence or early adulthood.” (DSM-5, 2013, p. 645).  
The mental health professional is told not to diagnose personality disorder if;  
 The enduring pattern of personality traits is better explained by the 
direct effect of a drug, or 
 If the traits are better explained by another mental disorder (like 
“Schizophrenia”), or  
 If the traits are better explained by another medical condition (e.g. 
problems have only developed after a head trauma).  
 
Thus Personality Disorder refers to pathological personality traits that have 
developed during someone’s biographical journey traceable back to early 
adulthood or childhood. These traits are enduring, relatively inflexible habits of 
thinking, emotion and action. Each sub-category of Personality Disorder 
diagnosis depends on the particular cluster combination of personality traits 
judged by the psychiatrist to be impeding the patient’s social functioning. 
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DSM-5 text authors Personality Disorder in two distinct senses; linguistically it 
constructs and defines how personality disorder, pathological personality traits 
and social functioning are defined for professional practice, and it gives 
legitimising authority to the professional who is trained in and believes in 
DSM’s semantic categorical lens to diagnose and treat people who meet the 
above criteria as having a Personality Disorder. The process of legitimising 
authority linguistically constructing and authoring diagnosis will be picked up 
in the analysis in chapter 5.   
 
DSM-5 (2013) defines seventy-nine pathological personality traits 
symptomatic of a personality disorder, examples of which include;  
1. Lack of remorse  
2. Persistently bears grudges, i.e. is unforgiving of insults, injuries or 
slights 
3. Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours as 
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest  
4. Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning 
others for personal profit or pleasure  
5. Reckless disregard for the safety of self or others  
6. Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain 
consistent work behaviour or honour financial obligations  
7. Views self as socially inept, personally unappealing, or inferior to others  
107 
 
8. Has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates 
achievements and talents, expects to be recognised as superior without 
commensurate achievements) 
9. Is interpersonally exploitative, i.e. takes advantage of others to achieve 
his or her own ends  
10.  Is often envious of others or believes others are envious of him or her  
11.  A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships 
characterised by alternating between extremes of idealisation or 
devaluation  
12.  Inappropriate intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g. frequent 
displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights) 
 
The previous chapter showed these habitual excesses and insufficiencies 
of poor self-control, such as frequent physical fights, irresponsibility, law-
breaking and overvaluing (pride/arrogance) or devaluing self and others, 
were described in moral terms in Prichard’s Moral Insanity (1835) and in a 
more medical/scientific genre in Schneider’s Psychopathic Personalities 
(1923/1950). This thesis is exploring the idea that these traits gain their 
meaning from the local moral context defining what counts as excess and 
insufficiency and are not exclusively medical symptoms of discrete 
disorders. For example, from DSM-5’s list, remorse requires a local moral 
framework as a prerequisite, within which guilt can be felt for perceived 
wrongdoing, and forgiveness/unforgiveness also need a moral framework 
in order to perceive wrongs done.   
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3.6 Livesley’s critique of political power relations influencing DSM 5’s 
Personality Disorder  
Livesley (2012) outlines that scientific research has shown over decades that 
people do not fit neatly into DSM’s ten personality disorder discrete categories, 
but instead people exhibit unique clusters of personality traits which appear 
within different categories. Additionally scientific research consistently shows 
that people exhibit personality traits on a dimensional range of severity, so 
traits like impulsivity are not either absent or present but rather there is a 
continuous range of trait expression as all people demonstrate degrees of trait 
expression. Livesley (2012) is a significant critic because of his authoritative 
speaking position as employed by the APA as part of the DSM-5 task force 
reviewing the research literature and evidence to re-define the diagnosis of 
Personality Disorder. The task force presented evidence that the current 
definitions of Personality Disorder were not supported by the scientific 
evidence, proposing a new dimensional approach rather than DSM’s 
categorical model. 
 
Despite their own task force presenting evidence that the DSM-IV descriptions 
were not valid, the APA decided to reject their recommendations, assigning 
them to a later section of the DSM-5 text on ‘emerging ideas’, and simply 
reprinted the old, now discredited (by its own taskforce), definitions of 
Personality Disorder from DSM-IV-TR (2000) in the new DSM-5 (2013) 
claiming they were valid for clinical use. Livesley explains this remarkable 
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decision as the APA choosing clinical tradition and interests of its member’s 
over scientific evidence: 
  
“Thus, by conceptualising personality disorders as discrete types, the 
DSM-5 proposal adopts a model that according to a publication by the 
Work Group is untenable. Faced with whether to follow the clinical 
tradition and represent personality disorders with categorical / typal 
diagnoses or accept empirical evidence advanced with its own work 
group, the DSM-5 does not appear to hesitate – clinical tradition 
outweighs evidence, even evidence adduced by members of its own 
Work Group.” (Livesley, 2012, p. 90) 
 
The DSM-5 working group recommended some of the categories of 
personality disorder were discontinued, such as Narcissistic Personality 
Disorder, because the evidence simply was not there that this was a real 
credible diagnosis. Political pressure was then put on the working group to 
include certain personality disorder diagnosis because there were vested 
commercial and reputational interests invested in continuing a category 
despite the scientific evidence, for example, for Narcissistic Personality 
Disorder: 
“The issue here is not whether narcissistic personality disorder should 
or should not be included but rather that the decision to include it was 
based on politics, not science. The lack of evidence for the types 
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selected and susceptibility to political influence gives lie to any claim 
that the DSM-5 is evidence-based.” (Livesley, 2012. p.90) 
 
Thus the dialogical context contains criticisms of current DSM-5 Personality 
Disorder definitions as invalid, not evidenced based, untenable and politically 
influenced. Significantly criticisms are coming not only from outside, but from 
within the APA’s own task force members, who are internationally recognised 
experts chosen by the APA themselves (e.g. Livesley, 2012). 
  
Livesley is critical of DSM 5 and the medical model. He joined the APA DSM 
5 working party to redefine Personality Disorder in line with scientific findings, 
but resigned and published some of his experiences of the political power 
struggles that go on behind the scenes when the APA create its DSM 
diagnostic categories (Livesley, 2012). He proposes developing an alternative 
conceptual model for ‘a new science of personality disorder’ based on 
evolutionary adaptations of the personality conceptualising personality 
disorder on a continuum with healthy functioning ‘normal’ personality (Livesley 
& Larstone, Ch 1, 2018). Whilst he has contributed much to the field of 
developing better services for this client group, I would view him as a relatively 
conservative critic of DSM 5 embedded within academic institutions, when 
viewed within the wider dialogical context of the heteroglossia of competing 
discourses around habitual excesses and insufficiencies of personality. 
Specifically Livesley promotes keeping the diagnosis of “Personality Disorder” 
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whereas I do not think this is sufficiently appreciative of patient disagreement 
(e.g. Allister et al., 2018). 
  
Whilst I would agree with Livesley’s preference for a dimensional model rather 
than a categorical model, I would differ in terms of what epistemology is 
appropriate for studying personality, as in this study I argue an ethical 
dialogical epistemology, based on Bakhtin (1986), better fits a dialogue around 
moral excess and insufficiency of personality. This study argues where the 
lines lie for excess and insufficiency will depend on the local genres and moral 
orders subjects are positioned within, and I will examine these lines in the later 
analysis chapters 5 and 6. By contrast Livesley takes a more traditional 
positivistic epistemological stance in his quest for “a new science” of 
Personality Disorder and does not see the excess and insufficiencies as moral 
issues but objective clinical ones (see Livesley & Larstone, Ch 1, 2018). 
However Livesley does draw on the work of Kellert, Longino and Waters (2006) 
to argue a philosophical pluralism of multiple approaches and models is 
needed for studying personality pathology. I would go further in arguing the 
personal and autobiographical needs to be considered more seriously and be 
given more weight within a systems-based approach such as Livesley’s. 
 
Livesley relies on the reviews of the literature by Widiger (1993) to evidence 
the research failure to find personality structures in line with DSM diagnosis. 
Whilst I would take this as evidence to argue for the abandoning of the 
personality disorder diagnosis entirely, Livesley proposes replacing DSM 
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categories with a dimensional four factor personality trait model covering social 
avoidance, dissocial traits, emotional regulation and compulsivity (Livesley & 
Clarkin, 2015). Whilst an improvement on DSM’s categorical model, I do not 
think it necessary to clearly divide “personality disorder/psychopathology” from 
“normal personality”. In contrast Livesley argues the need to retain, but better 
define, personality disorder in new classifications based on better science, in 
response to his criticism of DSM 5’s attempt. I do agree that people do have 
habitual problems of excess and insufficiency affecting their social functioning, 
but would be in favour of opening up a dialogical understanding of these to an 
infinitely expanding number of possible narrative explanations, including, but 
not restricted to, those offered by psychiatry and psychology and the local 
speech genres of the people affected. I do not think it necessary to describe 
excess and insufficiency as personality pathology or disorder as Livesley does, 
but would suggest using everyday language from the genre of the person’s life 
(such as ‘unhelpful habits’) alongside strengths based valuing of skills, which 
affect someone’s life-story, journey or narrative. I also differ with Livesley in 
arguing these habits are moral or ethical problems deriving from differing local 
moral orders. I believe an ethical dialogical approach opens up new ways to 
reflect on ethical problems of excess and insufficiency without necessarily 
being morally judgemental in an absolute or positivist sense. Part of the appeal 
of the medical model is it appears to offer a relief from moral anxiety as the 
subject enters a narrative where they are a relatively passive patient, mentally 
ill or disordered with the offer of medical treatment and cure. 
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My concern is that if habitual excess and insufficiency is connected to ethics 
and people’s local moral orders then we need an epistemology that allows an 
ethical dialogue about these dilemmas, and a medical model narrative may not 
be best placed to facilitate such a dialogue. I would suggest a dialogical 
approach could enable a helpful reflective dialogue about habitual excess and 
insufficiencies to occur without necessarily drawing on the medical lens of 
disorder. Such an approach could consider the range of discursive genres 
subjectivities in a dialogue are orientating within.  
 
I would also take a more systemic view than Livesley who largely views the 
pathology within the individual. As I will examine in my analysis in chapters 5 
and 6, I would put more emphasis on the context in which these habits are 
expressed by seeing any problematisation of excess and insufficiency as a 
dialogue between someone and their social world. Such a dialogical lens 
allows the social context of staff/institutions to equally be seen as a possible 
location in space/time where pathology is being expressed. For example 
Schneider (1923/1950) felt he could see excessive defiance in the 
psychopathic personalities of early feminist leaders in England, whereas an 
analysis focussed on the personal opens up space to consider the feminist’s 
view, where feminist leaders may have seen their defiance as a virtue 
campaigning for social justice/change. Livesley does not give enough 
consideration to context of pathology, with his writing predominantly locating 
pathology in the individual personality and not in contextualised moments of 
ethical dialogue.  
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3.7 Personal moral habits as a set of skills, with capacity for excess and 
insufficiency 
I am adopting a different theoretical underpinning from Livesley in viewing 
moral habits through a dialogical lens which considers the skills, excess and 
insufficiency of both professional and ‘patient’ within the wider context of 
differing discourses and institutions. DSM-5’s medicalisation of the moral 
through its diagnostic definition of Personality Disorder can be critiqued using 
Rom Harré’s social psychological concepts. Harré (1993) argued that to 
credibly reflect lived life a psychological theory needs to acknowledge that 
humans are moral beings. Harré argues that human beings live life within local, 
social patterns of value including institutions such as education, work 
environments, family life, etc. Within these “local moral orders” the course of 
our life is constantly being morally judged (evaluated) by others, and we too 
reciprocally judge others, and ourselves, in moral terms. Harré argues that 
social-psychologically we always hold multiple views of both how we 
see/judge/evaluate ourselves and how other people morally judge and 
evaluate the way we live our life, including its biographical trajectory. 
  
Harré argues our lived life is judged against the local moral values of what is 
believed to be good and bad ways to live, and these habitual ways of living 
attract social honour/respect or contempt/shame. Harré’s work developed 
Goffman’s concept of a moral career, arguing that local moral frameworks are 
essential to understanding the psychology of human beings within their social 
context. A psychological theory that did not incorporate moral thinking would 
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be of little use, as it would not reflect lived lives. Thus to be relevant and useful 
psychology and psychiatry needs to be able to reflect on how local moral 
orders affect the way people habitually think, feel and act, such as how the 
local moral order affects someone’s emotion of guilt or anger about a particular 
action.  
 
People morally judge/evaluate the success and failure of their own and other 
people’s lives in the everyday tasks and problem-solving of ordinary life. We 
are always evaluating and being evaluated on how well we perform these 
ordinary challenges of life, such as; speaking publically in a group, getting and 
maintaining employment, passing an exam, finding accommodation, 
socialising successfully, avoiding debt, finding an intimate partner, etc. 
Achieving these common social goals could be equated with DSM-5’s 
description of “social functioning”. Failure to function socially caused by 
personality traits is the defining characteristic of personality disorder as a 
health problem. Harré argues that failing to function socially and displaying 
certain habitual character traits or actions (e.g. lying, fighting) attract moral 
judgments from others. 
 
For Harré (1993) people attribute public social reputation in the form of respect 
and contempt based on how they judge others performing these tasks and 
reciprocally people can feel respect and humiliation as their “moral careers” go 
up and down in the eyes of others. The public social reputation is attributed to 
relatively stable characteristics demonstrated by people which Harré calls their 
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character. For example, someone may be judged morally by others as being 
“a good listener”, a “habitual drunk”, “resentful, holding a grudge” or “very 
helpful” by their colleagues at work, based on their habitual character trait 
interactions with others. 
 
When people are not functioning socially in the 21st century they may be 
referred for a DSM-5 (2013) informed mental health assessment. From this 
analytical lens the habits of thinking feeling and acting that mental health 
professionals are called on by DSM-5 to judge in their patients as personality 
traits, such as insufficient forgiveness, when making a personality disorder 
diagnosis, are the same moral habits of character Rom Harré (1993) discusses 
being practiced during moral careers. 
 
These personality traits have originally been formed in the local moral orders 
of someone’s social world. For example DSM-5 asks the professional to judge 
the personality trait of “lack of remorse” in a patient. This implies there is an 
appropriate, objective, level of remorse to feel for a particular moral 
wrongdoing. Therefore in the dialogue between the two unfinalised 
personalities of professional and patient the professional is called upon to 
judge a moral quality in their patient and ask themselves: do they lack the 
appropriate level of remorse for what they have done wrong (anti-social 
personality disorder)? Or alternatively at the other extreme, do they experience 
too much guilt linked to being over-conscientious (obsessive-compulsive 
personality disorder)? 
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DSM-5 claims the professional can judge this objectively using a 
medical/scientific lens. However there is no objective position for one 
unfinalised personality to judge another’s habits morally as this judgement is 
made relative to the local moral order of the psychiatrist’s social world or their 
imagined partial understanding of the local moral order of the patient’s social 
world which will be affected by a number of factors including class, age, 
ethnicity, sexuality, etc. Either way it is a moral judgement evaluating if 
someone has too little (lacking) remorse or too much (excess) guilt. The levels 
of too little, appropriate, and excessive remorse is not quantified anywhere in 
DMS-5, it is left to the professional’s clinical judgement. To illustrate that DSM-
5 personality traits are moral habits consider the habits of being un-forgiving, 
described as a pathological personality trait; “Persistently bears grudges, i.e. 
is unforgiving of insults, injuries or slights” (DSM-5, 2013, p.649) 
 
Medically unforgiveness is claimed as a pathological symptom of a mental 
disorder. However to be unforgiving of harm an individual needs to believe in 
a local moral framework with a good/bad axis around what is socially fair and 
just to enable them to judge the behaviour of others towards them as morally 
unfair and thus feel angry at being unfairly wronged. Unforgiveness cannot be 
problematised outside of a believed in moral framework. For example, to feel 
angry at being sexually abused as a child or robbed of intellectual property 
rights someone needs to believe these behaviours are morally wrong (abuse, 
theft, etc.). If someone repeats thoughts and feelings of anger at unfair injury 
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for a prolonged time period they may be judged by others to have a moral 
problem of being resentful, unforgiving and ‘holding a grudge’. 
 
Additionally unforgiveness is problematised morally only within those 
discourses that ascribe positive moral value to the practice of forgiving others. 
The local moral framework within which someone has developed 
unforgiveness is replaced by DSM-5’s scientific/medical lens which sees 
unforgiveness not as a moral dilemma but as an unhealthy pathological 
personality trait symptomatic of mental disorder. The professional undertaking 
a mental health assessment is making a moral judgement about the patient 
(e.g. are they unforgiving?) in order to come to a medical diagnosis. Moral 
judgements are being made in a clinical setting and being presented as an 
objective medical diagnosis within a health narrative. 
 
During a mental health assessment the professional’s evaluation of the 
patient’s habits in estimating their own value (self-esteem) are also moral 
judgements as is they have to judge if the patient has too much (excess) self-
esteem (i.e. “grandiose, self-important, arrogant”) or insufficient self-esteem 
(i.e. self-esteem as “unappealing, inept, inferior”) or they have an ‘appropriate’ 
amount of self-esteem commensurate with their achievements. The patient’s 
habitual estimation of other’s character (other-esteem / public-esteem) are 
also moral evaluations as the professional judges if the patient habitually over-
estimates others (e.g. “idealises”) or under-estimates (e.g. “devalues”) other 
people or if they unstably fluctuate between idealising and devaluing 
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themselves and other people, thus attracting a diagnosis of Borderline 
Personality Disorder. 
 
Seeing personality traits as moral character traits formed during the moral 
careers of people’s biographical trajectories raises the question as to whether 
medicalising moral habits into medical health problems holds back people’s 
moral development. By diagnosing personality disorder around habitual traits 
DSM-5 takes common problematic habits affecting everyday goals of social 
functioning away from people’s local moral frameworks, where they formed in 
the everyday genres of ordinary lived life, into a remote context of a medical 
discourse where the power, responsibility and authority lie more with the 
professional to prescribe an effective treatment to heal and cure these habitual 
problems. People may take less moral responsibility for their character trait 
difficulties if they believe it is a medical problem the professional is going to 
treat, especially if the professional takes authority, diagnoses disorder and 
prescribes treatments raising expectations of a cure. This suggests an analysis 
is needed to draw out the skills and problematic habits that can be 
conceptualised differently within both medical and alternative non-medical 
genres, which I will attempt to do through the analysis in chapters 5 and 6. 
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3.8 Moral habits as skills 
From the perspective of Harré’s moral careers people are seen holistically as 
much more than a list of their problematic habits (such as a list that DSM-5 
presents – see p. 106/7). For example, Harré talks about morally valued habits 
people develop within local moral frameworks as skills. Thus an individual can 
acquire positively valued skills which enable them to perform the everyday 
social tasks expected from their society. Thus within a moral career 
perspective someone could be seen to vary over their lifetime and have a 
mixture of problematic habits (such as unforgiveness) and valued skills (such 
as listening, compassion and co-operating with others). This mix of habits, both 
morally problematised and valued skills are always seen in the local context of 
the narratively driven biographical trajectory of someone’s life towards the 
goals they are trying to achieve with others.  
 
Taylor (1989) argues people pursue their strongly valued idea of “the good life” 
within their currently believed narrative within which they orientate. Resonating 
with Harré’s views, Taylor (1989) says this is primarily a moral experience 
where an individual’s narratively driven desire to pursue their “good life” is 
strongly value driven. The valuing of the desired good life is experienced within 
a believed narrative which drives and motivates people to practice habitual 
skills and avoid morally problematic habits in order to perform relevant social 
tasks. 
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3.9 A different kind of validity: Experiential validity and ‘expert by experience’ 
perspectives  
The voice of ‘experts by experience’ and ‘service users’ receiving mental 
health diagnosis and treatment being able to influence the dialogue around 
personality disorder has been growing in recent years. An example of this was 
emergence (2018), an organisation led by people who had received a 
diagnosis of personality disorder. Examples of ways in which they influenced 
services was co-writing and co-delivering the NHS Personality Disorder 
Knowledge and Understanding Framework (PD KUF) training on personality 
disorder alongside NHS professionals to mental health staff. Admittedly 
involving service users in writing and co-delivering training is unusual within 
statutory mental health services. Guilfoyle’s (2013) analytic lens would argue 
this is evidence of people becoming complicit in their own subjectification, 
drawn into promoting a subjective position of medicalised power/knowledge. 
However, the involvement of experts by experience in the NHS PD KUF 
training raises the question as to whether Guilfoyle over estimates the power 
of the medical model and in doing so is he disempowering service users as 
lacking choice and agency? The co-delivery of PD KUF training role modelled 
partnership working and visibly showed staff that people with the diagnosis 
have strengths, skills and assets, as well as difficulties. I have co-delivered this 
training myself and co-deliver the forensic Personality Disorder KUF course in 
2018. This is an example of shifting the power relationship between patient 
and professional to a more collaborative approach, compared to training only 
delivered by professionals. However, legitimate questions can be raised about 
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the extent of the service user involvement and the limits of the ideas that can 
be shared through this training once the course content is set and agreed. 
 
Also, unfortunately emergence as an organisation went into liquidation due to 
reduced funding from the NHS which clearly demonstrates the limits to service 
user involvement if the funding comes primarily from statutory mental health 
institutions, such as the NHS. As with any financial relationship service user 
groups funded by mental health institutions will have to negotiate the limits to 
how far they can go in campaigning for change without risking their funding 
being cut, which is clearly an unequal power relationship funding the voice of 
experts by experience.  
 
Another example of expert by experience voice is “The Consensus Statement 
for People with Complex Mental Health Difficulties who are diagnosed with a 
Personality Disorder” (Allister et al., 2018). The Personality Disorder 
Consensus Group producing this text was co-chaired by Sue Sibbald, a Peer 
Specialist in personality disorder, and involved a number of different 
professional and voluntary organisations in a dialogue to produce the 
statement. In comparison to DSM 5, this description of personality disorder 
talks of “poverty” and “childhood trauma” being large aetiological factors. It is 
also critical of the average service offered by the NHS as not meeting the 
complex needs of the people it diagnoses with this disorder. Its criticism are 
systemic in nature rather than focussing, as DSM does, all the pathology within 
the individual patient. For example it states, 
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“People given a diagnosis of 'personality disorder’ have been left in the 
wilderness for too long and it's about time the system as a whole, such 
as health, social care, housing, third sector and community initiatives 
come together to bring help and hope.” (Sue Sibbald, p.3) 
 
However getting consensus through dialogue between different professional 
bodies and service users is very difficult as it means sharing power dialogically, 
as the statement acknowledges. The statement says the label of “Personality 
Disorder” is misleading and stigmatising and their desire is to get rid of the 
label in favour of an agreed alternative (p. 4). However they also acknowledge 
that in the current system the diagnosis is for some the only passport to access 
services.  The statement advocates for a holistic and systemic understanding 
of the individual with personality difficulties in the context of; past trauma, 
sexual abuse and adversities, poverty, deprivation, social exclusion (affected 
by race, gender, sexuality) and past attachment and relationship history. They 
also point to system failures of services providing support as a contributing 
factor to people developing personality difficulties (p. 9), which can be 
compared to DSM 5 descriptions - which do not locate pathology within the 
wider system of service failures. 
 
The document summarises a consensus view between service users and 
professionals working in the field and is written in easy to understand plain 
English, without the need for clinical jargon. This is an example of how opening 
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up a dialogue and sharing power between experts by experience and 
professionals can produce a more useful discourse with a systemic 
understanding of aetiology, prognosis and treatment options whilst highlighting 
the need for change and continued campaigning for this socially excluded 
group of people. When the dialogical context is expanded to include views 
critical of the current system, including service user perspectives, then those 
services can be held in the dialogical moral context of excess and insufficiency 
(system failure) as well as the patients. An example of this is the view 
expressed that the NHS is insufficiently meeting the complex needs of people 
with personality difficulties associated with complex trauma (p. 4). 
 
3.10 The practice of a foreign knowledge 
Foucault said the motivation for his work was a curiosity for the practice of a 
foreign knowledge which resulted in the knower “…staying afield of himself” 
(Foucault, 1990, p. 8). In his work on the history of sexuality he argued seeing 
the history of our ways of thinking about our self can free people from being 
stuck in their ways of thinking, and so enable them to think differently about 
themselves. Foucault’s ethics refers to these ways in which someone can have 
a relationship with themselves as they form themselves as the subject of 
particular moral frameworks within narratives which problematises some 
habitual parts of the self, whilst valuing others and defining moderation and 
excess. 
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Foucault’s ethics (Foucault, 1990) is relevant to this study because in order to 
desire to be free of habitual thoughts, emotions and actions (of excess or 
insufficiency) any habit needs to be morally problematised within someone’s 
believed narratives and local moral frameworks. It is a believed narrative which 
creates the motivation and desire to change those parts of the self by practicing 
techniques-of-the-self on offer within a narrative. Exercising ethical work on 
the self to achieve moderate habits requires effort and will only makes sense 
within a narrative where someone is working towards becoming their ideal self 
(telos). 
 
As we shall explore in depth in chapter six, the subject who is discontent with 
their life-trajectory and experiencing a narrative failure may maintain their 
subject position or search for a ‘foreign knowledge’ to practice and a new 
narrative within which to re-orientate their habits within. In the analysis 
chapters I am going to focus on some ‘successful’ journeys of getting better 
from severe emotional and mental distress in order to examine other ways in 
which morality can be dealt with outside of, or hybridised with, the medical 
model genre. 
 
Some people try a number of different believable discourses on their journey 
through life  (scientific, medical, philosophical, political, religious, self-help, 
survivor, etc.) each of which offer different valued habits (skills) and 
techniques-of-the-self (revenge, forgiveness, meditation, medication, 
mindfulness, drug-intoxication, etc.) with which to reduce habits problematised 
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as insufficient or excessive (resentment, compulsion, anxiety, depression, 
intoxication, etc.) in order to work to achieve a specific ideal ‘good life’ or telos. 
  
Some narratives may simply not problematise certain habitual parts of the self. 
If a subject believes and re-orientates their lived life within a new narrative only 
those habits a specific narrative morally problematises will require ethical work 
through practicing techniques-of-the-self. However in addition to someone’s 
estimation of their self, there is always other people’s public moral estimation 
of their habits and life-trajectory. Other people, such as partners, parents, line 
managers, work colleagues, landlords or friends in the local moral order may 
problematise habits an individual does not view as morally problematical, such 
as intoxication or punctuality, so the issue of who is problematising specific 
habits within particular moral orders will need to be explored in my analysis 
chapters. 
 
However, Bakhtin’s dialogical perspective would argue that a polyphony of 
multiple narratives can be active within an individual consciousness at the 
same time, and a dialogue is always ongoing within and around someone in-
between these competing narrative explanations of our habitual ways of being 
(e.g. “Why am I resentful?”, “How ought I handle my resentments, with 
forgiveness or revenge?”). Someone may feel conflicted as they oscillate 
between believing different competing ethical narratives within which to 
orientate themselves and their habits. Bakhtin would argue such oscillations, 
hybridisations and contradictions reflect the reality of human psychological 
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consciousness (for example, see Bakhtin’s analysis of Dostoyevsky’s novel 
“Notes from Underground” (Bakhtin, 1984)). As we shall demonstrate in 
chapters five and six, Foucault’s ethics (Foucault, 1990) becomes more 
complex when combined with Bakhtin’s dialogical concepts, such as a 
polyphony of dialoguing discourses within an individual, as this opens up the 
possibility of conflicting ethics and ethical hybridisation. For an example of 
hybridisation, ‘meditation’ as a technique-of-the-self from Buddhism has been 
transferred into a secular technique-of-the-self and re-described in popular 
mental health discourses as ‘mindfulness’. 
  
Lived life is a heteroglot of multiple perspectives without any one unifying 
objective singular point of view (e.g. naïve positivism). However, 
epistemologically dialogism is not relativism, as each individual always holds 
a position with their moral values in time and space from which we evaluate 
other articulated positions, texts and utterances. There is no objective, value 
free neutral viewpoint above the discursive battle for the subject to position 
themselves within from which to observe the battle. The effect of the medical 
model genre is to close down every unique autobiographical journey and every 
voice, every alternative narrative understanding of problematic moral habits, in 
order to claim the final word (e.g. a diagnosis or a prescription). In contrast a 
dialogical approach always opens up understanding of something problematic 
(a failed narrative, a moral habit, an anxiety, a psychotic experience, a low 
mood, etc.) into an ever expanding context of different genres creating new 
dialogical understandings which could re-contextualise that which was initially 
thought to be problematic or unarticulated emotions. An example of applying 
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Bakhtin’s dialogical approach to mental health problems would be the “open 
dialogue” approach to severe psychotic experience in Western Lapland. This 
has produced consistently remarkably positive outcomes since they replaced 
the medical model approach with an open dialogue approach over thirty years 
ago (see Siekkula, 2006, 2012). 
 
Conclusion: 
There are well-established and wide ranging criticisms of DMS-5, both from 
within and outside of professional mental health institutions. That many of the 
criticisms come from within traditional mental health professional positions 
(e.g. Francis, 2013, Livesley, 2012) could be explained by centrifugal social 
forces possibly increasing and thus weakening the grip of centripetal 
monological texts such as DSM-5 over their subject. However most 
mainstream mental health institutions continue to practice the categorical 
knowledge of “Personality Disorder” as authorised in DSM-5 (2013) despite its 
criticisms (lack of validity, vested professional and institutional interests, 
political pressure regarding categories, etc.) and some of DSM-5’s critics are 
from equally centripetal competing forces such as the Research Domain 
Criteria bio-project of NIMH (Insel, 2013). 
 
This chapter has gone further than the current critiques of DSM-5 in arguing 
that the pathological personality traits used to diagnose personality disorder 
(such as unforgiveness) are predominantly moral habits of excess and 
insufficiency formed in local moral frameworks within everyday speech genres 
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re-worked into a medical/scientific professional genre as symptoms of mental 
illness/disorder. This perspective raises the argument that not enough 
research has been undertaken on the personal take on morality in relation to 
experiences of mental and emotional distress and I address this directly 
though my analysis chapters. 
 
Rather than medicalised as health problems, this chapter suggests that moral 
habits need to be investigated within people’s moral careers (Harré, 1993) as 
they pursue their valued ‘good life’ or telos. As people perform everyday social 
tasks working towards the good life they desire within their believed narratives 
dramas of character are played out where habitual ways of achieving narrative 
goals are judged to be morally valuable skills (e.g. patience, perseverance) or 
devalued as excess and insufficiency (e.g. theft, violence, dishonesty). 
Foucault’s ethical concepts allow some habits to be viewed as morally valued 
moderation or skills and others as morally excessive or insufficient. What 
habits are morally problematised and valued varies between locally situated 
narratives and moral orders. Ethical work on the self to reduce moral excess 
only make sense in the context of someone pursuing a believed narrative goal 
of becoming a certain kind of person (telos). The believable narrative motivates 
an individual to do ethical work on themselves through techniques-of the-self 
to reduce morally problematised habits into moderate habits in pursuit of their 
telos. 
 
130 
 
By medicalising moral habits into pathological personality traits DSM-5 has 
taken these moral habits out of their local moral framework into a remote 
context of understanding of a medical diagnostic text. This raised the question 
in terms of power-relations as to whether the power of DSM-5’s health/illness 
narrative holds back people’s moral development by taking problematic habits 
into the remote context of health where people become relatively passive 
patients being treated by relatively powerful professionals and their 
knowledge. 
  
The biographical trajectory of someone trying to live their ‘good life’ (telos) and 
their habitual ways to live that life are evaluated morally by themselves and 
others. When an individual’s narrative is failing (an experience DSM-5 defines 
as ‘not functioning socially’) they may have a mental health assessment within 
a medical genre that links this narrative failure to habitual personality traits 
resulting in a diagnosis of “personality disorder”. 
 
In contrast to the authorising positivistic medical/science categorical approach 
of DSM-5 (2013) a dialogical approach would allow problematic habits in failing 
narratives to still be understood in relatively remote contexts of understanding 
(new narratives, new genres) but would always resist privileging professional 
knowledge and medical/science narratives above all other narratives. We do 
not know enough of what people’s stories are and so the following analysis 
chapters are going to examine such stories. This chapter has addressed my 
second research question – ‘how do the moral and medical categories of 
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personality disorder currently interact?’ Chapters two and three also anticipate 
my final two research questions that will be fully explored in my empirical study; 
 
1. How do the medical and the personal narratives of "Personality Disorder" 
interact in lived experience?, and,  
2. What narratives aid recovery in troubled journeys involving mental health 
crisis?, with an interest in contrasting how medical and non-medical genres 
might be used in recovery narratives.  
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Chapter Four 
Methodology 
 
So far in this thesis I have outlined the philosophical and academic framework 
underlying this enquiry and examined the macro-level historical evolution of 
medical and moral categories of personality disorder, followed by a 
consideration of how they currently interact. Now I outline the methodology I 
am using in chapters 5 and 6 to analyse micro-level individual stories. 
 
4.1 Theoretical Justification for Narrative methodology  
 
There are different kinds of truth, as Bakhtin (1993) notes when drawing a 
distinction between truth as abstract (Istina) and truth as lived experience 
(Pravda). The kind of truth and understanding I am searching for in this study 
of madness is Pravda. Ontology refers to the basic assumptions being made 
about what it is to be a human being within any mode of thought (Smith, 2007, 
p. 70). Epistemology refers to the fundamental ways in which truth claims are 
being produced and accepted within a discourse (Smith, 2007, p. 70). It is 
important to be explicit about ontological assumptions before discussing 
epistemology, as ontology and epistemology are interlinked. Ontological 
assumptions can often be left unspoken if writers exclusively concentrate on 
only describing their methods for producing truth (epistemology). The key 
ontological point I want to be explicit about from the start is that I am assuming 
human beings are moral and narrative beings in line with Taylor (1989). 
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Taylor (1989) is crucial in developing this moral ontological position because 
he links narrative to morality. Taylor argues knowledge is the result of narrative 
experience. Narrative agents know the world primarily through engaging in 
relational experiences rather than ‘knowing’ through detached cogitative 
contemplation. This narrative engagement with the social world is, for Taylor, 
unavoidably a moral engagement with society, infused with strong (and 
variable) positive and negative evaluations of ways of being in the world 
(Taylor, 1989). Taylor says, “Selfhood and the good, or in another way 
selfhood and morality, turn out to be inextricably intertwined themes.”  (Taylor, 
1989, p. 3). 
 
Taylor rejects the Kantian view of ourselves as pure rational agents, in favour 
of seeing people as combinations of rational, relational, moral and emotional 
factors. Taylor argues identity cannot be separated from the moral views (the 
“strong evaluations”) which we constantly make about ourselves and others, 
about what it is good, fair and right ways of being in the world and which ways 
are bad, unfair or wrong. Being human means we have moral reactions to 
events. Morality is the tripwire of our emotions (e.g. anger at injustice). Prior to 
modernity people would speak of their ‘moral-emotions’ as a unified 
experience (e.g. Hancock, 1824). 
 
The success of modern natural science, argues Taylor, has cast a “great 
epistemological cloud” over the assumptions of much human sciences over 
the last two centuries. He criticises the widespread acceptance of modern 
scientific epistemology which in general fails to address the fact that people 
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are moral agents. Hence, while the DSM historically borrowed from narratives 
of Christianity, explored in chapter 2, now it has rhetorically obscured these 
narratives. Taylor also questions whether the methods of natural science can 
easily be applied to human beings. He argues modern science’s errors are 
largely accepted because “...[the] moral ontology behind any person’s views 
can remain largely implicit.” (Taylor, 1989, p. 9).  
 
Taylor argues we live under this “great weight” of a modern epistemology, from 
which the human sciences must escape to gain better ways of producing truth 
claims. Thus the modern identity dilemma is a moral dilemma - where we try 
to fit our moral selves into scientific facts, which simply does not work (Taylor, 
1989, p. 10). Social plurality means a number of competing stories circulate 
about what ‘the good life’ is, which makes many of our moral beliefs tentative 
and unsure (Docherty, 1993). For some people the solution is to believe that 
science can give us moral answers about what are ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘right’ or ‘just’ 
ways to live.  
 
Thus the modern identity, according to Taylor, tends to be wondering “what is 
the good life to live?” and, “in what way shall I live life?” These questions 
cannot avoid bringing morality into play. The space we orientate within is 
inescapably a moral space in relationship with others who judge us morally 
(positively or negatively) provoking feelings in us of pride or shame. We judge 
and evaluate ourselves by a set of values, which can change over time. In 
contemporary society people tend to be unsure if others share their moral 
views on a range of topics. In fact, we may ourselves only be tentatively 
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tethered to our current moral framework, doubting how ‘believable’ it is. In a 
pluralist world of competing and conflicting ethical stories about what “the good 
life” is, some people choose to change the narrative (story) they orientate 
themselves within many times, re-orientating subjectivity until they settle within 
a good story.  
 
The central relevance of Taylor to Personality Disorder is that he draws our 
attention to the narrative of being “on a quest”. The object of the quest appears 
to be the “...finding of a believable moral framework” (ibid., p. 17).   Finding this 
believable moral framework is crucial to understanding one’s problems within 
a life story. It is through believable moral stories (with plots, goals, conflicts 
and characters in them) that people make sense of their lives. This process of 
“trying to make sense of our lives” takes on the form of a story as it becomes 
“the object of a quest.” (ibid., p. 18). To illustrate this point, Taylor gives an 
example of a moral story in ancient Greece, as Plato’s view that the good life 
consisted of dominating and controlling yourself by gaining mastery over your 
desires through the use of Reason, a plot line he argues modern science has 
adapted. 
 
Comparing stories in a dialogue with each other and teasing out what parts of 
a narrative are general (e.g. Valuing Self-Mastery as a good way of being) and 
which are unique (e.g. Reason defined as scientific rationality) is one of the 
analytic techniques used in narrative methodology (Taylor, 1989, p. 21). I will 
apply this technique in this study, comparing different stories which made 
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sense of mental and emotional distress in a dialogue with each other, teasing 
out what elements were the same and which were unique.  
 
I agree with Taylor’s ontology of people searching for moral meaning within 
narratives, searching for a kind of narrative truth. We saw in chapter 2 how 
people sometimes describe their life metaphorically like a “journey”, describing 
where they have previously travelled to get to their current identity/position, 
and then often expressing intentions to move forward with their life in some 
way. Thus people make sense of themselves within unfinalised and unfolding 
narratives orientated towards “good” ways of being in the world, interwoven 
with morals, emotions and relationships. There is not just one narrative 
available, instead multiple possible narratives exist within which people can 
choose to orientate themselves. These narratives, including ‘self-mastery 
through reason’, often compete with and contradict each other, or fuse into 
hybrid stories (Taylor, 1989). 
 
Taylor’s philosophical ontology resonates with two basic points of 
Polkinghorne’s narrative analytic method: 1. Human beings constantly tell 
themselves and others stories (with plots), and 2. These stories can be 
analysed to create some useful insights and truth claims (Polkinghorne, 1995). 
In Narrative methodology the social (space) and time (history) dimensions are 
explored and analysed through the narrative elements of someone’s told story, 
drawing heavily on literary theory. This can then shed light on important 
concerns such as the transformation of identity, people’s relationship to social 
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space and the how plots and story-lines help people make meaning and sense 
of unusual, extreme or unexpected experiences in their life. 
 
Narrative accounts can be seen to be positioned amongst powerful discursive 
practices and major institutions, and/or ongoing social change processes. The 
weight of the focus on the narrative voice does not preclude the analysis by 
the researcher reflecting outwards, from the narrative with its plots, to reflect 
on insights into the bigger stories at work in the wider social world.  As 
Plummer (2001) argues, narrative method can be used as an analytic tool to 
allow the researcher to analyse the relationship between the dominant 
discursive practices and social change from the perspective of an individual 
narrative account. Plummer’s narrative approach focuses on examining the 
relationship between social history and biographical narratives, teasing out the 
contingent social forces that may be at work on the body of the individual 
narrator. 
 
Writers such as Plummer (2001) and Good (2001) have shown narrative 
analytic tools can be applied that enable the individual narrative to be linked to 
a relationship with social historic phenomenon. Macro-level social changes 
may be referenced in micro-level narratives, such as the growth of, and 
subsequent closing down of, asylums, or the growth of the post-psychiatry and 
service-user led movements. Thus the narrative account allows for sociological 
and social-psychological analytic observations to be drawn. Narrative 
approaches allow consideration of the structured spacial/temporal relationship 
between characters in a typical plot, such as professional and patient in a 
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medical drama - around the ever moving space of “what it seems reasonable” 
to do with someone in an extreme state. History shows us that anything can 
be justified as reasonable, the difficulty is that what is reasonable may not 
equate with what is moral. 
 
Bakhtin (1981) criticises monological discourses, such as positivistic human 
sciences, in favour of ‘polyphony’ - a dialogue between multiple discourses in 
time/space. Such a dialogue is without a final outcome (see Morson and 
Emmerson, 1990). Thus narrative epistemological approaches have the 
advantage of freeing up the analysis from dominant ideological theories that 
shape ways of thinking and listening to (filtering) the individual detail of 
someone’s story. Instead such approaches allow reflection outward, from the 
micro ‘small story’ to shed light on macro ‘Big Stories’ (wider social discursive 
practices). In positivistic approaches powerful discourses dominate their 
subject whilst saying little about the power relationship they are gripping their 
subjects within, in order to examine and treat them.   
 
There are multiple reasons human beings may believe something is true, such 
as; knowledge gained through training in a profession, they may trust a 
particular epistemology, or the authority of an institution/profession producing 
a text, or are emotionally moved by some information, or because it makes 
sense in a story (it is coherent and plausible), or they trust the teller through a 
relationship of built trust, or they may believe in a revealed truth, or people may 
believe the majority opinion, because it fits with someone’s values, sense of 
social-justice or ethical beliefs, or people may believe as ‘true’ what it is 
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traditional locally to believe (a variety being ‘clinical tradition’), or believe 
something is true through personal experience of some knowledge working 
effectively to solve a practical problem. 
 
The authority of an author to claim truth can be linked to power-relations, for 
example if their speaking position relies on holding a professional role within a 
powerful institution. Stanley (1994) illustrates how a narrative approach can 
challenge positivistic scientific research by bringing issues of power relations 
into consideration. Individual mental health service users hold relatively little 
power (institutionally, economically, culturally, in terms of roles) in relation to 
established powerful psychiatric institutions and their discursive practices. 
Consideration of power relationships is usually downplayed by psychiatry’s 
monological narrative of its method progressively discovering more and more 
human ‘truth’ to its subjects. Although relatively powerless, individual subjects 
can always practice strategies of resistance such as refusing to take part in a 
study, or refusing a particular type of treatment. Monological discourses are 
ones which, desiring a monopoly over what they consider their business, often 
silence and invalidate alternative ways of seeing the world. This is significant 
because studies find validation is often important in recovery narratives from 
Personality Disorder (Holm and Severinsson, 2011), so it would seem wise to 
be mindful of narratives that can invalidate experience.  
 
Professional psychiatric accounts tend to claim a monopoly on telling the truth 
of the subject they claim authority over. The reality is though that there are 
always multiple, competing, alternative accounts of how to make sense of 
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experiences, which a monological discursive practice like psychiatry 
undervalues, in order to exercise its authority over the subject. We touched on 
an example of this in chapter 2 when the Quaker’s “moral treatment” of 
madness valued itself as being an “amateur” approach to madness in the late 
1700’s, but this was quickly taken over and professionalised by medical 
science as its success threatened its professional hegemony. As a strategy to 
devalue and disempower amateur discursive practices medical science began 
to claim (for example, in the Asylum Journal (quoted in Digby, 1985, p. 113)) 
that moral treatment could now only be carried out by physicians. 
 
Narrative method itself can be put into its academic historical context within 
the hermeneutic tradition. The philosophical paradigm which narratives are 
analysed within will influence the interpretation, and thus the kind of knowledge 
produced.  Qualitative research methodology in the human sciences has been 
particularly influenced by the philosophical paradigms of both phenomenology 
and hermeneutics. Husserl’s (1975) phenomenological method involves 
bracketing off the researcher’s beliefs to understand the other’s experience in 
order to get at ‘the truth’ of an everyday subjective experience, from which to 
make broader generalisations (Husserl, 1975). Thiselton, trying to summarise 
the Hermeneutic approach says it: “...explores how we read, understand and 
handle texts, especially those from another time or in the context of life different 
from our own.” (Thiselton, 2009, p.1). Taking this seriously in this study meant 
reading and re-reading my selected sample of accounts to understand their 
experience. This is explained in more detail below (4.4 and 4.5) where I outline 
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the steps of my analysis, but signposting the connection between theory and 
analysis here helps to demonstrate its practical benefit. 
 
Hermeneutics as an approach, as outlined by Seebohm (2004), argues that 
the art of interpreting texts that recorded human experiences is the best 
method for investigating human experiences. Lived experience is seen as an 
internal subjective process that no one else can experience, but on the other 
hand, the expression of the lived experience (in art, music, language and other 
texts) allowed for interpretation and understanding to occur. Hermeneutics 
made epistemological claims to be the science of the interpretation of the 
symbolically expressed representations of interior lived experience. In this 
approach, understanding comes from interpreting from a particular perspective 
in time/space. Thus Hermeneutics allows for social and historical phenomena 
to inform the interpretation.  
 
For Gadamer (1975), a dialogue process of mutual understanding and 
interpretation creates the meaning of the narrative. He calls this dialogue of 
interpretation the “fusion of horizons”. The meaning of a narrative is created in 
the relationship of the reading of it - from another space and time. In a 
dialogical relationship more than one interpretation of a narrative account is 
possible as it is interpreted by different people from different time/space 
locations and subject positions. The hermeneutic interpretive relationship is a 
dialogical one where the reader and the read are sensitive to their position and 
relative trajectories in time and space and yet make an interpretation of the 
narrative account. This meant this analysis involved interpreting both the 
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subjectivities created by an author of a text and interpreting the anticipated 
alternative ‘readings’ by different readers. 
 
Gadamer (1975) developed the hermeneutic approach to argue we all have a 
‘belongingness’ to our world which situates us within historical and cultural / 
social traditions. We interpret other people’s narrative accounts with certain 
questions in mind from our situated (time/social space) context, or subjective 
reading position. For example, only in certain time/spaces does the reader ask 
of the narrative, what unconscious desires are at play here? Or, is the 
protagonist seeking “closure”? The questions that form in us are not originating 
in us. This applies to my work in that I will be analysing and interpreting my 
narrative at some points at a distance of 25 years in time. I will also critically 
examine the questions that come to mind and ask if they are not originating 
from within me then where are they originating from in time/space? If questions 
come to mind about my unconscious, alienation, class, closure, trauma, etc. 
then these questions need to be related to the history of the social space I am 
thinking inside of. If I thought differently in 1993/4 then this may say something 
about the trajectory of my reading position and the wider social context. 
 
Epistemologically, in contrast to scientific positivistic methods discovering 
ontological ‘facts’ about people outside of time and space hermeneutic 
narrative method searches for a ‘dialogical truth’ interpreting in-between at 
least two locations in time and space, which may change both the reader and 
the read. The co-ordinates of their relative positions will include factors such 
as gender, class, ethnicity, how long they have been alive, values, etc. A 
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dialogue can play out between them where they interpret the other from their 
positions. From this dialogue, epistemological claims can be made within the 
hermeneutic narrative method which acknowledges the unfinalised, dialogical 
nature of truths claimed.  
 
Narrative method is able to value individual stories over social and political 
concerns, without ultimately ignoring them.  According to Polkinghorne (1995) 
Narrative is defined as a story whose parts are unified in time by means of a 
plot. He argues human beings engage in a core activity of making meaning out 
of their experiences by organising multiple experiences into ‘stories’ with 
characters in them, where organised patterns help to connect the story 
together into a coherent whole. The patterns which organise the experiences 
into a kind of narrative order, or coherent story, are called a “plot” and can 
include such things as; beginning, middle and endings, cause and effect, co-
incidents, co-operation, conflicts and goals. Other common elements in the 
stories people tell each other are emotions, relationships, moral evaluations 
and descriptions of other characters. So, in practice, my steps of analysis (4.5) 
involve looking at accounts in these terms, after reading and re-reading 
phenomenologically. 
 
In narrative methodology the main unit of analysis is the individual life rather 
than a discourse, social group or institution. It focuses on specific and 
individual rather than seeking to make sweeping generalisations and resists 
the temptation to formulate grand theories, such as theories of madness (for 
example, DSM-5, 2013). It takes a contextual approach, where social/cultural 
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context is taken into account in its influence on the story but also the 
social/cultural question is inverted to consider what the story says about the 
historical/social/cultural context of the narrative account of a lived life.  
 
Narrative method takes time into account, i.e. the historical context of the told 
biographical account being analysed.  The subjective experience of how time 
is experienced can be analysed through plot, and other literary concepts such 
as chronotopic genre shifts indicated by time slowing down/speeding up. For 
example, Brunner (1986) argues analysing a biographical account through 
‘narrative plot’ is much more effective in terms of increasing understanding 
than using a “paradigmatic” framework or theory where theoretical models with 
atemporal categories and theoretic frameworks are imposed over someone’s 
story. If a person’s conceptual lens is dominated by a framework that divides 
people into clear categories such as “personality disorder” and “schizophrenia” 
as they listen they may try to fit the person’s story into one of these distinctive 
categories. The framework’s categories may help a professional decide how 
to act next, but at the potential cost of downplaying significant narrative 
elements. Brunner (1986) simply argues it is more helpful to analyse the story 
in terms of what it is, namely a story with plot, characters, action, etc. rather 
than trying to reduce and fit the story into a simple framework of categories 
(formed from a theory). In addition to resisting imposing frameworks and 
categories, the narrative analysis I am choosing does not try to build up large 
theoretical frameworks from biographical accounts.  
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Within the fields of narrative analysis there are conflicting views about 
particular emphasis of techniques to produce truth and insight, but these 
differences are generally tolerated and even welcomed in keeping with the 
underlying philosophy which tends to have a Bakhtinian dialogical flavour to it 
(Morson and Emmerson, 1990). In a narrative approach poetic, artistic and 
aesthetic power and qualities are thought to contribute to the meaning of 
narrative, so these concepts can be analysed (e.g. as in Frank, 1995). In 
contrast Kleinman (1988) emphasises empathic attention to “the voice”. 
Rejecting positivism, narrative practitioners emphasise considering the ethical 
stances of researcher, researched and reader in dialogical relationship. This 
ethical concern and the use of literary analytic approaches has been criticised 
(Atkinson, 1997) as being too loose with too much emphasis on ethics, lacking 
a rigid systematic structure or prescriptive method that others could follow as 
a systematic method. However, this criticism has since been addressed 
through publications of systematic methodological approaches to dialogical 
qualitative analysis (e.g. Sullivan, 2012). 
 
Some narrative approaches emphasise being holistic and person centred 
within psychology and social psychology in their opposition to positivism (e.g. 
Polkinghorne, 1995) whilst others are more influenced by Post-Structuralist 
(e.g. Barthes, 1973) and postmodernist thinkers (e.g. Foucault, 2001). An 
example of this postmodernist section within the range of narrative 
methodologies would be Tamboukou (2003). An example of commentators 
who make such a distinction within narrative approaches would be Andrews et 
al. (2008). The reason I have not followed the group of narrative approaches 
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represented by Tamboukou (2003) is that I believe they go too far towards 
assuming the discourse tells the story of the subject and does not allow enough 
individual agency to come through to allow the subject to tell their story. I do 
believe subjects can have numerous discourses within them at one time, but I 
prefer narrative methodology that, on balance, allows for enough individual 
agency to be at play to respect that people have choices and resistance 
strategies in relation to multiple discourses in society and are not just told by 
the discourses. However, I do acknowledge that discourses enter and leave 
people, in that people have experiences of thoughts and feelings within them 
that did not originate within them. In this analysis this meant identifying words 
or phrases from authoritative discourses (outside-in) that people make use of 
to express subjective (inside-out) experiences, such phrases as; ‘one day at a 
time’, ‘alienation’, ‘PTSD’, ‘trauma survivor’, ‘disassociation’, etc. This also 
involved identifying the major genres these phrases have originally been 
created within. 
 
In terms of power relations, narrative analysis empowers the individual over 
institutions (Frank, 2006). Narrative research methods emphasise listening to 
the individual story that is voiced, which has usually been silenced over time 
and left on the margins of public spaces and debates. Thus politically, in 
narrative approach, power shifts towards empowering the subject and away 
from powerful institutional discursive practices. Power relationships (between 
researched, researched, discourses and institutions) can be fore-grounded 
and considered rather than denied and hidden (Reissman, 1993). Thus 
ethically narrative method resists centripetal traditional forces by paying 
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attention to individual stories, analysing them using narrative concepts taken 
from literary theory (Bakhtin, 1981) as a way to open up a new space for 
thinking about a human experience.  
 
Another reason for choosing narrative method is that personal biographical 
accounts contain evaluative statements (because we understand experiences 
in moral/ethical ways) and this allows us to align ourselves with others 
collectively. As Plummer (2001) has pointed out, once people are enabled to 
see their experience within a moral and ethical framework and share their story 
with others they can become politicised and connect with likeminded others, 
and start to relate to moral debates in the public sphere and collective action 
to improve society. Narrative method can allow social groups to form loosely, 
around similar biographical narrative plots (such as the ‘survivor’ movement 
campaigning against certain psychiatric practices). Thus narrative can 
threaten the status quo because its moral/ethical focus politicises subjects with 
madness instead of individualizing, depoliticising them into individually passive 
patients exhibiting pathological symptoms outside of space and time, subject 
to powerful expert treatments and opinion (Foucault, 2001). 
 
The moral, when organised collectively can become political, and this is 
achieved through stories people can identify with, containing themes and plots 
(e.g. Blackman, 2001). For example, six alternate narrative plots for social 
change are: the system needs no substantial change / needs some improving 
/ needs reforming / needs radical transformation / needs replacing with an 
alternative / needs closing down. If people feel morally strongly motivated on 
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the issues they orientate themselves within one of these stories (e.g. as seen 
with the anti-slavery movement). Whitaker (2010, 2017) would be an example 
of a change narrative calling for a ‘radical transformation’ of mental health 
services in America.  Blackman (2001) has argued that enabling people to put 
their unusual or extreme experience into a moral/ethical story allows them to 
‘make sense of it’ with other people and so the experience becomes social, 
real and “embodied”. This allows people’s stories to become political and they 
can then align themselves with others, through their story telling, and then work 
collectively and politically for social change.  
 
Any resistances to monological discursive practices are more likely to succeed 
if individuals organise resistance collectively, which requires a narrative 
understanding in time/space (chronotope). Relating socially to others with 
similar biographical narrative plots, or sub-plots, can empower people to not 
feel alone and to believe their own account more than contradictory 
professional accounts of their experience. Developing narratives can be used 
to resist professional re-telling of experiences because they have their own 
power (Porter, 2008).  
 
A criticism noted by Reissman (1993) was that narrative analysis in the 1990’s 
did not have a set of standardised procedures to follow, however now 
standardised methodological approaches are much more established (e.g. 
Sullivan, 2012). The narrative analytic approach I will use will draw on the 
narrative methods of Mishler (1995), Reissman (1993), Sullivan (2012) and 
Bakhtin (1981). In chapter five this study aims to investigate an account of a 
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journey through, into and out of mad time/space, or what some people might 
chose to call madness, mental illness, mental health problems, moral insanity 
or mental disorder, depending on the time/space they are thinking and feeling 
within. The analysed narrative account includes experiences of receiving 
diagnoses from medical science (such as “psychotic depression” and 
“personality disorder” (documented in psychiatric notes) as well as a various 
treatments (for example; psychopharmacology, hospitalisation and 
psychotherapy (reflected on in diary entries)).  
 
I justify my methodological approach by placing narrative epistemological 
methods within a stream (admittedly not a mainstream) of accepted academic 
tradition, with particular emphasis on the methods of Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1981) 
Dialogical approach. These narrative epistemological methods are positioned 
in an explicit relationship with the moral ontology of Taylor (1989). This is 
necessary in order to resist the often not-articulated positivistic ontological 
assumptions of psychiatry, which remove the human subject from its moral 
and social world, as explored in chapter 3. 
 
Analysing narrative accounts of recovery is one way to challenge the power of 
the medical model of psychiatry because it can build an evidence base for 
alternative understandings of experiences which can challenge powerful 
professional understandings. Narrative accounts have the potential to allow 
mental and emotional experiences pathologised as symptoms of a disease 
process to be re-thought as normal variations of social being. For example, 
Romme & Morris (2013) challenged traditional psychiatric thinking on 
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schizophrenia by reflecting on the landmark publication researching 50 first-
hand accounts of recovery from people who hear voices (Romme, et al., 2009). 
They concluded voices were better understood in relation to the person’s 
problems in daily life and not as a ‘psychotic symptom’ of an illness. 
 
Medical science tends to hide its ethical and political positions (its power 
relations with its subjects) within monological epistemological claims to be the 
only, or best, way to produce truth (see Burkenkotter, 2001, Hodge and Bryant, 
2017, Shaw and Proctor, 2005). Dialogical narrative approaches are one way 
to redress this epistemologically supported power imbalance, through listening 
to individual stories of people with lived experience of psychiatric diagnosis 
and treatment.  Thus narrative methods can empower survivor / service user 
accounts by privileging amateur accounts over professional 
accounts/assessments. 
 
Narrative method favours those with less power in society and takes up an 
ethical and political position with a bias towards the relatively powerless, 
inherent in its methods of truth production (Frank, 1995). As Plummer (2001) 
argues, it is a strategy for giving voice to the marginalised accounts which tend 
to be silenced by powerful professional methods, such as medical science. 
Narrative method for producing truth claims have been criticised for this bias 
towards those with relatively weak positions in time/space (e.g. Atkinson, 
1997) but all truth producing methods have bias. Large scale scientific studies 
are biased, before they start, towards those topics to be studied that someone, 
somewhere, for some reason, is willing to pay for. The dominant epistemology 
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of medical science has its own bias towards the already existing rich and 
powerful institutions (which pay for its studies) and their discursive practices 
(see Burkenkotter, 2001).  
 
Tomas Kuhn has shown in his work (Kuhn, 1962) that even within the range of 
discursive practices called “science”, scientist always bring pre-existing beliefs 
and moral positions to their work (Kuhn, 1962, p. 4) and so are never fully 
‘objective’, in the sense science often claims, when it tells its story. This is not 
to dismiss positivistic science, it has a story to tell and can be useful, but it 
needs to be seen in the context of its strengths and weaknesses, as one way 
of claiming truths amongst many. 
 
My argument now develops to the position that, whist positivist science can be 
helpful at times, other approaches to making sense of extreme experiences 
exist within the academic literature. Examining the macro-level historical 
discursive shift from moral to medical understandings in chapters 2 and 3 
showed there is a gap in the literature when it comes to understanding the 
moral narrative ‘quest’ that stories from diagnosis to recovery can reveal. The 
shift in perspective from examining macro level discursive histories over the 
past two centuries in chapters 2 and 3 to the micro level of auto-biographical 
accounts in chapters 5 and 6 is the reason for this chapter setting out a 
narrative methodological approach appropriate for analysing personal 
accounts of madness.  
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4.2 Top-down, theoretically informed narrative analysis 
This chapter outlines the methodology I am using for this study, which is a top-
down, theoretically informed narrative analysis of both an autobiographical 
account of a journey, diary entries, medical notes and an analysis of other 
accounts. Such an approach can be situated amongst others, such as Drake 
and Whitley’s (2014) thematic narrative analysis of ‘recovery’ narratives, Adler 
et al. (2015) study of variability in mental health narrative identities, Holm and 
Severinsson’s (2011) study of recovery narratives of those diagnosed with 
Borderline Personality Disorder, and Morris et al.’s (2015), narrative analysis 
of people referred to a personality disorder service (discussed in more detail 
below in 4.3). This chapter outlines (in 4.5) the specific steps of narrative 
analytic method I am adopting epistemologically, in order to claim 
understanding from analysing accounts of journeying through a space-time of 
chronic emotional and mental distress.  
 
The kind of analysis I am attempting is similar to Peter Good’s (2001) 
Bakhtinian narrative technique and I use the dialogical methodological 
approach outlined by Sullivan (2012).  Good (2001) explores how the different 
time/space locations of professionals and patients influence their dialogues 
and sense-making, such as the extent to which they draw on official 
professional languages and/or unofficial everyday narratives. Essentially, 
Good analyses psychiatry through a Bakhtinian lens, focussing on the contrast 
between the formal language of psychiatry and the informal language used 
both by psychiatrists and service user.  The following two chapters analyse 
narrative accounts and, in part, attempts to identify the different discourses 
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people draw upon in order to make sense of their experiences, which include 
both official/professional languages and unofficial/everyday languages.   
 
Bakhtin’s writings (1981) have established his way of thinking epistemology, 
and his analytic concepts as having significance beyond literary theory. 
Although he appeared at first (in Soviet Russia) to be thinking about the novel, 
it is easy to see how this way of thinking can reach over to look at the traditional 
territory of the human and social sciences. If ontologically people are basically 
moral people looking for a good narrative to make sense of and position 
(orientate) themselves (and other people) within, then it makes pragmatic 
sense that philosophical and literary narrative analysis can aid an intellectual 
questioning and analysing of what those stories are. The stories people are 
positioned within, or have imposed upon them despite resistance, by powerful 
institutional practices can also be considered, as there is always an ongoing 
dialogue between authoritative stories and the internal persuasiveness of 
individuals. Recent examples of narrative research into mental health crisis 
and recovery are discussed in the next section (4.3) followed by two further 
sections, outlining the steps taken in this study for my data collection (4.4) and 
data analysis (4.5).   
 
4.3 Narrative and Autobiography research focussing on mental health crisis 
and recovery 
 
Personal narrative accounts of experiences such as madness have always, 
and currently, exist. However, compared to the 1990’s, when Reissman noted 
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they were largely ignored in research (Reissman, 1993) they are now 
increasingly paid attention to. Particularly over the last decade the use of 
autobiography as data in mental health research has become more 
established and accepted. Examples of this include McGrath and Reavey 
(2015), who used a thematic approach drawing on theories of embodiment and 
relational space to analyse published autobiographies. Examining how people 
manage mental health crisis they found people either increase or decrease 
engagement with public or private spaces. Drake and Whitley (2014) also 
examined autobiographical accounts, specifically of ‘recovery’ from severe 
mental illness. Making use of thematic narrative analysis they found common 
themes of; being ‘on a journey’, developing autonomy and agency and 
increasing involvement in community activity, education or employment.  
 
The use of autobiography in mental health research often draw on theories of 
narrative identity (such as Hammack, 2008). Such theories view people 
making sense of their lives by constructing a narrative order and then narrating 
stories about their day to day experiences. Adler et al. (2015) draw on narrative 
identity theory in two longitudinal studies exploring the relationship between 
trajectories of mental health and variability in narrative identity.  They found 
the way an individual constructs personal narratives are likely to impact their 
trajectory of mental health, particularly around how challenging experiences 
are constructed into personal narratives.  Narrative themes of agency, 
communion, contamination and redemption were found to significantly impact 
people who developed mental health problems, when compared to those who 
did not (Adler, et al., 2015). 
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Holm and Severinsson (2011) conducted in-depth interviews with women 
diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder to explore how a recovery 
process changed suicidal behaviour. A thematic analysis showed two key 
themes of “struggling to assume responsibility for self and others” and 
“struggling to stay alive by enhancing self‐development”. They concluded 
some key experiences are significant in allowing positive change to take place, 
specifically the narrative themes of feeling safe, trusted and validated (Holm 
and Severinsson, 2011). Another study, by Morris et al. (2015), examined the 
narratives of eight people who self-cut who had been referred to a personality 
disorder service. Five narrative temporal themes were identified, namely; “A 
vicious circle”, “Trying to turn my life around”, “A big release … to get rid of all 
the pain and hurt”, “A different world” and “Being seen and not heard”. They 
concluded there was a need for mental health service staff to have skills to be 
validating and compassionate to enable service users develop more optimistic 
narratives about their future (Morris et al., 2015). In another study Adler et al., 
(2012) draw on narrative identity theories to compare 20 people with 
Borderline Personality Disorder with 20 people without a diagnosis. They found 
three themes of significant differences became apparent in relation to narrative 
identity, which were; narrative coherence, communion fulfilment and individual 
agency (Adler et al., 2012). Thus there are examples of approaches to the 
study of mental health and Personality Disorder that use a narrative 
methodology and autobiographical accounts. I intend to take these forward via 
a turn to ‘dialogue’ by utilising key elements from Bakhtin’s conceptual lens, 
such as dialogical ontology, otherness and understanding in a relatively 
remote context.  
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However, whilst there has been an increase in studies taking a narrative 
approach it is worth noting some narrative accounts are looked at through the 
lens of a modern positivist methodology and agenda. For example, some 
historical narrative accounts of madness are read with the sole aim of 
diagnosing historical figures retrospectively with 21st century psychiatric 
disorders (e.g. Cox, 2003, in relation to King George in England).  
 
4.4.1 Data Collection and Ethical Dilemmas for this study 
 
To undertake this analysis I needed an auto-biographical account to analyse 
and reflect upon using narrative methodology. This throws up many ethical 
questions, such as: how to recruit someone who felt comfortable telling their 
story (Loue & Pike, 2007)?, would retelling their story cause them distress or 
damage in going over traumatic episodes?, whose benefit was this for? – to 
cast some light on the experience of madness?, to help improve approaches 
to madness or widen a debate around this?, or was it just to help Ray get a 
PhD and improve the status of his ‘speaking position’?. These ethical 
dilemmas were not insurmountable, but on reflection I came to the decision to 
tell my own story and then analyse it using narrative methodology. This 
possibility had its own ethical dilemmas to consider, as well as methodological 
ones.  
 
The use of my own data (medical notes and diaries) was discussed with the 
chair of the ethics committee, but at that time ethical clearance for this by 
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the committee itself was not needed, therefore it didn't go through the ethics 
committee. For the use of public domain material I attach an appendix (IV) of 
the relevant ethics form from 2012 (see annex 1 of the form which instructs 
supervisors to sign off public domain material themselves). Ethical 
consideration was given to the Internet-mediated research (IMR) aspect of this 
study as publically available online narratives were to be analysed using 
narrative methodology. Currently the most recent guidance around ethical 
considerations is published by the British Psychological Society (BPS, 2017). 
The consideration of the ethical concerns was made in discussion with my 
supervisors in 2012, and we considered it would be ethically justifiable to use 
these publically available narratives in the context of this study through a 
process of weighing up the potential harm against the potential benefit. Our 
decision considered that this data collection was passive (i.e. non-reactive) as 
the data about individuals would be collected unobtrusively as ‘found text’ in 
publically published narratives on a website. Current guidelines (BPS, 2017) 
are particularly concerned about reactive contexts, when participants are 
actively and knowingly participating in a study mediated through the internet. 
As this study was not proposing to set up a reactive context it was not 
necessary to set up consent, withdrawal of consent, and debriefing processes. 
Ethically with IMR there are particular considerations if the data is generated 
in a private or semi-private forum, such as a chat room. As this study only 
looked at pre-published narratives already in the public domain concerns 
around confidentiality of private data were not thought to be significant.  
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Consideration was given to anonymising the direct quotes, but this was 
considered to be potentially disrespectful to the authors of each narrative as 
they had identified themselves as the author in the public domain. Where 
someone identified with a first name only, or anonymously, this was respected 
by copying their preferred public and published way to identify themselves with 
their narrative. Direct quotations also respected author’s autonomy and 
ownership of their narrative. The risk of this research disrupting social groups 
in terms of being social responsible was considered to be negligible. Scientific 
integrity was thought to be achievable as the scope of the research online was 
limited to these narratives and the methodology was appropriate and 
proportionate (i.e. narrative/dialogical methodology). Potential harm was 
minimised by directly quoting publically available narratives and not seeking to 
generate new narratives in a reactive way of recruiting people with mental 
health difficulties for the purpose of this study.  
 
Thus the gathering of publicly published online narratives is considered to be 
in line with the latest ethical guidelines (BPS, 2017), specifically because The 
Code of Human Research Ethics states consent is not needed when public 
behaviour would be expected to be observed by strangers. The narratives of 
recovery used in this research were published on a publically accessible 
website, which could reasonably be argued as being in the public domain. We 
believe this puts this data into the category where participants expect to “…be 
observed by strangers” (BPS, 2017, p. 6) and thus not needing valid consent 
according to the ethical guidance. Although the ethical considerations were 
made in the academic context of 2012, on review in 2018 we believe they also 
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meet the requirements of the most up to date ethical guidance (BPS, 2017) for 
the reasons outlined above. 
 
In terms of justifying the ethics of disclosing my own narrative in this study, I 
have criticised science for pretending to an objective, amoral and valueless 
reading, observing and speaking position which never fully exists in the real 
world (Kuhn, 1962). I then thought if I analysed another’s story whilst keeping 
silent about my own speaking position (in space/time) I was in danger of 
mimicking that which I had criticised psychiatry for doing – of implying I had 
some neutral position outside of time/space from which I was observing and 
analysing someone else’s narrative. Narrative method allows for the revealing 
of the researcher rather than revelling in anonymising them (as psychiatry 
tends to do). I concluded at the very least to be ethically consistent with the 
dialogical approach I needed to make my position clear in space/time from 
which I was reading any narrative account. To use the concept of a speaking 
and reading “position” may suggest too much stability to the vantage point 
because we are always already moving in time/space and so a speaking or 
reading ‘trajectory’ may be a more accurate concept. This point led me to 
consider using my own narrative as the subject of the study because I have 
been through mad space/time during my life journey. I would be a valid subject 
for this study because I was diagnosed with “Personality Disorder” during the 
1990’s alongside other psychiatric diagnoses from different psychiatrists, such 
as depression, psychotic depression, Bi-Polar disorder, anxiety, obsessive 
compulsive disorder and substance misuse disorder. I have experienced a 
range of discursive practices from mental health services; such as 
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psychopharmacology, psycho-therapy, inpatient hospitalisation and multiple 
diagnosis. If I had not had these experiences then my story would not be an 
appropriate one to analyse for a study such as this, looking at personality 
disorder, but as I had had this journey, to a considerable extent my narrative 
does relate to the research topic. 
 
However I considered a risk that the account would be emotionally and 
mentally disturbing for me to revisit, and could do me some harm. I concluded 
that it would probably be emotionally and mentally disturbing, but not 
overwhelmingly so and that for me some emotional challenge was not 
sufficient reason avoid it. I thought the benefits of sharing experience and 
insights from receiving psychiatric services might outweigh the risks of 
personal upset at recalling difficult experiences or later regret at having put 
some of these in the public domain. One alternative considered was to 
interview someone else, in which case I would be willing to risk their upset for 
my benefit? So why not risk my own upset, as that seemed to me more ethical.  
 
It is worth noting I did not decide this recklessly, as I considered that my writing 
position in time/space now has some distance from the events. Having gone 
through mad time/space in the 1990’s I found ways to get better, relative to 
how I was, in a non-medical way and left behind a chaotic life and took on a 
much more stable life where I have been in full time employment, happily 
married with children, for over a decade. I thought that this decade away from 
using mental health services was for me, long enough to give me sufficient 
dialogical distance in time/space to revisit my story for the purposes of this 
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study. I also discussed the issue of the risk of psychological upset versus the 
possible benefits with my academic supervisors.  
 
Another consideration for me was that in the 1990’s there were very few 
positive auto-biographical accounts of coming through mad time/space 
successfully. In my ‘getting better’ journey of change it was important for me 
to hear stories of other people coming through extremely difficult human 
experiences, narrating, as Foucault (1990) puts it, the practice of “escaping 
themselves” to get to a better place. This influenced my decision, ethically, as 
I hoped in a small way my story and any analysis of it might be helpful to others 
going through some extreme difficulties. During my trips as a patient in and out 
of the psychiatric hospital in the 1990’s I never heard an account of someone 
getting better from “Personality Disorder” - none of the mental health 
professionals who treated me ever shared a “getting better” narrative with me, 
even an anecdotal one, that they may have heard about from another patient. 
Such a story may have given me some hope for my future. Narratives hold the 
potential power to instil hope for a better future, both individually and for 
socially excluded groups of people. 
 
There are precedents in the academic literature for auto-biographical 
narratives. Frank (2006) arguing on this point, says pretending it is desirable 
to avoid emotions is a scientific fallacy embedded in positivism. He argues we 
need to avoid pretended objectivity. However modernity has a strong influence 
on modern identity imposing a distrust of emotions and a false belief that 
epistemologically somehow emotion and truth have a spatial distance, and the 
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more we can eradicate emotion the closer we must be (spatially) to the “truth” 
– as in the modern Stoical approach (Taylor, 1989, p. 21). However, in reality 
the truth is not emotionally numb. It is a very modern fear that the ‘emotion’ 
might overwhelm the ‘rational’. This issue of allowing and validating emotions 
epistemologically in research methodology has been significantly 
acknowledged and addressed by feminist writers within the social sciences. 
For example, Gilbert summarises that,  
“Despite major shifts in social science research, emotionality is still 
constructed in opposition to rationality and professionalism, and the 
importance of emotions is denied.” (Gilbert, 2001, p. 19).   
However, I will be mindful to resist emotions overshadowing the theoretical 
threads I draw from the woven story, whilst not denying emotion is an important 
element in mental health and truth telling.  
 
There is also the ethical issue of how much to reveal of myself in the telling? 
Revealing certain episodes exposes me to the moral judgements of the 
readers, which could have many possible future implications, such as some 
employment prospects. This can usually be avoided methodologically by 
anonymising the narrator. However to achieve this here would, I think, be 
impossible without giving a misleading impression that I was analysing 
someone else’s narrative and not my own. Having considered the issue I will 
decide what an appropriate level of self-disclosure is in an ongoing way as I 
write the next chapter. Other authors who have narrated auto-biographical 
accounts have managed to edit what they share publically appropriately 
without having to anonymise their account (e.g. Frank, 1991).   
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Another influence on deciding to tell my story was that third party professional 
documentation was available to me, through data protection act (1998), such 
as all my medical notes, which I accessed. It would still be possible to apply a 
narrative analysis without these notes, but access to them allows for a richer 
analysis through reference to this professional discourse about my life. 
Interviewing someone else would be ethically justifiable, but not necessary for 
this study. In addition, it would be possible to compare analytic conclusions 
from analysing my autobiographical account to other autobiographical 
accounts in the public sphere to consider if similar themes can be drawn out 
from other accounts.  
 
The narrative will be written for research purposes, so this will influence the 
‘telling’ of it, but this in itself is not a good enough reason not to try, particularly 
as there is no neutral telling or reading position in life, only ongoing dialogues 
between locations in time/space. Therefore I concluded to take my subject 
matter as my first-hand narrative account of madness at the close of 20th 
century. Taking a narrative approach, one research aim is to increase 
understanding and the range of dialogue around extreme experience rather 
than seeking to establish objective scientific facts about difficult thoughts and 
feelings on the margins of time/space (historical social relations).  
 
Alison Torn (2009) helpfully introduces another dimension to the ethical 
dialogue on narrative method, that of “the ethics of telling” (Torn, 2009, p. 176). 
Morally she argues, researcher’s should identify who the possible audience is 
– who are the communities of powerful and marginalised voices (the 
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gatekeepers and policymakers) within a possible audience who the story 
intends to dialogue with and influence. Drawing on Plummer (1995), she 
argues the socially structured consumption of stories needs to be considered, 
in addition to the production and effect of stories. My hope would be in a small 
way this study may contribute to the wider debate between those 
commissioning and providing services and those experiencing chronic 
emotional and mental distress around what they can realistically offer (and the 
limits of what can be offered) in terms of helpful, and potentially new, dialogical 
practices. 
 
4.4.2 Steps of my Data Selection 
 
The data selected for analysis involves gaining access to my psychiatric 
medical notes and diary entries from the early 1990’s and my autobiographical 
account from 2012, in addition to the selective use of non-medical successful 
recovery stories already available in the public sphere on The Scottish 
Recovery Network website (2018).  I obtained my medical notes through 
requesting them under the data protection act. To begin with the non-medical 
successful recovery narratives are treated as both equal in status and 
independently analysed using the narrative methods outlined in this chapter, 
particularly drawing on Sullivan (2012). My autobiographical account was 
written when I had decided to use my own medical notes and diaries as a main 
source for the PhD, and the autobiographical account was a reflection from 
that time on what I read in the diary and medical notes. The fact that I wrote 
my autobiographical account after my theoretical reflections had begun and 
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after I had decided on a narrative/autobiographical approach is justifiable as I 
am doing a top-down narrative analysis which is theoretically informed. The 
top-down analysis is a selective focus, allowing the analysis to zone 
specifically in on the moral journey that emerged as a central theme from the 
earlier chapters.  
 
In chapter 6 I use data from online narratives. In 2012 there were a total of 50 
narrative accounts of recovery hosted on The Scottish Recovery website 
(2018). The clinical notes data analysed in chapter 5 showed six different 
psychiatric diagnosis were given, in addition to “Personality Disorder”, to the 
same individual (anxiety, bi-polar affective disorder, depression, psychotic 
depression, substance misuse disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder). This 
did raise interesting questions about arbitrariness and how inconsistently 
categorical models might be applied by different psychiatrists in clinical 
practice. I did not use 'Personality Disorder' as an exclusion criterion when 
selecting the 50 stories to analyse in chapter 6 because the academic journey 
so far has led to the conclusion that all mental health crises are a crisis of 
personality - understood as involving moral habits of excess and insufficiency 
- rather than there being a disease specific to the personality. So the accounts 
read for chapter 6 involve a broader variety of mental health diagnosis than 
just Personality Disorders, such as PTSD and Depression. Through an 
iterative and circular process of reading and re-reading the original 50 
narratives gradually dropped to 7 accounts for the final analysis, because 
those accounts that were dropped lacked particularly relevant 'key moments'.  
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Having read all of the data I selected specific excerpts for use in this analysis. 
These excerpts were selected for analysis because they involved ‘key 
moments’ (Sullivan, 2012) which were particularly significant in terms of 
medical and/or moral understandings relevant to answering the research 
question; ‘what narratives aid recovery in troubled journeys involving mental 
health crisis?’. The key moments selected for analysis in this study are quoted 
in their entirety throughout chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.5 Steps of my Data Analysis  
 
Specifically the systematic steps I am taking for the data analysis use the 
dialogical methodological approach advocated by Sullivan (2012), applied in 
chapter 5 to my own psychiatric notes and diary entries alongside an 
autobiographical account and also in chapter 6 to online narrative accounts of 
recovery. This systematic approach involves five steps;  
 
Step 1: Reading and Re-Reading all the transcripts/accounts; 
Step 2: Looking for and selecting key moments; 
Step 3: Identifying the major genres; 
Step 4: Looking for the material features of narration (formal, informal, 
diegetic, intra-diegetic), chronotopic genre shifts, use of metaphor.  
Step 5: Evaluation and validation of interpretations through dialogue with 
supervisors  
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Having selected my data (see 4.4.1 and 4.4.2) the first step I took was to read 
and re-read all the transcripts/accounts in order to familiarise myself with the 
whole data set. Having familiarised myself with all the transcripts/accounts, the 
second step I took was to re-read them looking for, and selecting, ‘key 
moments’. In narrative methodology key moments are described by Sullivan 
(Ch. 4, 2012) as significant utterances of variable length whose meaning is 
ready for a reaction/reply. These key extracts were selected on the basis of 
being the most relevant to the research questions, which for chapter 5 was; 
'how do the medical and the personal narratives of "Personality Disorder" 
interact in lived experience?, and for chapter 6 was; ‘what narratives aid 
recovery in troubled journeys involving mental health crisis?, with an interest 
in contrasting how medical and non-medical genres might be used in recovery 
narratives. In addition to content, in terms of form key moments were given a 
boundary in terms of containing significant shifts in chronotopic genre and/or 
the emotional atmosphere surrounding the reflection. For clarity each key 
moment was then given a letter/number reference and an identifying title in 
term of its referent. All key moments selected are reproduced in chapters 5 
and 6 in their entirety.  
 
Having selected key moments I moved onto the third step of identifying the 
major genres and discourses the key moments related with. Discourses were 
identified by direct reference or by use of key phrases or terms, such as 
diagnostic labels indicating the discourse of psychiatry was being referenced. 
Genres were primarily identified through generally accepted common plot 
elements, for example, the introduction of being set free by a spell being 
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broken into an everyday/conventional narrative plot would indicate the genre 
of magic realism was being utilised.  
 
Having identified the major genres I moved onto the fourth step of looking for 
formal and informal material features of narration involving the identification of 
metaphor, literary devices, structure, character(s) and plot along with the 
interlinkage of these to subjectivity. Such subjectivity is theoretically informed 
as being narratively changeable, in relation to the moral journeys someone 
orientates within. I am using these concepts in this study. Some are easily 
understandable from literary theory whilst others are hard to grasp due to the 
challenge to modern thinking that Bakhtin is making, in terms of ontology and 
epistemology. These narrative analytic tools, concepts and concerns include: 
the status of the author, narrative structure, the chronotope (representations 
of time and space within the narrative), dialogical relationships, voice, 
polyphonic complexity versus monological discourses, unfinalisability versus 
finalising texts, heteroglossia, the temporal structure of the narrative (when 
meaning is shaped in relation to time), threshold (crisis) and chronotopic genre 
shifts, change of identity in relation to threshold chronotopes (identity crisis), 
plot, sub-plot, character, textual inter-illumination and understanding 
something ‘in a remote context’. I will relate these material features back to my 
theoretical understanding of subjectivity in crisis, considering the social forces 
that may be at work on the subjectivity of the narrator. Drawing on Mishler 
(1995) this analysis also considers the narrative appears to function on 
multiple levels, such as in relations of resistance to power (political) and 
social/institutional processes (e.g. mental health assessments).  
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This fourth step includes identifying differences between inter-diegetic (inside-
out) narratives (where the narration comes from a character within the story) 
and extra-diegetic narration (outside-in) where a discourse is created from 
outside of the ‘hero’ of the text (see Sullivan, Ch. 7, 2012), such as in a 
professional mental health assessment. Consideration was given to how 
extradiegetic narratives re-accentuate intradiegetic utterances. Chronotropic 
genre shifts in the atmospheric representation of time and space (Sullivan, Ch. 
7, 2012) were identified, and reflected upon, in terms of how they both restrict 
and allow different types of subjectivity to emerge within complex genre 
interactions involving hybridised dilemmatic identity and changing authorial 
power via narration. 
 
Having analysed the material features of narration I moved onto the fifth step 
of evaluating and validating the interpretations through dialogue with 
supervisors. This final step in the process of evaluating my data analysis 
involved re-reading my interpretations through the dialogical methodological 
lens outlined above, in light of my supervisor feedback, and re-drafting 
chapters to draw out my key findings, themes and reflections on these. 
Persuasiveness (Reissman, 1993) was considered in terms of the extent to 
which there were similarities, but also differences, in themes emerging 
between different accounts in chapters 5 and 6. Thematic coherence 
(Reissman, 1993) was also considered in terms of validity in relation to the 
consistency with which narrative themes emerge regarding goals of narrators 
(e.g. to gain identity) and their justifications for ways to achieve overarching 
goals (such as undertaking a staged journey).  
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The evaluation step considered whether major genres were actually identified 
and the extent to which key moments were identified and then reflected on 
analytically. Evaluation of the quality of the analysis considered how well it 
tethered to the data, for example, reflection on how well the analysis-data 
relationship drew attention to transformative experiences of subjectivity 
through chronotpic genre shifts and interlinkages between dialogical 
subjectivity and discourses. Whether the analysis brought distinct voices (such 
as professional/amateur, medical/moral) into contact with each other in a 
polyphonic relationship between author and hero was also reflected upon 
during this step. This analysis was considered an intertextual product capable 
of being reconfigured within different space-times for evaluation. It was also 
held in mind that the truth being sought was a complex lived experience truth 
of ‘pravda’ and not an abstract truth (‘istina’).  
 
Conclusion: 
 
The purpose of this narrative approach is in part to value micro-level individual 
stories and illustrate that alternative ways of understanding madness are valid. 
My hope is to complement the macro-level in depth genealogical critique of 
psychiatric discursive practices examined in the preceding chapters. In order 
to avoid any conclusions from the analysis in chapter 5 being over-generalised 
from one data set in chapter 6 I will analyse other narrative accounts of 
madness available to researchers in the public domain via The Scottish 
Recovery Network (2018). The online accounts of recovery will be analysed 
independently and methodically, as outlined above, and then cross-compared. 
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This will allow both myself and the reader to weigh up for themselves how valid 
they believe the analytic conclusions are and how applicable they are to other 
accounts available in the public domain. 
 
I have outlined and justified the methods I am going to use to analyse my diary 
entries, an auto-biographical account and my medical notes in chapter 5 and 
online accounts of recovery in chapter 6. Ontologically I am taking a position 
in line with the moral ontology of Taylor (1989). I am thinking human beings 
are moral agents in search of believable stories within which to orientate 
themselves (and others) towards “the good life”. In terms of methodology for 
producing truth claims I am drawing on dialogism as it is essentially an 
epistemology. I have argued a dialogical approach to narrative opens up the 
possibility to listening to how ‘the mad’ narrate their experience from outside 
the coordinates of the authoritative monological discursive framework of 
positivism. The next chapter will analyse that trajectory of moving coordinates 
in time/space that I call “my story” during a time when I was going through, in 
and out of mad time/space, re-orientating within various stories. I will analyse 
this story alongside my psychiatric notes and diary entries using the narrative 
analytic approach, drawing on the narrative methods of Sullivan (2012), 
Mishler (1995), Reissman (1993) and Bakhtin’s (1981) Dialogism. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis of Clinical notes, Diary entries and an Autobiographical account 
 
So far I have clarified that “Personality Disorder” is laden with a hidden 
morality, with moral-emotions and power relations shifted to the background 
by the foregrounding of a literal medical disorder. Chapter 2 demonstrated the 
evolution of literal medical genres from religious genres by examining the 
disorder of “Moral Insanity”. Chapter 3 highlighted service-user resistance to 
this medical model through calls for a more systemic and trauma-informed 
approach (Allister et al., 2018). Now through a top-down analysis (Sullivan, 
2012) this chapter addresses how these medical and moral genres play out in 
the lived experience of those diagnosed with a Personality Disorder, to answer 
the research question, 'how do the medical and the personal narratives of 
"Personality Disorder" interact in lived experience?’. I will do this by drawing 
attention to the different genres, including their emotional connotations, within 
which the self-self-other relationship is constructed.  
 
How different genres interact biographically will be analysed by outlining an 
experience of Personality Disorder from diagnosis to treatment. This allows 
examination of how differing subjectivities emerge within complex genre 
interactions involving shifting chronotopes, hybridised dilemmatic identity and 
changing authorial power via narration. Sullivan’s (2012) dialogical method for 
analysing commentaries on subjectivity is utilised to analyse how extradiegetic 
(outside-in) narratives re-accentuate intradiegetic (inside-out) utterances. This 
includes exploring the emotional orientation of the author to their hero and the 
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atmospheric representation of time and space they create. This chapter 
analyses three data sets in relation to the subjective experience of having ‘a 
very troubled journey’ through life. The three data sets analysed are;  
 Contemporary Diary entries [Text D] 1993 - 1994 (Appendix I)  
 An autobiographical account [Text A] 2012 (Appendix II)  
 Clinical psychiatric notes [Text C] 1993 - 2000 (Appendix III)  
For clarity of discussion I label and number each extract, for example, C1 
would refer to the first extract analysed from my clinical notes, and D1 would 
refer to the first extract analysed from my Diary entries.  
 
5.1 Moral emotions within “Personality Disorder”  
C1: Letter from a psychiatric assessment by a psychiatrist to my G.P., 
28/05/1993 
“Dear Dr K, 
Thank you for asking me to see this interesting 22 year old man who told me 
about his alcohol dependence, drug abuse and even compulsive gambling in 
his early teens. He described all of this as self destructive behaviour and that 
even though he has conquered all of these he still has the same feelings. He 
tries to deal with them and usually can come through the bad patches but he 
is having a particularly prolonged one at the moment. He has suicidal thoughts 
and sees himself as being shot, dying or crashing his car. He has noted 
decreased motivation, feeling a bit depressed and feeling emotional pain from 
the past.  
He said he was sexually, physically and emotionally abused by a woman when 
he was 11 and for a prolonged period over the following seven years. He now 
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has angry feelings towards many women he meets in different situations. This 
has never been revealed to his parents or anyone else. He said emotional pain 
has always been there but he has been lifted out of it by drugs and alcohol but 
never on a permanent basis. He no longer wants to avoid this – he wants to 
go through this and “come out the other end and enjoy life… 
IMPRESSION 
I do not think that Mr. Middleton has a mental illness. His description suggests 
that he has also felt alienated and has not felt as though he fully fitted in in 
terms of the people around him, both family and friends. He is questioning his 
early life and what he got out of it. He would like to feel differently about that. 
This is all complicated by the abuse which started when he was 11 and it was 
possible in this setting that the other addictive and compulsive behaviours 
occurred. He still has very painful memories and emotions as a result. He 
would like to work towards a better acceptance of this and would also like to 
think that one day he could have a normal and balanced relationship with a 
woman. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER MANAGEMENT 
I suggested two options – one being contact with the therapist who works with 
male victims of abuse; the other being a referral to the psychotherapy 
department. He chose the second option and I will therefore send a copy of 
this letter with a covering letter to my colleagues there who I hope will see him 
with a view to further work. I have not arranged to see him again. 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr. R.” 
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Analysis: 
C1 is future-orientated and uses words like ‘hope’ and ‘one day’, describing a 
possible future-space for subjectivity that may contain better relationships by 
strategically using quotations from the intradiegetic narrative. Quoting part of 
the intradiegetic narrative referring to hopes for a better future re-accentuates, 
acknowledging and adding authorial value to these hopes as it passes through 
the medical drama genre. They deliberately re-contextualise the words and 
give them new meaning in the medical drama cliff-hanger of C1 where therapy 
is being offered (i.e. Author: His hopes may be fulfilled through our therapy 
offer). C1 can be read in different ways, but the emotional orientation of the 
author appears to be hopeful and optimistic in re-accentuating the hopes of 
the ‘hero’ they are creating, but also creates some distance from the hero by 
not explicitly saying if this is a realistic hope.  
 
In C1 the narrator is telling the story from an extradiegetic speaking position, 
outside of the narrative, which contrasts to the intradiegetic speaking position 
in D1 (below) where the narration comes from a character within the story. This 
extradiegetic narration creates an ‘outside in’ discourse (Sullivan, 2012, p.127) 
in the genre of a medical drama framed within a letter where generic plot 
expectations are raised, in both author and reader, such as “will a diagnosis 
be given?” and “what treatment will be offered?”. The letter outlines two 
chronotopes of the patient, the present caught in past orientated painful self-
destructive feelings is contrasted with a hoped for enjoyable future time-space. 
Their desire to shift through the pain into a different future chronotope sets the 
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scene for the offered treatment choice of different types of therapy, which may 
allow this desired chronotpic genre shift to happen. 
 
C1 is intertextual in how it addresses the reader with a summary and 
psychiatric assessment, by drawing on a least two genres, the medical model 
and psychoanalytic genre. The author possibly anticipates the reader’s generic 
expectations of a diagnosis within the medical model, so with a sideways 
glance at the reader she explicitly states she does not think Mr. Middleton has 
a mental illness and instead draws on a term from a psycho-analytic genre, 
alienation in her summary, before suggesting psychotherapy or trauma-
counselling as treatment. ‘Alienation’ is a psycho-analytic construct indicating 
estrangement from the values and emotional connection with 
caregivers/society, formed as inadequate infant mirroring internalises an 
inescapable mismatched, split, ‘alien self’ based upon a mirrored fantasy (see 
Fonagy et al., 2002).  By expressing her impression as a personal opinion 
drawn from the patient’s narrative she may be anticipating, with a sideward 
glance at imagined possible future professional peers, who may read the 
medical notes and take a contrary opinion. In terms of power relations the 
discourse allows future space for other professionals to dialogue into her 
psychiatric assessment with alternative readings. C1 illustrates the discussion 
in chapter 1 of mental health assessments being a micro-level site mediated 
by meta-genres such as DSM (Burkenkotter, 2001), where the medical model 
structures the assessment even as it resists it (‘he is not mentally ill’). 
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Evidence for this anticipatory sideways glance can be read in the following 
assessment from a different psychiatrist in 1996, who does diagnose 
“psychotic depression” and “alcohol dependence” using the medical model 
genre, which summarises and re-describes this 1993 assessment as being by 
a “female psychiatrist” (which C1 is an extract from) who diagnosed 
“Personality Disorder”, despite that diagnosis not being mentioned anywhere 
in the letter. So Personality Disorder is not always immediately diagnosed but 
the conditions are established to open up a power-differential in the 
understanding of one’s personal life through the narration, into which 
subsequent professional readings may introduce diagnosis.  
 
C 2 Extract from a Psychiatric assessment leading to hospital admission 
04/01/1996 
 
“Previous Psychiatric History: Bipolar Affective Disorder Diagnosed in august 
1995 by G.P. Commenced on Lithium by GP after consulted psychiatrist.  
Prior to this seen by a Psychiatrist 2 years ago at Uni – Thought he had 
Personality Disorder. Suggested Psychotherapy. Going for 2 years. Thought 
he was getting worse. Stopped three months ago… 
Mental State: Well dressed. 
Mood – “Subjectively – “Bit detached and harbouring self destructive thoughts” 
Objectively: Low, smiles, laughs, suicidal intent present. “thoughts of being tied 
up by ropes, jumping out widow or from train.”  
Thoughts – “for long time had usual thoughts of suicide, e.g. being shot, 
hanging myself. Often just didn’t take notice of them, they were just there.” 
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“Sometimes I feel I am possessed by an evil creature inside me. Struggle going 
on drawing on religious symbolism. Arch angel is struggling inside me with a 
demonic being.” He is grimacing and curling his body up knowing this is going 
on inside him. Has partial insight. Occurs 4 to 6 months out of 12.  
August 95 - Believed he was Karl Marx, Fredrick Niche, and ‘the new 
Jerusalem’ when manic etc. and paranoia that he was about to be arrested 
and images of hell behind him (6 months ago) as hell falls away at his feet. 
(monthly) - “Two police officers coming to my door to arrest me” (pseudo-
hallucinations).   
 
Feels entrapped to do things by external forces but manages to prevent himself 
from doing these things. E.g. violence towards women or stabbing someone – 
this led to a psychiatric interview at Bradford Uni by female psychiatrist [1993]. 
Never acted on violent thoughts – Never hit anyone - either male or female.  
Perceptions – Visual hallucinations – seeing himself falling out of a window 
whilst tied to a chair screaming – this is now, whilst in this room having this 
interview.   
Insight: present. 
Impression: Psychotic Depression + Alcohol Dependence 
Plan: Admit + Urine drug screen + Symptomatic relief for tonight.” 
 
Analysis: 
In C2 the extradiegetic speaking position of the narrator is similar to C1 as an 
‘outside in’ discourse, but in comparison to C1 they draw heavily on the 
medical model genre. This time the medical drama fulfils the generic plot 
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expectations of providing a diagnosis. In terms of intertextual power relations 
the psychiatric assessment from 1993 (that did not provide a diagnosis) is re-
interpreted as having diagnosed “Personality Disorder”. This could be read and 
interpreted in numerous ways, including the possibility that an informal verbal 
genre exists between psychiatrists where adjectives such as “interesting” are 
read as a code for personality disorder when a clinician does not want to use 
such a diagnosis. For whatever reason the psychiatrist in C2 felt confident 
enough in their authority as an author to re-read the C1 assessment as 
assigning a diagnosis and assimilating this intertextually into their re-telling of 
this medical drama. C2 is deliberately intertextual in addressing the reader with 
an analysis resulting in diagnosis. The genre and discourse shifts between C1 
and C2 helps to foreground and understand the dialogical power relationships 
between the texts. C1 tells a medical drama drawing on the psycho-dynamic 
genre and resisting the medical model (whilst also acknowledging the genre) 
and also anticipates possible future chronotopes that may involve re-
imaginings and re-telling(s) by professional peers.  
 
C2 tells a medical drama using medical analysis and diagnosis. There is a shift 
in language characteristics of the genres, from combining informal terms like 
“interesting young man” with psycho-analytic terms such as “alienated” in C1, 
to formal medical terms like “personality disorder” and “psychotic depression” 
in C2. In C2 the narrative presents a singular truth in ‘making-sense’, reducing 
into traditional diagnostic categories the reported trauma-informed story and 
past assessments through the lens of a medical drama framed by psychiatric 
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discourse. C2’s authorial narrative leaves little discursive space for the subject 
to have agency to disrupt or disagree. 
 
Contrasting C1 and C2 reveals chronotropic shifts in the atmospheric 
representation of time and space. These act to support their genres and also 
allow different types of subjectivity to emerge. In C1 the emotional orientation 
of the author appears to be future-orientated and optimistic by re-accentuating 
the hopes of the ‘hero’. In comparison C2 describes the atmospheric 
representation of time and space as an institutional space of immediate 
admission to the psychiatric hospital, and does not look very far forward in time 
– only to “tonight”. Planned activity within this space includes a urine drug 
screen, which suggests some need to check the accuracy of the intradiegetic 
narrative in relation to drug taking. C2 can also be read in different ways, but 
the emotional orientation of the author to their created hero appears to be 
mistrustful, fearful and pessimistic when compared to C1, both in relation to 
the subject and towards other professional intertextual contacts, such as C1.  
 
The author’s narrative position in C2 allows them to move freely backwards in 
time by reading past medical notes (including summarising and re-interpreting) 
to create the subject of the text. Whilst they freely travel backwards in 
biographical time to the subject’s childhood, future-time is severely limited to 
‘tonight’, creating a subjectivity predominantly constructed from the past with 
a limited future. C1’s hoped for better future does not make it into C2’s 
summary, in favour of summarising C1 as diagnosing personality disorder. 
Childhood sexual abuse is also edited out in C2’s summation of C1 as they 
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foreground diagnosis. This supports the discussion in chapter 1 of the 
damaging role pathologising medical discourses can have in under-playing the 
aetiological significance of childhood sexual abuse (Hodge and Bryant, 2017). 
 
Thus the potential subjectivity of the hero shifts through different chronotropic 
atmospheric representations of time and space. In C1 the hero is adventuring 
into a world with potential futures, through more pain, hopefully into an 
enjoyable world of better relationships and reconstructed memories. This shift 
in C2 into creating a subjectivity predominantly defined by mental illness and 
narrative expectations of hospital and medication, where the future is fixed and 
certain, but only for tonight. In this limited future the role of ‘truth’ appears partly 
mediated through a drug urine test, whose purpose is not explicitly articulated, 
inviting the reader to wonder if the test will match the drugs the hero claims to 
have taken? This professional medical mistrust may reflect the research 
findings discussed in chapter 1 of medical professional’s poor attitudes 
towards their patients (Sansone and Sansone, 2013). 
 
The authors of C1 and C2 both create a ‘hero’ (or other) within the text with 
varying degrees of power to ‘answer back’. C1 gives a greater degree of 
freedom to other voices compared to C2, with a genre that leaves open future 
possibilities. For example, she summarises the future-orientated hopes of the 
subject (“He would like to work towards… and would also like to think that one 
day he could have...”). Thus creating a subject with some agency whilst 
resisting answering anticipated questions that may arise in the reader (Reader: 
is this likely? Author: he hopes so). Thus C1 takes less authorial control over 
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the reader response than C2, by allowing possible space to open up between 
the author and reader by drawing on the literary genre of a “cliff-hanger” where 
the story is not resolved, but has further chapters to play out (Reader: will he 
get better or worse? Author: Who knows? - I have given him some choices and 
will not see him again). In comparison the author of C2 assumes less space 
between reader and author by taking a more informational/educational tone. 
This suggests they anticipate a reader that will be in close agreement with their 
narrative/diagnosis and they assume more authorial control over the reader 
response.  
 
C1 and C2 both create a narrative summary of the subject’s difficulties and 
attempt to solve them by placing the hero in a relatively remote context of a 
medical drama using either a medical model (C2) or a hybrid genre - psycho-
dynamic/cliff-hanger (C1). Both remote contexts of understanding allow new 
possible futures to emerge for the subject to re-orientate their self-other 
relationship within. The reader is invited to anticipate the future subject 
positions made available through the text (Reader: Is he mentally ill? Author 
(C1): No I don’t think so, but his future may benefit from therapy, or, an 
alternative answer, Author (C2): Yes he is mentally ill - he has psychotic 
depression, he needs psychotropic medication, urine tests, and 
hospitalisation).  
 
These shifts in genre and discourse allow the changing relationship between 
author and hero (self and other) to be reflected upon. Both C1 and C2 are 
extradiegetic narratives addressing the reader in a relationship of explanation. 
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They author the ‘other’ as the subject of an explanatory narrative from a 
distance and from particular reading positions (medical drama, medical model, 
psychodynamic, cliff-hanger). C1 uses the strategy of quotation from the 
subject’s intradiegetic narration to describe a self/other future-orientated 
relationship moving through social time/space, who hopes to ‘go though’ the 
pain and ‘come out’ the other side to an enjoyable life. By contrast C2 reduces 
the intradiegetic narration in the assessment to quoted utterances that are 
used in support of a conventional diagnosis where the self/other relationship 
created is structured in terms of needing to take medication and stay in hospital 
for observation.  
 
Another ‘other’ in C1 and C2 is the reader, or superaddressee, who is 
addressed imaginatively as a reader with doubts and questions which these 
texts try to anticipate and answer so the reader understands the hero in a 
particular way. These anticipated others structure the narrative differently in 
C1 and C2, shifting the subjectivity and relationship between created subject 
and creating author.  For example, in C1, the anticipation is - Reader: What is 
his diagnosis? Author: he is “interesting” but “not mentally ill”, and he hopes to 
get better. C2 then anticipates a reader who may read C1 and their text - 
Reader: But C1 did not think he was mentally ill? Author: But he is mentally ill, 
I can summarise the 1993 assessment – it diagnosed personality disorder, and 
in case you overlooked it, the psychiatrist was female. C2 illustrates a 
discursive tendency to assume a dyadic relationship between professional and 
client, even within the more psychotherapeutically informed criticisms of DSM 
(e.g. Livesley, 2012) discussed in chapter 3. This analysis suggests a greater 
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plurality of author-hero-reader positions are available, with different 
constructions of subjectivity emerging as professionals re-interpret their peer’s 
previous ‘heroes’ within their preferred genres. To develop this analysis further 
it would be useful to consider some intradiegetic narrative extracts, from 
contemporary diary entries: 
 
D1 Diary entry relating to anger, 21/04/1993 
“Forgiveness is what?????.... I’m angry. She f**king sent me to Hell, how do 
you forgive an unrepentant child molester for sending you to an emotional and 
mental Hell?... I have to deal with this. No it does not sound fair.” 
 
D 2 Diary entry relating to justice, 27/04/1993 
“Lot of pain. Wondered why I am in Hell for what someone else did to me, it 
does not seem fair/just.” 
 
Analysis: 
In D1 and D2 there is intertextuality as, although I considered myself an atheist, 
I draw on a religious genre by using the metaphor of “Hell” and the allegory of 
being sent to Hell for wrong-doing. However, my subject position in relation to 
this allegory is one of disagreement and ethical protest. I express my 
subjective distress like being in Hell but then voice that it does not seem 
“fair/just” to have been sent to Hell for someone else’s wrongdoing. Bakhtin’s 
concept of authoritative and internally persuasive discourses is helpful in 
analysing this. Traditionally the allegory of going to Hell from a Christian genre 
refers to a time/space of unpleasant after death experiences. It is a popular 
185 
 
adaptation of the chronotope to use it to describe pre-death experiences. The 
author compares this narrative with experienced lived life and highlights a 
difference to ethically protest that it appears to be the wrongdoing of someone 
else towards the hero, not their wrongdoing that has sent them “to Hell”. The 
authoritative discourse of going to Hell is used to both express the degree of 
distress and morally to protest that I do not think lived life matches the 
narrative. In the transition to becoming internally persuasive the time/space is 
brought forward in time (post-death to pre-death) and the moral wrongdoing is 
re-positioned in someone else to protest, in a kind of carnivalesque literary 
mode that subverts and frees the hero from the dominant atmospheric 
meaning of the allegory. Thus in contrast to the literal narrative in C2 of a 
medical drama where my subject position is created as being literally mentally 
ill (psychotic depression) in D1 and D2 we have an intradiegetic voice creating 
a subject position using a literary narrative, in a literary attempt to understand 
and make sense of subjective distress. This raises questions about the relative 
effects of literal compared to literary understandings. 
 
Thus the intradiegetic voice in diary entries creates a subject position where 
anger is linked to my story of what happened to me in the past and its effect 
on me reaching my future desired ‘good life’, combined with beliefs about 
justice and ‘fairness’ (i.e. because the hero believes sexual abuse of children 
is morally wrong they feel angry about the unfairness of it happening to them). 
Anger features in the narratives in other ways, for example, sometimes I feel 
angry towards myself, “He has suicidal thoughts and sees himself as shot, 
dying or crashing his car” (Clinical notes, 28/05/1993) Sometimes angry 
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feelings and thoughts take on a visual or auditory expression such as seeing 
myself “shot” or “dying” or hearing things that others cannot, such as a voice 
saying “destroy yourself Raymond” (Clinical notes, 30/01/2000). Sometimes I 
get angry feelings and thoughts towards other people, such as wanting to kill 
other people. However, because I believe being violent is morally wrong I then 
feel guilty about having these feelings, and anxious that I may lack self-control 
and act them out. Again these emotions can manifest as a visual experience 
of seeing myself stab or hit someone. Although I was ethically motivated not 
to be violent towards other people I did sometimes harm myself, for example, 
“He has on two previous occasions, aged 15 and 18 taken overdoses” (Clinical 
notes, 28/05/1993). However I describe resisting the desire to commit suicide 
on ethical grounds, “...because I felt guilty about committing suicide due to the 
affect it has on it has on other people” (Clinical Notes, 04/01/1996).  
 
Analysis of these diary entries and third party recordings in the clinical notes, 
suggests my anger is described best as a moral emotion because it is always 
linked in a narrative with strong evaluations of ways of being that are right and 
wrong (e.g. violence to self or others) and beliefs about what is just or unfair 
(e.g. being subject to sexual abuse). If I did not hold ideas of justice drawn 
from my local moral order (Harré, 1993) I could not be angry at being treated 
unfairly by being sexually abused as a child. I also am angry at being too 
anxious in relation to women, to whom I am attracted, to form a relationship 
with them. After some years of unemployment I also express anger at not being 
able to work and hold down paid employment. If I did not have the strong value 
of wanting a job and a girlfriend as my desired ‘good life’ then I would not be 
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angry at failing to live my good life successfully. Thus it is only in the context 
of my narrative and in relation to my strong evaluations of desiring to live a 
particular kind of “good life” that I develop angry emotions. This develops 
Taylor’s (1989) concept of ontology as a social-self orientating within moral 
narratives by illustrating the gap between present lived life and desired future 
‘good life’ can not only remain at a significant distance for years, but the gap 
can grow, thus developing a powerful moral emotional atmosphere of anger, 
fear, etc. Applying Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope to Taylor’s ontology allows 
us to see the need to find a believable narrative to transport/transform the 
subject as a need to negotiate the hero into a chronotpic genre shift which 
begins to close this gap between current entrapped space-time and the 
desired future space-time of the good life. 
 
Time is an important factor in the data because the more years that go by with 
me failing to achieve my desired ‘good life’ the angrier I get towards myself 
and others, and the more prolonged my failure to live my desired life, the more 
hopeless I feel about my prospects of sorting myself out in such a way as to 
‘succeed’ in my narrative. For example, on my first admission to the psychiatric 
hospital I am hopeful the professionals’ prescribed treatment will make me 
better and “relieved” that my failure to succeed in life was not my responsibility, 
but down to my “illness” (initially diagnosed as Bi-Polar Disorder (C2)). There 
is a historical tradition in clinical practice of initially relieving people’s feelings 
of guilt by telling people and their family that their problems are not their fault 
because they are “ill”. As this practice is seen as a ‘good’ thing it makes it 
difficult to discuss morality and emotions in mental health discourses as it goes 
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against the grain of that narrative. Anti-stigma arguments are built up around 
not judging someone “because they are ill”, whereas it is possible to argue the 
value of engaging in ethical dialogue and ways of being non-judgmental for 
reasons other than illness, such as the unique co-ordinates of our biographical 
trajectories make interpersonal moral judgements unfinalisable, at best, as 
they are intertextual. In contrast the historical tradition within the medical model 
genre is to present diagnosis as ahistorical literal ‘facts’, as if outside of time 
and social space, as discussed in chapter 3, where Guilfoyle (2013) argues 
the initial moral relief of being “ill” traps subjectivities within their diagnosis.   
 
Time is a factor because after my initial relief at being told I was mentally ill 
and the hope treatment would make me better, when I got worse over time I 
then began to disbelieve the illness narrative as I compared lived life to the 
generic expectations. Some years later after seven repeat hospitalisations, 
and diagnostic shifts, I despair of, and start to disbelieve, the psychiatric 
medical drama narrative of diagnosis of illness and psychopharmacological 
solutions. This shift in subjectivity can be understood as it ceasing to be 
internally persuasive to my subjectivity and I start to relate to it doubtfully, in 
Bakhtinian terms, as an authoritative discourse. The range of discussions and 
decisions over time (years) with psychiatrists around the failure to recover 
within the medical model genre were severely limited within the psychiatric 
genre, around re-diagnosis or changes in medication. This resonates with the 
discussion in chapter 2 of Peter Good’s (2001) work observing psychiatry as a 
powerful monological, unitary language which views diverse alternative 
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language genres surrounding it as irritants (kept at a distance and limited in 
power) in order for psychiatry to maintain a monopoly over its subjects.  
 
C3: Clinical Notes, Psychiatric Hospital discharge summary, 21/05/1998 
“Diagnosis: Obsessive Compulsive Disorder with secondary anxiety and 
depression, also Long-Term Personality Disorder…”  
Progress on the ward: On admission he was tense and agitated, expressing 
feelings of anger. He became more settled but it was not clear if it was related 
to a small increase in Clomipramine. 
Review: He felt that his thoughts had become less severe and felt well enough 
for discharge though was still prone to violent thoughts and thoughts of self 
harm but he recognised that these thoughts were longstanding. 
Discharge Medication:  
Clomipramine 200 mg nocte. 
Chlorpromazine 200 mg. tds. 
Procycladine 5 mg. tds” 
 
Analysis: 
In C3 my expression of anger is included in a summary under “progress on the 
ward”. The medical drama genre does not appear capable of articulating it as 
a moral emotion as it is expressed in intradiegetic narratives, as shown in D1 
and D2. The author leaves the reader some interpretative space as to whether 
clomipramine is ‘treating’ the hero’s anger as “it is not clear”. The moral anger 
at the injustice of harm done to me and my own failures to live a successful life 
are removed from their local moral order and re-described, once I am 
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dialoguing with psychiatrists, by a powerful psychiatric discourse not as ‘moral 
emotions’ but instead as ‘medical symptoms’ of mental illness. Strong 
emotions are viewed as evidence of mental disorder. The psychiatric narrative 
is what Bakhtin (1986) calls a monological narrative because it is powerful and 
attempts to silence all the alternative narratives and their differing ways of 
‘making-sense’ of these experiences.  
 
Within the polyphony of narratives surrounding psychiatry C3 shows a 
psychiatrist’s attempts to contain, close down and finalise what he has heard 
in my moral narrative of my life so far through the practice of diagnosis and 
medication, converting a moral narrative into a medical drama. As we saw in 
chapter 1, Bakhtin distinguishes between narratives that attempt to finalise, 
that is, to dominate and have the final word on a subject, and those that tend 
more to open up dialogue to the unfinalisability of being human, with always 
more to say. In this difference, psychiatric narrative discourses attempt to be 
monological and dismiss alternatives in a desire to diagnose people into clear 
categorical containment.  
 
However this data set opens up the finalising psychiatric monolog by allowing 
comparison of different psychiatrist as authoritative narrators with each other. 
By showing how each different psychiatrist (e.g. C1, C2, C3) as an 
authoritative narrator, took the basic intradiegetic utterances of the hero’s 
narrative with its expressed moral emotions and concluded different diagnosis 
(e.g. Bi-Polar Affective Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Anxiety, 
Psychotic depression, Substance Misuse Disorder, Long-Term Personality 
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Disorder, “Not mentally ill”, etc.). The psychiatric gaze claims an epistemology 
of systematic method and repeatable reliability, which would mean that it did 
not matter which psychiatrist dialogued with me, they would all draw on their 
positivistic knowledge base and clinical training and consistently conclude I 
had the same diagnosis. Clearly the reality is different, in that each psychiatrist 
interprets an extradiegetic biographical narrative from their particular location 
in time and space and demonstrate significant variation in how they “read” the 
story and its emotions. Hence intradiegetic biographical narratives are “read” 
in multiple ways, even within psychiatry, by different authoritative narrators 
(psychiatrists) as they create the subjective hero in a relationship to their 
authoring authority. Although the clinical notes clearly indicate I get 
considerably worse during my time being subject to psychiatric narrative 
practices, none of the authoritative narrators (apart from the first and last, 
seven years apart) suggest that perhaps the solutions to my problems do not 
lie within psychiatry and maybe I should be discharged to look for alternative 
non-medical narrative discourses to re-orientate my subjectivity within. 
 
The meaning of my experiences is formed in-between myself and authoritative 
narrators in a dialogical process where, for example, I describe hearing a voice 
which I interpret as meaning one day I might achieve something (“You are the 
new Jerusalem”) but ‘the other’ I dialogue with (a psychiatrist) speaks back an 
interpretation with authority that I am “psychotic” and “hallucinating”. Analysis 
of the data shows moral emotions, such as anger at unjust harm done during 
childhood sexual abuse, is dialogically taken out of its moral context by the 
authoritative practices of modern mono-logical medical science (psychiatry) 
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and re-accentuated into a new genre of medical drama where psychiatric 
pathological symptoms of diagnosable mental disorder are in need of 
treatment. Thus in a dialogical process of unequal power relations 
(professional/patient) moral emotions become medicalised and pathologised 
into a subjectivity of self/other. As I become the subject of the medical gaze I 
begin believing it, and in good faith start to tell others a story of my life that 
includes “I am Bi-Polar” or later, to explain my failures in life, “I have a 
Personality Disorder”. This appears to be a biographical example of repeating 
a pattern discussed in chapter 3, where we saw it is possible to appropriate a 
medical diagnosis to re-form subjectivity, but at the significant long term cost 
of limiting the subjectivities available to the hero (Guilfoyle, 2013).  
 
5.2 Pathologising desire within Personality Disorder  
 
D3 Diary entry attempting to make sense of my repetitive excesses, 
02/04/1994 
“I have such hunger I fear it. I fear I will devour myself trying to satisfy it. What 
do I ‘hanker after’?, what do I wish to entomb in my stomach, or mind or soul? 
I know not what I crave. I long for something. Something within cries out, but 
is it satiable?, “Satisfaction” refers to the atonement or reparation (repair) of an 
injury or wrong. Repayment of a debt. Is that why I always hanker after 
something more, trying to satisfy my unhealed wounds? Pouring repetitive acts 
into bottomless wounds.  Or is it a desire for wholeness? To be ‘at-one’ with 
God, often mis-read as concupiscence.” 
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Analysis: 
D3 shows I fear excessive repetitive acts to satisfy possibly insatiable desires 
may destroy me. D3 is narrated from intradiegetic speaking position. The text 
can be analysed as dialogical because it is un-finalised and creates a number 
of different hero/author self/other subject positions in an attempt to make 
sense of subjective distress. The author starts by suggesting possibly the hero 
has some excessive part of himself – a desire - that needs putting to death, 
“entombing”, in the stomach. But the hero fears he may eat himself trying to 
solve the problem in this way. At the same time a different understanding is 
suggested, that the hero has an unhealed injury from a trauma and these 
repetitive acts of excess are attempts to repair (satisfaction) a painful wound 
or repay a debt. Immediately a third subject position is suggested to the reader 
– that the hero may have an insufficiency (rather than an excess that needs 
eating) which means the hero is incomplete, not whole, with repetitive acts 
made sense of as attempts to fulfil this lack. The author then places the hero 
into the genre of Catholic theology by raising the possibility it as a strong 
appetite which is in opposition to reason (“Concupiscence”) but immediately 
problematises this explanation as perhaps a misreading, as it may be a desire 
to be completed/whole through a relationship with God. D3 is intertextual, as if 
the reader is familiar with Catholic theology they read concupiscence as a 
strong appetite in powerful opposition to reason. The entry on “Satisfaction” is 
delivered in the genre of a dictionary definition, with a pedagogical tone, as if 
the author is trying to teach himself something.  The author uses five question 
marks and places alternative explanations simultaneously into the hero (eating 
excess, filling insufficiency, repairing unhealed injuries, desire for God, 
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unreasonable desire). D3 is dialogical in resisting committing to any subjective 
position, which invites the reader to reflect and consider which, if any, becomes 
internally persuasive. In 1994 this was written as a diary entry, so primarily it 
was intended as a dialogue with different parts of myself, or with several 
possible alternate selves. As part of me values continuing to live I am anxious 
that I may destroy myself with the awareness that some of my techniques 
aimed at surviving may ironically kill me, such as self-harm or excessive 
drinking, whilst trying to stem the pain of past hurts. The clinical notes record 
my belief that it is morally wrong to kill myself and so my repetitive excess 
causes me anxiety because I know my way of being may result in my death. 
Thus my anxieties are moral and linked to desire expressed in the private 
space of a diary, but become medicalised within psychiatrically controlled 
space (e.g. C6). This links with the discussion in chapter 2 of poorly controlled 
anxiety being viewed differently in different space-time, such as becoming 
medicalised in DSM I (APA, 1952) into personality disorder as it 
supersedes Schneider’s (1923/1950) psychopathic personality. However 
anxiety can be viewed in space-time instead of individualised pathology, 
as the next entry illustrates:  
 
D4 Diary entry in relation to space, time and emotion, 21/04/1993  
 
“...the unknown terror-tory I’m in these days, or am it, in.”  
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Analysis: 
D4 shows that being in my system of social relations in my early 20’s was 
generally terrifying. In D4 the intradiegetic narrative breaks down a word into 
an unconventional chronotropic organisation of meaning by playing on the 
word “territory” to express a fear (‘terror’) of the social space (territory) I am in 
and express an anxiety about not knowing where the boundary lies between 
my identity and my relationship to the social space I am in. Playing on a word 
is a literary technique usually used for humorous effect, but here appears 
employed for horror. Linking back to Sullivan’s (2012) focus on ‘emotional 
connotations’ as part of chronotopic analysis, the emotional atmosphere of the 
narrator appears to be fear. I do not know whether to locate the fear inside 
myself or outside in my social space, hence the grammatically strange 
sounding phrase “...the unknown terror-tory I am in...or am it, in.”  The reflective 
self is invited to consider if their social identity is equivalent to their social 
space? Or have they a distinct identity with a boundary and are just “in” their 
social world? The author creates an other who is unclear as to whether they 
are a fearful social space or in a frightening social space (from which I could 
escape?) or will the fear somehow travel with the hero if it is part of them? I 
appear to be unsure of where the boundary is between my social space and 
my individual ‘self’ as I reflect on whether I am the territory I am anxiously 
inhabiting and trying to escape? 
 
As well as feeling anxious about killing myself I am also fearful that I will be 
harmed by a woman if I start sexual relations with them. Intellectually and at a 
rational level I know this fear is linked to my being sexually abused by a woman 
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as a child but this intellectual knowledge (that I fear a repeat of past trauma) 
does not stop me feeling the fear of attack by women I am attracted to, for 
example,   
 
D5 Diary entry trying to make sense of my fear of women, 22/05/1993 
“Fear, sweat, pain, regret. Went out. Found it hard to interpret women’s 
intentions / signals. Seems very confusing / complicated. Felt threatened by 
women. Were they out to get me? Do me some harm? Want to be with a 
woman but when they get near I feel threatened and cannot escape. This is 
before we even speak! Felt sick, panicky. They might come and get me.”  
 
Analysis: 
I fear a repeat of the harm done to me as a young person. The difficulty and 
central relational conflict is that: the object of my fear is also part of my over-
arching desired “good life”, in that I do want a sexual relationship with a 
woman. Hence the strong emotions stirred up - because I am desiring what I 
fear most. If I was frightened of spiders, I could just avoid them!  This contrasts 
with the medical framing of fear in C6 (below) that summarises a lengthy 
mental health assessment interview as the main problem (today) as anxiety, 
guilt and feeling persecuted, but the anxiety is detached from desire and 
presented as a symptom, also detached from yesterday and tomorrow within 
the chronotope of “today”.    
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C4 Clinical notes, partly summarising past clinical notes by others, 05/01/1996 
 
“Referred to psychiatrist R in 1993 – No mental illness present at that time. 
Thought sexual abuse had led to drinking problem. August 1994 seen by 
psychiatrist Dr W – “Depressive illness due to sexual abuse” – referred to and 
commenced psychotherapy. August 1995 – Diagnosed Bipolar Affective 
Disorder.”  
 
C5: Clinical notes quoting an interview on the ward on 05/01/1996 following 
admission to psychiatric hospital the previous evening  
“Feeling persecuted by something / vague / ‘a force’ – “I think it is my abuser, 
also it is more general” – “No one in particular at moment” Increased anxiety – 
‘wound up’ “feeling like someone might approach me and harm me.” (no 
change from being in hospital from being out of hospital) Feel it is unfair. Get 
resentful that ‘I feel persecuted because I haven’t harmed someone. 
I was harmed. Things are the wrong way round. Where my abuser seems 
happy and well adjusted. Don’t know this really – haven’t seen her for 5 
years…”  
 
C6 Clinical Notes 05/01/1996 following interview, summarising the main 
problems and a plan:  
“Main problems today: 1) Anxiety 2) Feeling persecuted 3) Guilt 
Contacted psycho-therapist – story confirmed.  
Plan: haloperidol 10 mg tds, lofepramine 2 nocte Observations: To stay on 
ward.”  
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Analysis: 
The feeling of anxiety (C5) that someone might come and harm me is similar 
to my diary entry of 1993 (D5) and my anger at the injustice of childhood sexual 
trauma is consistent with Dairy entries (D1 and D2). However the reading 
position in time and space of this psychiatrist is different in that their goal is to 
categorise with authority within a medical drama and to practice treatments on 
the body of the patient. They are deciding whether to say I have “no mental 
illness” and discharge me, or to admit me to the psychiatric hospital, prescribe 
anti-psychotic medication and diagnose me with something. They chose the 
latter practice and admit me on this occasion. The context was that I had taken 
a life threatening overdose recently and was reporting “feeling suicidal”.  
 
C4 and C5 makes use of quotation marks and bracketing to re-accentuate at 
the level of words used by others (not the author). The 1993 (C1) view that I 
had no mental illness is not put in quotes, but with a sideward glance at the 
reader the author instead qualified C1 with the phrase “at that time”, which 
intertextually serves to address the reader with the idea that the passage of 
time may have reduced the authority/power of C1’s view that sexual abuse had 
led to a drinking problem (Reader: What about C1? Author: That was in the 
past, I am speaking now in the present, which has more authority than the past 
in this chronotope). However a diagnosis given in 1994 is put in quotes, 
“Depressive illness due to sexual abuse”. The alternative diagnosis is closer 
in time and in genre as it uses the medical model but includes an aetiology of 
trauma. Perhaps this is why it is put in quotes, to create distance from the 
original context as it is too close to the author’s different diagnosis and 
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treatment plan. The original context of “Depressive illness due to sexual 
abuse” is clear, but invested with new meaning and value through this 
intertextual contact and re-accentuation. The authorial intonation could be read 
as casting doubt on this diagnosis and aetiology in favour of today’s “psychotic 
depression”.  
In C5 a list of utterances selected by the author from the intradiegetic narrative 
are put in quotation marks, but the statement that hospital makes no difference 
is instead put in brackets by the author. Why not just quote the hero saying 
hospitalisation makes no difference? Perhaps this view is read by the author 
as a threat to their authority and the medical model narrative in the medical 
drama. With a sideward glance at the superaddressee the hero created by the 
author is given much less room to answer back within brackets. The contours 
of the self/other relationship between author and their created hero reveal 
themselves as the reader reads along as the words the hero speaks are quoted 
in support of the diagnosis and plan, but when they speak against the authority 
of the author (i.e. the plan includes hospitalisation) the authorial intonation 
exerts its power. Switching to brackets instead of direct quotation assumes 
more authorial control over the reader response as the author anticipates a 
superaddressee  who might use the hero’s words against the author (Reader: 
Why treat him with hospitalisation if it makes no difference? Author: Do not 
listen directly to him, he is ill/psychotic, his words serve to support my plan, not 
challenge it). Thus there is a shift in the self/other relationship of hero/author 
as the author of a medical model drama allows the subject to speak until they 
speak against the author’s plan at such points they are bracketed.  
200 
 
Thus C4, C5 and C6  gives clues as to the emotional orientation of the author 
to their others, intertextually, it suggests they feel threatened when the hero 
speaks against the plan but more relaxed when their words can be used to 
support the author’s plan. Alternative professional intertextual texts appear 
also to provoke a threatened emotional orientation, an anxiety which the author 
contains by creating an analytic distance through time (e.g. “at that time”) or 
by using quotation marks.   
 
Of dialogical interest is that within the medical genre psychiatrists record the 
subject’s emotional state but never their own emotional state in the clinical 
notes, as that is not the tradition within this set of practices, but this psychiatrist 
may well have been feeling anxious about taking a therapeutic risk and 
discharging me. He may have felt it was better for me (or for him) and a safer 
practice to admit, diagnose, medicate. He was in a set of discursive systems 
himself which influenced how he felt, what range of responses seemed 
‘reasonable’, and what choices he could make. His range of responses was 
limited by his dialogical context. 
 
This decision, to admit, diagnose, medicate, amongst many others in my life, 
involved me in the psychiatric system even more deeply. I spend the next years 
of my life as a “revolving door” long term psychiatric patient on high doses of 
anti-psychotic and anti-depressant medication. It would have been difficult and 
anxiety provoking for the assessing psychiatrist to say I had “no mental illness” 
because if I had gone home and committed suicide they would have had to 
justify their actions within current discursive practices, such as in a ‘critical 
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incident’ process. Like most people he will have wanted to be able to justify his 
actions within the set of systems and sub-systems that dialogues like this take 
place within and so the hero/author position created may have had more than 
one sideward glance, anticipating readers as regulatory bodies of the hospital 
institution, potential critical incident review panels, and the professional 
governing authorities. Thus the structured genre of the clinical assessment 
concludes with a plan, C6, which reduces the problematic narrative to a brief 
list of three emotions; Anxiety, Feeling Persecuted, and Guilt. Intertextually 
contact with the psycho-therapist is simply put as “story confirmed”, which 
serves to support the overall creation of the subjective hero with the narrative 
concluding with a plan; medication, observations and staying an inpatient – 
holding the subject in a chronotope of medicalised observed space within a 
chemically altered subjectivity which allows little agency for the hero to move, 
despite their view that hospitalisation made no difference.   
 
Through this dialogue, involving C4, C5 and C6, I became involved in a 
medical drama in the medical model genre with a conventional plot involving 
diagnosis, hospitalisation and medication, and believed myself to be mentally 
ill. Orientating myself with a subject position offered to the hero in a medical 
drama I believed I was being treated by professionals in mental health whose 
treatment would transform me to become mentally healthy. Initially I felt 
relieved that I could explain my failure to live a successful life to others with a 
different narrative, that I was not morally responsible for my failure to live a 
successful life because I was “mentally ill”. Within this narrative responsibility 
shifted from myself to the professionals and I waited for the medication to work. 
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As previous narrative understandings of myself appeared to be failing when 
the medical model narrative was presented to me through authoritative 
narrators (psychiatrists) I willingly re-oriented myself into the subjectivity it 
created with the hope it would enable me to live the good life I desired, but had 
so far failed to achieve. 
 
It was only several years later that I came to doubt this psychiatric narrative as 
I appeared to decline and get worse rather than better whilst receiving 
psychiatric treatment.  On the other hand, if the psychiatric assessment had 
not admitted me to hospital then I may have gone home and committed 
suicide. So maybe hospitalisation saved my life until a later point in time when 
I found a narrative that did help me to live the “good life”? I cannot say for 
certain (it is unfinalisable) if this intervention prevented me committing suicide 
or not in 1996, although obviously, I am alive today to recall the dialogue. 
 
The data shows a pattern emerges where I tell my story to different 
psychiatrists over the years who take the basic elements of my story and 
repetitive excess/insufficiencies and ‘read’ them into a different narrative of 
being mentally ill or disordered. This shows that the process of being read into 
another powerful narrative like psychiatry is dialogical and varies significantly 
depending on the beliefs of the authoritative narrator. C1 thought I was 
troubled but not mentally ill whilst later psychiatrists, in the same role of 
authoritative narrator, listen to my story and diagnose me with “Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder” and “Personality Disorder”, with underlying “anxiety” and 
“depression”. The authoritative discourse of the medical model narrative 
203 
 
became internally persuasive for me for several years and thus my subjectivity 
shifted into it (outside-in), and then out of it (inside-out) later, as I came to 
disbelieve its story. The medical drama gave me very little agency to disrupt 
or disagree with the authoritative narrative and a narrow range of subject 
positions for me to negotiate. The range of subjectivities offered shifted around 
seven diagnostic categories. Conversations about my difficulties with 
psychiatrists often ranged around increasing or changing medication, 
admission (or not) to hospital, or re-diagnosis. This links with the discussion, 
in chapter 1, around the damaging role pathologising medical discourses can 
have erasing the social production through trauma of subjective distress, by 
re-describing them as symptoms of disorder within the individual (Hodge and 
Bryant, 2017).  
 
5.3 Trapped in a chronotope, desiring escape into a recovery journey     
 
D6 Diary entry about anxiety and its relationship with repetitive excess, 
25/03/1994 
 
“What is called “addiction” is a possibility of being. It is an unwillingness to feel 
anxiety. An always referring back to some repeatable sensation, always 
unsatisfying, one chooses to repeat into a vertigo of endless repetition. 
Trapped into a circle without a future. Going nowhere. An unwillingness to feel 
anxious.”  
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D7 Diary entry about anxiety about the direction of my life, 13/04/1994 
 
“I fear what I am becoming. Despite my desire to be alright. I dislike myself 
more. I seem to be getting worse. What am I doing? Waiting for Godot?”  
 
Analysis: 
D6 and D7 involve intradiegetic narration, which can be thought of as an 
‘inside-out’ discourse compared to the ‘outside-in’ narratives of C1 to C6. D6 
draws on a geometric metaphor of a circle without a future in a horror genre of 
being trapped forever. D7 contrasts my desire to get better with my fear I am 
getting worse, directionally descending rather than ascending or trapped in a 
circle. Mindful of the conflict between my desire to get better and my 
experience of decline and dislike of myself more, I evoke the genre of 
tragicomedy to help express my anxiety, drawing on Samuel Beckett’s play 
“Waiting for Godot”. This suggests the hero identifies with the two protagonists 
in the play who engage in circular dialogue searching for meaning whilst 
waiting for someone who never arrives.  
 
The literary understanding can be contrasted with the literal understanding of 
C4 where I am literally mentally ill within a singular truth with little room to 
negotiate a subject position. My anxiety is consistently related to perceived 
success or failure to live the ‘good life’ I strongly value leading by having a job 
and a relationship. As time passes my anxiety increases as the trajectory of 
my lived life becomes clearer to myself that I am moving further away, not 
closer, to living out the life I value living. Thus part of our emotional life relates 
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to evaluations we make of our biographical movement (trajectory) in 
time/space towards our desired life. The more distance that opens up between 
the way I am living and my valued ideal life the more I dislike myself. Over time 
my fear grows as my doubts grow that I will be able to succeed at life within 
my current narrative.  
 
The analysis shows that anxiety and fear is moral within the ethical time/space 
opening up between lived life and desired/valued ‘good life’ (Taylor, 1989) as 
I am trapped in a circle, declining. Morality is the tripwire of emotion. ‘Time’ 
was an important factor as short term failures can often be accommodated 
within a narrative, in terms of ‘trying harder’ to practice it or seeing if any 
narrative techniques have been missed. Narrative techniques are ways of 
moving the subject towards their goals but can themselves be the subject of 
anxiety (e.g. “Am I doing it right?”). However, the longer the good life is not 
lived reasonably successfully, especially if it seems to be getting further away, 
then the more moral anxiety produced and the subject’s desire to escape their 
current narrative (rather than practice it more efficiently) starts to emerge.  
 
D8 Diary entry making sense of shame and guilt, 22/03/1994 
 
“A ‘pleasant youth’ seemed to mock mine, and I thought of hanging myself or 
stabbing myself from ‘shame’. I am unaware of how ashamed I am, of myself. 
We only notice the moods that pass, if it were icy winter all year we’d not note 
it. For years I’ve not stepped outside of shame to note it. From the age of 11 I 
felt ashamed of every sexual encounter I had. I felt such guilt I wanted to be 
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physically ill. And such fear of discovery I wanted to die. Over seven years sex 
and death fused into one for me. The “beast with two backs” is death to me.”  
 
Analysis: 
D8 is an intradiegetic narrative attempting to make sense of the connections 
between guilt, shame, feeling humiliated (mocked), suicidal urges, the urge to 
vomit, fear of discovery, the urge for death and early sexual experiences. It 
uses a confessional genre of self-disclosure. The author uses the allegory of 
seasons changing to communicate the idea that we subjectively become 
aware of our emotional states as they change like the seasons but then shifts 
the reader to consider what if you were permanently caught in an emotional 
winter of guilt and shame? D8 also references the play Othello by using 
Shakespeare’s euphemistic metaphor for sexual intercourse. Quotation marks 
around “beast with two backs” may be creating some authorial distance 
positioning it as someone else’s concept, but then it is re-accentuated into a 
subject position by saying this has become death to me. This suggests the 
emotional orientation of the author to the hero of some fear for his safety as 
he has created a subjectivity walking around an endless winter with life-
threatening beasts within a horror genre. This can be compared with C6 where 
guilt is listed in a numbered list genre (1,2,3) in a medical drama as today’s 
main problems. Summarisation of guilt into a number/list genre positions the 
subject in the present (today) and re-orientates guilt towards the plan 
(medication, observation, hospitalisation). By comparison D8 creates a subject 
position where guilt is connected to several problematic habits over several 
years, with a pessimistic future-view of endless icy winter.  
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D8 appears to contradict itself by saying the hero is unaware of ‘shame’, whilst 
articulating an awareness of shame using literary devices. A dialogical analysis 
would argue it is possible to think in different ways about the same thing at the 
same time, so the author could be creating a hero who may fluctuate in future 
between consciousness of guilt and shame and unconsciousness of it - as 
winter has come again. The dialogical normalisation of thinking in different 
ways about the same thing at the same time contrasts with the literature on 
Personality Disorder where medics assume attempted manipulation of the 
emotions of others is being attempted if patients express different views to 
different people about the same issue (e.g. Bowers, 2003) or such dialogical 
subjectivities are over-pathologised as “splitting” or dichotomous thinking (e.g. 
Coifman, et al., 2012). Thus D8 may be an attempt to capture a moment of 
insight into subjectivity that the author may fear may be lost if not written down 
to allow later reflection. The next data extract analyses experiences within a 
chronotope which other people cannot see or hear.  
 
5.4: Communicating in-between literal and literary chronotopes create 
misunderstandings   
 
D9 Diary entry about not being happy and seeing and hearing unusual 
experiences, 28/04/1993 
 “A good morning free from the tyranny of unwanted thoughts... I felt uneasy, 
uncomfortable. I thought reality was an illusion and I was starting to see that 
in fact I was in Hell as my illusion vanished (reality). Heard a voice saying “I 
am the new Jerusalem”. Wondered what that meant. No one to talk to about 
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these experiences. What does it mean? – “I am the new Jerusalem”? Saw 
some angels and trumpet in the sky about a book I would write, what does that 
mean?. Seems a bit weird. Thought “this will pass”... Feel “sane” now, but not 
happy with life at all...My delusions may be alternative to remembering how 
she abused me.”  
 
Analysis: 
D9 tries to make sense of some unusual experiences, hearing and seeing 
things that other people did not see/hear and the question of what is real and 
what is illusion? I am struggling with the idea that my sensory experience of 
lived life might by illusory and in reality I am in “Hell” and the metaphor of vision 
is used (starting to see). As also mentioned earlier in this chapter, seeing 
angels, trumpets and hearing about the New Jerusalem are imagery drawn 
from Christian narratives. The meaning for me is left unresolved as the hero 
says they do not have someone to talk with about their meaning. The genre of 
12 step recovery is drawn through a slogan related to coping, but re-
accentuated in quotes, “this will pass” (Reader: Will it?). The genre of mental 
health is also drawn on as feeling “sane” now implies a possible subject 
position for the hero being insane hearing and seeing things. However, an 
alternative subject position is opened up for the reader drawing on 
psychoanalytic genres as these auditory/visual experiences may be 
“delusions” with a purpose, to avoid painful memories of trauma. Thus D9 
presents a wide variety of subject positions for the hero; sane/insane 
(temporarily), trauma survivor, deluded/reality-seeing, sane but not happy. To 
try to make sense of them I dialogue with others (such as psychiatrists) and, 
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as Bakhtin (1981) would argue, the meaning is made in the space in-between 
people. Earlier we saw C2 describe my fear I am going to be arrested as 
paranoia, my perception as experiencing visual hallucinations during the 
assessment, and my seeing two police officers coming to my door as pseudo-
hallucinations (enclosed in brackets to re-accentuate the experience). These 
audio/visual experiences are not linked to my chronic feelings of guilt linked to 
childhood trauma in the key summary sections, but positioned in a medical 
drama where I am mentally ill with psychotic depression. In the next data 
extract we see how psychiatric narratives will take unusual audio visual 
experiences and write them into a new narrative with diagnoses, 
hospitalisation and treatments.   
 
C7 Progress Notes of assessment and inpatient ward observations 30/01/2000  
 
“No [thought disorder] but describes fleeting illusions whilst in bed of someone 
chopping his foot off. Informally admitted to ward. Currently complaining of 
lowered mood, anxiety and thoughts of taking an overdose, has made 
superficial scratches to his arms. Abused by older woman aged 10 – 18? 
Several previous admissions to [psychiatric hospital] following overdoses and 
also experienced alcohol related problems but states he has not drunk for 3 
days and receives support from A.A. Recently been drinking 3 to 4 bottles of 
wine a day - but had been abstinent for a year prior to this. Smokes 20 
cigarettes a day. No illegal drugs for one year, used to abuse amphetamines 
and cannabis. Drank heavily 14 to 19 then rehab. Off alcohol 19 – 24. On/off 
anti-depressants. Psychotherapy for 2 years. On/off alcohol last few years. 
210 
 
Seven psychiatric hospital admissions in last four years.  Says his occasional 
“lapses” with alcohol helps with symptoms for 1 hour but then feels worse. 
Shadowy figures hover over his bed at night “torturing” him, feels pain over 
entire body…” 
 
Analysis: 
Having my ankle severed had been a visual experience I had shared with 
mental health professionals for some years and in C7 it is described as “a 
fleeting illusion”. In 1996 I had a conversation with a student psychiatrist when 
I was an inpatient about seeing my ankle cut open and bleeding (when it was 
not actually physically damaged). The student psychiatrist asked me about this 
experience at length. I had reflected previously on this experience, which I 
found distressing, depressing and anxiety provoking. I had read about the myth 
of Achilles, who was a hero of the Trojan war, in Homer’s Iliad. Achilles was 
invulnerable to harm except for his ankle, but despite being ‘a hero’ he 
eventually died from a wound there. His mother, the nymph Thetis, had tried 
to make her son immortal by dipping him in the river Styx, but had held on to 
his ankle and so this area remained vulnerable to harm despite his mother’s 
efforts to protect him. Thus the phrase Achilles heel is used in speech genres 
as a metaphor for someone’s vulnerability, etymologically derived from the 
Greek story. Thus my chronotope (time/space) from which I drew meaning 
included the Greek myths.  
I noticed I felt vulnerable to harm when I saw my severed foot, so I thought that 
I saw this vision because I wanted to be invulnerable to harm, but I knew in 
reality other people could harm me (as in being sexually abused). Thus I made 
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sense of my visual experience using a Greek tragedy genre as an expression 
of a subjective experience I found difficult to articulate in words and this picture 
allowed my subjectivity to express to itself my fears of vulnerability to harm.  
 
When the student psychiatrist asked me about my severed foot I assumed that 
his professional training in psychiatry would include a wide range of discourses 
on madness, including metaphorical interpretations of the Greek tragedies. 
However, his line of questioning seemed strange to me, which made me 
suspicious that he was not thinking about the Greek myth at all. I had 
mistakenly assumed his chronotope (time/space) was similar to mine, but 
conversationally he did not appear to be travelling very far back, at least not to 
ancient Greece. 
 
I felt anxious about interrupting his flow of questioning. I did not want him to 
think I was patronising him by pointing out what seemed obvious, given the 
cultural currency of the phrase “Achilles heel”. I wondered why he brought the 
subject up at all and wondered if he thought this picture was ‘the essential clue’ 
to my escape from mental health difficulties, so eventually I found the courage 
ask him why he was asking me about this visual experience in particular? He 
said because he had been “told to ask me about it” by the consultant and it 
was part of his clinical training to ask such questions.  
 
I remember suddenly realising I was the object of study, part of the process of 
this student becoming a qualified professionally practicing psychiatrist and felt 
disappointed that he appeared not interested in me and my problem living life 
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in itself, but in me as a vehicle to his profession. This changed the emotional 
atmosphere of the dialogue and I decided not to tell him my ‘Greek’ theory, 
partly as he had not asked me what I thought, but instead I asked him what 
the meaning was of my frequently seeing my ankle severed? 
  
He told me that visual hallucinations were clear evidence that I was indeed 
‘psychotic’, and so he said he could reassure me that I was in the right place 
at this time (I was an inpatient in a psychiatric hospital) and that the anti-
psychotic medication prescribed for me to take would likely stop me seeing 
such distressing things, that I should not worry as “hallucinations were not real” 
and that soon I would “feel better” and so be able to leave the hospital. If their 
approach did not work, he re-assured me, there was lots they could do, such 
as increase the dosage or try a different anti-psychotic. Thus a literal 
explanation of the severed ankle being not real in a medical drama evidencing 
my psychosis contrasted with a literary explanation of it being a real experience 
expressing my vulnerability to trauma through a Greek tragedy. 
  
5.5: The self-self-other relationship 
 
Next I build on the previous sections by drawing attention to the self-self-other 
relationship by presenting six data extracts, followed by an analysis; 
 
D10 Diary entry regarding the judgements of others, 08/05/1993 
“People judge me, but by whose moral standards are they judging me, their 
own? Have they experienced what I have experienced?”  
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D11 Diary entry regarding self esteem, 11/05/1993 
 
“Obviously I hate myself to try to kill myself. Surely better to kill myself than kill 
someone else, that would be morally worse.”  
 
D12 Diary entry making sense of emotional pain and disintegration, 
27/12/1993 
 
“Darkness. Depression. Felt I was possessed by a seven headed serpent 
daemon last night. 3 weeks now. I felt I was disintegrating. Pain. Longing for 
death. Self-destructive urges. Agitation. Dislike of myself. Spent Christmas 
trying to think up alternatives to suicide other than homicide. Must go to 
therapy, might help? “where are the leaves?, must be dead/ No more 
weeping.”. Difficulty forming and maintaining relationships with women. 
Unresolved anger. Self-harming impulses. Food problematic.”  
 
D13 Diary entry concerning the structure of my personality, 7/04/1994 
 
“An ill constructed damaged self like mine is always prone to structural 
implosions and tectonic shifts, reformations, etc. The solution eludes me, 
obviously not accessible via intellectual effort or I’d have got there by now.”  
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D14 Diary entry making sense of repeated identity crisis, 8/04/1994 
 
“What I do seems like so much theatre. Identity Crisis after Identity Crisis. Re-
running the “I can’t cope” and “I want to die” scenes over and over again. I just 
need to grow up and walk away from all that. Just do what I need to do and 
stop talking about it. I’m like an alchemist searching for the philosopher’s stone 
that will turn my base metal into gold.”  
 
D15 Diary normalising identity crisis and considering direction on life, 
14/04/1994 
 
“My identity Crisis is normal. I am looking for some purpose, meaning and 
direction in my life.”  
 
Analysis: 
The data shows I have a difficult relationship with myself (e.g. D11, I hate 
myself, D12, I dislike myself). However other diary entries show the author 
creating a hero which allows some critical distance from the author. A subject 
is created within several literary narratives who does have difficult self-
evaluations and self-judgements, but who attempts to make sense of this with 
more than one narrative and possible futures are constructed. For example, 
D10 is an intradiegetic narration creating a hero who is having a sideways 
glance at an imagined reader (their other(s) - “people”) whom they feel morally 
judged by. This creates a subject with some agency that can speak back to 
the reader and challenge the grounds they judge from. This suggests an 
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emotional orientation of the author of shame imagining the judgements of the 
reader (others) on the hero’s way of being in the world but the author also 
provides some textual resources for the subject to resist these judgments. 
 
D13 draws on geological metaphors to create a subject whose surface can 
shift and reform like the earth’s crust, suggesting powerful instability and 
earthquakes, where molten lava may spill out. It also creates a subject like a 
structure that may implode due to damage or poor construction. This draws on 
a disaster movie genre where anxiety over surviving is a theme, but adapted 
so the building or nature is the self rather than the context that must be 
survived. Whilst creating a self as an unstable inevitable disaster it also holds 
some hope for the hero as reformation is possible after the inevitable 
implosion/explosion. The damaged self is seen as a problem with a possible 
solution (hope) but within an anti-Reason genre in rejecting intellectual effort 
as having the power to solve it. 
 
D14 draws on the genre of the quest, searching for something that will 
transform subjectivity, using the narrative of the alchemical search for the 
philosopher’s stone. At the same time the narrative creates a subject who 
needs to develop and just grow up, implying it may not be difficult for the hero 
and so the power of repeated identity crisis is reduced by placing it into the 
genre of theatre as “scenes” in a play. This creates some distance from the 
author and hero and allows the reader to respond by agreeing or disagreeing 
with narrative explanations (Reader: What is wrong with the hero? Author: You 
decide; he is a child, he is play acting, or he on a quest). The author creates 
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some critical distance from the hero to enable him to be read in a critical way 
(child/actor who needs to grow up/act differently). Whilst self-critical these 
narratives also open up hopeful possible future spaces for the subject to enter 
– into the adult world, an actor in a different narrative, or transformation through 
a quest if he can find the transforming stone. By creating multiple narrative 
explanations the author may be increasing the power of the hero over these 
repeated crisis points (self-harm and suicide attempts) and creating several 
escape routes for the hero into different narrative futures. However he 
complicates the dialogical direction to move in by creating so many, perhaps 
choosing one narrative and sticking to it would be easier for the hero. 
 
A theme emerges of my evaluation of my own self-performance at living life. I 
consistently describe ‘hating’ myself, not valuing myself and having no self-
worth. I describe lacking direction and being in search of something which 
would give me some value/purpose and some self-esteem, all of which I 
appear to be painfully aware I lack. As my current narrative appears to be 
failing to transport me to the good life I desire to live I appear to search 
dialogically for an alternative narrative to re-orientate my subjectivity within (a 
quest to find a transformative stone, a child to grow up, an actor in a search 
for a different play, a disaster waiting to happen and then reform, etc.). This 
dialogical search for a new narrative when my current one failed can be seen 
in the autobiographical account, as the next example reveals.  
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5.6: A dialogical search for a new narrative 
  
A1 Autobiographical narrative extract regarding leaving Alcoholics Anonymous 
(A.A.) and Psychotherapy 
“Anyway, at this point in my life journey some of my friends in AA had ‘relapsed’ 
and gone back to drink and drugs. This contributed to me thinking about that 
way out of my increasingly desperate emotional state. I decided AA and 
psychotherapy were not working for me and went to the pub on the way home 
from my last therapy session. I was in a desperate state of inner tension where 
I just wanted to change how I felt as the pain seemed unbearable so I ordered 
a pint of Guinness. After a few more pints I found my bad mood started to lift. 
Then I drank excessively until I ‘blacked out’ (memory loss). I started drinking 
every day as an attempt to manage my mood and I was determined to “have 
some fun”, which I had always found hard to do...” 
 
A2  Autobiographical narrative excerpt about being admitted to the psychiatric 
hospital, diagnosed and medicated   
“I remember feeling a great relief that the psychiatrist felt there was something 
wrong with me. I did not feel guilty for messing my life up any more. I recall 
thinking; “I knew there was something wrong with me.”  
It seemed very validating to me to be admitted to the hospital, like a 
professional endorsement saying that I did have some serious problems, I was 
not just a failure at life through bad choices. I was not guilty because I was ill 
– what a relief I felt. I could explain this to others now as a way to explain how 
badly my life had gone so far... 
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…Through this process I started to see myself in a new light - as someone with 
“mental health problems”. Someone had mentioned “Bi-polar affective 
disorder”. I was hopeful that the professionals would diagnose and treat me 
and I would get better.  
Surprisingly to me the opposite happened - I seemed to get considerably worse 
and deteriorate in my mental health...” 
 
Analysis: 
A1 and A2 are intradiegetic narratives within the autobiographical genre. They 
do describe the process of dialogically searching for new narratives (self-help, 
psychotherapy, mental illness, Christianity, etc.) once I believe the current one 
is not transporting me to the good life I desire (a job and a relationship). A1 
describes the ‘hero’ on a journey (both allegorically and literally) journeying 
home from the psychotherapy session when I decide to call into the pub for a 
Guinness, creating a plot twist, into an adventure genre, where the expectation 
that self-help and therapy will help me get better is challenged by a sudden 
turn in a different direction. The author appears to create the hero with a 
sideward glance at an anticipated reader who might judge this decision 
negatively, as they do not allow much room for a reader response. For 
example, they say the hero’s social network had relapsed recently and the 
author does not speculate on alternative directions the hero could have taken, 
such as asking for a different therapist or therapy. The emotional orientation of 
the author appears to be anxious and protective (Reader: He was foolish to go 
drinking, he could have made better choices. Author: The emotional pain was 
unbearable. Reader: Was it really?)   
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A2 describes a fairly clear transition into the medical model of mental health, 
which reflects the way the story is organised and told into a narrative with clear 
transitions between narrative understandings (A.A., therapy, mental illness, 
Christianity, etc.). However comparison to the data from diary entries and 
clinical notes raises questions about the smoothness of these transitions 
because they often overlap and hybridise. This is an important point regarding 
hybridised genres creating complex subjectivities, often missed in the existing 
Personality Disorder literature (e.g. Livesley & Clarkin, 2015, Bodner et al., 
2015, DSM-5, 2013) For example before I enter fully into a mental health 
narrative I draw on this genre in order to wonder if I am insane (e.g. D9) 
although I re-accentuate the concept of sanity by using quotes (“sane”). Also 
a year after I have decided to re-orientate my subjectivity within a Christian 
narrative in 1999 I am re-admitted to the psychiatric hospital. This analysis is 
not saying the autobiography is false, or not “true” as all narratives re-organise 
actual events into a narrative plot in order to tell a story. The difference 
between actual events and emplotted story itself can be analysed fruitfully. 
Perhaps the author wanted the hero to progress on his journey in clear stages 
and the idea of believing several narratives at the same time seemed difficult 
to recall accurately. Perhaps the author had a sideward glance at the reader 
whom he wanted to understand that the hero had travelled through several 
narratives. However, having the diary entries and clinical notes allows a critical 
perspective from the reader to wonder if the story has been over-simplified, 
particularly in these transition points between narratives.  
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Comparison with other texts (diary and clinical notes) allows a more complex 
picture to emerge where hybrid narratives are drawn upon by the subject 
making sense of their journey through life. Thus although the hero travels 
through many different narratives, perhaps they see themselves in more than 
one at the same time, or in a hybrid of narratives, especially during these 
transition periods, such as in 1999 when the hero is in a faith narrative, but 
also attending self-help and has a “relapse” in their mental health requiring 
hospitalisation. Thus someone may negotiate several subject positions 
drawing on (foregrounding/backgrounding) a number of different narratives, 
some newer and some older, with varying levels of importance to their social 
identity.  
 
5.7: Problematising personal agency, self-control, motivation and 
direction 
  
D16 Diary entry making sense of acting in opposition to moral values, 
3/05/1993 
 
“This is the root of my unease considering the ethical or moral dimension, the 
contradiction between holding moral values for ways of being and me acting 
opposite to them. Am I just a thrill junkie? Searching for a sense of self worth 
and value? Does this obsession direct my life?”  
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Analysis: 
The author creates the hero in a confessional genre as well as a diary genre. 
The hero is troubled by their apparent lack of self-control acting in opposition 
to their moral framework and values. More than one subject position are 
created, opening up the explanation that he is excessively attached to 
excitement (‘thrill junkie’) alongside a quest genre searching for self-worth. 
Both are given a question mark inviting a reader response. It is unclear if the 
“obsession” refers to seeking excitement or the quest for self-worth, but either 
reading invites the superaddressee to consider if this directs the course of the 
hero’s journey through life and is dialogical in allowing room for several reader 
responses. This suggests an emotional orientation of uncertainty towards the 
hero by creating multiple subject positions without telling the reader in a 
didactic way why the hero acts contrary to his moral framework.    
 
D17 Diary entry making sense of lack of self-control, 28/03/1993 
 
“Lack of power over myself appears to be my problem. I am a land full of battles 
but the bits I loosely group together and call myself (the bits in the battles I 
identify with) are always losing the daily battles I have with the other bits that 
land on my island and leave, regroup, attack, taunt, leave, revisit, I am a small 
part of me holding out in the fog of war, why am I always losing the battle for 
control over myself? Other people appear in total control of themselves, no 
signs of a battle raging within them?”  
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Analysis: 
D17 draws on a military battle genre to create a hero who is allegorically a 
geographical territory (an island) at war. The hero is created spatially as a 
small part of themselves, suggesting to the reader they are at constant war 
with other parts of themselves they wish to defeat and banish from the island. 
This subjectivity is contrasted with another kind of subjectivity, the hero’s 
“other”, people who are in total control of themselves without raging internal 
battles. However the author creates some uncertainty in the reader by saying 
they “appear” that way, prompting the reader to wonder if people who look in 
control actually lack self-control secretly? Lack of self-control is presented as 
the only problem for this hero this day as none others are mentioned. The 
subject position created creates a conflict between parts of themselves that 
lose battles with the parts of themselves they do not identify with. So two selves 
are created, the larger self and the smaller self whom the hero identifies with, 
creating a civil war within the territory of the self. This is contrasted with the 
other people with a singular subjectivity in total self-control, not at war with 
themselves. The central question asked and unanswered is why does the hero 
loses these battles and lacks the power of self-control to defeat the repeat 
visitors to the island? The emotional orientation of the author towards the hero 
appears to be uncertainty expressed through the phrase “fog of war” drawn 
from military genres it evokes the uncertainty of combatants about their 
awareness of their situation, powers and capacity of their enemy. Visually it 
prompts the reader to see the hero as directionless, lost in the fog, on this 
island making victory less certain. Controlling myself appears to be a real daily 
battle, full of tremendous effort and emotion. The subjectivity emerging here, 
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the sense of being at war with oneself, is distinctly different too much of the 
existing literature on Personality Disorder, as either manipulating others 
(Bowers, 2003) or having a dominant, singular personality that is disordered 
(DSM 5, 2012). It is also interesting in being written from the perspective (time) 
of ‘losing’ the battle, different from the ‘recovery’ perspectives analysed in the 
next chapter. The next section in this chapter demonstrates how the author 
can place the hero into radically different genres (from terrestrial battles to 
celestial struggles) in attempts to make sense of lived experience.  
 
D18 Dairy entry searching for meaning in a philosophical genre, 19/03/1994  
 
“In my ‘Dasein’ I can feel the centrifugal force or pull of urge or addiction. It’s 
always a possibility. I felt it tonight. How am I to interpret these urges, 
Heidegger? The ‘ars interpretandi’ depends on what texts I’ve read... Satellites 
of sensation orbit my being and I can always orbit them, If I can’t find a more 
meaningful existence. I have a habit of choosing to give ‘urge’ power over me. 
Can I choose not to do this?”  
 
Analysis: 
In D18 the author draws on philosophical narratives, Heidegger is addressed 
directly with a request for guidance on interpreting addictive forces. The 
German philosophical term for being (Dasein) is perhaps an intertextual 
reference to Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927/1962). The art of interpretation 
is written in Latin, which is from the genre of philosophy, and foregrounds the 
intertextuality of interpretation. This appears to address the reader with a 
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cautionary warning that their reader response will be intertextually based on 
what they happen to have read. The self is created as a celestial world that 
could be orbited or could orbit something else, using gravity as a metaphor to 
make sense of the hero’s lack of power to self-control. This creates a double 
sense of self as powerful being orbited or lacking power and orbiting something 
else (a desire). Seeing the self as a powerful planet (implied by having 
satellites) is undermined by the idea that the hero may be orbiting their own 
satellites of sensation. The author appears to place the hero in a philosophical 
genre and be asking philosophy, personified by Heidegger, what answers they 
have for lack of self-control? Two days later the satellite metaphor for self is 
used again, this time using the lost in space genre from science fiction:    
 
D19 Diary entry making sense of feeling lost, 21/03/1994 
 
“I am lost. A satellite without a body to orbit...My subjectivity spins from one 
orbit to another.” 
 
D20 Diary entry considering motivation, escape and likelihood of relapse, 
3/05/1993 
“What motivates me now? A vague woolly positivity? Which direction should I 
go leaving the pit????????? What would I choose as my motivation (direction) 
in life?... 
…What/who could I trust to lead me away from the pit’s edge? I’m bound to 
fall back in. Looking for a means of escape from the pit. Voyaging to?”  
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Analysis: 
D20 uses the genre of gothic horror to create a hero caught in a pit and 
searching for a means of escape. Having placed the hero on the pit’s edge, 
creating a narrative tension (Reader: will he fall back in? Author: he is bound 
to fall back in) the author gets him to ask the question of what motivation and 
direction should he voyage in, the uncertainty communicated via nine question 
marks in a row. Voyaging could be in space, which contextually would make 
“the pit” a black hole, which then re-contextualises the hero in tragi-comedy as 
the gravitational pull of a black hole is compared to the power of “a vague 
woolly positivity” which may power the escape from the pit. Overall the 
emotional orientation of the author to the hero seems comic and pessimistic, 
but still asking questions of the reader which leave a glimmer of hope for 
escape. Power over my subjectivity is a theme in the data and in most 
narratives I describe a consistent desire to get away from intensely 
uncomfortable moral emotions and escape myself via practicing a new 
narrative or “escape to a better place” by drinking or taking drugs. Although I 
get out of one narrative into another, repeatedly I appear to doubt the power 
of the new narrative to hold me out of “the pit” and empower me to live a good 
life.  
 
When I came to disbelieve the psychiatric narrative about professionals 
treating my illness/disorder and making me better I moved into the Christian 
narrative and orientated myself within that discourse through dialoguing with 
other Christians and reading my Bible. This was done through building a 
friendship with a Christian when we were both washing up in voluntary jobs in 
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a community café. I wanted some occupational activity washing up to help me 
stay away from drink and drugs. I came to believe he was quite genuine in his 
Christian faith (an authoritative narrator) and built up some trust in him as a 
friend. Partly my trust was helped by the fact he had been addicted to heroin 
and alcohol and been in prison, so I thought he had lived experience of some 
of the difficulties I had and so I felt I could trust him. Thus he was an 
authoritative narrator of the Christian narrative to me partly because he had 
overcome similar difficulties to me through this genre and was able to describe 
how he had put the narrative into practice. He also spoke about being 
‘emotionally healed’ which as a phrase appealed to me as something I needed. 
He appeared to genuinely care about me as an individual. I started attending 
a small home group with him to explore the Christian faith. In terms of my 
problem with self-control subjectively I shifted to think of Jesus as “Lord” of my 
life, that is, a powerful figure I was subjecting my will to (i.e. ‘seeking God’s will 
in my life’) and prayed for the power of the Holy Spirit to help me resist some 
of my unhelpful habits of repetitive excess such as alcohol and drug use. 
  
Irrespective of whether or not someone believes in the Christian narrative, 
reading the autobiographical account shows believing in this discourse 
orientated and organised me, and gave me direction in how to live my life in a 
way that the psychiatric narrative had not been able to do. I was also dialoguing 
regularly with a church community of others who, more or less, shared a belief 
in this narrative which helped to keep me believing and practicing its 
techniques or ways.  
 
227 
 
The emotions I felt could be made sense of within this new narrative and 
techniques were available within the narrative to help free me up to live a “good 
life” I still desired, namely to get a paid job and a relationship with a woman. 
For example, when I dialogued with other Christians about my resentments 
and anger at being sexually abused they agreed that that was morally wrong 
and unfair and suggested I admit the hurt done and how it made me feel in 
confidence with another Christian and forgive the wrongs that had been done 
to me, in line with Jesus’ teaching in the Bible. This was a different kind of 
confession to the confessions of the therapy room (e.g. Fonagy et al., 2002) 
mediated by a superaddressee intertextually referencing ‘forgiveness’ in the 
Christian New Testament. When I practiced this technique found I was relieved 
of my angry resentments.  
 
Other examples were around being encouraged to be brave around my fears 
and to admit what I had done wrong in my past and be forgiven, which when 
practiced as a technique relieved me of longstanding feelings of guilt and 
shame. Thus orientating myself within a Christian narrative converted the 
emotions that had been seen as pathological symptoms of illness back into a 
moral narrative with techniques to handle them, such as forgiveness, which 
allowed dialogue about feelings like guilt, anger and fear as moral issues rather 
than symptoms of an illness. Viewing habits such as resentment within a 
Christian ethical narrative provided me with techniques of the self to do ethical 
work on myself, techniques such as confession, turning away (repentance) 
from harmful habits (like repeatedly getting intoxicated) and being forgiven. 
The narrative encouraged me to see myself as a valuable person within this 
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genre as a “new creation” whose ‘old self’ had metaphorically “died with Christ” 
on the cross and risen with him through adult baptism, to be a “new creation”.  
 
As this identity was different from my previous one (of seeing myself as a 
mentally disordered patient with a personality disorder being treated by 
professionals) this helped improve my self-esteem. People in church invited 
my round for a meal and built relationships with me which helped me feel 
valued and loved and they appeared not to mind about my psychiatric history, 
accepting me as I was whilst believing I could get better. However, as noted 
earlier, the autobiographical account in A1 and A2 describe a more clear-cut 
narrative transition that the clinical notes suggest. During 1999 I experienced 
a relapse into excessive alcohol use and re-admission to the psychiatric 
hospital whilst attending my church community and self-help 
(Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous). Thus this analysis would suggest in actual 
lived life multiple narratives are negotiated at the same time by a subject in a 
dialogical search for a new narrative, with hybrid genres being engaged with 
to make sense of experience, such as mental health, self-help and faith 
genres. Later this journey may be simplified into a narrative account with 
clearer transitions between narratives.    
 
Conclusion: 
 
A narrative analysis of the data sets revealed some key themes. Fear, low 
mood, anger, guilt and shame appeared significant habitual states of repetitive 
excess. However analysis showed these were moral emotions which made 
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sense within particular narratives in relation to failing to achieve a ‘good life’ 
desired and valued. These habitual emotions of excess were shown to be 
transferable into a medical drama where they were re-positioned within a 
typical plot structure to justify diagnosis, hospitalisation and treatment. 
Direction and motivation were also identified as significant themes placed into 
several literary genres.  
 
Self-esteem and self-control were also identified as significant in terms of an 
ethical evaluation during this life-journey of insufficiency (too little) rather than 
excess (too much), but these habits of thought and emotion were also shown 
to be thought about differently within different genres. In particular the analysis 
highlighted differences between literal and literary (allegorical, metaphorical) 
understandings of habitual excess and insufficiency. Most medical dramas 
were shown to claim I was literally mentally ill/disordered in need of 
psychopharmacology, hospitalisation, etc. Literal understandings in 
extradiegetic medical dramas were shown to create little agency for the subject 
to negotiate their subject position when compared to intradiegetic literary 
understandings, especially when several literary explanations were created at 
the same time.  
 
Over a significant timeframe (years rather than weeks) what can best be 
described as a significant narrative failure was shown to occur multiple times 
within different genres (self-help, medical drama, philosophical, etc.). 
Significant narrative failure sometimes provoked strong moral emotions such 
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as suicidal urges, and for some a dialogical search for a new narrative to re-
orientate subjectivity within, as alternative narratives are always available. 
However comparison of the autobiographic account with clinical notes 
suggests these transitions are more complex and overlapping than may be 
remembered and re-told in a simple narrative account of a journey through life. 
Instead of a clear cut re-orientation from one narrative to another, it is possible 
to draw on several narratives at the same time in different ways in order to 
make sense of experiences/re-orientate the self in time/space.  
 
Authoritative narrators appeared significant transmitters of genres in addition 
to the power of the genres themselves (e.g. psychiatrists for the medical 
model, recovering addicts for the 12 step genre) as they more or less embody, 
believe, practice and dialogue about their narrative with curious others who 
may be in a dialogical search for a new narrative. Even within one genre there 
was variation which showed the power of the authoritative narrator, as different 
psychiatrists interpreted the medical genre differently, in order to create a 
variety of ‘heroes’ in their medical dramas. This chapter has primarily focussed 
on a dialogical narrative analysis of the major literal/medical and literary/non-
medical genres encountered in pre-recovery chronotopes, prior to a 
chronotopic genre shift into ‘recovery’. The next chapter takes these findings 
forward to focus on recovery chronotopes, by analysing several diverse 
autobiographical accounts of ‘successful’ recovery, in order to answer the last 
research question: what narratives aid recovery in troubled journeys that 
involve some kind of mental health crisis?  
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Chapter 6 
Narrative Analysis of autobiographies of recovery 
 
This chapter applies dialogical narrative methods to analyse some 
autobiographical accounts of successful recovery from serious mental health 
difficulties already available in the public sphere on The Scottish Recovery 
Network (2018). These are first person accounts of recovery from people who 
identify having personal experience of mental health problems. My aim in this 
chapter is to identify the different genres and discourses people draw on to 
explain their process of ‘getting better’. In the last chapter I considered how, in 
my own narrative of recovery from a serious mental health crisis, I had found 
a non-medical route to recovery through a belief system and its practices that 
helped me to deal with my own troubled journey through part of my life. In this 
chapter I want to broaden this analysis to look at other stories of how people 
have made sense of having their own ‘very troubled journey’ through life, but I 
cannot assume that their route through will be the same as mine. Because of 
this I analysed this data to understand how people drew on both mental health 
genres and genres outside of mental health discourses when making sense of 
their own troubled journeys. This led to the final research question I want to 
answer in this chapter – what are the narratives that aid recovery in troubled 
journeys that involve some kind of mental health crisis? More specifically I 
wanted to analyse narrative accounts holding the question in mind of whether 
people draw on moral discourses and/or non-moral discourses when 
organising their experiences into an account of recovery, which they intend to 
be read by the public.  
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Initially I read the data set of all fifty the accounts available on the website in 
2012. I then selected the fullest narratives that express predominantly genres 
from outside of mental health and those whose narratives involve genres from 
within mental health. I have organised this chapter this way to provide a good 
point of comparison between predominantly medical and non-medical 
recovery narratives. This also allows different emerging themes to be explored 
and contrasted with my own data analysed in chapter 5. Having selected 
narratives on the basis of the fullest examples of contrasting medical/non-
medical genres, key extracts were selected from these narratives to focus on 
in this analysis.  
 
Selecting ‘key extracts’ from the data set is a narrative dialogical approach 
favoured by Sullivan (2012, p. 72). These are utterances of significance of 
variable length which embody a readiness for reaction or reply on the part of 
the reader (either from the author disagreeing with their hero or the reader 
response of the audience). Key extracts (or key moments) contain significant 
aspects of the experience that is trying to be communicated linguistically. 
These key extracts were selected on the basis of being the most relevant to 
the research question asking what narratives aid recovery in troubled journeys 
involving mental health crisis, with an interest in contrasting how medical and 
non-medical genres might be used in recovery narratives. What counted as a 
key moment in terms of content included descriptions, anecdotes or reflections 
on moving into recovery (including both before and after experiences) and 
descriptions involving significant discourses. These key moments were given 
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a boundary in terms of form in terms of significant shifts in the emotional 
atmosphere surrounding the anecdote or reflection.   
  
The Scottish Recovery Network (SRN) was launched in 2004 as an initiative 
to raise awareness of the experience of ‘recovery’ from serious mental health 
problems. Part of the initiative aims to make publically available personal 
stories of recovery from “experts by experience”, that is, people who have 
direct experience of mental health problems. Part of their stated aims in doing 
this is to show that people do recover. Another stated aim is to inspire and 
inform people experiencing mental health problems, and those in a caring 
relationship with them (family, friends, employers and professionals) as to what 
helps and what hinders people getting better. It should be acknowledged that 
these accounts will represent a cross section of people who see themselves 
as having made positive changes in their life and found ways to get better, to 
varying degrees. The accounts analysed are limited to people who feel 
comfortable to put their stories into the public sphere. As such their accounts 
may be more edited than if they were talking to a researcher under the promise 
of anonymity. Their accounts may also be influenced by regional variation in 
mental health narrative practices, such as if more people receive certain 
diagnosis or treatments in Scotland than in England then these narrative 
practices are more likely to feature in individual stories.  
For clarity of discussion I label and number each key extract by initial(s) of the 
author and by number of extract from each author, for example, CE1 would 
refer to the first extract analysed, CE2 would refer to the second extract 
analysed from the same author and JB1 would indicate the first extract from a 
new author.  
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6.1:       Part 1: Recovery narratives with heroes that resist medical genres 
 
CS1: Magical Realism and transformation  
“I, more than most, have had to learn how to live my life one day at a time.  I’ve 
believed for many years that “labels are for jars and not people”, but the penny 
hadn’t dropped that this also applied to me. I’d worn the mantel of grieving 
mother and PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) sufferer since witnessing 
my five year old son Anthony burn to death in the back of my car in November 
1987.  My seven year old daughter Samantha had also suffered severe facial 
burns… 
Fast forward to 15 February 2007 when my good friend, a former TV 
personality, took away a series of articles which I’d written and said “Jesus 
Christ, you’ve got talent, but we’ve got to get you away from The Dead Kid 
Bollocks.” * Outraged and simultaneously relieved, I almost wet myself 
laughing. The spell was broken and I was suddenly set free.  My Day of 
Atonement which had lasted for nearly twenty years was over. 
It was another major turning point for me…My friend’s remark enabled me to 
reconnect to my joie de vivre which had been dormant for more than twenty 
years. I immediately gave up the psychotherapy course I was studying at the 
time and the crucifying need which had dogged me to make sense of what had 
happened to me and my children. 
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I allowed myself to own my outrageous sense of humour, to abandon the 
survivor guilt once and for all and to rejoice in my sense of being different in all 
of its various manifestations. Today I feel very comfortable being a combustible 
mix of Catholic guilt and Jewish neurosis, and to no longer feel completely 
identified as a “bereaved mother”.  That is very much in the background now. 
(*This is a direct quote and was considered by the author to be important to 
the story. It is not intended to cause offence.)” 
Analysis: 
The author utilises a number of genres to create differing subjectivities. Before 
the friend’s utterance the hero had a singular view of their identity as a grieving 
mother with PTSD, created from the trauma survivor and medical model 
genres. Intertextually labelling theory is referenced through a quote from 
popular culture connecting the reader with the hero’s realisation they had 
labelled themselves in the past. The hero is then transformed/transported by 
their reaction to their friend’s remark. The narrative is organised around 
anagnorisis, the critical moment within ancient Greek tragedy when the hero 
realises their true identity by making a crucial discovery, which shifts the hero’s 
subjectivity from ignorance to knowledge. The hero is transformed into 
someone who can enjoy life through a multifaceted subjectivity through 
abandoning the subjective excess of needing to make sense of past trauma 
and the moral repetitive excess of survivor guilt. The 
transformation/transportation of the hero into a new chronotopic genre is also 
achieved through catharsis, a plot devise also taken from ancient Greek 
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tragedy, where emotions are purged through extreme emotional shift (outrage 
and relief) of the hero which creates a renewed/restored identity.  
 
The shift from singular identity, as a label, to multi-dimensional subjectivity is 
achieved through the genre of magic realism by introducing magical elements 
into the conventional plot (i.e. the spell was broken/ I was set free). Christian 
discourse is referenced intertextually as the past need to make sense of 
trauma was crucifying the hero. Jewish biblical discourse is also reference 
intertextually as the Day of Atonement (where annual guilt from the 
community’s sins are purged through elaborate rituals) ends. This represents 
an intertextual chronotopic genre shift because in the original text (Leviticus) 
the Day of Atonement only last a day, but in the hero’s life it lasted 20 years. 
Similarly, in Christian biblical discourse the crucifixion lasted 3 hours, but in an 
intertextual chronotpic genre shift it lasts 20 years for the hero’s pre-recovery 
subjectivity. This analysis allows us to see the kind of subjectivity emerging 
from genre shifts, where until they are set free the hero is trapped in an 
atmosphere of suffering and guilt of Biblical amplitude for an extended amount 
of time.   
 
After the cathartic/anagnorisis remark the hero’s subjectivity travels in a 
different direction (a ‘turning point’) and their previous (dormant) capacity to 
enjoy life is freed from the spell that had held them captive in 
crucifixion/atonement space-time. This has elements of fairy tale genre, as in 
sleeping beauty awakened. The ‘self’ created by the author was enchanted to 
not be free to roam outside of the crucifixion/atonement chronotopic genre for 
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20 years until a dialogical reaction to a remark frees the hero into a space of 
joy and humour in present-time.  
 
The author creates some distance with their old self by placing the hero in a 
new landscape. The author shifts subjectivity back and forth - by placing the 
old subjectivity ‘very much in the background’ the humorous/joyful space is 
foregrounded and brought into the present time of the 12 step recovery genre 
(‘one day at a time’). Before the spell is lifted subjectivity is dominated/trapped 
in the past chronotope but afterwards the hero’s space-time is located more in 
the present.  
 
Thus this hero recovers through a dramatic chronotopic genre shift - from 
unending crucifixion/atonement within a hybrid genre (dominated by medical 
model/trauma survivor) into a multi-dimensional subjectivity capable of humour 
and joy (foregrounding comic/Catholic/Jewish/12 step). The author uses 
literary (not literal) ways to create the transformation/transportation into 
recovery, which allow both author and anticipated reader (superaddressee) to 
negotiate the hero’s subjectivity through a transition out of a trapped narrative 
into a more dynamic narrative with a go-ahead plot. The hero’s subjectivity 
shapeshifts and pivots via catharsis/anagnorisis through magic-realism and 
fairy-tail.  
 
The transformation is complex and nuanced as it has allowed the medical 
model and label of PTSD to be purged along with survivor guilt, but the 
bereaved mother to remain, re-positioned with less narrative power in the 
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background, whilst the sleeping joie de vivre awakens and is foregrounded. 
Literary techniques transform subjectivity through purging ethical excess which 
is formed from psycho-analytic discourse (‘survivor guilt’). The subjectivity’s 
perceived habitual insufficiency is formed from a non-English language (joie 
de vivre), suggesting it had been exiled in a foreign land, before being restored.  
 
CE1: Realisation of a transformational journey   
     
“I am no longer the same person who started this journey at sixteen.  At the 
time I didn’t know or feel I was on a journey, but looking back over twenty-two 
years I can see it was a very long journey that actually, if I had anything to do 
with it, would have ended very abruptly.  I almost feel I had to go through this 
whole journey to emerge a better and more capable person, and most of all 
grab back and attain my own identity…” 
 
Analysis: 
The author creates a hero and places them in an allegorical journey which 
frames and links the series of shorter stories that follow. The literary technique 
of flashback is used to adjust the time sequence and take the reader back to 
when the hero was sixteen. The hero (speaking now) addresses the reader 
with the information the hero (aged 16) no longer exists. This literary framing 
device sets the scene, acting as an interesting dramatic narrative hook to keep 
the reader reading. The author draws on a number of genres including mystery 
(where has the 16 year old hero vanished to?) and suspense (Who is the hero 
speaking now? How have they transformed their identity?). The author creates 
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a past hero (age 16) with insufficient knowledge (naïve). Realising they were 
on a journey creates the chronotopic genre shift which transforms their 
subjectivity. 
 
The chronological time (22 years) is given a metaphorical description in space 
as a very long journey. It is not an adventure genre because if it were whatever 
happened on the journey would not have transformed the 16 year old hero at 
all, only tested and confirmed in their unchanging teenage character. By 
contrast this narrative appears the mirror opposite of an adventure genre, as 
the journey completely changed the subjectivity of the hero and erased the 
original. The new subjectivity emerging from the recovery journey is 
better/more capable indicating the author compares two selves (the 16 year 
old hero and the 38 year old hero) and creates a dialogical relationship 
between them (the journey). The author creates reflective distance by giving 
the hero a view on the journey itself. This journey enables the new (better/more 
capable) subjectivity to emerge (be attained) suggesting a developmental 
genre where overcoming challenges on the journey develops the dynamic 
character of the hero. 
 
However, another subjectivity is presented in parallel, where the journey 
allowed them to “grab back” their identity (rather than develop it) suggesting it 
had been unfairly taken before the journey began. The reader response is 
opened up to wonder how the hero developed skills along the journey and/or 
who stole your identity and how did you grab it back? The hero is placed in a 
quest genre where they set off on a long and difficult journey to obtain 
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something stolen from them, the object of the quest being their identity. 
Achieving/regaining a better/more capable subjectivity (the object of the quest) 
makes the hero almost feel they had to go on this journey. This addresses the 
reader by raising questions around the subject’s will power; did they go willingly 
or were they forced by another’s will? ‘Almost’ is double voiced allowing the 
hero to disagree with the author. It speaks from an ambiguous boundary 
position leaving open the idea that the hero feels they could have chosen a 
different journey, or achieved their quest in a different way. In the next excerpt 
CE explains why they set off on their recovery journey; 
  
CE 2:  An invisible monster forces the hero to journey   
 “…Psychiatry is like no other medical profession out there, it’s invisible, 
internal and destructive.  There are no tests, examinations and even 
assessments are never 100% absolute.  My admission in 2000 was to be my 
last and I vowed never to return there again.  
Having come away dejected by lack of care, support and sensitivity, I laid out 
a path to follow…”  
Analysis: 
Because the author is writing about their own experience the hero expresses 
an emotionally invested embodied subjectivity. The words they place in the 
hero have an intonation that can be read, for example in this dialogue with 
psychiatry I hear an intonation of heaviness, anger, despondency, and fear. 
The author draws on a supernatural horror genre, as the medical profession is 
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described as harmful character with supernatural powers. The power 
relationship between the will of the hero and the will of the authoritative 
discourse of psychiatry is negotiated through a hybrid horror/quest-journey 
genre. In a dialogical reaction a supernatural character is created to 
communicate its threat to the hero and explain the beginning of the journey. 
This suggests the author may have hit a sore spot, where an authoritative voice 
wedging into subjectivity (from outside-in) attempts to penetrate the 
subjectivity at a vulnerable place, where they are supersensitive to the idea 
that psychiatry is right, and the dialogical reaction is to expel (inside-out) the 
invader as a supernatural beast.   
 
‘Invisible’ character suggests it could approach the subject unseen without 
warning and do them harm. ‘Internal’ suggests the monster is able to invade 
the subjectivity of the hero and got inside their subjectivity (outside-in 
penetration). This reflects the hero’s other as the authoritative discourse of the 
medical profession entering into their discourse about themselves. The hero 
struggles with psychiatry’s will to order their subjectivity and judge them 
(“assessments are never 100% absolute”). Thus the monological ‘outside-in’ 
discourse of psychiatry is moved into the dialogical ‘inside-out’ narrative of 
quest-journey in order to express a conflict between the author and their other. 
This intense emotional struggle is around the boundary of the self-other where 
the hero has been penetrated (internal) by the unforeseeable (invisible) 
malevolent force of the medical profession which has harmed her and left her 
feeling dejected.  
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This is a sub-genre of the quest genre, where a malevolent character forces 
the hero to go on a journey-quest to find something that will fulfil what they 
lack, restore an insufficiency, heal a harm or restore something lost. The hero 
reacts to the harm done by psychiatry by going on a quest-journey where the 
object of the quest is to grab back their identity. Moral responsibility is placed 
outside the self onto psychiatry for causing traumatic harm. This resonates 
with the discussion of expert by experience, in chapter 3, who saw systemic 
lack of care by mental health services being part of the re-traumatising 
aetiology of personality difficulties associated with complex trauma (Allister et 
al., 2018). Despite the trauma the author persuades the hero to say (and so 
hears back) that without this journey they would not have developed into the 
person (subjectivity) they are today. This can be contrasted with the next 
extract which describes a recovery experience from a different person. 
 
S 1: Life turned upside down 
 
“My whole life had been turned upside down by personal circumstances and 
as I sat there I contemplated what I saw as a bleak future.  Illness had seen 
my employment terminated and I had little income. I felt that I was at the bottom 
of a deep dark void, I was very emotional, lonely, frightened, totally lost and in 
many ways detached from life and I didn’t know what to do.  It was as if I were 
the victim and everything was being done to me, I had tried to outrun my 
problems but had found that they followed me everywhere. I had tried to talk 
to people but my detachment from life seemed to prevent the right words from 
coming out. People looked at me and as I usually appeared clean and tidy they 
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assumed I was alright, but no-one saw inside to the emptiness and loneliness 
within.  To where could I turn for help, what could I do?” 
Analysis:  
The author creates a hero on a journey, who having run from her problems 
now felt totally lost in their chronotope. The hero experiences a narrative failure 
(loss of; employment, income, health) with very little interpersonal power, as a 
victim created by the actions of others. The subjectivity has an insufficiency of 
words to communicate this experience to others. This connects with JB1 
(below) who did not have the mental health vocabulary in the culture of her 
youth to describe her experience. Thus constructing a narrative of recovery 
can involve a sub-plot (a story within a story) of going on a quest to find the 
words to describe experiences the hero initially does not possess.  
The author of S1 creates distance from the hero by saying it was ‘as if’’ they 
were the powerless victim of other actors, which is double voiced in raising 
doubt and a question in the reader response: Is the hero entirely the passive 
victim of others wrongdoing? The subject’s chronotope creates an emotional 
atmosphere of despair as future-time looks bleak and the present chronotope 
has been “turned upside down” with the hero detached and placed at a great 
distance at the bottom of a deep dark void. The narrative is structured around 
an implied other space-time which is the mirrored opposite of their current one, 
if it were turned upside down again - where they would feel attached to life, to 
people, fulfilled (not empty), light (not dark). This draws on a fairy tale or 
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fantasy genre where the hero may pass through a mirror into another world 
where everything is reversed (big/small upside down/back to front).   
S 2: Crossroads causes recovery to begin 
“Deep inside me, I knew that I had three choices – to go down the road of drink 
and drugs, to commit suicide or to plan a way forward. I recognised that the 
first two choices would lead to suffering and grief for those friends and family 
who loved me and who would care for me should they realise how ill I was – 
but I had never had the courage to tell anyone how I felt and therefore what 
right did I have to cause them many years of grieving.   Slowly I turned my 
thoughts to the third option, and as I did so, I felt for the first time in ages, a 
very slight stirring of hope and excitement, and I reached for a pen and a piece 
of paper…” 
Analysis: 
The author places the hero at crossroads, extending the journey allegory with 
three moral choices/roads they could travel down. This visually strengthens 
image of the hero on a journey by creating three new space-times the 
subjectivity could move into depending on the direction they re-orientate. This 
pivot in the narrative is described as a moral dilemma, as two of the choices 
are resisted for ethical reasons because in the hero’s moral framework they do 
not believe they have the right to cause anticipated others (friends and family) 
grief and suffering, particularly as they had insufficiency of courage to tell them 
how they suffered. The cinematic technique of slow motion is used, indicating 
a chronotpic shift as ‘slowly’ they turned and a future space-time of hope and 
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excitement emerges as a possibility for the hero. However this feeling is ‘very 
slight’ and double voiced allowing some doubt about these future hopes and 
communicating an emotional intonation of feeling still dark and heavy, but 
allowing a little light (very slight).  
S 3 Twelves steps of the journey: Flipping the Script 
 “…Excitement began to seep into every cell of my being as I gradually made 
a list of the steps that I needed to achieve in order to take me from where I 
was – in a deeply depressed state, to where I wanted to be – a happy, normal 
individual.  In all there were twelve steps, starting from a small challenge to 
simply sit still for 5 minutes and gradually increasing in difficulty to the last step 
– entering the world again as a healthy adult. 
In doing this small activity I felt that at last I was beginning to take back an 
element of control over my life.”  
Analysis: 
The articulation of the life they desire/value (happy/normal) as a destination 
illustrates the importance, as discussed in chapter 1, of the desired ‘good life’ 
which Taylor (1989) argues forms the basis of a quest to find a believable 
moral narrative to orientate the subjectivity within. Intertextual reference to 12 
steps of recovery and mention of drink and drugs anticipates a reader 
response and raises expectations of the 12 step (Alcoholics Anonymous) 
genre of recovery. When the hero reveals the first step is ‘sitting still for 5 
minutes’ the literary genre of parody is used. This anti-establishment anti-
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authority genre addresses the anticipated reader and allows a range of reader 
responses, such as; surprise and celebration with the author that they are 
writing their own plan of recovery, or disapproval and disappointment that it is 
not a typical 12 step plot, or it could be read as coincidence. Using the literary 
genre of parody disempowers the 12 step discourse in relation to the hero and 
so the author gives the hero a gift - more agency to resists the 12 step 
discourse (as an authoritative discourse). It may indicate the 12 steps of 
A.A./N.A. is not internally persuasive for the author and so is parodied, 
disempowered and so not opened up as a possible subjectivity for the hero. 
Instead the hero’s journey is broken into 12 stages (steps) of incremental 
difficulty with a clear start (deeply depressed) and clear desired destination of 
a good life (happy/healthy/adult/normal).   
S 4: Flipping the Script again - from medicine to trauma survivor  
 “… My journey to recovery took me along the complementary route, simply 
because there is no medicine to cure extreme grief and trauma and I knew 
therefore that the healing had to come from inside myself.  Learning new skills 
would allow me gradually to heal, to achieve the steps on my list and also to 
rebuild my self confidence and self-belief.” 
Analysis: 
The author uses a health/illness medical drama genre but resists the medical 
model version. They take a sideward glance at their anticipated reader 
response and use an element from the typical medical model plot (medicine) 
to challenge the authority of the medical model by saying there is “…no 
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medicine to cure extreme grief and trauma”. Using this technique the author 
flips the script on the medical model genre and takes its authoritative power to 
govern the subjectivity of the hero away by doing something unexpected with 
a typical plot element. Flipping the scrip dramatically pivots the hero into a 
different genre, that of trauma survivor genre. Healing of trauma is the 
destination for the hero but this route is not from traditional medicine, instead 
healing comes from; rebuilding a healthy self-confidence, learning skills, from 
inside-out and from the complementary route of medicine.  
 
The subjectivity that gradually emerges along the recovery journey is one of 
increasing agency as a trauma survivor. The author transitions/transforms the 
hero via a journey genre which positions the subjectivity pre-recovery as; a 
victim, lost, in a lonely chronotpic genre of deep dark detached void without 
words, without a future. The journey out of the void has a clear destination and 
is achieved in self-defined steps of incremental difficulty. The author negotiates 
the hero’s subjectivity past authoritative discourses through parody and 
flipping the script. Thus this analysis shows both comic (parody, S3) and tragic 
(horror, CE1) literary genres can be used strategically to resists powerful 
discourse’s will to order subjectivity. Time features significantly in these 
recovery narratives, as the hero is lost/trapped for years/decades rather than 
days/weeks. Entry of the hero into a recovery chronotope is usually heralded 
by alteration of time (it slows down (S2) or speeds up (CS1))  The metaphor of 
being ‘totally lost’ is a chronotopic clue to the reader that insufficiency of 
direction in life is of significance, until a chronotopic genre shift supplies 
subjectivity with direction. 
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Part 2: Recovery narratives where mental health genres are internally 
persuasive  
 
JB 1: The hero’s initial dialogue with racist discourse 
 
“I am a mixed race woman (Scots-Irish mother, my father from Peshawar). 
Within the context of that background and culture, “mental”, health as a subject 
was never in the vocabulary and “depression” was a word and concept never 
used or discussed. 
From a personal perspective, on reflection, I can see now where the roots of 
depression took hold for me.  I am the oldest first-born girl, from ten younger 
siblings. As for my youth…. think of the film “East is East” but much darker. I 
can relate to that film – it was the first time I saw my family life reflected on 
screen. 
Having been subject to racism in the school playground in the early 60’s 
definitely affected my self esteem.  Even worse, I felt so ashamed of the often 
daily name calling. I never told my parents about being called “darkie”, “paki”, 
“get back to your own country” but this experience affected my sense of mixed 
race identity, and my self confidence.” 
Analysis: 
Jamila is creating an intradiegetic (inside-out) narrative where the originating 
chronotopic genre (‘my youth’) is a traumatic space located in the past where 
habitual insufficiencies grow out from, where “…the roots of depression took 
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hold for me”. The author draws intertextually on her cultural resources to 
reference the comedy film “East is East” to connect the reader to her 
experience of a complex and conflicted mixed-ethnicity British household. She 
then amplifies the emotional atmosphere of the film, creating a difference to 
establish some distance and uniqueness between the hero’s subjectively and 
the comedy film (i.e. ‘but much darker’). The film East is East itself intertextually 
draws on Kipling’s poem, The Ballad of East and West, which transports 
colonial cultural tensions into the genre of Scottish boarder ballad conflicts. 
This evokes a subjectivity trying to negotiate culturally differing but conflicting 
chronotopic landscapes (Scots-Irish / Peshawar). The hero’s habitual 
experience of shame is interlinked with orientating their subjectivity within a 
racist discourse as the relatively powerless subject of such a discourse. 
Remembering, re-imagining and re-articulating the past into a present ethical 
narrative (roots of depression lay in unfair racism) politicises the hero’s 
subjectivity by linking political (outer) with the psychological (inner) 
experiences. Remembering past trauma through an ethical lens and naming 
racist discourse in the narrative as an early influence could be a way for the 
author to decolonise their subjectivity of the racist discourse’s power to govern 
and create a subjectivity of shame, low confidence, low self-esteem. It also 
resists the medical model genre of individualised and depoliticised symptoms 
(e.g. shame) of (inner) ill health by placing shame in a social context on the 
boundary between inside-outside. 
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JB 2: The hero’s dialogue with other discourses 
 
“I’ve experienced depression on and off for the past two decades. I became 
very skilled at covering it up. I started to feel a bit low and anxious, not quite 
on top of things (which I now understand to be disassociation)…   
Also, in the early days, I studied for a drama degree and I loved it, received 
exemptions in the 1st and 2nd years (unknown to me, I had undiagnosed 
dyslexia and P.T.S.D). So I subsequently struggled, and left university (minus 
my degree). Also at that time, I was also going through a traumatic divorce, 
and facing life alone as a single mother. On reflection, that experience was my 
first serious bout of depression. Work wise – I became involved in community 
drama, and I eventually found my niche as a group facilitator – working with 
different culturally diverse and ethnic groups in the community.  Having 
depression (especially if it’s undiagnosed) can leave you feeling very isolated 
(you never completely trust people) and I did not have the ability to develop 
close relationships with other people. Again, having two young sons, gave my 
life purpose and meaning – but often it feels as if I was leading a double life.” 
Analysis: 
The author find the genres of therapy and the medical model internally 
persuasive and draws on them to re-imagine the past chronotope through 
these genre lenses in order to explain partial narrative failures (failed 
degree/divorce). The pre-recovery hero had unknown/undiagnosed conditions 
(i.e. undiagnosed PTSD/dyslexia/depression/disassociation/lack of trust). This 
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illustrates the discussion, in chapter 1, which considered how habitual ways of 
thinking, feeling and/or acting can be reformed and re-conceptualised as 
“mental health issues” when viewed within mental health discourses, such as 
the reporting of habitual feelings of guilt and shame (Hodge and Bryant, 2017). 
However this analysis expands this point to show how mental health 
discourses from both medical and therapy genres can be used creatively by 
an author to help negotiate their hero out of a pre-recovery chronotope by 
retrospectively recreating it as undiagnosed/untreated space-time for the hero, 
and thus relieve the present-time hero of excess of guilt and shame as their 
previous subjectivity had insufficient knowledge.  
Taylor’s (1989) concept of identity orientating around the narratively negotiated 
desired good life helps us to understand this hero does not have a total 
narrative failure, because parts of the good life they desire are achieved, 
particularly through the role of mother and work. However, the author 
problematises the hero’s subjectivity by giving them a double-voiced emotion 
that they were living a “double life”. The author gives the hero room to answer 
back and question what these two worlds are. It is also double voiced in 
addressing the anticipated reader and allowing them to imagine the two lives 
differently from the author and hero. The reader response may think the 
‘double life’ is the ‘outside’ world of fulfilling socially valued roles (parental and 
employment) and the ‘inside’ world of depression, low self-esteem etc. But the 
hero may connect intertextually with two ethnically conflicting chronotopic 
landscapes (Scots-Irish / Peshawar). However, the author themselves holds a 
dialogical subjectivity never identical with themselves, but always in a 
relationship with their hero/other, and so they are free to think differently from 
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their hero, for example, they may read the double life being between the 
fulfilling life they dream of/desire and the partially fulfilling one they are living.  
JB 3: The hero is inspired by reading other authors 
 
 “Over the next decade or so (from the 80’s) I felt that the “recovery” process 
happened gradually. 
I am a voracious reader, and I found various writers who reflected, some 
experiences of my life, and I related to this. Alice Walker, Maya Angelou, Zadie 
Smith, I admired and found these writers, really inspirational and I joined a 
creative writing class.  The first class, was therapeutic writing class, and it 
helped me to get my feelings out through poetry and sharing work in a group 
setting.  I started being more open, and honest, about my hidden feelings of 
despair, being isolated, and feeling different from other people.  Even better 
than that – I could now write about it.  I wrote about racism in the playground, 
being mixed-race and “different” in a positive and empowering way, and I 
began to construct a 10 minute, spoken word poem – about the journey, of 
depression and recovery called “BLUE”.” 
Analysis: 
Reading texts (novels, short stories, essays and autobiographies) written by 
female writers whose texts intertextually resonate with the author’s lived life 
inspires the hero to imagine herself as a creative writer. Thus reading relevant 
resonating texts opens up new subject positions to re-orientate within. The 
hero has a relationship with both the published authors (as role models) of 
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those texts and the fictional heroes created by them. Alice Walker, Maya 
Angelou and Zadie Smith could be seen as authoritative narrators for the hero, 
with their authority partly drawn from being seen as creative trustworthy 
‘experts by experience’ as they also resist racist and sexist discourses that had 
attempted to govern and create their subjectivity. The hero is then inspired to 
write about their own movement through depression and oppression through 
poetry and journey genre. Re-articulating the lived life experience through 
these genres allows a new subjectivity to emerge, one that is empowered, 
positive and creative/productive.       
JB 4: The hero’s dialogue with medicine and therapy 
 
In my process of recovery getting the right information was crucial. I have 
received different types of counselling, and also psychotherapy (some NHS 
and some private), which have all proved profoundly helpful. This was 
particularly the case where the therapist was from a culturally mixed 
background… 
Initially Prozac was suggested (which I found not to be helpful) and my name 
was put on the list for psychotherapy (my request).  At the same time I started 
a ten week course at the local women’s counselling service to teach childhood 
sexual abuse survivors (I am one) how to manage the long term effects of post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). I don’t particularly believe in labels but in my 
case identifying my conditions was helpful.  All of this, proved to be a turning 
point for me in terms of my recovery and healing process because at last I had 
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identification of all those untreated conditions I had been living with in isolation 
for so long made sense.  And – I was not to blame for my conditions.” 
Analysis: 
The author creates a hero who has been helped on their recovery journey by 
counselling and psychotherapy, but this medical drama empowers the hero in 
rejecting the initial treatment offer from the mental health genre 
(psychopharmacology) and emphasising that the hero had to assertively 
request psychotherapy, thus creating a hero with active dialogue within the 
medical drama rather than a passive recipient of a subjectivity initially offered 
(i.e. the narrative patient recovers by taking drugs). The subjectivity is 
transported into the genre of being a trauma survivor who learns skills to 
manage the effects of trauma. The author negotiates a complex subject 
position in relationship with the medical model with a sideward glance 
anticipating a reader with negative judgements about labels by saying they 
“…don’t particularly believe in labels..”. At the same time the hero found these 
labels helped their recovery journey as naming (identifying) untreated 
conditions helped make sense of the past and helped not feel morally 
responsible for them (‘I was not to blame’). This double voiced believing/not-
believing in medical labels reflects the discussion in chapter 1 around survivors 
of trauma being given mental health labels of disorder, as this creates a 
subjective tension as deliberately inflicted trauma needs to be understood 
within a local moral order that makes sense to the survivor. The double voiced 
‘not particularly believing in labels’ utterance shows the author taking less 
authorial control in this section by leaving room for a range of reader 
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responses. For example, a reader could intertextually bring Shaw and 
Proctor’s (2005) view, discussed in chapter 1, that a medical label pathologises 
moral experiences of surviving unfair sexual abuse, to the hero, but still remain 
close, as the author does not particularly believe in them either. This shows 
double voicedness and degree of belief is significant in negotiating narratively 
formed hybrid subjectivities. The power of the medical model over the hero is 
reduced through the author not particularly believing in a key feature of that 
genre (labels). However the genre is then used to relieve the hero of emotional 
pressure of moral responsibility (blame) as in the past as they had insufficient 
knowledge they had these post-traumatic conditions. Here the absent other in 
the author’s subjectivity structures the narrative as it turns to address the 
hidden voice who is critical of the medical model/labelling.  
 
The author is also having a sideward glance at anticipated absent others 
wedging into their subjectivity from outside, those who may judge the hero 
morally for some of their narrative failures (failed degree/divorce). The author 
turns the hero to address them with the past unknown/undiagnosed but now 
officially sanctioned medical conditions (PTSD, disassociation, etc.). Thus the 
power of the medical model genre is used strategically in nuanced ways by the 
author to resist moral judgements of anticipated others whilst at the same time 
‘not particularly’ believing in labels. The outside-in discourses of mental health 
penetrate the subjectivity’s inside-out boundary as it is allowed in to explain 
the past, but also oscillates around the subjective boundary (outside-inside) as 
it is pushed out through some doubt (not particular belief).  
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JB 5: Chronotopic genre shift from East is Ease to international Buddhist 
community  
 
 “Five years ago, through working with 7:84 company (as a writer), I connected 
with SGI Buddhism, and I am now an SGI Buddhist.  This act of mentally 
becoming, and committing, to Buddhism, has probably had the most profound 
effect on my recovery journey – I have found a sense of community locally, 
nationally and internationally – the twice daily, rituals of prayer, and chanting 
puts me, in a state of calm, and extreme positivity – the clear, rational, thought, 
and thinking, is referred to “high life state” by Buddhists… 
From being a young, bullied, mixed race girl, with no self-confidence and self-
belief – I feel I’ve become an expert in the area of human relations!   I could 
now say I could live next door to a hungry lion!! 
…One of the most inspirational quotes that kept me going through recovery is 
from the black Afro American writer – Maya Angelou, “the question is not just 
to survive, but to THRIVE, with passion, compassion, humour and style.” 
Analysis: 
Different degrees of value are ascribed to different genres and discourses, for 
example, having drawn on medical, therapy, faith and fictional genres, a quote 
from Maya Angelou is highlighted as “one of the most inspirational” in helping 
the hero. The faith genre of Buddhism is also foregrounded and raised in value 
relative to other genres as probably having “the most profound effect” on the 
hero’s journey. However, ‘probably’ is double voiced in allowing the hero and 
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anticipated reader some room to disagree. Significantly, the subjectivity is 
located in a new chronotopic genre that is local, national and international. This 
international relational space contrasts dramatically with the chronotopic genre 
at start of the hero’s journey (‘a young, bullied, mixed race girl, with no self-
confidence and self belief’) where their subjectivity lives in “East is East” in a 
complex and conflicted mixed-ethnicity British household and outside the 
house is a racist discourse governing and oppressing her subjectivity. 
 
Jamila creates a dynamic hero travelling from my youth in East is East (where 
outside the door was a powerful racist discourse) into an international self-
confident subjectivity (able to handle the hungry lion outside the door). The 
journey allegory enables past, present and future space-time to be in dialogue 
with each other. Narratively shaped subjectivities differ in the degree to which 
the coordinates of their biographical trajectories orientate the hero towards 
past, present or future space-time and such differences can be fruitfully 
analysed. For example, CS1 and JB2-5 describe getting better by locating 
themselves more in the present/future and less in the past. In order to 
transition/transform the hero into a present chronotopic genre they need to 
place their hero’s initial mental and emotional distress into a past chronotpic 
genre. The narrative allows this to happen by creating distance between two 
chronotopes and then connecting them in a way that makes sense - via a 
journey. They appear to make different sense of the past through new genre-
informed lenses, glancing backwards as they journey forwards. It is interesting 
that CS1 and JB1-5 negotiate a different relationship for the hero on their 
recovery-journey (acceptance/inside or rejection/outside) towards the medical 
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model’s PTSD label, but both still recover. Both allow new, but differing, hybrid 
subjectivities to emerge with new capacities to enjoy life and have increased 
agency and self-confidence. In the next extract from a new author the complex 
and nuanced negotiation of recovery subjectivities with multiple discourses 
within overlapping genres is further explored.  
 
FG 1: Writing their own wellbeing and recovery action plan (WRAP) was 
empowering 
Recovery gave me back my self-respect; I had spent so many years being put 
down that I put myself down. My self-esteem was slowly rebuilt over time and 
even more slowly I became confident in myself, meaning and purpose was the 
key to this. When I was faced with responsibility I could no longer be a 
passenger in my life I had to take personal responsibility and make my own 
fate in life. My parents played a big part in making this journey happen for me, 
so I am truly grateful for their devotion and hope that I’ve made them proud of 
me. Asking for help when I needed it and fighting for my rights was hard at first 
but is now second nature to me. Self harm is a thing of the past which when I 
look back, I can’t imagine how I could have done all this harm to myself and 
how I suffered the pain, but I carry the scars as a constant reminder of how 
bad life was for me. I’m so pleased to now have healthy coping mechanisms 
which will live with me forever. Writing my WRAP was such an important part 
in my recovery as I had a wellbeing manual on myself written by myself and 
that felt so empowering.” 
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Analysis: 
The author creates a hero whose recovery journey begins by taking personal 
moral responsibility when faced with it. Their pre-recovery subjectivity inhabits 
a landscape where others put them down and consequently the hero had a 
self-other relationship with themselves where the voice of their abusive other 
(outside-in) became internally persuasive and penetrated into their subjectivity 
as they put themselves down, creating a hero with low self-esteem, low self-
respect and low confidence.  
 
In this chronotopic genre down-space is pre-recovery mental and emotional 
distress and up is the space of recovery. The “key” to unlocking the hero from 
their pre-recovery chronotope was finding meaning and purpose in life. Once 
the sub-plot quest for the key to unlock the hero is achieved and taking 
personal responsibility moves the hero, subjectivity shifts into a new recovery 
chronotopic genre. Taking personal responsibility empowers the hero to travel 
up from being down (by building up self-esteem). As we have seen in previous 
narratives, hero’s entry into recovery space alters time, as going up happens 
“slowly” and “even more slowly”, contrasting with CS1’s hero’s entry into 
recovery space heralded by time speeding up (fast forwards and change 
experienced suddenly). 
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The hero’s recovery chronotope builds up; self-confidence, self-esteem, self-
respect and builds interpersonal power (agency). Now the hero is writing their 
own recovery plan (WRAP) and fighting for their rights (inside-out). This 
recovery chronotope becomes about increasing agency by switching 
subjectivity from passenger driven by others to driver of the vehicle (the hero’s 
life) by taking moral responsibility for the direction of travel. The words placed 
in the hero’s mouth are that she had to “make my own fate in life”. “Fate” refers 
to the predetermined events in our life outside of our power/control but the 
author repositions it in an opposing utterance about taking personal 
responsibility for life. This is double voiced reflecting the author’s inner-outer 
struggle with the authoritative words of others (outside-in) urging her to take 
personal responsibility containing the old notion of fatalistic passivity. It could 
also be a pun, or parody, to express the author’s disagreement with the old 
subjectivity’s idea of fate. The utterance allows the hero, reader and author to 
disagree about how much subjectivity is shaped by outer or inner forces. In 
this context “fate” is also a word with a loophole as it offers an escape from the 
position that our life-journey is entirely down to taking personal moral 
responsibility for our choices and not determined to some extent by powerful 
external forces (‘fate’). 
FG 2: The hero experiences anagnorisis, through an accidental discovery  
“Around about this time I accidently found out my real diagnosis was Borderline 
and Dependent Personality Disorder. I wasn’t meant to find out but as I had, 
the psychiatrist gave me books to read about it so I could get a better 
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understanding. For the first time in my life I understood a little bit more about 
me…. 
I manage my symptoms of mental illness everyday in a healthy way and have 
gone from having a very poor quality of life with no hope at all to having a 
meaningful life with lots of hopes for the future with even more dreams and 
aspirations, so never give up on your dreams. I am now proud of myself, proud 
of what I’ve achieved in such a short space of time and hope that I’ve now 
made my family proud of me too. Not only that but my journey is not completed 
yet so I’m excited about what the future holds for me. My son has so much to 
answer for, as he made all this possible. I hope that he too will one day read 
this and be proud of how I turned my life around for his sake.”  
Analysis: 
The author draws on the medical model genre of a medical drama to see the 
hero’s subjectivity as mentally ill, and then conceptualise some everyday 
difficulties as symptoms of the illness that they manage in healthy ways. In the 
failed attempts by professionals to keep this secret knowledge away from the 
hero the accidental discovery takes the literary form of anagnorisis, as a critical 
moment when the hero realises their true identity by making a crucial discovery 
shifting their subjectivity from professionally managed ignorance to personally 
discovered knowledge. Once the medical knowledge of diagnosis is 
discovered the hero is given books they find helps her on her journey. This 
hero has several other turning points, such as finding meaning and purpose 
and the realisation taking personal responsibly was essential (the key). 
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This up-future (space-time) is also populated with several anticipated others, 
a future grown son who is proud of his Mum (when he reads this), and family 
members (parents, siblings) who are looking at the future-hero with moral 
judgement on the hero’s journey and feeling proud of the hero’s turn around in 
life. The author is also proud of the hero as time now speeds up (‘in such a 
short space of time’). 
 
The author integrates a medical model genre into the hero’s journey allegory 
as a way to structure their narrative and communicate change. This does 
produce subjectivities that potentially contradict each other, such as being self-
confident/healthy and mentally ill, so in this recovery chronotope the author 
may think in different ways about their hero at the same time. However, the 
good life the hero desires (is achieving, and is working towards) in recovery is 
not defined primarily in health terms but in achieving socially valued roles of 
being a good mother and being employed. Personal responsibility is also 
analysed in the next extract, from a different author’s experience.  
 
AM1: Taking partial responsibility for some of the past is emotional and 
empowering   
“Through his practice, I was also in close contact with a psychologist who had 
a very patient nature and a real enthusiasm for CBT (cognitive behavioural 
therapy). Through my work with her I came to realise my own part in many of 
the negative events which I believed had “been done to me!” As painful as it 
was at the time to realise that I had in fact played a part in some of my own 
263 
 
misery, it was exciting to learn that I did in fact have some control and through 
this realisation, had a choice as to whether it would happen again… 
I realise that within this story of recovery, there are elements which are out with 
our control..” 
Analysis: 
Here the author creates a hero who changes their subjectivity in part through 
dialogue with a psychologist. Narratively structured as anagnorisis, the 
dialogue is a critical moment in the narrative when the hero realises part of 
their true identity by making a crucial discovery that they were partly morally 
responsible for some of their misery. This has an emotional atmosphere of 
pain as it shifts their subjectivity from ignorance to knowledge. However the 
pain is mixed with excitement as their subjectivity emerges with a new sense 
of agency through control and choice. Thus taking some moral responsibly for 
part of what has happened in the past transforms the hero from passive victim 
to someone who can choose to protect themselves from repeating past 
patterns in their future chronotope. The emotional element in this narrative 
section of excitement and pain transforming the hero also employs the literary 
device of catharsis where an extreme emotional shift in the hero 
(excitement/pain) transforms the hero into a new subjectivity. The author 
however qualifies some space-time boundaries to this pre-recovery and in-
recovery journey, by saying although taking more moral responsibility for the 
past was part of her recovery/transformation there are also elements in the 
hero’s chronotopic genre that the hero is not/was not in control of. This 
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contrasts with JB who was not to blame for her past due to 
unknown/undiagnosed disorders. 
 
B1: A hiccup after biting off more than he could chew causes chronotopic genre 
shift 
 
“Things have moved mostly forward since that time, though with the odd 
hiccup. I am now in a long-term relationship and more in love every day. 
Worrying about the past and fearing the future has always been my curse, so 
I try to look at the positives and keep my thoughts in the present. 
Recently I changed jobs and perhaps bit off more than I could chew. I became 
very stressed and depressed thinking that all I had achieved had gone and I 
was back to square one. My lovely partner and kids were saviours. 
I went for help. This time I was not too proud to take advice. I took medication 
as prescribed and, for the first time, received local counselling. What a 
difference! I also tried to do positive things when I was off sick and this time 
recovered very quickly. 
My recovery was greatly helped by realising that others (family and friends) 
can often be a better judge of how I am than I am!” 
Analysis: 
The pre-recovery hero could move through extended space-time, but this was 
problematic as they would travel into past worry and future fears. By contrast 
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the in-recovery hero lives in a present chronotope of positive thoughts and love 
where the hero is mostly moving forwards. This shows the chronotopic genre 
shift required for recovery can be from past/future orientation into present-time 
and not necessarily past-oriented to present/future time. A challenge for 
authors of recovery narratives is explain to themselves and others periods 
where the hero returns to some or all of their pre-recovery subjectivity with its 
problematised habitual excess and insufficiencies. They also need a literary 
devise to rescue the ‘fallen hero’ and return them to the recovery chronotope 
or risk them living in a genre of decline and fall rather than back in-recovery. 
To achieve this B1 uses the metaphor of a “hiccup”, as a hiccup is not 
deliberate but may be caused by something the hero ingests. The intense 
emotions of stress and depression when he “bit off more than he could chew” 
resonated and reminded the hero of his pre-recovery subjectivity. Initially he 
framed (understood) this experience as losing everything and being back at 
square one, intertextually temporarily placing the hero into the genre of a board 
game - snakes and ladders. However, he hero is saved from this catastrophic 
snakes and ladders narrative by his “partner and kids”. He subjects himself (is 
not too proud) to medical advice in the form of medication and counselling. 
Time alters as he enters the recovery chronotope for a second time (recovered 
very quickly).  
 
The author explains the hero’s hiccup as a sub-plot (story within a story) which 
is cathartic, shifting the hero’s self-other relationship in his recovery journey. 
Now the hero is more willing to subject their outer-inner relationship to the 
differing (from the hero’s) judgements of other character’s in their story, such 
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as family/friends (a better judge of how I am than I am!) or doctor/counsellor (I 
took medication as prescribed). This contrast to other recovery narratives (CS, 
CE, S, JB, FG, AM) where increasing agency appeared to be part of the 
journey. In contrast B1 describes the opposite, of letting others have more 
influence (outside-in) over his subjectivity (shared responsibility for wellbeing?) 
and so a reduction in excessive agency/autonomy (pride) can also be part of 
a new chronotpic recovery genre.     
 
Summary: 
This analysis has expanded our dialogical understanding of what narratives 
aid recovery by demonstrating a wide spectrum of subject positions in recovery 
relationships with authoritative mental health discourses and this has taken us 
forwards from the conclusions of chapter 5. This moral/medical spectrum in 
recovery space-time ranged from holding mental health discourses morally 
responsible for causing emotional distress/trauma and trapping the subjectivity 
in a pathological pre-recovery chronotope (CE) to those that varied in degree 
of allowing medical discourses (outside-in) in to shape their subjectivity (JB, 
FG, AM, B). My own data analysis on chapter 5 can now be seen on this wide 
moral/medical spectrum as a subjectivity that felt trapped/held back (close to 
CE) by medical discourses shaping subjectivity with a pre-recovery 
chronotope.  
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Those recovery narratives that partly accept medical genres were shown to do 
so in complex and nuanced ways which hybridised with non-medical moral 
genres. Often the medical drama was contained as a sub-plot (story within a 
story) within an overarching moral narrative aiming to fulfil socially valued roles 
(B, JB, FG). Although dialogical differences could be discerned between 
recovery narratives making use of medical drama genres. For example, JB 
had a more complex and assertive relationship with the medical drama than 
B, by resisting some aspects (medication) of mental health discourse’s will to 
order her subjectivity, whilst requesting others (psychotherapy). She then used 
the language provided by both medical and therapy genres to relieve the hero 
of past problematic moral issues (guilt and shame). Differing from JB, AM used 
a medical/moral dialogue to say CBT therapy helped her take more moral 
responsibility for her part in her misery, an insight increasing her agency to 
resist repeating painful patterns in her future. Thus narratives that aid recovery 
do position subjectivity in complex relational dialogue with authoritative 
medical discourses within a spectrum of often overlapping moral/medical 
genres.  
 
Those narratives that reject authoritative medical discourses were also found 
to vary in the subjectivities they allowed to emerge. For example, CS rejects 
the label of PTSD to allow humour/joy to enter the hero whilst CE takes a 
stronger position in judging medical discourse as morally responsible for 
causing her trauma and forcing her to make her own path. However, moral 
recovery narratives were also found to be relationally shaped by medical ones, 
for example, although CE creates a moral recovery quest-journey it is 
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structured around her rejection of psychiatry’s will to order her subjectivity. This 
shows narratives that help recovery at either end of the medical/moral 
spectrum both need to negotiate a dialogical power relationship with 
authoritative discourses, either as a sub-plot within a moral narrative or full 
rejection involving creating authoritative medical discourses as impotent (S) or 
supernatural characters (CE) to be escaped, or excessive characteristics to be 
abandoned on the journey (CS). The way journey-narratives help some heroes 
was demonstrated to be by bringing powerful discourses (outside-in) into a 
drama where they could be engaged with, in an emotionally charged struggle 
with the hero’s will (inside-out). At both ends of this spectrum experiences 
appear to be filtered through two genre informed lenses, a moral lens and a 
medical lens. Experiences diffracted through these lenses create a range of 
images of subjectivity within recovery space-time where the moral is in a 
dialogical relationship with the medical, creating subjectivities ranging from the 
hero escaping a re-traumatising medical trap to being relieved of guilt through 
validation of a disorder.  
 
This analysis found similarities as well as these differences. Narratives that 
help recovery all involved the transformation of subjectivity through chronotpic 
genre shifts which transported the hero between distinct space-times which 
allow different subjectivities to emerge. Subjectivities formed in pre-recovery 
chronotopes were all described as having moral habitual insufficiencies or 
excess (guilt, pride, fear, agency, self-esteem, etc.) Consistently the hero is 
described as having insufficient personal agency to escape (is 
trapped/imprisoned/cursed/caught in a chronotope) and/or had insufficient 
269 
 
direction (lost in a fog). At both ends of the medical/moral spectrum the 
chronotpic genre shift consistently frees the hero to move in in a direction they 
value and simultaneously addresses the hero’s pre-recovery habitual excess 
and insufficiencies (guilt, pride, shame, fear, self-esteem, personal-agency, 
etc.) Irrespective of the hero’s relationship (inside-out/outside-in) with medical 
discourses the transportation/transformation of the hero was almost always 
achieved through a narrative employing journey genres. However journey-
genres do not hold a monopoly on narratives which help recovery, as B 
showed in his chewing-hiccup narrative.  
 
My data analysis on chapter 5 showed lack of self-control was a strong theme, 
however this did not emerge strongly here. This could be explained by the 
difference in the data set, where chapter 5 was primarily analysing experiences 
in the pre-recovery chronotpic genre described at that time. Perhaps the 
perspective of the hero in-recovery is from an author that feels more in control, 
so descriptions of gaining more agency might be a retrospective description 
compared to chapter 5’s pre-recovery experiences of insufficient self-control. 
Also admitting lack of self-control invites moral judgements from the reader 
response, so the author may want to protect their hero from these.   
 
Narratives that help recovery consistently provided enough dialogical power to 
the hero to free them from the power the pre-recovery space-time held over 
their subjectivity, for example GF’s finding meaning and purpose in life 
empowered her to leave her pre-recovery chronotope. This resonates with 
chapter 5’s analysis, and chapter 1’s discussion of Taylor (1989) where the 
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desired ‘good life’ or destination emerged as a strong theme which drove the 
dialogical search for a new narrative. The importance of authoritative narrators 
emerged from chapter 5 as significant figures of trust who embodied particular 
discourses. This did not emerge as a strong theme in this data, though there 
were examples such as JB’s relationship with authors sharing similar 
experiences of ethnicity and gender, or AM’s CBT therapist ‘passionate’ about 
CBT.  
 
There were descriptions of significant narrative failure pre-recovery (S, FG) 
similar to this theme drawn out from chapter 5. However, JB showed a more 
nuanced experience of how having only a partial narrative failure can help the 
hero survive if the responsibilities and benefits of the ‘successful’ parts (e.g. 
parenthood) can maintain the hero’s journeying. These narratives did show 
heroes engaging in a dialogical search for new narrative (JB) however they 
appear not to have had as wide a range of ‘tried and failed’ narratives as 
chapter 5 found. This could be due to the writing position of the in-recovery 
author, where the range of narratives tried that failed during the years trapped 
in pre-recovery chronotope may be simplified or forgotten as the author 
emphasises the most recent narrative that worked to free the hero. The data 
in chapter 5 included contemporary dairy and clinical notes from the pre-
recovery chronotope that may help capture more of the failed narratives. 
Overall there was support for several themes from chapter 5 in this analysis 
and additional themes emerged, outlined above, which have taken our 
dialogical understanding of recovery further than had been reached in chapter 
5.   
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List of recovery narratives and authors analysed from the Scottish Recovery 
Network: 
CS - Cynthia Spillman, “You don’t have to suffer to feel good” (2008) 
CE - Catherine Eadie, “Emerging from a Cocoon” (2008) 
S - Stroma (pseudonym) “Twelve Steps to Recovery” 13/01/2010 
 
JB - Jamila Brown “Coming Home” 13/09/2011 
 
FG - Fiona Gray “There was never a truer saying than life begins at 40” 
01/06/2012 
 
AM - Abbey Macleod “There Is No Rehearsal” 08/08/2006 
B - Billy “The story of Billy” 15/04/2010  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Ethical dialogue in social networks during very troubled life-journeys 
When I reflect on the journey I have been on, working on this study, I recall 
initially entitling this thesis as being about people experiencing “very troubled 
journeys” through life. This was because I wanted to create some critical 
dialogical distance from the dominant medical categorisation of Personality 
Disorder in order to allow the thesis to develop in ways that were not overly 
restricted by current medical/scientific ways of thinking. The people who are 
the focus of this thesis are usually positioned outside of mainstream society 
and often experience ineffective contact with traditional statutory services. 
 
During my journey through life, in my years using psychiatric services and later 
when employed as a manager of Personality Disorder services, I became 
curious about the very real emotionally charged ethical and moral dilemmas 
experienced by people during very troubled journeys through life. I noticed 
these emotionally charged ethical dilemmas were experienced both by the 
people on very troubled journeys and by their relatives, friends and staff in 
services within their social networks. I noticed the habits that concerned people 
within someone’s social network, including staff, revolved around repetitive 
excesses and insufficiencies, such as, too much or too little guilt, too much 
anger, too much alcohol, too little compassion, too little employment, etc.  
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I became curious about the variation of views between staff and clients about 
which habits of thought, emotion and/or actions to problematise. I was also 
curious about variations between staff, clients and family members as to what 
level any habit was problematised and judged excessively or insufficiently 
practiced because these judgements appeared to be related to the differing 
social networks, narratives and local ethical frameworks people were 
embedded within. I also noticed professional staff tended to judge the habitual 
excesses of their patients but rarely reflected on their own ethical practices, for 
example, they may comment that part of the problem was the patient ‘lacked 
empathy for others’ without also wondering if the workers involved in the 
patient’s care also ‘lacked empathy’ for the patient themselves. 
 
In 21st century economically developed countries people not functioning 
socially in employment and stable housing, who are positioned outside of 
mainstream society, tend to be subjected to a professional mental health 
assessment in order to judge if there is a link between their lack of social 
functioning and a mental disorder of some kind. However mental health 
assessment can prove difficult for people with complex combinations of needs 
around trauma, homelessness and substance misuse, as they are often 
leading chaotic lives which do not easily fit into a professional middle class 
appointment/diary systems of service delivery. Also when assessed they often 
meet the diagnostic threshold for several different overlapping categories of 
mental disorder, including Personality Disorders.  
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One of the findings of this thesis is that moral judgements about habitual 
excess seep into the medical discourse of DSM. Chapter 3 explored the 
current moral judgements implicit in DSM-5 (2013). Mental health 
assessments were found to include moral judgements about whether a person 
has a range of excessive or insufficient habits including guilt, empathy, self-
esteem, impulsivity, impatience, unforgiveness and shame. DSM-5 does not 
acknowledge these are ethical or moral judgements, nor is medical science 
currently capable to deal with moral dilemmas of this kind. These habits of 
excess and insufficiency are formed in local moral frameworks within the 
narratives of people’s lived lives. However for any problematic habit, where to 
judge the line between valued habitual moderation and negatively valued 
excess or insufficiency will differ dialogically in the relationship between the 
psychiatric professional and their patient. This is because each will draw on 
different local moral narrative frameworks to judge the degree to which their 
habits are problematic, and to whom they are perceived as problematic (the 
patient, the professional, or others within their social network).  
 
7.2 Remote contexts of understanding 
Chapter 3 showed the health narrative of DSM-5 (2013) transports several 
problematic habits into the remote context of understanding of medical science 
in order to diagnose people with a Personality Disorder. This often then leads 
to offers of medical treatments adopted from physical medicine, such as 
chemical psycho-pharmacology or psychiatric hospitalisation. 
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This thesis did find evidence to support the view that people with very troubled 
journeys through life had more than the average amount of traumatic abuse 
and neglect in their childhood and less than the average amount of resilience 
or skilful habits to deal with trauma (e.g. Livesley, 2003). In addition many 
problematic habits in adulthood were found to be formed in reaction to past 
traumas (e.g. Livesley and Larstone, 2018). However it should be noted that 
not everyone who experience childhood abuse and/or neglect goes on to live 
very troubled journeys outside of mainstream society. The evidence suggests 
the combination of early trauma combined with lack of skills to deal with trauma 
were significant factors to consider. Although higher levels of trauma increase 
the likelihood of accessing mental health services (Livesley, 2003, Allister et 
al., 2018), this study found that people’s experience of being traumatically 
harmed and neglected was a moral experience rather than a medical one. To 
feel angry at the social injustice of being harmed or wronged requires a local 
moral framework with an ethical axis around socially acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour. For example feeling guilt or resentment about 
perceived unfair mistreatment involves believing in a local moral framework 
where some behaviours (such as physical or sexual violence towards children) 
are considered morally wrong. Therefore not only are the current problematic 
habits of people on very troubled journeys moral rather than medical, but their 
past experiences of trauma and/or neglect were also experienced ethically 
within local moral frameworks. Chapters 5 and 6 showed the importance of the 
range of narratives and genres available to individuals, as this influenced the 
range of subjectivities allowed to emerge as people tried to make sense of 
emotional and mental distress.  
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Thus this thesis has challenged the medical model by putting the narratives of 
people’s troubled journeys into a moral framework. In order to do this I needed 
a social scientific and moral philosophical standpoint that could deal with moral 
issues in the real context of the various situations of individuals’ everyday lived 
lives. Thus, ontologically I took a position against positivism alongside the 
moral philosopher Charles Taylor (1989) and the social psychologist Rom 
Harré (1993) considering human beings to be both social and moral beings 
who attribute strong evaluations to their own and other’s habits of emotions, 
thoughts and behaviors. These moral habits are formed when human beings 
are relating with each other in their pursuit of narratively driven goals. 
Foucault’s (1990) work around ethics and his concepts of telos and techniques 
of the self was also utilized to justify the legitimacy of analysing moral issues 
within the human sciences. Epistemologically this study also drew on the work 
of Bakhtin (1981) taking a dialogical approach to truth claims with an emphasis 
on narrative understandings. Thus this thesis undertook a dialogical analysis 
(Sullivan, 2012) which included considering the relationship between narrative 
discursive practices concerning the moral habits of excess and insufficiency 
that affect social functioning during someone’s life-journey. 
 
Whilst this study has attempted to be explicit about its ontology and 
epistemology it is worth noting that positivist medical science texts (e.g. DSM-
5, 2013) often assume their readers and their authors share implicit ontological 
assumptions and make no attempt to articulate explicitly those which underpin 
their research into human beings. This study’s analysis of DSM-5 (2013) in 
chapter 3 went further than the current critiques of DSM-5 in arguing the 
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pathological personality traits used to diagnose personality disorder are moral 
habits formed in local moral frameworks within everyday speech genres 
(Bakhtin, 1981), which have been re-worked into a different medical/scientific 
professional genre - as symptoms of mental illness/disorder. The analyses of 
auto-biographical accounts in chapter 6 supported the idea that habits such as 
guilt, shame and resentments are formed in local moral frameworks and are 
best understood within believable narratives. Narratives that aid recovery were 
shown to involve chronotpic genre shifts, often organised around a journey 
genre. 
 
7.3 The heteroglossia of the historical context: 
Chapter 2 explored the historical process through which moral habits became 
medicalised. Bakhtin’s (1986) concept of heteroglossia helped in the analysis 
of the historical process by which moral habits become enveloped within the 
medicalisation of madness. This study showed that this process was occurring 
within the wider context of increasing scientific and medical centripetal forces 
during the 19th century. For Bakhtin the meaning of any text on madness is 
made in dialogues governed by the contextual conditions within which its 
meaning is created and operates (historical/social, political, economic, local 
contexts, etc.). Unique contexts are the primary factor in understanding a text 
as it cannot hold priority over its context in the meaning making process. 
Historically changing contexts create the meanings of any text. A unique matrix 
of forces, including discourses and institutional practices are at play when 
reading or producing a text. Heteroglossia is this unique cultural mix of 
meaning-making contexts where centripetal centralising forces holding the 
278 
 
traditional social world together are constantly colliding with decentralising 
currents of centrifugal forces for change. From a dialogical historical analysis 
this study resisted arguing for a singular linear explanation that modern secular 
medical science of madness (e.g. Prichard, 1835) took over the Christian 
based ontology of Hancock (1824) or took over the Christian innovative 
amateur practices of Moral Treatment (Tuke,1813). Instead this study 
demonstrated in chapter 2 that medical science adopted both Christian 
ontology and moral treatment practices in a dialogical relationship between 
Prichard (1835) and Hancock (1824) and Tuke (1813). This dialogical 
relationship was explored in chapter 2 in the wider epistemological context of 
Prichard being a pro-modern medical scientist of madness and Hancock 
writing a non-medical anti-modern treatise.  
 
In addition, the adoption of moral treatment by the medical profession was 
considered dialogically as it originated at The Retreat, which was originally set 
up as a practical amateur protest at professional maltreatment of the mad in 
the York asylum. However, Bakhtin would say these battles, discursive thefts, 
deaths and rebirths are constantly going on in the heteroglossia of competing 
narratives as texts collide with each other in the opposing centripetal and 
centrifugal forces at work. The context of the early 19th century was one of the 
rise to power over its subjects of modern medicine and science.  
 
However, Bakhtin argues any monological discourse can never finally succeed 
in silencing all its rival narrative explanations of its subject matter. It is possible 
to find all kinds of practices and ideas from the archaeological layers of 
279 
 
alternative ways of thinking about madness being absorbed into the centripetal 
forces of medical/science discourses on madness over the previous two 
centuries. Perhaps these moral habits of excess, such as unforgiveness, which 
were sucked into the centripetal monological forces of medical science in 1835 
and remain in the current DSM-5 (2013), can be understood differently within 
the polyphony of decentralising discourses, such as post-psychiatry and 
service user/survivor movements, which are creating centrifugal forces for 
change within the current heteroglossia. That this study was capable of 
observing and articulating the medicalisation of moral habits in ways that make 
sense to the reader is perhaps a sign that at this moment in time the centrifugal 
forces may be gathering momentum and opening up new discursive spaces. 
At the same time the monological powers of medical science’s centripetal 
forces may be strengthening in reaction to these challenges to its authority. 
The historical lens shows us powerful monological discourses symbiotically 
supporting intuitions do not give up power over its subjects willingly, as 
evidenced in 1970’s with the neo-Kraepelinian movement increasing the power 
of medics in reaction to challenges, resulting in DSM III (1980). More recent 
examples discussed in chapter 2 include the APA rejecting its own working 
party’s fairly conservative proposed changes to defining “Personality Disorder” 
in DSM 5 (2013) (see Livesley, 2012) and NIMH’s bio-project which aims to 
create a new mental health nosology based on biology (Insel, 2013). 
 
After examining the macro-level historical development of “Personality 
Disorder” in DSM through chapters 2 and 3, this study made use of narrative 
methodology to examine micro-level narratives in chapters 5 and 6, drawing 
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on the methods of Sullivan (2012), Mishler (1995) and Reissman (1993). 
Human beings were considered to be moral agents in search of believable 
stories within which to orientate themselves to a desired good life. In terms of 
methodology for producing truth claims, the narrative analysis also drew on 
Bakhtin’s (1981) dialogism as an epistemology, arguing a dialogical approach 
to narrative opens up the possibility of listening to how ‘the mad’ narrate their 
experience from outside the coordinates of the authoritative monological 
discursive framework of positivism. From this methodological position, Chapter 
5 analysed the three data sources; my psychiatric notes accessed via the data 
protection act, my diary entries from the 1990’s, and a written autobiographical 
account. In chapter 6 this study analysed seven further autobiographical 
accounts of mental health recovery in the public sphere using a dialogical 
narrative analytic approach. 
 
In texts such as DSM-5 (2013) and Hancock (1824) spanning two hundred 
years, this study has found evidence of people forming a number of habits of 
emotions, thoughts and/or actions, such as guilt, anxiety, unforgiveness, 
intoxication and self-harming, which do affect people’s ability to function 
socially. Chapter 5 and 6 found evidence to support the view that these habits 
are moral habits that have been formed in the local moral orders of an 
individual’s social network within the narratives of their lived life (Taylor, 1989) 
and everyday speech genres (Bakhtin, 1981). Evidence was found that human 
beings have capacity to form emotionally charged moral habits; however, 
these will be judged differently in different narratives because they are only 
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morally problematised as excessive or insufficient within particular believable 
local moral narratives and frameworks.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 also found evidence to support the view that moral habits 
are formed within narratives whilst people are pursuing their desired good life 
(Taylor, 1989) or telos (Foucault, 1990). Chapter 6 found evidence that people 
who had experienced significant mental health problems, who wanted to share 
their experiences of recovery, predominantly re-organised their lived 
experiences into a narrative with the allegorical structure of life being like a 
journey.  
 
7.4 Significant narrative failure 
Evidence was also found in this study that some people experience a 
significant narrative failure on their journey through life when over a significant 
time period they do not achieve the good life they desire from the narrative(s) 
they are orientating their subjectivity within. Because the good life people 
desire to achieve is highly valued, significant failure to achieve it - in terms of 
meeting educational, housing, employment or relationship goals - produces 
strong moral emotions, for example, guilt, shame, envy, resentments and 
negative self-estimations. Significant narrative failures such as becoming 
unemployed, failing educationally or habitual misuse of substances also attract 
negative judgements from others. Evidence to support this view was also 
found and discussed in chapters 5 and 6.  
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During a period of significant narrative failure this study found people often 
remain in a failing narrative for several years despite not achieving the 
narrative’s valued goals. Evidence was also found within autobiographical 
accounts that during a period of significant narrative failure people form further 
powerful habits such as self-harming or intoxication, often to suppress 
uncomfortable emotions such as habitual guilt, shame or resentment which are 
partly formed in reaction earlier trauma, but also reacting to their consistently 
not achieving the ‘good life’ they desire.  
 
7.5 Searching for a believable new narrative to re-orientate within 
However for some people it was found that the strong moral emotions 
provoked by a persistent significant narrative failure created the motivation for 
them to undertake a dialogical search, or quest, for a new narrative within 
which to re-orientate their life. Chapters 5 and 6 outlined evidence showing 
that people experiencing a significant narrative failure begin to doubt and 
disbelieve their current narrative and go through a period of searching for a 
new believable narrative within which to re-orientate themselves. The narrative 
analysis of auto-biographical accounts demonstrated that getting better within 
a new narrative was not an intellectual or purely cognitive process but involved 
emotional and social contact with others who believed in the new narrative 
(e.g. mutual aid groups, faith communities, survivor groups, etc.) and the 
practice of new habits which are morally valued both within the new narrative 
and social network, such as helping others, forgiving unjust hurts, abstaining 
from drugs, meditation or increasing compassion. 
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This study also found that a factor within someone’s journey was the variety 
and type of narratives an individual is exposed to during the time they are 
experiencing a significant narrative failure. If people have become socially 
isolated with little social contact, often they are exposed to very few dialogues 
containing potentially helpful alternative narratives. However, it is important to 
note some people experiencing a significant narrative failure chose to 
persevere within their currently believed narratives instead of searching for a 
new narrative. For example, someone orientating within an 
educational/employment narrative who desires to become a nurse may fail 
their final year of studies and thus fail to qualify. Although this may well be 
experienced as a significant narrative failure, someone, instead of searching 
for a new narrative to orientate within, may decide to retake their final year of 
studies and carry on with their desired narrative goal of becoming a nurse. If 
they succeed their future narrative explanation to others would include how 
they did not give up on their dream when they failed their finals, but persevered 
with their desired goal and eventually became a nurse.  
 
7.6 Getting better: 
For those who do go in search of new narrative understandings for their mental 
and emotional distress, the range and variety of alternative narratives on offer 
to them is significant because these are all potential ways to re-orientate their 
life in order to get better. After analysing the autobiographies, ‘getting better’ 
appears to be a more useful concept than ‘recovery’, as recovery often implies 
return to some former state of health which for many has simply never existed. 
Thus the concept of getting better allows for entry into previously unexplored 
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new territory within someone’s narrative journey. This study found any new 
narrative may be a potential way to get better. These new pathways to getting 
better are formed through dialogical relationships with other people who 
always hold potential new narrative explanations for life’s difficulties. However, 
as well as potentially helping someone get better, any new narrative may be 
something that an individual gets ‘stuck’ in once again for several years on 
their journey through life. For example, in chapter 5 and 6 we saw examples 
where once someone believes they are seriously mentally ill they became 
‘stuck’ for years as a patient within an illness-narrative understanding of their 
emotional and mental distress. Some people’s autobiographical accounts 
reported that eventually they discovered an alternative to the narrative of being 
ill which allowed them to move on with their journey through life. 
 
Chapter 6 also found evidence that the predominant response for people 
experiencing a significant narrative failure in Western countries in the early 21st 
century was to be directed by friends, family, colleagues and professionals 
towards mental health services that acted within a health/illness narrative. For 
example, this study found people experiencing a significant narrative failure 
were often directed to a professional mental health assessment, which usually 
led to a diagnosis within a classificatory model and treatments being 
prescribed (medication, hospitalisation, talking therapies, etc.).  
 
7.7 The Authoritative Narrator 
Chapter 6 found some evidence that whist people are experiencing a 
significant narrative failure and are in search of a new narrative they dialogue 
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with other people, some of whom are in the role of an “authoritative narrator”. 
For example, a psychiatrist or other mental health professional is in a relatively 
powerful position of authorising a medical/scientific narrative understanding of 
their emotional and mental distress. In the process of a psychiatrist diagnosing 
a patient they are giving authority to that category as a valid label for this 
subject, and they communicate this version of reality to their patient and their 
family. To a large degree, mental health professionals do believe in their 
professional training and in a medical/scientific categorical lens for looking at 
people and therefore are embodied as an authoritative narrator of one way of 
assessing and understanding emotional and mental distress. Chapter 6 found 
that currently, medical science and psychiatry is the predominant narrative 
people are signposted to when they experience a significant narrative failure. 
However the analysis of the autobiographies raises real doubts about 
psychiatry’s usefulness because it takes moral problems around people’s 
habitual excess and reframes them as medical issues in need of professional 
medical treatment. However this analysis of narratives that aid recovery 
showed a wide spectrum of subject positions in recovery relationships with 
authoritative mental health discourses. This moral/medical spectrum in 
recovery space-time ranged from holding mental health discourses morally 
responsible for causing emotional distress/trauma and trapping the subjectivity 
in a pathological pre-recovery chronotope to those that varied in degree of 
allowing medical discourses in to shape their subjectivity. My own data 
analysis on chapter 5 could then be seen on this wide moral/medical spectrum 
as a subjectivity that felt trapped/held back by medical discourses shaping 
subjectivity with a pre-recovery chronotope.  
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Human beings constantly want to make sense of their everyday experiences 
and a significant way in which people do this is by telling each other moral 
narratives about themselves and other people who appear in their day to day 
journey through life (Taylor, 1989). Chapters 5 and 6 did find people attributing 
strong positive and negative ethical evaluations to their own and other people’s 
habitual ways of thinking, feeling emotions and/or acting in pursuit of life-goals.  
 
7.8 Weakening centripetal forces? 
This study found some evidence in the autobiographical accounts in chapter 6 
that medical science’s centripetal forces may be weakening (but also 
strengthening) as alternative centrifugal forces within the heteroglossia may 
be increasing at the start of the 21st century. This would begin to open up new 
discursive spaces to think about mental and emotional distress. For example, 
post-psychiatry represents one attempt to open up new spaces for a polyphony 
of understandings of madness to be valued and given a voice, particularly the 
voices of service users and ‘experts by experience’ who have had, or are 
having, very troubled journeys through life.  
 
The findings of this study suggest there is a case for considering a new 
approach, or the creation of a new genre, for ways of trying to help people 
experiencing significant narrative failures who have difficulties with moral 
habitual excess and insufficiency. It would be useful for paid staff to include 
reflecting on themselves in any ethical dialogical approach which is trying to 
help people co-produce better journeys through life because they too have 
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habits of excess and insufficiency (combined with their habitual skills) due to 
staff being human beings also. 
 
7.9 Journeying Ethical Dialogue: 
Part of my personal motivation for undertaking this study was a curiosity I had 
in experiencing resentment and unforgiveness at being sexually abused as a 
child, and this habit being taken as a symptom by a psychiatrist as part of their 
reasons for diagnosing me as having “Personality Disorder” during the 1990’s. 
When I heard this I began to have doubts about the usefulness of medical 
diagnosis and treatments in helping me get better because I had received 
seven different diagnoses from seven different psychiatrists during seven 
separate inpatient admissions to the psychiatric hospital. I was curious about 
how one profession could be so divided and ‘split’ to come to seven different 
conclusions about the same individual. As I found ways to get better, my 
biographical trajectory of coordinates in time and social space changed. I 
gained employment as a mental health housing support worker and eventually 
became a manager of Personality Disorder services, before becoming a senior 
care co-ordinator in an Early Intervention in Psychosis (EIP) service, and then 
Work Force Development Lead/System Broker at a non-profit programme in 
the North East of England, Fulfilling Lives, working with people with multiple 
and complex needs combining mental health, substance misuse, 
homelessness and criminal justice  issues, who other services find difficult to 
engage. 
 
288 
 
Whilst my journey was getting better, including getting married and raising 
children, these employment experiences exposed me to many different ways 
of thinking about people with very troubled journeys through life, both from 
people with lived experience and a variety of interesting professional 
approaches and attitudes. The group of people who are experiencing complex 
needs on very troubled journeys do not fit easily into current statutory mental 
health provision and continue to have very poor outcomes circulating around 
homeless hostels, hospitals, prisons and addiction services. Contact with 
traditionally offered services often has little positive effect on the narrative of 
their biographical trajectory through time and social space.  
 
My frustration with traditionally offered services and their poor outcomes for 
this group of people motivated me to start this study. This has led me to 
conclude that a dialogical, ethical epistemological approach may be useful 
where all people in a dialogue reflect on their own moral habits, both positively 
valued ones and those ascribed negative ethical value. This would go some 
way towards addressing the power imbalance of a professional judging a 
patient’s excessive habits without disclosing their own relative habitual 
excesses and insufficiencies. Any assessment by one human being of another 
human being’s habits has a dialogical relationship influenced by the assessor’s 
practice of that habit. This is because the process of assessment involves a 
unique meeting of two unfinalised personalities, who to some extent hold 
differing ethical ideas around habitual excess and insufficiency. In addition to 
the dialogue between two individuals there is also a polyphony of different 
genres and voiced narratives in dialogue within each individual about how any 
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habit may be judged ethically, and at what level to judge habits having reached 
problematic excess/insufficiency. Thus problematic habits could be explored 
dialogically within the relatively remote contexts of understanding amongst 
someone’s social network, including staff in services, friends and family 
members. As each person in a dialogue is potentially a remote context of 
understanding for someone else within the social network any group reflection 
could create a micro heteroglossia of narratives which would be resonating 
with the wider social heteroglossia at that time.  
 
There may be value in engaging someone’s social networks in reflective 
dialogue about issues this study has found to be important, such as: significant 
narrative failure, moral habits (both as positively valued skills or ethically 
problematic excess and insufficiency), the desired ‘good life’ someone want to 
live, and the range of possible alternative narratives they could re-orientate 
themselves within. This could include sharing the dialogical view that medical 
science is historically and socially contingent. An ethical dialogical approach 
would involve contextualising medical science as one of several narratives 
within which emotional and mental distress could be understood. 
 
In my current role I have applied some of the findings from this study by writing 
a social/psychological framework called Ladder4Life (Middleton, 2016) which 
visualises someone on a journey: 
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The ‘top of the hill’ in this picture visually represents the “good life” someone 
desires, or any way in which they would like their life to get better in future. The 
‘dead end’ with a blue forest visually represents any narrative understanding 
within which someone feels they have become side-tracked, lost or 
experienced a significant narrative failure in achieving their desired good life. 
The ‘quick sand’ visually represents any habits of excess or insufficiency 
someone considers they express which habitually get them ‘stuck’ on their life 
journey, such as self-harming, guilt and shame, substance misuse, etc. 
Journey 1 and 2 could represent different narratives being considered for 
journeying along. Within my current work role I have opened up an ethical 
dialogue with people who are experiencing a very troubled journey and with 
their social network by listening to how they would organise their experience 
291 
 
into this new narrative genre of a journey with quicksand, dead-ends, rocks 
blocking their journey and ‘a ladder’.  
 
The ‘rock’ on their path visually represents any problem they think is blocking 
their way to achieving the better life they desire at the top of the hill. The ‘ladder’ 
represents the habitual skills people practice to overcome their perceived 
problems. The first ‘rung’ of the ladder represents how they describe a 
problem, the second rung represents the habitual emotions they feel on life’s 
journey, the next rung represents the habitual ways they deal with conflict of 
wills with other people on their journey. The next rung represents habits around 
co-operating and asking for help with problems, while the next rung represents 
habitual skills around planning. The next rung represents any actions people 
have taken to put their plans in to action and the final rung of the ladder visually 
represents reflecting on the whole journey within this new narrative genre and 
consideration of what they have learnt or what they may change in their 
approach to life. 
 
I have used this Ladder4Life social/psychological framework to develop 
dialogically informed version of Psychologically Informed Environments 
(P.I.E.) (see Johnson, 2018) which develop reflective practice amongst staff 
within frontline services engaging with clients with complex needs. This has 
included a day centre for people who are homeless and mental health 
residential rehab services in Gateshead, England. The effect of developing 
these ethical dialogical approaches has been researched and a positive 
evaluation published which found staff improved relationships with clients and 
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became more reflective of their own practice through this approach (Boobis, 
2016). 
 
7.10 Co-production: 
In my current employment role I have also recorded ethical dialogue interviews 
with people with complex needs experiencing very troubled journeys on this 
Ladder4Life framework and co-produced films with them (e.g. Middleton, 2017 
a), making these films publically available on You Tube. I have also valued 
opening up a dialogue in group discussions with experts by experience with 
complex needs, on the Ladder4Life topics, and coproduced a series of five 
films with them (e.g. Middleton, 2016). I have made the films publically 
available on You Tube in order to amplify their ‘voice’ and use them in work 
force multi-agency training on reflective practice.  
 
In addition I have developed and co-delivered with experts by experience 
training based in part on findings from this study to staff from multiple services 
such as probation, substance misuse, homeless services and statutory mental 
health services. The effect this ethical dialogue training has had on these staff 
is currently being evaluated. This involves co-delivering training with experts 
by experience where we introduce dialogical ideas and then show the multi-
agency staff receiving the training (probation, mental health professionals, 
homeless staff, addiction workers, etc.) coproduced films around the 
Ladder4Life framework. We then open up a dialogue to discover the different 
ways professionals interpret what they hear experts by experience saying in 
the films and help staff reflect and appreciate alternative ways of interpreting 
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and responding to the lived experience shared in the films by people on very 
troubled journeys through life.  
 
An illustration of how this approach works can be seen from my work as a 
system broker at Fulfilling Lives, where I opened up a dialogue on the 
Ladder4Life framework with one of our male clients and their key worker 
(called a ‘navigator’). The client was able to reflect on his life-goal of running a 
burger van and for his Mum to become ‘proud’ of him. He had been trying to 
achieve this goal for several years without success and so this could be seen 
as a significant narrative failure. Through dialogue he identified the thought 
that part of the reason for this was he was in the habit of being “easily led” by 
others. He reflected that his tendency to do what others suggested led him to 
take drugs, which had also led to overdoses and to him committing crimes for 
which had been imprisoned. He recalled his mother had said he was in the 
habit of being “easily led” as a teenager and she thought it led him into getting 
into trouble. He was unsure exactly what being too easily led meant, so I 
offered my understanding of its meaning and on reflection he said he thought 
that was a problem habit for him. I then invited his key worker into the dialogue 
to share his thoughts, and his key worker shared how he had noticed his client 
would often be easily influenced by others to take drugs which had led to 
overdoses and the need to be resuscitated. He recalled he had helped his 
client move from a large homeless hostel to a smaller one and this change in 
social context appeared to have helped his client, as there were less people 
asking him to spend money on drugs. This is an example, in a small way, of 
opening up a dialogue about a habit of being too submissive in interpersonal 
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relationships and how this contributes to a significant narrative failure. The 
ethical dialogue involved his present social network (e.g. his key worker’s 
shared opinion) and his memories of the local moral framework he grew up 
within (e.g. his mother’s negative evaluation of his habit of being too easily 
led). He gave permission for the ethical dialogue about his life journey to be 
recorded and made publically available in a Film (Middleton, 2017 b) to help in 
our training programme to develop multi-agency staff understanding and skills. 
 
This was an attempt to create of a safe but ethical dialogical space for 
someone to consider their narrative goals and reflect on any habits that may 
be making it difficult to achieve them. Each view on the problematic habit was 
held dialogically within the social network as having a history, a social context 
and possible futures. He reflected he could see one possible future where he 
may be able to resist being easily led by others. Each participant accepted 
they only partly knew about a habit within a narrative, but were able take 
responsibility within the social network for sharing their potential narrative 
understandings of; the desirable ‘good life’ (running a burger van), problematic 
habits and valued skilful habits (e.g. resisting unhelpful suggestions from 
others). Attempts were made for everyone to have their unique contribution 
valued within the safe dialogical space. The principle of always only partly 
knowing is based on Bakhtin’s epistemology where the truth is constantly 
being created between unfinalised personalities in dialogue so any one 
individual can only every partly know the truth.  
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Applying Bakhtin’s ideas to help people with mental health difficulties from a 
social network perspective has successfully been developed in Western 
Lapland since the 1980’s through the “open dialogue” approach for those with 
the experience of psychosis, who often attract a diagnosis of “Schizophrenia” 
(Siekkula, 2006, 2011). In contrast to making sense of ‘psychotic’ experiences 
(Siekkula, 2006) I am suggesting, based on this study, that there may be value 
in applying an ethical dialogue approach with people experiencing very 
troubled journeys through life in their social networks. This would attempt to 
productively reflect, within the relatively remote contexts of understanding 
provided by someone’s social network, on both the problematic habits and 
habitual skills expressed in the pursuit of narratively driven goals. Each 
participant in such an ethical dialogue, with others on an apparent significant 
narrative failure, would need to open themselves to being transformed through 
each contextually unique dialogical exchange. All participants as unfinalised 
personalities would be considered to have both skilful habits and problematic 
habits whose ethical evaluation can change within different narrative 
understandings and local moral frameworks.  
 
It is my belief based on these findings that radical new approaches do need to 
be tried and new ways of journeying alongside people through very troubled 
periods in their life-journey. An ethical dialogical approach may co-produce 
better journeys for those who are very troubled by facilitating dialogue between 
experts by experience, family, friends and professionals within someone’s 
social network. By ethically, dialogically journeying with people it may be 
possible to co-create new paths allowing someone’s biographical trajectory to 
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travel into new, previously unexplored social spaces. It is my hope that this 
study can be in some small way a contribution to the growing sets of innovative 
ideas around what may be helpful. Ethical dialogical approaches and the co-
production of innovative getting better journeys may provide a more fruitful 
approach than modern medical health narratives. The centripetal forces may 
be weakening enough to accept that modern medical genres have not helped 
this group of people get better, nor transported (‘healed’? or ‘cured’?) them in 
any significant numbers into better life journeys. New work requires new 
genres. 
 
7.11 How the findings of this study may be used by others: 
The ethical dialogical approach developed through this study could be applied 
in several different ways. People with lived experience may want to explore 
dialogically the different ways habits of thought, emotion and actions are 
morally problematised within narratives within different social networks during 
people’s journeys. The key concepts could be researched further to see how 
they resonate with a wider audience and explore if they are helpful in practice 
for people on very troubled journeys. This could include concepts developed 
throughout this study such as “significant narrative failure”, “dialogical search 
for a new narrative”, the dialogical ethics of “habitual excess and insufficiency” 
and the role of “authoritative narrators”. The idea of opening up ethical dialogue 
around habits in polyphony of narratives within social networks could be further 
explored. Often people on very troubled journeys become socially isolated, so 
ways of creating supportive social networks with which to dialogue could be 
explored. Co-facilitating ethical dialogues around journeying and habitual 
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excess and insufficiency in social networks could involve experts by 
experience and other staff in a joint endeavour to co-create better journeys 
alongside people. New narratives could be introduced and reflected upon that 
may enable a chronotopic genre shift into a new journey around ‘getting 
better/recovery’. 
 
My reflections on the findings of this study have led me to believe an ethical 
dialogical approach to people’s life-journeys within the relatively remote 
contexts of understanding of their social networks could be beneficial for 
people experiencing significant narrative failure. Such an approach could help 
co-produce better journeys for people by reflecting on skilful habits and 
habitual excess and insufficiency as people pursue narrative goals. The 
dialogical principle of only ever partly knowing what is going on, drawn from 
Bakhtin’s epistemology, would hopefully provide some protection against any 
one perspective imposing a powerful monological narrative understanding on 
someone’s very troubled journey through life.  
 
It is possible to have helpful conversations with people struggling with their life-
journey without necessitating them to medicalise their moral habits into the 
narrative of being sick and disordered. I believe the ethical dialogue in social 
networks approach developed through this study allows our moral habits to be 
reflected on alongside people experiencing significant narrative failures. Such 
an approach is hopeful because it allows a quest for new narratives to be 
continually opened up until someone re-orientates their subjectivity within a 
narrative that actually helps them get better and live the ‘good life’ they desire.  
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7.12 The originality and limitations of this thesis 
This thesis has gone into greater detail than previous authors in tracing the 
moral origins of personality disorder, through DSM, the military’s Medical 203, 
psychopathic personalities and Moral Insanity. It has also demonstrated 
disorder in the Moral Faculty is a concept underlying Moral Insanity that has 
been transported into modern medical discourse from its origins in non-
medical moral Christian discourse deployed in anti-modern texts. It has also 
explored the moral social context influencing current DSM 5 diagnosis of 
Personality Disorder.  
 
The fine grained dialogical narrative analysis of clinical notes, diary entries and 
an autobiographic account has highlighted a significant difference between 
literary/moral and literal/medical understandings of severe mental and 
emotional distress during someone’s life-journey. The dialogical narrative 
analysis of accounts of successful recovery demonstrated how different 
subjectivities are enabled to emerge as they negotiate their position within 
genre informed overlapping spectrums of moral and medical discourses. 
Whilst other studies have identified journey genres as important in recovery, 
this study has gone into detail to show a variety of ways in which chronotopic 
genre shifts are significant in transporting/transforming subjectivity. 
 
However, this thesis has been limited in only analysing one individual’s 
psychiatric notes (as commentaries on subjectivity) and only analysing 
excerpts from seven recovery narratives, although this limitation did allow the 
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analysis to go into some depth. Other limitations were that analysing publically 
available accounts of recovery excluded material that may have disclosed 
more personal information, for example, if I had undertaken anonymised 
interviews the participants may have disclosed different experiences than they 
would in accounts intended to be read by the public. Thus any conclusions 
drawn from this thesis would need to hold these limitations in mind, including 
that accounts from people currently experiencing emotional and mental 
distress (pre-recovery) were not sought or analysed.    
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Appendix I  
Data for Analysis: 
A short auto-biographical narrative account from 2012 (age 41) 
 
My mother had left Dublin, Ireland, in the late 1960’s to study, and met my 
father, who was from England, at Leeds University. They both became 
teachers, and I was born in Leeds, in 1971. Family life was stable, routine and 
predicable. There were no dramatic big issues in the family (such as domestic 
violence, or drink and drug problems). I don’t recall hearing my parents argue. 
My parents seemed active helping out in the running of Catholic Church, or 
school fairs, and my Dad, although he did not say much always seemed to be 
active with DIY, making craft items or digging, building and growing things. I 
don’t really know why, but I didn’t feel I ‘naturally’ fitted in to social life. I felt a 
bit of an outsider trying to work out what “family life” was all about. My parents 
seemed a bit distant to me. Family holidays seemed to alternate between large 
extended families; grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins, in Ireland and in 
Britain or seeing the families of friends my parents had made at Leeds 
University. I remember enjoying playing with children my age when we visited 
other families. My earliest memories are of going to junior school age 4. I 
remember going up seven stone steps with a metal railing and entering in 
through a large wooden door. It just happened one day out of the blue – off to 
junior school, as if that was the natural thing and everyone did this, although it 
felt very unnatural to me and a challenge to learn how this world ran with bells 
and lessons and playtimes and teachers and wooden desks with holes in the 
corner for ink wells which were empty as that technology was not used any 
more. We were given a miniature bottle of milk every day. 
Junior school seemed to me to be a very, very strange world. I set about trying 
to understand it. The other children / pupils my age appeared to know all about 
school, know each other and somehow naturally fit into school life. I felt like an 
alien in a strange world. I had a strong sense that I did not fit in here, and that 
most of the other pupils did seem to me to ‘fit in’ and belong and naturally know 
things I did not. They knew the rules and names for games played in the 
playground, like “kiss catch” and “football”. They knew the lyrics to rhymes 
people would link arms and chant as they marched around the playground, like 
318 
 
“We won the war, in nineteen forty four!” Why were we chanting about winning 
the war as this was 1976? They knew which football team they supported, and 
this seemed important as a gang of lads surrounded me and demanded to 
know “what team I supported?”, I recall anxiously wondering what the right 
answer was? Later I discovered the ‘right’ answer would have been “Leeds 
United”!. Anyway, I thought of a football and it seemed in my mind to link to a 
flag of Japan, so I said “Japan”. There was a stunned silence as they were not 
sure how to react to...“do you watch them play?” one of my incredulous 
inquisitor asked me, “every weekend” I lied, anxiously wondering what would 
happen next. They just walked away looking for someone else to interrogate 
about their sporting allegiances. I do not recall being bullied at school at all, 
but do remember trying to work out what the “right thing” to do in social 
situations was. I remember being asked if I wanted an ice cream outside of 
school by a family friend and I really felt like I wanted one but said “no” as I 
thought that was “the right” think to say.  
Apart from trying to puzzle out the social rules of school for ‘fitting in’ before 
anyone realised I did not know them, the emotion I remember most is being 
overwhelmingly bored by the experience of school. I remember seeing a black 
boy and thinking I was “the only other black kid in the school”, which looking 
back now, was a strange thought as ethnically I am white British. May be he 
looked as out of place as I felt. Looking out the window aged 6 or 7 I saw three 
lads from my class mates climbing over the fence to ‘play truant’ from school. 
I was impressed that they knew the rules of how to ‘do’ school so well aged 7 
that they were confident enough to break the rules, and escape from this world. 
I envied them as they seemed naturally at ease with the social rules and how 
to escape the constraints of compulsory education for some unknown better 
time outside on the streets of Leeds that afternoon. Playtimes I remember as 
cold and wet. I tried playing “football” – I was chosen last and put in goal as 
they could tell I did not know how to play. Football seemed very important topic 
of conversation but I could not work out why, or even start to join in a 
conversation.  
I was always very well behaved at school as this seemed an important 
expectation of the teachers and I wanted to fit in. I seemed to get into lots of 
trouble for spelling mistakes. This was 1976 and word like “dyslexia” was not 
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commonly used. Spelling things correctly seemed very important to teachers 
and try as I might this was not something I seemed able to do. Instead I 
seemed to amaze my teachers with the number of variations I could produce 
on spelling simple words like “thyre, there, thear, their,,,, and so on!”.  
Singing “times tables” in class appeared to be just as important as spelling and 
standing up when another teacher entered the classroom. We would chant: “2 
times two is four”, three times two is....six, etc.”. I found it hard to convert the 
song quickly in the class maths tests. I recall falling over a lot at school and 
banging my head – and having to go to A&E a few times. The standard test for 
concussion in A&E appeared to be “what is eight times seven?” – If you did 
not know the answer you were probably suffering from concussion. I did not 
know the answer, so my Mum pointed out to the doctor that I did not know the 
answer to “7 times 8” that even when I’d not fallen over. Anyway I decided to 
memorise “fifty six” as being an important answer to pass the process when 
A&E doctors assess you for head trauma.  
Reading books seemed important in this junior school world as well. I recall a 
picture of an African woman grounding tapioca and thinking that there was a 
very different world out there, somewhere, where this woman was doing 
something different to rote learning times tables and learning the correct 
spelling of “Their” (“i before e except after c”). I felt extremely bored. What was 
this world I was in? – I began to feel like I from another planet? A lot of the 
rules seemed not to make a lot of sense but seemed more about being in a big 
gang together, like the people who can spell and play football and knew their 
times table. I knew other worlds existed out there like Africa where a black 
woman was grinding corn with a pestle and mortar because I’d seen a picture 
of it in a book I’d read at school.  
I would get terrible ‘pins and needles’ and a ‘dead leg’ when I sat down and 
crossed my legs - as instructed, for school assemblies -  when I told a teacher 
they did not believe me and insisted I do what everyone else was doing. I 
thought it unfair that they did not believe me as it was true. Some food tasted 
awful to me but this seemed not to be believed by adults who said it tasted fine 
and I should just eat it up, but it really did taste awful.  
At playtime we went outside. How to not be outside at playtime, in the cold, 
became a problem I wanted to solve. I just felt so cold. I was about seven. I 
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studied the rules of junior school - rules about having to go out to play unless 
it was “raining”. I could not make it rain so the solution I thought up was to steal 
a razor blade and cut my hand with it when no one was looking and then 
present the injury to the teacher on playground duty. I would claim I had “fallen 
over”, and she would take me inside for first aid treatment and I would warm 
up. I carried out my plan, cutting my hand etc.  - but after they bandaged my 
hand up the teacher sent me back outside and I remember being very 
disappointed my plan had not worked.  
It was a catholic school, and so we had “Religious Education”, and in this 
lesson one day, aged about seven or eight, the teacher asked the class where 
human beings had come from? I put up my hand and when chosen, gave a 
short synopsis of “Darwin’s theory of evolution” to the class, which I hoped 
would impress my fellow pupils. The teacher immediately sent me out of the 
class to see the headmistress, who was a nun, and I was asked to repeat the 
theory to her. I was trying to work out if I was in trouble or not. She walked over 
to a cupboard and got out a Terry’s chocolate orange and gave it to me. I then 
recall walking over to the adjacent high school to meet my father, who was a 
teacher there, and told him the story. I could not work out if the school’s 
reaction was a good thing or a bad thing - as being sent to the headmistress 
(who seemed friendly) tended to be for pupils in trouble, but a chocolate orange 
appeared to me to be a reward, or some kind of encouragement. 
I was taught about the Catholic faith’s beliefs in school and attended church 
on Sundays with my parents. Church seemed very boring to me, full of rituals 
to work out and lots of rules to learn about standing, sitting and kneeling and 
saying thigs together at the same time. I remember believing in a God of some 
kind but having some doubts about what I was being taught about God in 
religious education lessons. Some of it seemed like lots of rules and 
regulations to pass a test and get to heaven – which seemed to be the most 
important thing and avoid going to hell or getting stuck in a place catholic 
teaching called “limbo” which was neither heaven nor hell but a kind of post 
death waiting area of some kind. I remember thinking “Limbo” did not sound 
like a good place to end up. There were bits of the teaching I liked though, like 
stories of “saints” doing things that the rest of society thought was very odd or 
different – like Francis of Assisi who rejected the rich life to live with the poor. 
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I thought these saints were great as they did not seem to fit into society 
whichever century they were born in and I did seem to fit into my society so I 
started thinking about how I might become “a saint” – whatever that was. I also 
liked the stories about Jesus because he seemed to be against the religious 
authorities and against the rich and powerful of his day. I also recall liking the 
stories Jesus told, like the “Good Samaritan”. But I could not see how these 
stories connected to the rules and rituals of church life and all that sitting and 
standing.   
I thought logically about some of the catholic teaching. I got the impression 
God was on the side of the poor and interested in social justice issues. I also 
thought that if it were true that going to “confession” and confessing one’s sins 
to a priest meant you were forgiven then technically as you stepped out of the 
confessional box you would be free from “sin” and so this would be a good 
time to die, and so I wondered about aged seven, would it be a morally “good” 
thing to do to stab and kill my school colleague as they stepped out of the 
confessional as they would then “go to heaven”, which seemed the most 
important place to end up going to. I would then be guilty of murder though, so 
would have to confess and repent and get forgiven, but would have helped 
transport someone to heaven. I was not feeling close to acting this out in any 
way – it was just a logical thinking through of the moral implications of what I 
was being taught and wondering if it was true or not?  
I recall reading a secular child’s book -  “The road to Oz” - and it had a picture 
of a tramp at a cross roads and people were nice to him because he had a 
magical magnet wrapped in brown paper and tied with string secretly hidden 
in his pocket. I remember being affected by this story, aged about six, and 
wondering what the magic magnet was?. He gave it away to someone else 
and I wondered whether he got beaten up as he wondered off down the street. 
I have no idea how much of my memory corresponds to the actual 
chronological events of my lived life, but this is how I remember it. Most of my 
class seemed to play out on their streets at night with each other, but I lived 
about five miles away and no one from my primary school lived where I lived 
so some of their conversational content was hard to follow. 
There was a way to escape the madness, boredom and confusion of junior 
school though and that was by attending appointments with my mother to have 
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my hearing tested as there was some concern I might be partially deaf. I recall 
this experience had its own rules and routines such as waiting rooms, headsets 
and questions about hearing “beeps”. I assessed what the adults were doing 
around me and guessed if I scored well on the hearing test I’d “pass” and be 
sent back to boring junior school. So I decided to fake the test and pretend not 
to hear some of the test material so I could keep getting out of some boring 
school stuff. It worked and I was sent off for a routine operation to have 
“grommets” put in my ears on repeated occasions, which meant I could not 
take part in swimming lessons and had to have more tests for my hearing 
problem. I do not recall being unhappy at school, just not belonging, not fitting 
in and being bored and envious of my classmates ‘natural’ social skills and 
ease with how to “do life”. 
I remember wanting to belong and fit in and feeling like an outsider learning 
the rules by observation and mimicking what people around me were doing 
‘naturally’. I noticed other children called their parent “Mum” and “Dad” and 
then felt very self-consciously aware that I called my parents by their first 
name, so with great emotional awkward feeling subjectively for me, one day I 
started calling them “Mum and “Dad” so as I could blend in more easily with 
other children my age. 
My Dad took me to play rugby at weekends and taught me how to fish at sea 
and by rivers.  Sea fishing seemed exciting as I might catch a fish and the 
rocking of the boat on the sea seemed to imply some danger, and it was a 
world away from boring junior school with its strange rituals and its rules 
regulating its pupils for the purpose of something called “education”. 
Interestingly, before I went to high school, when I was aged around ten, an 
older female started to initiate sexual encounters with me. This then continued 
in a cycle of off and on for approximately seven years and it was a secret that 
nobody else knew about at the time, including my parents, until I decided to 
disclose that I had been sexually abused to my parents when I was aged about 
20 (in 1991) who believed me which was a great relief. This also helped them 
make more sense of why I had ended up in a residential alcohol rehabilitation 
unit aged 19.  
I developed mixed, and often conflicting thoughts and feelings about the sexual 
encounters with this older woman. Part of me found them exciting and I liked 
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the attention and I had sexual desires to have the experiences. At the same 
time I began to feel angry and resentful at the amount of power she developed 
over me, and that she went through repeated cycles of telling me it was wrong 
and had to stop and then she would initiate the encounters all over again. I 
developed feelings of guilt and shame about myself and my sexual encounters 
and anger towards her and the power she held over me. I experienced my 
sexual desires as a vulnerability I had - where someone could have power over 
me and I did not seem to have the power or self-control to resist their advances 
and offers. After a couple of years of this, aged about 12, I started a process 
that I would repeat many times over the next few years, of me deciding sex 
with this woman was causing me too much emotional distress and so I would 
not engage in it any more. But then when it was initiated / offered by her again 
then I seemed to lack the power to say “no”. Then I would hate myself for my 
lack of self-control.  
Sometimes she said it had to stop, but on these occasions I would have no 
choice in the matter and would feel hurt and rejected and not in control of the 
situation.  I also developed a high level of fear of discovery – that we would be 
caught and discovered by someone engaged in sex which I thought was both 
illegal and morally wrong to be having sex at ten. She also seemed clear that 
it was wrong to be having sex with me at such a young age (10+) and would 
tell me “what we are doing is wrong, we will go to hell for this you know”. This 
went on roughly from the age of ten to seventeen. During that time I developed 
strong feelings of guilt and shame about myself in relation to my sexuality and 
sexual encounters. I also began to form a relationship with myself where I was 
angry at my lack of self-control to not stop engaging with sex with this older 
female. As a teenager I noticed I was attracted to other females - but this also 
made me very anxious and frightened as I felt threatened by them. Later I 
wondered if I could be gay to avoid relations with women but eventually 
realised I was sexually attracted to women, not men. I desired a sexual 
relations, as in as in having “a girlfriend”, as a teenager but felt very threatened 
by the prospect and overwhelmed with anxiety that they would destroy me or 
else that I would not be able to leave them if I did not like them because it 
would cause them too much pain and emotional upset for me to “split up with 
them”. If I dated someone I feared I might be stuck with them, or they might 
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humiliate and hurt me. I also felt angry with the older woman initiating sex with 
me from the age of ten onwards - but also enjoyed some parts of these sexual 
encounters and so felt guilty about enjoying myself having sex. Sometimes I 
would start these encounters when I was 13 or 14 years old, so I felt guilty 
about my part in the sexual relations with this older woman. Sometimes I liked 
how it made me feel.  
I found living with these very strong feelings of guilt, shame, anger, fear and 
lack of self-control around enjoying myself very uncomfortable to deal with. 
Ironically I found that thinking about, or having sexual encounters with this 
older woman would temporarily lift me out of my difficult thoughts and feelings. 
Sometimes I started to initiate the sexual encounters when I felt particularly 
bad, but afterwards would feel more guilt and shame in that I had started it this 
time. Sometimes she would initiate it. I also felt very confused about the whole 
process and rejected many times. After about three years of this, about the 
age of 13, I discovered that if I drank enough alcohol it had a very significant 
impact on my inner turmoil of tense thoughts and feelings. Basically if I got 
drunk then my inner tension of guilt, shame, fear and anger tended to dissolve 
and go away and I went into another world away from all the emotional pain 
and guilt. Guilt appeared to dissolve in alcohol for me. I would feel “great” for 
about four or five hours. Then I would feel terrible suffering from a hangover 
the next day, but as time went on I noticed the hangovers gave me a kind of 
satisfied feeling. It was almost like I felt strongly that in all fairness and in the 
interests of justice I ought to be punished for being involved in these secret 
sexual encounters and the physical suffering of a bad hangover felt like my 
just punishment for all my wrongdoing. Thus I drank alcohol repeatedly to 
excess and gradually increased the number of nights a week to five or six by 
the time I was sixteen.  
I also found that entering the doors of arcades and gambling on fruit machines 
had a similar effect of lifting me out of the mixture of guilt, shame, anger and 
fear temporarily whilst I enjoyed gambling and playing slot machines whilst I 
was doing it for an hour or two until my money was gone, which again felt like 
a just punishment for my wayward behaviour.  
I would say I enjoyed high school while i was at school (i.e. 9 – 4.30 p.m. 
Monday to Friday) as it seemed to be a separate world I would enter and 
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perform well in having friends and “having a laugh” and I enjoyed some of the 
academic study also. At high school seemed to be able to make friends and 
would meet up out of school to play computer games or try to get hold of 
alcohol to get drunk, but I would also get drunk on my own to relieve the 
feelings of guilt, fear etc. Mainly I was well behaved at school, except for a brief 
time aged 15 where I was caught truanting to be in gambling arcades and was 
given “The Cain” (corporal punishment) as a penalty for this (before it was 
made illegal in England). I just found being given corporal punishment a very 
interesting process as I could not see how this would make me change my 
behaviour? Secretly I was proud to have got the Cain before it was made illegal 
as I could brag about it to friends as a status symbol. Academically I fluctuated 
a lot depending on how distracted I was and how hard I tried. I went from the 
top to the bottom set in maths and then back up again, sitting my ‘o’ level a 
year early and getting an ‘A’. I ended up with eleven ‘O’ levels and went on to 
do ‘A’ levels, but got significantly lower grades than predicted aged 18 and 
failed to get good enough grades to get into University.  
I then got a paid job washing up in a pub restraint 70 hours a week and found 
I could drink alcohol while working, and then get drunk in the bar when my shift 
finished. My work colleagues seemed friendly enough. I thought I’d entered a 
new world of full time employment, but found some of the “banter” with my 
work colleagues difficult to join in with, which I put down partly to it being 
working class culture which I found difficult to fit in with and some of the banter 
was about sexual conquests which just made me feel very anxious inside. After 
three months I was drinking excessively every day and not having any money 
saved. I remember feeling incredibly angry about the situation I was in. When 
I felt attracted to a woman I also felt very anxious and threatened. I would try 
to manage these feelings by drinking alcohol but then would drink too much 
before, for example, being able to “chat up” a waitress at the restaurant that I 
felt attracted to. I also recall hating myself for this and feeling very angry with 
myself at not having the power to organise myself any better than being a 
“celibate drunk washer upper” in a restaurant. Was this going to be the life I 
would be stuck in? I felt desperate and could not see a way out of my situation. 
I tried to ask a waitress out on a date, but felt overwhelmed with anxiety and 
images of me dying violently (e.g. falling off a bridge, hanging myself). I recall 
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going out for a cigarette break and drinking a bottle of spirits and then being 
picked up by the police for “drunk and disorderly”, who brought back to my 
employer, who said he thought I’d been a long time on my break. Incredibly he 
let me keep my job – as long as I could wash up for his business, he said, he 
“did not care what problems I had”. 
I went to my G.P. and told him virtually nothing - apart from that I seemed to 
be very anxious and he prescribed me “beta-blocker” saying I was “getting 
panic attacks”, the medication he said would slow my heart rate down. I recall 
being pleased that the prescription seemed to me to be a small symbolic 
recognition by my GP that there was something “wrong” with me, though I had 
not told him what exactly. I gave up gambling as it cost me too much money, 
but carried on drinking to repetitive excess. I kept wondering how to solve my 
problems.  
I would think through my problems on my own, in my head. I felt too frightened 
to tell anyone about why I had these problems with my thoughts and feelings. 
I felt as though if I told anyone I’d been sexually abused as a child then the 
world would end in some kind of catastrophe and the sky would fall in on me 
and terrible things would happen. My abuser had said that if I ever told anyone 
what she did then “I would go to Hell” and I guess at some level I believed this, 
though at another level I remember thinking that’s not true, I don’t even believe 
in Hell.  
After lots of trying to “think it through” - I decided the solution to my problems 
was to emigrate to another country and “get away” from all my problems in 
England. I could then make a fresh start on a new chapter of my life away from 
all these difficulties. I bought a flight to Canada and went there with £50 in my 
pocket. I worked there and stayed with my aunt for a while, who was kind 
enough to put me up. I remember thinking as the plane landed in Canada, “no 
one knows I am an alcoholic in this country, I’ll be able to enjoy a few drinks”. 
To my surprise I found far from “leaving all my troubles behind” in England, 
they had somehow followed me to Canada on the plane, which I thought was 
strange.  
I got a paid job and when I thought about asking a woman out whom I felt 
sexually attracted to again I felt overwhelming fear that she would attack and 
hurt me, I felt guilt and shame about wanting a sexual relationship and felt 
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angry at my lack of self-control over my internal life of thoughts and feelings. I 
started to drink alcohol to steady my inner turmoil, but did not seem able to 
control the amount I drank. I drank repeatedly to excess and ended up picked 
up by the police in Canada one night for “drunk and disorderly”. I then decided 
to sort my problems out by hitch hiking across the trans-Canada highway which 
took about six weeks, to cover 3000 miles. I liked hitch hiking as I was always 
heading away from something behind me in the last town, I was putting all my 
problems behind me and had some forward direction in my life - which was 
getting to the next town, so to speak. I liked having the purpose and direction 
of trying to get to the next town and the excitement of not knowing what 
adventures I might end up involved in. I met some very interesting people along 
the way who gave me lifts in their car. I would make myself little signs about 
where I wanted to get to next, and listen to music while waiting at the side of 
the road for a lift.  
I liked the excitement of not knowing who would pick me up or what might 
happen next, and that I had never been to the next town I was heading 
towards. At the end of the road I got to Vancouver and suddenly felt very 
depressed and desperate, bit sure what to do with my life or what direction to 
go in. I tried to get the authorities to deport me but they refused, so I went into 
America. I carried on hitchhiking and ended up living above a pub in Chicago 
temporarily and got a job moving furniture with a group of American men. At 
first I thought this was very interesting and a chance to find out more about 
American culture. However in the course of working and drinking with these 
men I remember thinking this is a very different world I have ended up in here. 
Their lives appeared to involve legal and illegal ways of getting hold of money 
for alcohol and cocaine fuelled adventures at night which often ended in 
extreme violence. They did not seem bothered about going to prison. Their 
values seemed very different from mine. I felt quite frightened whilst with one 
of my associates in the furniture removal business described his delight at 
sneaking into his cousins barbecue the previous evening and stabbing him. 
Everyone in the group appeared to find his story very amusing and laughing, 
partly because they knew the victim, had “got it coming” and “deserved a bit of 
a stab”. I felt scarred for my own safety and started to think I needed to escape 
this world of drink, drugs and violence. I also met Americans who seemed 
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regular people with regular jobs, but my work colleagues scared me, and I 
worried they might turn on me or I might get caught up in something with them 
and I did not fancy that. I went out for a few drinks with a colleague whilst I 
thought up a plan to get away from my situation as I thought I was definitely 
out of my depth and did not know how to relate to people here. I got offered 
some crack cocaine and asked if I’d like to get involved with “a job” that would 
earn “enough money to buy a month’s worth of coke”. I thought this sounded 
like a movie, but the guy asking me looked genuine enough and had the look 
of someone who had been to prison and was on crack. I was frightened I’d end 
up dead or in prison. I thought of a character from a novel I’d read called 
“Decline and Fall” who kept ending up “in the soup” – that where I was I 
thought. I thanked him for his offer of employment but said I was “too busy”. I 
went drinking by myself and ended up being picked up for “drunk and 
disorderly” by the American police. I complained that this was the third country 
where the police had done this to me and this had to more than a coincidence? 
I remember telling the police in the fourteenth century this would not be 
happening as we would both be native Indians catching trout in a river and we 
would have no access to alcohol or the modern criminal justice system. The 
police said it was nothing to do with the ‘crap’ I was talking about, it was just 
happening to me because I was ‘a drunk’.   
I decided to get out of America as quick as I could, it seemed like two worlds 
in one to me – America of the rich and the poor – and I had visited without any 
money. I escaped on a plane back to England, about 12 months after leaving 
it. I then got a job working on the Channel Tunnel as a labourer for a few 
months before heading off to do a politics degree at Newcastle University. 
However by this time my drinking was so excessive that I dropped out after a 
few weeks, feeling very desperate and defeated, with some suicidal thoughts 
and a desire to do something about my drink problem. I went to an alcohol 
service in Newcastle and recall telling them I needed to stop drinking and the 
councillor telling me I  was “too young” to do something excessive like stopping 
drinking entirely, and he advised me to try “drinking with moderation” and 
keeping a “drink diary”. His theories did not seem to connect to my experience 
and what I felt I needed, which was abstinence.  I returned to Leeds with the 
help of my parents and explained to them the extent of my problem with 
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alcohol, and they helped arrange the offer of a place in a 12 step abstinence 
based alcohol rehabilitation centre. I felt guilty about this as it was a private 
facility and my parents did not have savings so they were going to borrow the 
money to send me to this rehab.  
I accepted their offer and after 28 days treatment there, which involved working 
through a 12 step programme, I was advised I had “more serious problems” 
than the average patient who routinely went home at the end, and that I should 
go to a further rehab for more extended work in Lincolnshire, which I did. I 
remember thinking what are these more serious problems? - but was afraid to 
ask directly. I felt guilty that I had been such a failure at “doing life” that I’d 
ended up in rehab when my peers were getting on with education, careers and 
relationships. I felt very envious of people who seemed to be able to “do life” 
without too much bother. I tended to idealise other people I saw and think they 
did not have big problems or difficult emotions to struggle with and so was 
jealous of the life i thought they had and envied and resented them. I wanted 
to “get a life”, which to me meant a job and a relationship. I was puzzled why 
this seemed so difficult for me.  
For the next four or five years I saw myself a “recovering addict / alcoholic” and 
worked at a “12 step” programme which involved attending Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings and being completely abstinent from alcohol and illegal 
drugs. There were some basic ‘steps’ or techniques that I practiced such as 
admitting what I had done wrong in my past, making amends, looking at my 
character defects and trying to be honest. I took responsibility for my 
alcoholism and what I was going to do about staying in recovery. I met with 
other people in recovery and saw part of the process as using some of my 
experiences to help others get into recovery and stay sober also. As part of 
putting the programme into practice I tried to direct my life towards some 
“higher power”, in a spiritual sense, which would give me the power and 
direction not to drink alcohol (a power I thought had evidently previously 
lacked, demonstrated by several attempts to stop drinking on my own ‘will 
power’).  
I was not a Christian at this time so my “higher power” was a vague undefined 
notion, which a 12 step approach considers to be sufficient for its stated 
purpose - of helping members stay sober. On some levels this worked for me, 
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for example, I stopped drinking alcohol self destructively for the next five years. 
During this time I went to University and got a first class honours in Sociology 
and Social Psychology.  
However, despite academic success I found I had some serious underlying 
emotional conflicts and turmoil once I got sober – For example, I experienced 
repeated severe depressive episodes where I felt suicidal. I had thoughts of 
harming others which upset me and thoughts of harming myself. I was never 
actually violent. I also had problems being highly anxious around other people, 
especially women I felt attracted to, to the extent that I did not date anyone 
despite wanting to. I felt resentful about having been sexually and emotionally 
abused and resented the person who had done this as I thought it was unfair 
that they had and I seemed stuck with the consequences in terms of inner 
turmoil of guilt, fear, anger etc. I felt emotionally damaged and searched for 
solutions in lots of things such as self-help books, Hindu texts, the Koran, 
Buddhist texts,  the Bible, popular psychology texts and attended confidence 
building courses. I tried applying techniques in books like “Feel the Fear and 
do it anyway.” - popular at the time.   
My self-esteem seemed negative as I hated myself and high academic 
achievement did not seem to make me feel good about myself. I felt driven to 
work hard, which has been a habit all my life, and would study for 12 or more 
hours a day. I recall daily life being a real struggle - in terms of looking for some 
meaning in my life and trying to avoid feeling guilt, shame, fear, anger and 
depression. I recall reading philosophical text looking for some meaning and 
direction in my life that I could really believe in and not just see as human 
constructed projects with rules and regulations. I recall seeing my GP often 
and getting some anti-depressants. These seemed to lift me for a while so I 
could function again and feel less suicidal. 
Then I remember getting some counselling from relate in my search for ways 
to get better, now I was not drinking self destructively. They thought my 
problems were ‘more serious’ than they were trained to deal with, and referred 
me via my GP to a psychiatrist who offered me psycho-therapy. She warned 
me that it might make me worse and it might not work for me, but I was 
desperate to get better and had heard a lot in the media about psycho-therapy 
supposedly being helpful. I remember thinking that Woody Allen had been 
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going to psychotherapy for years and his movies were very funny. I went to 
psychotherapy every week for about 2 years and talked about my problems. I 
did get much worse – psycho-therapy seemed to help me get more articulate 
about me problems and their causes without this leading to me getting better. 
I wondered how the process was supposed to work in people who found it 
helped them get better rather than in my case where it seemed to unravel me 
even further and expose all my pain and fear without offering a solution. I 
remember thinking the psychiatrist referring me had warned me that it might 
make me worse and so she had been fair in warning me. I recall being very 
suspicious about my therapist and thinking he might steal some of my ideas. 
Eventually I told him I was thinking of going back into the adventurous world of 
drink and drugs because I had got much worse and the inner pain was 
unbearable and i needed some kind of painkiller unless he had any bright idea 
about how to get better that he had been holding back to do with his therapeutic 
stance? When he repeated what I said back to me in a ‘client centred’ style I 
felt really angry and left, not to return again. On reflection, it must have been 
difficult for him to listen to me describe my problems and pain every week for 
2 years, and witness my deterioration.  
Anyway, at this point in my life journey some of my friends in AA had ‘relapsed’ 
and gone back to drink and drugs. This contributed to me thinking about that 
way out of my increasingly desperate emotional state. I decided AA and 
psychotherapy were not working for me and went to the pub on the way home 
from my last therapy session. I was in a desperate state of inner tension where 
I just wanted to change how I felt as the pain seemed unbearable so I ordered 
a pint of Guinness. After a few more pints I found my bad mood started to lift. 
Then I drank excessively until I ‘blacked out’ (memory loss). I started drinking 
every day as an attempt to manage my mood and I was determined to “have 
some fun”, which i had always found hard to do. A friend of mine offered me 
some amphetamine and I thought “why not, it must be better option than 
suicide, homicide or being desperately miserable”. I then took amphetamine, 
cannabis, ecstasy (MDMA) or excessive alcohol every day for about six 
months. I thought it was great at first as the chemicals produced large shifts in 
my mood, such as myself confidence on amphetamine was suddenly fantastic 
and on ecstasy I enjoyed myself and felt good for the first time in years, but 
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the chemical management of my moods only lasted temporarily before 
depression or anxiety or guilt started to influence me again. The side effects 
appeared to be increased paranoia, low mood, panic attacks. I tended to treat 
the side effect with more drugs. I worked on a PhD at this time, after I 
graduated. My alcohol and drug use quickly escalated to the point where I felt 
out of control and desperate to get ‘clean and sober’ again, as I thought I’d end 
up dead soon if I did not, probably from an accidental overdose. 
I decided to tell my parents I’d “messed up” my life again. I felt very guilty about 
the repeated distress I caused my parents due I believed to my failure to 
organise my life in a more manageable and orderly way and bad choices such 
as taking drugs to relieve emotional problems I had. I felt guilty that I might 
affect my younger siblings with the example of my self-destructive lifestyle. 
Sometimes told others I would kill myself which understandably stressed them 
out. My parent’s attention tended to drift towards me and my problems rather 
than being balanced amongst my younger siblings at the time. I was quite 
selfishly caught up in my own world and my own problems and did not think 
about others much at this time of my life.  
My patents helped me get to see my GP. I was asking for a referral to rehab 
again, but this was not routinely funded on the NHS. I described what was 
going on with my thoughts and feelings to my GP, whom I remember appeared 
to be genuinely concerned about me. He referred me to the psychiatric hospital 
for an assessment, with a letter from him. So I went up there and had a long 
interview with a psychiatrist, at the end of which they said I needed to be 
admitted to the psychiatric hospital. I felt relieved given I was quite desperate 
and suicidal at the time.  
They prescribed some medication which I had high hopes would make me 
better, after all why else would they prescribe me medication, if not to make 
me better? 
I remember feeling a great relief that the psychiatrist felt there was something 
wrong with me. I did not feel guilty for messing my life up any more. I recall 
thinking; “I knew there was something wrong with me.”  
It seemed very validating to me to be admitted to the hospital, like a 
professional endorsement saying that I did have some serious problems, I was 
not just a failure at life through bad choices. I was not guilty because I was ill 
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– what a relief I felt. I could explain this to others now as a way to explain how 
badly my life had gone so far. I also felt less guilty as I entered the psychiatric 
hospital as an inpatient about the fact that psychotherapy and AA appeared 
not to have worked. I had felt that it was my fault these approaches had not 
made me better, but if I was mentally ill in some way then maybe it was not my 
fault, or it was not due to some lack of effort on my part, but because I was 
mentally ill in some way. I hoped the professionals would know what was 
wrong with me from my description of my problem and hoped the anti-
psychotic medication would make me get better so I could enjoy my life and 
get back to my PhD. It was 1996.  
After being admitted to hospital, the next thing I remember is my body starting 
to get stiff and freeze whilst I was having a wash and shave, I then had difficulty 
breathing and tried to get down the corridor to the nurses in their office, but I 
could not move my legs and fell over in the corridor and then I stopped 
breathing. I was terrified and thought I was going to die. Then a nurse ran down 
the corridor and some more and they injected me with something in a hurry 
and after a few seconds my throat muscles relaxed and I took in a deep breath. 
I had had some kind of reaction to the anti-psychotic drug, “haloperidol”. I 
wondered if these doctors knew what they were doing and started to doubt if 
these medications would make me better - or just kill me? They prescribed a 
different anti-psychotic, chlorpromazine, and I took that to see how it would 
alter my thoughts and feelings. I was very curious about the whole process. I 
recall wondering why as part of the admission process they were weighing me 
and checking my reflexes, why was this important I wondered, as my problems 
were not physical but inside “my head”, so I thought.  
Through this process I started to see myself in a new light - as someone with 
“mental health problems”. Someone had mentioned “Bi-polar affective 
disorder”. I was hopeful that the professionals would diagnose and treat me 
and I would get better.  
Surprisingly to me the opposite happened - I seemed to get considerably worse 
and deteriorate in my mental health. Professionals kept asking and I kept 
answering their questions about my problematic thoughts, emotions and self-
destructive behaviours. I spent the next five years in and out of the psychiatric 
hospital. Chemically I was prescribed a combination of anti-depressants, anti-
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psychotics and/or mood stabilisers for that time. I seemed to attract lots of 
different kinds of diagnosis from professionals and I noticed professional 
opinions were divided about me and my “case”.  
As I continued to deteriorate under psychiatric care they appeared to increase 
the dose of my medication rather than notice psychopharmacology was not 
working to make me get better. I became a long – term unemployed, chronic 
‘mental health service user’ for the next five years. I felt like I had entered some 
terrible nightmare, or I was in some kind of living hell where I was suffering 
torment without an escape or a way out. I remember being diagnosed with 
bipolar affective disorder, which I thought was ok because some celebrities 
had this, so it must be ok. Then it got changed to “psychotic depression”, and 
I was not sure about this as I had not heard any media celebrities saying they 
were psychotic, unlike Bi-polar which seemed more fashionable and therefore 
more acceptable and understandable my other people. Depression, recurrent 
depression, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) and anxiety were also 
diagnosis I was given during the next five years.  
I remember thinking at one point that the 1000 mg a day of chlorpromazine 
was “a bit like having ten pints of bitter”. I remember thinking that I had in 
common with the doctor that we both thought a chemical solution would be the 
best way to sort out my troubles and afford a cure, we just could not find the 
right combination of chemicals to make me better. One day after about five 
years and six or seven inpatients admissions I got very depressed and started 
to despair that my life would ever improve. I had no job, felt very lonely, had 
no role in society, no relationship and no prospects of finding a way to get 
better. I was starting to realise that this dance of seeing professionals such as 
doctors and them diagnosing me and prescribing medication was clearly not 
only not working but I was somehow getting much worse in the process, 
although I did not think anyone was intending this to be the outcome as most 
staff treated me very well and were very friendly and seemed to genuinely care 
about my welfare. My memory now is that over these years my story told to 
mental health professionals was fairly consistent in complaining of anxiety, 
depression, guilt, shame, and anger linked to sexual abuse in my childhood 
which I felt had been unfair and consequently I lacked “a life” now, in terms of 
I had no job and no relationship despite wanting these things. Although some 
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professionals varied slightly with their personality or their professional role, in 
general I found the response of services pivoted around changing diagnosis 
or medication. Professionals appeared to me to be more at ease emotionally 
talking about anxiety and depression and appeared less emotionally 
comfortable talking with me about guilt and shame issues. The anger issue 
tended to be talked about in terms of an anti-psychotic might be able to reduce 
intrusive psychotic images of violence that were associated with me feeling 
angry about things I perceived as unfair, such as being sexually abused as a 
child. Things may have been different than I remember now as a forty one year 
old man, but that was my general impression. Sometimes it appeared that 
whatever the details of my story the answer was always “chlorpromazine”. 
Sometimes I secretly thought, well I could do that, listen to peoples sad stories 
of their lives and then say “chlorpromazine” at the end like a magical spell or 
panacea. Other things did happen in terms of treatment from services, but the 
weight of professional hope often seemed to me to fall on prescribed 
medication. 
 
My life had no direction and I was caught in an endless cycle of admissions to 
hospital to “prevent harm to myself or others” followed by months of loneliness 
in my flat, unable to find a way out of my prison. Sometimes I tried things that 
failed, like buying and selling things or painting pictures to sell. Everything I 
seemed to try seemed to fail and be unsuccessful which lowered my self-
esteem and depressed me. One day I recall asking my psychiatrists, “after all 
these years, what do you think is really wrong with me?”  
To my surprise they said “the truth is you have a personality disorder, most 
likely a borderline personality disorder”.  
They did not explain what that meant. I did not ask for an explanation either. 
I’d not heard of this diagnosis before. I left and started telling people that was 
why my life was a train crash of a failure, according to my psychiatrist it was 
because I had a “borderline personality disorder.” I’m amazed they did not 
explain or I did not research myself, and find out what this diagnosis meant. At 
the time it seemed enough that there was this explanation for my failure of a 
life, and it was not just my fault for making poor choices or not trying hard 
enough, but it was because I had a personality disorder.     
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Fed up with deteriorating I tried moving to another city and getting involved 
with direct political activism around 1996. This gave me a purpose and some 
direction. I was loosely associating with environmental campaigners trying to 
get issues of “global warming” into the mainstream media and political 
discussion by taking direct action. I was introduced to this through one of my 
brothers who seemed more ethically and politically minded than me around 
these issues and was very accepting of my mental health problems and he let 
me live with him for around a year. At the time warning people about global 
warming was portrayed in the mainstream media and by politicians as a “Mad” 
activity of a few fringe “tree hugging hippies”. When I studied the scientific data 
it seemed fairly straight forward and clear that the world was likely to end 
through climate change but the difficulty appeared to be the vested interests 
of the rich embodied in multi-national capitalism, international banking and 
dictatorships by small elites in countries such as Britain in so called 
“democracies”. At the time I thought there was not much difference between 
Labour and the Conservatives in terms of distance on the political spectrum 
and anyway I thought they were run by a small rich elite who reproduced 
themselves via the public school system (including the press) so little could be 
expected there except protecting the already established vested interests of 
the rich and powerful.  
So the social world appeared to me to be disordered like I was, and intent on 
self-harming through consumer capitalist fuelled climate change. Instead of 
harming myself I thought I’d try political action to try to stop capitalist society 
harming itself. I got involved with the direct action environmental groups like 
“Earth First!” Actions were divided into “fluffy” (legal) and spiky (illegal). I got 
involved with actions strategically targeted against genetic engineering 
experiments, nuclear facilities, stopping a wood being knocked down, open 
cast mining, anti-capitalist actions and pro-squatting actions. I got arrested for 
“obstructing the undersheriff” when I was locked into a concrete block buried 
in the ground when the authorities wanted to fell a wood. The reason I was 
locked in down on the ground was that I was too frightened by heights when I 
tried sleeping up in the trees with everyone else, so I volunteered to be “the 
first line of defence” when the police invaded the site to avoid losing credibility 
with my fellow environmental activists.  
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I was impressed by most of the people I met (apart from the animal rights 
activists, as they seemed not to like people). For a time I felt part of a group of 
people who were trying to raise the issue of global warming and the threats 
from multi-national capitalism. However most of the other people I met seemed 
more ethically motivated and had a more stable identity than I had. I felt acutely 
aware that I had problems with anxiety and depression and other emotional 
difficulties and the other environmentalists did not appear to have these 
problems. I seemed to be looking for an identity and a sense of belonging more 
through my involvement more than other people were. Morally we were 
locating problems with the behaviour of powerful capitalist organisations as 
‘unethical’ and the limitations of Western “democracy” to tackle the problems 
of global warming. This process of direct political action against wrongdoings 
of multi-national companies did not appear to resolve my own problems with 
guilt, fear of sex, anger at personal injustices and my re-ignited drink problem. 
After about a year I returned to Leeds following a particularly ‘bad patch’ where 
I got low in mood and lost some memory through drinking. The press were 
reporting environmental activists as “crazy” for suggesting climate change was 
a threat from capitalist materialist obsession with growth. Nowadays 
mainstream politicians think climate change is a legitimate subject to be 
concerned about and not “crazy” at all to be concerned about.  
Back in Bradford in the late 1990’s I sank into another couple of years of 
unemployment and repeated admissions to the psychiatric hospital. I thought 
it likely I’d be dead by thirty. I kept looking for a way out of my situation, which 
I hated. Sometimes I got so desperate to change an intolerable feeling of guilt, 
shame and anger that I self-harmed by taking overdoses or cutting myself. I 
did not want to die as I thought suicide morally wrong, but I was “half in love 
with easeful death” as some poet once said, and was in two minds as to 
whether I wanted to carry on struggling with an unsuccessful life after feeling 
like this for the best part of twenty years (between the ages of ten and thirty).  
Then I decided to have another go at staying to stay off the drink again by 
washing up voluntarily in a fair trade cafe in Bradford and going to a few AA 
meetings again. While washing up I heard someone telling an ex-heroin addict 
(fresh out of prison) that “Jesus had died on the cross and risen again to set 
him free from the ways that bound him.” I was interested intellectually, 
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analysing the interaction and thinking “This guy must be a ‘born again’ 
Christian.” What surprised me was that he genuinely seemed to care for the 
welfare of the other person and this challenged my idea of ‘born again’ 
Christians which I thought were deluded gullible victims of right wing American 
evangelicals, or so I thought, based on what I’d seen on the B.B.C.  
This guy talked about Jesus being able to emotionally heal people through the 
Holy Spirit and I thought that sounded like something I needed. I had heard 
‘the gospel’ before, but for some reason walking home I suddenly felt: “it’s 
true!”. I then joined the church in Bradford that this man went to and made a 
decision to ask Jesus to be the “Lord” of my life. Seeking God’s will in my life 
seemed to give me some much needed direction which helped. 
Psychologically this meant I was subjecting myself to the authority of Jesus 
(as in ‘Lord’). Practically I worked this out by practicing some of what it said in 
the Bible, for example, I shared the emotional damage done to me by my 
sexual abuse, and I forgave the perpetrator. This lifted a lot of anger and 
resentment from me. I also admitted the things I had done wrong in my life, in 
confidence, to another Christian, turned away from them and believed I was 
forgiven, which lifted the feeling of guilt from me.  At the same time I felt 
accepted by other people in this church and felt they genuinely cared about 
and loved me. About 10% of the congregation were ex-addicts so I felt at home 
and not judged by them. They invited me round to their houses for meals and 
they appeared to care about and love me. They seemed to accept me as I 
was, and also seemed to believe I could get better at the same time. They did 
not care about my diagnosis or medication and I did not scare them off.  
I was 29 years old. I stopped drinking and taking drugs (both illegal and 
prescribed. I did voluntary work for the church’s outreach to addicts in 
Bradford. I then got a job in a bookshop, then as a support worker in a mental 
health hostel, then I worked in a personality disorder accommodation service. 
I then applied for the manager’s job and managed the small personality 
disorder service for three years before changing jobs to work for an early 
intervention in psychosis service as a senior care co-ordinator. When I was 
about 29 I started dating a woman I met at church. Dating for me was for the 
first time in ten years, which was quite scary. I asked her to marry me and she 
said yes. I then became a step-dad to her two children who were aged 6 and 
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eight which I found a big challenge. We’ve been happily married now for 11 
years. My wife is very supportive and I think it helps that she has a fairly stable 
identity and that she did not have any addiction or mental health problems in 
her past. Now I feel I have a good life which I enjoy and have roles in terms of 
being a Dad and husband as well as paid employment. I also am active in my 
local church. I have problems today but I see them as the everyday problems 
that we get because we are human beings in relationships with other people, 
that is the normal problems of everyday life which I try to solve, more or less, 
with the help of others. I can also be helpful to others. As a forty one year old 
man I no longer have the set of problems I had between the ages of ten and 
thirty.   
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Appendix II  
Data for analysis: 
Contemporary Diary Entries [Age: 22 years old] 
 
21st April 1993: I feel often these days a frustration at my inarticulateness. The 
struggle to share, or attempt to share, the ambiguity, the unknown terror-tory 
that I’m entering these days, or am it, in. The struggle to attempt to depict that 
or to shed light on, even to myself often seems too much. I feel like not 
expressing it as it seems so incomplete, so inconclusive. Perhaps I like 
conclusions too much. Anyway when I want to give up and turn back from my 
truth I think of the Russian Harlequin in Heart of Darkness. When his self was 
prodded, when the questions became too awkward, he gave up. He resorted 
to “I’m just a little man” and turned to his idol for comfort. Cold, false comfort.  
Last night I dreamt I struggled with a demon. Such a model of existence is not 
very popular in the West now. It’s not too popular with me either! I can see why 
other models are more appealing. Science reassures us via its distance and 
complexity, it has become the dominant model. Psychology contributes much 
but it denies evil as a force, which is great, unless there is an evil force that 
influences us. Then the fact that a model does not account for it does not 
eliminate it. Labelling theory sounds great, - but once you throw away the label, 
what do you do? Do you act like the Harlequin and say ‘this no longer exists – 
I threw away its name’. Such could be said of the devil. If modern theories 
throw away its label it still exists. And what of God? I’m not such a pessimist 
to acknowledge only a malevolent, destructive force in the world, though I have 
been there. No, God must exist. I have difficulties in my relationship with God.  
I know Hell exists because I’ve been there. To some extent I’m still there. This 
talk of post-mortem journeys misses the point slightly for me. What about now? 
The strange thing is I didn’t go to Hell for what I did wrong. I don’t think so 
anyway. I may change my mind. Anyway strangely enough someone else sent 
me to Hell. Yeh, whackked my soul so badly with a bat that it nearly bled to 
death. But it didn’t. It just crawled off to Hell. My fall, the fall, the fall, wasn’t so 
much a fall, a fall, as I was tripped, tricked, pushed. I had part of my soul, yeh, 
my soul ripped out of me by some evil bitch of a she devil, yeh, strong 
language, but oh so true. Sometimes the truth hurts (it hurts the good though, 
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or not?) Anyway this she-bitch-devil was the nicest, sweetest, most 
respectable, alright person, they just had an evil streak or something. I can’t 
deny that she beat, broke and scratched my soul. How’s your moral decision 
making at eleven – hey, yeh, you – at fucking eleven. With some bitch-eve-
devil standing with an apple for you to bite. Well I took a bite. The poisoned 
fruit seemed so sweet. I bit and i was struck. I bit into the offered fruit. I bit and 
was bitten. Once bitten (and scratched) forever smitten. Or maybe not. 
Anyway I always wanted more of that fruit and didn’t she know it. I was hooked. 
A real addiction to that fruit I had. And she’d offer it and then take it away and 
I’d cry and then she’d offer it and away then away gone away offered away 
smash bang wallop bang offered away bang, fuck off, fuck me, fuck off, fuck 
me, fuck off, fuck me, haha ha your hooked on me good and proper!! Oh how 
it hurt. And the sad thing is I thought my cure lay in more of the same. I didn’t 
know it was pagan idolatory, a heavy word again to use. Did she know? 
Forgiveness is what???? God will have to show me coz no one else has yet. 
The bitch. I’m angry. She fucking sent me to Hell, how do you forgive an 
unrepentant child molester for sending you to an emotional and mental Hell?  
Obsession/Compulsion/addiction/Idolotary of: Gambling / money making / 
alcohol and first and foremost “sex”. Thanks for that present. Anyway I have to 
deal with this, no it doesn’t sound fair. The good go to Hell. The sinned upon 
go to Hell. It doesn’t make sense. I don’t know. Maybe the next world rights 
these wrongs.  
 
22nd April 1993: Sent away for Richard Hamilton Print (+ve and fun).Sorted 
out next stage of my house purchase. Attended lectures. +ve. Avoided essay 
– not so good. Went to Manchester and attended my first Sex Addicts 
Anonymous meeting. A nice group of honest and brave individuals. I felt I could 
share freely. My desire for sex seems to me to be more powerful / in control of 
me. A kind of higher power. I don’t know where this will lead me, but I am 
prepared to find out. 20 days since I acted out in my sex addiction. This time 
solving my problem I have strength of fellowship and willingness to work at it 
from me.  
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23rd April 1993: I can see/say that a good, Godforce / +ve force in the universe 
has helped me through other people. Also I can say/see that the Devil, 
evilforce, negative force in the universe has harmed/damaged me through 
other people. Therefore I can see/say conclude that God or the Devil can work 
through me to help or damage other people in this world in my lifetime.  
Struggled to not act out my sex addiction. Not acting out an addiction means 
difficult thoughts/feelings start to surface that addictive acts work to 
avoid/hide/distract. Thus not acting addictively means difficult feelings surface. 
Unsure / a bit confused. 5 p.m. – 5.30 felt emotional pain about letting go of 
my obsession. Felt much greater grief later. 11.45: in tears with grief of letting 
go but feel it is healthy move. Excellent meeting in Armley Prison. One man 
got 10 years for what appeared to be sexual obsession mixed with alcohol. 
Sobering thought. 
 
24th April 1993: Very painful day. I experienced a stream of involuntary, 
compulsive sado-masochistic thoughts/flashes/fantasies. Some thoughts 
involved me harming women. Felt guilty about these thoughts. I prayed to 
some ‘higher power’ for them to stop. They did not straight away but persisted 
for about nine hours constantly. I felt wretched, awful. Looking into my creepy 
thoughts was very unpleasant! Anyway I also felt ‘this to shall pass’ and I was 
‘doing the right thing’. I voluntarily welcomed the pain of looking into myself 
now I have stopped acting out ‘issues’ and stuff are going to surface. I have a 
gut feeling the only way to progress is through the pain to the ‘promised land’, 
the other side. I resisted the temptation to ‘act out’ and deny my disturbing 
thoughts. I allowed myself to be disturbed. Shared with R at earliest opportunity 
as he was working all day. That helped. Also shared my pain at a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting. Not ideal environment but I chose my words carefully. 
The pain was almost unbearable and I felt worse than my withdrawal from 
alcohol dependency. These thoughts of violence to women, violence to myself, 
or women being violent to me are not right or fair! There is no-where to talk 
about these things without others judging me as ‘bad’. 
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25th April 1993: No sado-masochistic compulsive fantasies today, (either as 
perpetrator or the victim). Read some Sex addicts anonymous literature. 
Talked with R., who is having a hard time.  
 
26th April 1993: morning dominated for me by sexual fantasy (SF). Wondered 
aimlessly around. Phoned R. Avoided writing my essay. Afternoon dominated 
by SF. Felt I was restraining myself from acting out some of this stuff. Came 
home. Went over to R’s and shared for about four hours. Feel returned to 
sanity for the time being. I am powerless over my sexual fantasies. Lack of 
power over myself seems to be the main problem. I hope I can be freed from 
this powerful controlling compulsion in my life. Surely anything is capable of 
God if I am entirely willing. Samuel Johnson (1759) had same thing from 
sounds of things. My pursuit of sex interferes with my spiritual development. 
My sexual fantasies lead me to feeling hopeless, inadequate and suicidal (not 
good).  
 
27th April 1993: Felt a lot of pain today. Went to therapy. Lot of pain. Wondered 
why I am in Hell for what someone else did to me, it does not seem fair/just. If 
God is good, and just, as some commentators suggest then one would think 
the next life would redress the balance.  
I felt inner turmoil and chaos. I felt strongly that I was possessed by an evil 
spirit and it was winning it’s struggle for my soul. Went to bed. Shook 
uncontrollably. Prayed a lot. Asked God why God did not respond to my pleas 
for help. Said the word “God” seven times as I thought I was dying – said I 
rejected Satan and all his evil work several times. Felt glimmer of hope for 
about 5 seconds. Inner chaos, feeling possessed, shaking, self destructive 
behaviour.  
11 p.m, at 7 p.m. I felt at point of mental collapse. As if I was about to be 
possessed by the evil spirits that were raging battle within my soul. I felt I had 
held out to the last and refused to make a pact with the devil for some light 
relief from the pain of the psychotic episode. I ended up saying the word “God” 
seven times and holding my hand up. Since then i have returned to a fairly 
sane state of mind after having a bath and a herbal tea. Strange how one’s 
inner moods and experiences can swing so in a brief snatch of time, but a few 
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hours. Anyway tomorrow is another day. Perchance that was some kind of 
test. I don’t know but I did the right thing. I did wonder if I had been taken over 
afterwards but one look in the mirror at my eyes – they were clear and bright 
as they have ever been, told me about the healthy and positive state of my 
soul now than any priest could have done. 
 
28th April 1993: A good morning free from the tyranny of unwanted thoughts. 
I faced essay at two and felt unable to write, a huge resistance, as if I’d been 
asked to work down a sewer or something. Anyway, from 3 pm to 9 pm the 
sense of dread returned. I felt uneasy, uncomfortable. I thought reality was an 
illusion and I was starting to see that in fact I was in Hell as my illusion vanished 
(reality). Heard a voice saying “I am the new Jerusalem”. Wondered what that 
meant. No one to talk to about these experiences. What does it mean? – “I am 
the new Jerusalem”? Saw some angels and trumpet in the sky about a book I 
would write, what does that mean?. Seems a bit weird. Thought “this will pass”. 
Mother asked me how I was, so I told her. She was o.k. about it and I felt better 
for sharing my thoughts of possession. Wrote end of my essay. Feel “sane” 
now, but not happy with life at all. Manchester tomorrow. As Jung says, 
“Neurosis is always an alternative to legitimate suffering.”. Me delusions may 
be alternative to remembering how she abused me. I remembered being bitten 
by her today. Uhhhh! 
29th April 1993: I dreamt I rescued myself, Rapunzel, from a tower in a forest. 
Today was an o.k. day. Attended lectures. Did some study free of obsessional 
thoughts. Went to Manchester Sex Addicts Anonymous. Good fellowship. 
Honest. Got some phone numbers. When I think of society I think 
“Arhhchnknknk Ah Ah *! Huh ! Arrrr! Oh Waht!? Ahrr! Helhelhelhel”Hell?”  
30th April 1993: Very good Day today. Finished my essay. Shared at Young 
Person’s A.A. group. Felt I had integrity. Shared my experiences with C. About 
benefits of SAA. They want to come to next meeting. Felt attack of obsessional 
thoughts, handed it over, prayed and it was gone – just like that. Felt strong 
sense of what it means to be “fishers of men.” Interest in Christianity.  
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1st May 1993: Very good day. Felt freedom from: a) compulsive objectification 
of women. 
b) involuntary sexual fantasies. 
c) Felt spiritual strength and integrity as a result.  
 
2nd May 1993: My day was virtually free of sexual thraldom. Worked in Gallery 
with bad cold. Felt very ‘needy’ of something when I got home. Phoned L, 
drove over to share with R. Felt genuine, centred and honest after that.  
3rd May 1993: 10:30 Woke. Bath. General reading. Now 3 p.m. Feel a bit 
melancholic. Still free of sex obsession. I do feel an underlying uneasiness, 
restlessness, uncomfortable dis-ease within. Intend on finding out what it is 
and appropriate way of addressing it. 
I have felt much that “what now” feeling now my sexual pre-occupation has 
gone. What is my motivating / driving force now? In theory ‘God’, in practice I 
feel no motivation. Maybe this will come. Also practice of the 12 steps.  
Freed from thraldom 
My soul blinks at the light 
It knows not what to do 
Stood at the gate, it wants to turn back 
Light dawned on me 
Dwelling in the shadows 
What 2 do now? 
Shall I return to the familiar darkness 
Is it enough to be free from false gods? 
What motivates me now? A vague woolly positivity? 
Which direction should I go leaving the pit????????? 
What would I choose as my motivation (direction) in life? 
My self esteem has reached the new dizzy heights of neutrality. 
If one pursues happiness one has lost the chase, 
Give up and it will reward the insight 
Decision made: to change direction, to turn my ‘will’ over to ???? 
 What/who could I trust to lead me away from the pit’s edge? 
I’m bound to fall back in. 
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Looking for a means of escape from the pit. Voyaging to? We must prepare for 
death. Human soul. Weather forecast for my soul. Storms on the way. To be 
prepared to calmly meet danger and risk death. 
The problem with soul searchingly testing, defining, rejecting, affirming what 
one believes, what one’s values are through intellectual debate and bookish 
truth chatter, rational debate and the rest is that it creates in me a quiet 
consistent accusation that I am a hypocrite, as I have beliefs I temporary hold 
to but do not put into action (lack of power?) This is the root of my unease 
considering the ethical or moral dimension, the contradiction between holding 
moral values for ways of being and me acting opposite to them. Am I just a 
thrill junkie? Searching for a sense of self worth and value? Does this 
obsession direct my life?                           
 
4th May 1993: Apathy and depression. No motivation in life? What is it all 
about? Exams in three weeks? 
5th May 1993: Natural morning. Thoughts of acting out started to creep in. 
Phoned L. Phoned R. Phoned A. Tried to fix car. Wrote out a practical 
programme of action rooted in the 12 steps. Feel ok now. Exams in 14 days! 
 
6th May 1993: Drove five people to Manchester S.A.A. Good share with R. 
Want to start West Yorkshire S.A.A. meeting. All ok day. I feel I have a problem 
doing what is right for me (such as study). And also a problem enjoying myself.  
 
7th may 1993: Woke. 2 hour bath. Read SAA literature. Went to A.A. meeting 
and shared. Felt centred and ok about myself. My relationship with reality, that 
“clingy thing”, is improving.  
 
8th May 1993: Felt free of compulsive sexual fantasies. Felt centred and 
spiritually sound. 2.15 pm: Eye contact with young female waitress caused 
feeling of “total well being” – “total serenity” and euphoric feeling beyond belief. 
This lasted for 10 hours (until now). Shared about this. Suppose this is what 
people mean by “love at first sight” or “falling in love”? Will keep honesty and 
‘God-centeredness’ as two guiding principle, as I did today. Also saw G and 
booked venue for Sex Addicts Anonymous meeting in Bradford tomorrow 
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night. Lot of stigma about the sex stuff – people want to present a front that 
they are ok. May be they are ok, may be its just me? People judge me, but by 
whose moral standards are they judging me, their own? Have they 
experienced what I have experienced? 
9th May 1993: held first SAA meeting in Bradford. Me R, C, and J. I do not know 
where this is leading. 
 
10th May 1993: Started day with a prayer. Sat next to attractive woman as I 
was late for lecture. Felt nervous. Away with sex fantasies. I got increasingly 
depressed. Violent thoughts towards women crowded in. Felt more depressed. 
Numbed out feeling to cope with it. Felt angry. I dreamt last night I was sat on 
a ledge watching people bellow and suddenly I felt the compulsion to jump off 
the ledge, lacking power to control my desire, so I grabbed my bags and went 
back inside.  
 
11th May 1993: A difficult day. Compulsive visual cruzing to lift me out of 
emotional pain. I was in painful Therapy session today. Did not like what 
therapist wanted me to address. Is therapy abusive I wonder? Certainly I feel 
much more pain now and no pay off since starting therapy. Anyway I can 
always share that it was abusive if that was the case? Phoned L. Thought 
about buying pornography to get out of the pain pit. Felt guilty about this, 
doesn’t seem the right. Conflict. Tension. Did not act out. Yearned for death. 
Resisted quick addictive lift out of the pain. Struggled with my self. Fell on the 
floor crying at 11 pm saying I could not take any more of this pain. Thought I 
was having a nervous breakdown. Got up again and went to bed. Tried to kill 
myself. Obviously failed at the task, else I would not be scribing away at my 
“notes on a failing life”. I usually pass things but they tend to be intellectual 
exercises in head knowledge. Killing yourself is a different enterprise. It is very 
organic. Not as easy as you would imagine. Big hurdle is I believe it is morally 
wrong and not fair on those I am related to as it would cause them pain etc. 
Another problem with attacking yourself violently in attempt to murder your self 
is that their is always a spy in the camp. I always know what I am plotting 
against my self and so I also plot against the plan to assassinate myself. “Half 
in love with easeful death” I am, I think that is from an Elliot poem. I kind of 
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want it to look like an accident to avoid the guilt and inevitable emotional 
damage to others. With cutting I’m a bit of a coward and never get very far. 
With an overdose I think of Caesar crossing the Rubicon and saying “Lets role 
the Dice!”. Obviously I hate myself to try to kill my self. Surely better to kill 
myself than kill someone else, that would be morally worse.  
 
12th May 1993: I felt very clever today, intellectually. I thought of killing 
someone. I thought of death. Are my problems normal? What measure should 
we use? ‘Man, the measure of all things”? What to do? What to do? Thought 
about seeing my G.P., he might have some bright ideas. Appointment the 
same day. I talked to Dr. C., disclosed a bit of the underlying structural 
problems with my identity and social relations. He talked in a kind of G.P. style. 
I felt he was a very good male role model, strong, assertive, reassuring, 
decisive. He gave the impression he knew what to do with suicidal/homicidal 
stuff. Anyway, he referred me to someone else – a psychiatrist – Dr. R. on 
Friday at 9.30. I suspect I have a lot to come to terms with about my past. I 
also do not like identifying with serial killers, but apparently I do. Very important 
you deal with this, Ray.   
 
13th May 1993: Emotional pain. Talked with L. about this psychiatric referral – 
what did he think? What path might I go down?? They might have the 
answers? 
 
14th May 1993: Psychiatrist asked me lots of questions. I told her the answers. 
Went back and forth like a game of ping pong. Ping pong. Ping pong. Ping 
pong. Ping pong. I was honest as she was a professional and I was desperate. 
The more I told the truth the better she could help me with my probleomos. 
After a while we stopped playing ping pong. I was desperately hoping she had 
some kind of solution. She said she could refer me to another service if I 
wanted, psychotherapy paid for by the N.H.S. – different from the one I go to 
now. But she warned me that it would get more painful, it might not get better, 
some theories think therapy is form of abuse and it was my responsibility to 
decide in the end. She was not exactly selling psychotherapy! Sounded like 
she had her doubts. Anyway, I thought about the choice, medicine was offering 
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me a slow painful potentially abusive treatment that might not even work or I 
could say no thank you to medical intervention and go back to my house and 
carry on in my dysfunctional hell – on earth way of going about life / painful 
way of being in the world.  
 
15th May 1993: Started sex fantasy life again as a synthetic elevator out of my 
painful prison in the world. What about that great offer from the N.H.S.? Lets 
role the dice! Asked S out for a date. She said no. Panic attacks before and 
afterwards. Found it difficult to talk / breathe. Later, chaired second Bradford 
Sex addicts anonymous meeting. Good turn out. Shared with R. after. Very 
good.  
 
16th May 1993: A profoundly painful and depressed state of mind was my lot 
today. Thought of having sex as an elevator out of my pain, but decided not 
to, as it is temporary escape and does not work as with all escapist repetitive 
excess. I do use sex as a psychological analgesic, an emotional pain killer. Kill 
bits of me? Kill all of me? Cut bits out of me? May be killing my self is a 
metaphor?  Kill my self and start again? I don’t know what the answer is. I went 
to bed five hours ago as I thought I’d do least harm there. Can’t sleep as usual. 
Phoned L. But he was out. No sign of God yet. What does it mean when you 
abandon all your false gods, false powers I’ve been subjecting myself to, and, 
anticipating meeting God, one find oneself living in Hell???? Where are you 
God? A Quiet God I seem to have. Regular therapy / counselling tomorrow. 
Still not decided about psychotherapy offer from NHS. Be assertive and ask 
Questions about therapy being abusive. Stop people pleasing Raymond! You 
defer to almost anything, even your therapist!, you wont tolerate the 
excruciating pain of someone disapproving / judging you, not liking you, of 
being in conflict with them. You are a coward Ray. Be brave. 
 
17th May 1993: Release at last. 22 years old. Saw therapist/counsellor (T) 
Shared the pain. Decided to disclose to Mum and Dad about my abuse, etc. 
Had to do something before I killed myself or someone else. Also shared about 
cutting self at 7. Lack of communication etc. Was worried my abuser might 
start on someone else aged 10 now I’m an adult and of no interest to them. 
350 
 
Thought if I do not share and they abuse 10 year old I’d be partly guilty for not 
saying what had happened to me. Mum and Dad believed me which was great 
relief. Must have been shock to them. Feel better already. Alcoholism and 
ending up in rehab at 19 makes more sense to them now they know I was 
sexually abused for years.  
 
19th May 1993: Today I was less depressed than yesterday. I did not do much 
though. I was still powerless over sexual fantasy stuff though. Power over my 
subject seems to be the big issue? Where am I orbiting? My next move wants 
to be improving my re-alationship with reality. I am at a new beginning. Where 
is God? 
20th May 1993: 22 years old. I felt some freedom today. I am not responsible 
for how the perpetrator of my abuse feels or thinks as a result of me speaking 
the TRUTH!  
I read that in a self help book if I’m honest, I wonder if it is true or if I believe it. 
The CAPITALS make it sound dramatic – like a bold statement. Blah blah blah. 
The power of positive thinking. The power of positive drinking? Three years 
sober at 22. Some people appear to be ‘natural’ social human beings in their 
social world, like they absorbed all the rules young or something, soaking them 
up from the social sponge. I always felt like an alien from another planet, trying 
to work out what “primary school” was all about etc., ‘how come everyone else 
knows the rules’ I used to think. What was expected was a real puzzle. Rhymes 
in the playground, “we won the war, in 1944!” - It was like I was from another 
planet. I cut my hand with a razor aged seven to get in out of the cold playtime. 
At the time it made logical sense, but now it seems odd. Why did I not 
communicate my needs in a better way? 
 
21st May 1993: I feel very well. Very centred. No regrets. Read “Out of the 
Shadows” by Patrick Carnes and made notes. Went out for fresh air and 
prayer. Sound of woman’s voice locked into / triggered my addictive belief 
system. Had sex addict head on again, or belief system. Fear, sweat, pain, 
regret. Went out. Found it hard to interpret women’s intentions / signals. Seems 
very confusing / complicated. Felt threatened by women. Were they out to get 
me? Do me some harm? Want to be with a woman but when they get near I 
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feel threatened and can not escape. This is before we even speak! Felt sick, 
panicky. They might come and get me. Fell “into the soup” a bit again, as in, 
“Decline and Fall”, by Waugh. 
 
23rd May 1993: Struggled to study. Felt Shame of last night’s sexploits. Power 
of this addiction blew me away. Was rigorously honest and shared at SAA 
meeting tonight. Meditated for one hour. Shared much. Breakthrough! Relief. 
I have a false / dysfunctional / damaged belief system around certain 
problematic issues for me – alcohol, drugs, gambling, which I have changed 
via practicing 12 steps and abstinence based fellowships. Not that popular in 
UK as we think NHS will mother us. I digress. Tonight I had insightful 
breakthrough – I have dysfunctional / damaged belief system around sex due 
to being victim of sexual abuse from 10. I “act on” my belief system. It is not 
real. My beliefs are unreal. I need to root out all these false beliefs around 
women, sex, sexuality and my self. I can now see it for what it is. What do I do 
with this information? 
[there are no entries for dates that are missing, I appear not to have made any 
diary entries on those days]  
 
24TH September 1993: Sadness has come upon my soul Boundless blue, 
dense, heavy, blue smog of my heart. Have I now to don detectives hat and 
deduce from this blue funk what causes this melancholia, and thus fashion an 
easy remedy? ‘Tis fate struck me a cruel blow, perhaps, I should accept it. 
Would I were a prince. A fair fight I’d put up then. Wohin ist Gott?  
 
28th Sept 1993: Get organised. Psyche o.k. 
 
27th December 1993: Darkness. Depression. Felt I was possessed by a seven 
headed serpent daemon last night. 3 weeks now. I felt I was disintegrating. 
Pain. Longing for death. Self-destructive urges. Agitation. Dislike of my self. 
Spent Christmas trying to think up alternatives to suicide other than homicide. 
Must go to therapy, might help? “where are the leaves?, must be dead/ No 
more weeping.”. difficulty forming and maintaining relationships with women. 
Unresolved anger. Self-harming impulses. Food problematic.    
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18th March 1994: Woke dazed and shaky, spent morning trying to balance the 
caffeine and nicotine levels coursing through my veins. Still felt sickly so had 
a shave, etc. and felt much better! Missed R’s lecture who told me later the 
feeling was mutual, as no one else was asking taxing questions. Felt weak 
returning home and stopped for a rest half way. Puzzled ‘till I realised it was 5 
pm and I had hardly eaten all day. 4 weeks break ahead so need for self-
discipline and routine of reading as last break was start of my last depression, 
which I do not want to repeat.  
 
18th March 1994: About a week ago I came up with the “theory of perpetual 
choice” – arguing we deny our omnipresent choice by using a language which 
attributes excessive power to patterns of choice in our past, I used the 
examples of “Character Traits” and addiction as examples of this linguistic 
avoidance and objectification of responsibility – a false ideology of historical 
determinism.  T pointed out this had been thought  - Sartre and Existentialism. 
Neither of which I’d read then. I’ve read some since. Sartre used the same 
examples – traits and compulsion! Did I think up existentialism independently? 
Probably not – I’ve probably read stuff indirectly influenced by existentialism 
and come to the same conclusions.  
 
My identity is an ongoing dialectical discourse between the views, beliefs and 
values that I presently identify with and all the ‘other’ conflicting values, beliefs 
and views I engage with. For example, my positivist and project orientated 
belief is heightened by my engagement with and rejection of decadence and 
hedonism.  
How can I break my habits of perception? 
I always have choice, within the cultural, political, economic restraints I am 
enmeshed in. Perceptual choice is heightened by the omnipresent immanence 
of the ascension and the fall, progress or regression, freedom or submission. 
(The progression of Time towards Death). My identity evolves through the 
selective retention of variables, First prescribed, then random, then possibly 
chosen, I choose to Choose my Culture, a fictive kin of Intellectuals, some 
dead already.  
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How many of us exercise the maximum degree of self-direction open to us? 
Passivity is the easier option. Latent Cultural forces lie dormant, internalised, 
within the self, such latent forces are awaken when I attempt to asset an 
authentic Self. Slay the beast! 
Sartre says we are the choices we make towards the issue of “being”.  
 
 
19th March 1994: I am directionless. Writing anchors me to a text. I read for 
seven hours today and then roamed the streets in the rain.  
“Addiction and urge are possibilities rooted in the throwness of Dasien” 
(Heidegger, ‘Being and Time’)  
“Throwness” – as on a potter’s wheel. “Dasein” – H’s ontology. “Being there” 
in the world; searching for a meaningful existence.  
Spinning – the world on it’s axis and it’s orbit, and me on my potter’s wheel. In 
my ‘Dasein’ I can feel the centrifugal force or pull of urge or addiction. It’s 
always a possibility. I felt it tonight. How am I to interpret these urges, 
Heidegger? The ‘ars interpretandi’ depends on what texts I’ve read. 
Understanding is circular. Where is the centre? Where is my faith? (the anti-
dote to urge?) Will I choose to assert an authentic self? Will I take 
existentialism seriously? I come out of depression and have no direction! To 
what shall I commit? If I do not commit, will I be committed? ‘A’ restored my 
faith on the telephone. Satellites of sensation orbit my being and I can always 
orbit them, If I can’t find a more meaningful existence.  
I have a habit of choosing to give ‘urge’ power over me. Can I choose not to 
do this? And thus assert my authentic self? Tomorrow I will try an experiment, 
I will choose to get up when the alarm goes and renounce the ‘urge’ to lie in all 
day, go jogging, and renounce caffeine and nicotine, despite my habit of 
yielding to my urge to ingest them.  
 
20th March 1994: Got up at 6:00 a.m. Decided not to go jogging. Went back to 
bed and lay there for eight hours. Got up again and had a cup of tea and a 
cigarette.  
That is typical of me. Living my life in hyperbole. I think of my goals as a house 
of cards, if I don’t get one they all fall down. I wish to pursue goals but not use 
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them as a means of self oppression. Hyperbole is dust. I will accept partial 
success in future. I would like to be an “intellectual”, a worker in the sea of 
ideas. Can I be more than a filter? These continental philosophers sound ok at 
first, but deep down their is clearly better philosophy hidden within Irish drinking 
songs. The reason is that when the Irish were preserving scholarly pursuits as 
valuable and putting gaps inbetween Roman word to improve things Satre and 
Heidigger’s forefathers were expending all their energies running about in the 
dark ages trying to catch a wild boar to ‘bring home the bacon’ so to speak. If 
an Irish drinking song had a bar fight with some continental philosophy it would 
always win, but it would be a brave philosophy lecturer that would risk such a 
point – Joyce could see that – “Lots of fun at Finegan’s Wake” and all that: as 
in, “Tim Finegan lived in walken street, a gentleman Irish mighty odd, he’d a 
beautiful brogue so rich and sweet, and to rise in the world he carried a hod. 
But you see he’d a kind of tippling way, with a love for the liquor Tim was born, 
to help him at his work each day, a drop of the ‘crater’ every morn, wasn’t it 
the truth I told you? – lots of fun at Finnegan’s wake, he fell from the ladder 
and cracked his scull, so they took him home his corpse to wake, they wrapped 
him up in a nice clean sheet, with a bottle of whisky at his feet and a gallon of 
porter at his head, pipe tobacco and whiskey punch, Tim my love – why did 
you die?, afits broke out and a bottle o whisky broke over Tim, up he rose and 
looked around – “thundering Jaysus, did you think I was dead?” – There you 
have it, the labour to rise in the world, the fall and the resurrection all hidden 
in a drinking song. 
I was stuck in a coffee house earlier when youths fought in the doorway. The 
blood looked so surreal. Pride kills. A and R are going away so I need to 
develop some new friendships – outside of the fellowship.  
 
21st March 1994: No cigarettes today. We are confronted with the reality of 
choice.  
I am lost. A satellite without a body to orbit. What is the promised land? The 
new Jurusalem? What? What? My subjectivity spins from one orbit to another.  
 
22nd March 1994: I awake and immediately ascribe ‘meaning’ to my day. My 
first dilemma as always, to get up or not to get up? That is the question. I fish 
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around my psyche for some philosophy to cobble together to get me 
downstairs, breakfast eaten, washed and dressed.  
“The weight of this sad time I must obey, speak what we feel, not what we 
ought to say.”  
Went to King Lear. Will’s right, justice is a fiction. A fiction we try to make fact. 
But there’s nothing natural about it. I was distracted by a young couple 
copulating two rows down. ; a ‘pleasant youth’ seemed to mock mine, and I 
thought of hanging myself or stabbing myself from ‘shame’. 
I am unaware of how ashamed I am, of myself. We only notice the moods that 
pass, if it were icy winter all year we’d not note it. For years I’ve not stepped 
outside of shame to note it. From the age of 11 I felt ashamed of every sexual 
encounter I had. I felt such guilt I wanted to be physically ill. And such fear of 
discovery I wanted to die. Over seven years sex and death fused into one for 
me. The “beast with two backs” is death to me. It’s five years since I had sex 
with a woman and I wanted to die then. It was her who’d filled my head with all 
her talk of sex and slipped her hands down my pyjamas when I was 11 and 
she was 16 only to scratch and dig her nails into my groin to give her some 
kind of thrill and me a scrambled brain, which I’ve still got twelve years later. It 
was not ‘pleasant’. ‘Pleasant’ I am not familiar with. I wish my past were gone. 
I feel ill. I’d rather be dead and I feel ashamed of that as well! I’d like ‘pleasant’ 
instead of ‘not-suffering’.  
I went for a walk to get some peace of mind and was attacked by an Alsatian 
10 yards down the way! It ran off when I kicked it, but I’m shaking like a leaf. I 
don’t want “sex”. I had “sex” for seven years and it drove me mad. I could have 
sex for £20 down some dark allay off Lumb Lane. Dogs want and have sex. 
No. What I want is to go to bed with someone who does not hate me, who did 
not bite and scratch me and tell me I’m going to Hell. (Animals do not do this 
to each other!). I would like to have some affection. Is that asking too much? I 
have not experienced “affection” and it is probably “pleasant”. 
 
23rd March 1994: I have just read yesterday’s entry. I can’t recognise myself. 
Did I write that 24 hours ago? I feel great now. I went to King Lear with T and 
had a very pleasant evening. I must read “Dr. Jeckle and Mr. Hyde”. Was that 
me yesterday? I read Lear today. Edmund’s speech about the ‘globes’ and 
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Astrology is existentialist. Power shifts between generations. The break with 
‘tradition’. “Beware language” is what it says to me. How far do our eyes 
pierce?  
Such a bout of self-pity I had last night. It seems there is an ‘identity’ I can shift, 
subjectively into. Objectively nothing alters but subjectively I take on the 
persona of a tragic figure. A paradigm shift. I feel confident now and at peace. 
24th March 1994:Being = Choice. Confronted by choice I try to avoid it. 
Referring to my ‘ past’ is an attempt to deny my future potential. Addiction is 
the extreme form of referring to the past. ‘Being’ asks ‘what shall I do now?’, 
perpetually. The inauthentic ‘being’ self references to its past – that already 
achieved or experienced, and so “safe”, accessible, ready at hand, convenient, 
familiar, and chooses not to move on to new potentialities but to REPEAT 
something and so live in-authentically.  
Repetition is always a possibility of ‘being’ – a denial of the self. It is always 
the easier option. I must renounce the familiar if I am to become authentic.  
I need a guiding principle? – God’s will? 
Which means:  
1. prayer and meditation to know God’s will and for power to practice it. 
2. Moral inventory to separate divine from non-godly aspects of being 
3. Confession and atonement  
4. Renunciation of ungodly, inauthentic being.  
5. Theological existentialism. Full potential = to realise the God within. 
24th March 1994: Talked with A last night about philosophy, economics, 
theology and my bouts of self pity. Engaging and fruitful as always. Stayed the 
night but could not sleep with so much caffeine and nicotine coursing through 
my veins, so I read Sartre’s “Existentialism and Humanism”. I like much of this 
philosophy and intend to apply it to my life, although I tend more towards 
theological existentialism. Read Ezra Pound, then went to Lear for third time 
this week. For me its about the power one generation should have over the 
next, and the tragedy that can come from abandoning tradition for selfish 
reasons. Its also about the danger of language – that can deceive, and when 
actions do not mach words.  
“...the yoke / Of the old ways of men I have cast aside”  (Ezra Pound) 
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I ‘project’ myself into my future by the choices I make, and thus resolve the 
issue of being. I need to choose to commit to my projects, and by my actions 
realise them or die trying. Dreams are dust. I “value” a “way of being” by 
choosing and acting on it, as an example to others. I choose what texts to read 
and how to interpret them. What counsel to seek and what to ignore. I choose 
how to act and what goals to pursue. I cannot rely on what others may do, as 
they do as they please, thus Sartre talked of despair, a bleak realism.  
“And the days are not full enough 
And the nights are not full enough 
And life slips by like a field mouse... 
...not shaking the grass”   (Ezra Pound) 
I am crushed, I am 23, I suffer. A weight. I want to kill my self. Will I be the 
same when I am 43? 
 
25th March 1994: I need to equate the choices I now make about what 
activities with what I will become. I need to bring to bear the weight of my future 
upon my present. My actions are not only an example to others, but in valuing 
that behaviour I am an example to my self.   
My being has many possibilities. I must choose today what I am - And 
everyday.  
What is called “addiction” is a possibility of being. It is an unwillingness to feel 
anxiety. An always referring back to some repeatable sensation, always 
unsatisfying, one chooses to repeat into a vertigo of endless repetition. 
Trapped into a circle without a future. Going nowhere. An unwillingness to feel 
anxious.  
I am wondering whether to spend the summer reading or would that be 
obsessive? Should I prostitute myself to some capitalist in a so called “job”? – 
that is much more ‘acceptable’ than trying to educate oneself. I’ll see how the 
next three months go. 
 
28th March 1994: 6:00 a.m. Woke and escaped into daydreams for eight 
hours. Shopped. Read for 2 hours. Ate. Escaped into television, hypnotized by 
images for 6 hours. Then started smoking again. What a day. Passivity. A 
‘non’-day. 
358 
 
Q: Why? A: It was the easiest path. 
What was that passivity about? A backlash to my existentialism? Whenever I 
form a plan an ‘anti-plan’ also always forms, and the ‘anti-plan’ has more power 
than the plan! Lack of power over my self appears to be my problem. I am a 
land full of battles but the bits I loosely group together and call my self (the bits 
in the battles I identify with) are always loosing the daily battles I have with the 
other bits that land on my island and leave, regroup, attack, taunt, leave, revisit, 
I am a small part of me holding out in the fog of war, why am I always losing 
the battle for control over my self? Other people appear in total control of 
themselves, no signs of a battle raging within them?. 
 
26th March 1994: The text of my life, my creed, that which I believe in, which 
gives meaning to my life, is dissolving, deconstructing. The sentences and 
words separate and I can see nothing holding them together. Nothing behind. 
Nihilism. I don’t see a good reason to believe in anything. Maybe this is a stage 
I need to go through? Life seems absurd. I am committed to nothing. I am on 
the outskirts again. Not depressed. Wohin ist Gott? The texts of my life are 
slipping away. I am dissolving into meaninglessness. I must choose some 
meaningful view.  
 
27th march 1994: Nature is an eye-sore. Felt good today. Read for six hours. 
Haven’t smoked for two days now. Just a matter of exercising choice. 
Heidegger says in inauthentic being and addiction we are always already 
alongside our being, i.e. trapped in circle without a future. Always referring 
back to our past.  
 
29th March 1994: Went to psycho-therapy as usual. I talked of being fed up 
with being non-committal about my world views. I hop from one philosophy to 
another and am lost in a sea of relativity. I think it is time to commit to one way 
of looking at the world. I am acquainted with a few: communism, fascism, 
anarcho-capitalism, Welfare Capitalism, a smattering of world religions, but the 
one I most admire is Christ’s message in the Gospels. By ‘commit’ I don’t mean 
blind dogma, like the evangelicals appear to mean, but free, critical choice.  
Here is my interpretation of St. John’s interpretation of Christ’s message:  
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In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God. My body is Christ’s sanctuary, look after it. Be born again. Remember 
John the Baptist’s humility, Do God’s Will (LOVE) and don’t sin, and you will 
walk fearlessly in the truth. Spiritual thirst is quenched forever by the word of 
Christ. Spiritual hunger is satisfied by doing god’s Will (labour for LOVE) not 
one’s own will. If you really want to be healed “get up” and sin no more. Let 
Christ live in you by acting on his message, Judge according to rightness 
(depth) not appearance (surface), Validity is knowing where you are coming 
from and where you are going. To sin is to choose slavery, sin is slavery. Let 
him who has not sinned cast the first stone. The truth shall set you free, act 
not as you were conditioned by men, but as God wills, Live life to the full in 
Christ, choose to lay down your life and then take it up again in God’s name, 
remember Christ quoted “you are gods” (10:34) In this life you will have trouble, 
also Christ ‘wept’, was ‘distressed’ and had ‘a troubled soul’. Christ washed his 
disciples feet, Christ gave his disciples the power to forgive sins, You are a 
branch of god, bear fruit, and be pruned by the word of God to bear more fruit.  
 
30th March 1994: My interpretation of Mathew’s interpretation of God’s will: 
Judas sold Christ for the price of a slave, and Christ suffered death on a cross 
and rose again to life, the inner (depth) life matters not the (surface) 
appearance, Love God and love others as you love your self, Forgive each 
other, Better to be drowned with a mill-stone around your neck that interfere 
with children, become childlike, take up your cross, The gates of the 
underworld symbolise its power to keep captives, Peter sank as he doubted, 
The kingdom of heaven is a treasure hidden in a field, Banished daemons may 
return, JTB preached repentance and forgiveness of sins, Jesus was tempted 
in the desert for 40 days and did not yield, Love your enemies. The thought of 
sin needs to be dealt with as well as abstaining from sin. The eyes are the 
window of the soul, be reconciled, go by the hard road and the narrow gate, I 
cannot be the slave of two masters, choose God or Mammon. Happy are the 
poor in spirit, those who grieve, the persecuted.  
 
31st March 1994: My interpretation of the translation of Mark’s interpretation 
of Jesus’ interpretation of God’s will: Forgive others so God may forgive your 
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failings. Physical separated from the spiritual in terms of healing, divides man’s 
way of thinking from God’s way of thinking, Renounce your life, take up your 
cross, and live a new life. Some possessions can only be driven out by prayer, 
put your self last, a-hierarchical, Let the Holy Spirit speak through you.  
And Luke: Your faith can save you. Detach from your past life, take up your 
cross and follow Christ, Property ownership secures nothing, give up your 
possessions to the poor, why not judge for your self what is right? Tragedies 
happen to anyone, it rains on the good and the bad, Some people mature later 
with a bit of love and support, try your best. Of 10 lepers, one thanked God.  
 
April 1st 1994: Went to Bach’s ‘B’ minor mass. R was singing in it. Very good 
only Bach’s not my kind of thing, Too repetitive and safe, represents traditional 
theology apparently. Had very good talk with A. Helped to ground me again. I 
spend so much time reading I can lose touch. Anyway, I think liberation 
theology is the way forward for me.  
 
April 2nd 1994: I have such hunger I fear it. I fear I will devour myself trying to 
satisfy it. What do I ‘hanker after’?, what do I wish to entomb in my stomach, 
or mind or soul? I know not what I crave. I long for something. Something within 
cries out, but is it satiable?, “Satisfaction” refers to the atonement or reparation 
(repair) of an injury or wrong. Repayment of a debt. Is that why I always hanker 
after something more, trying to satisfy my unhealed wounds? Pouring 
repetitive acts into bottomless wounds.  Or is it a desire for wholeness? To be 
‘at-one’ with God, often mis-read as concupiscence. 
What will satisfy my soul? What foolishness will I engage in trying? Why does 
nothing satisfy? I hunger on. I am too foolish and blind to let God’s Grace in. 
 
7th April 1994: What am I doing with my Life? Woke up this morning to a phone 
call from R, whom I have not heard from in six months asking If I would start a 
sexaholics anonymous meeting in Bradford. Why hadn’t he come when R and 
I had started the meeting which folded? “Denial” he said. I shared with him 
where I was at, but am not willing to commit to that meeting a second time. I 
wished him well, but for me it is just a symptom of the underlying structural 
problems of the self. An ill constructed damaged self  like mine is always prone 
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to structural implosions and tectonic shifts, reformations, etc. The solution 
eludes me, obviously not accessible via intellectual effort or I’d have got their 
by now. Must be another way into the mountain, but what? What chant will turn 
my base metal into gold? 
After Narcotics Anonymous walked C back to her house, no sign of the lads 
who had been harassing them for being white / gay / women or what ever? 
Another situation where I need to tread carefully. (over what I say and why and 
how) care and tact. With C I brought up the subject of how certain situations 
can be dramatized into high theatre, and those playing the role can be caught 
up in the (adrenaline) action which always refers to itself, and the increasingly 
tense imaginings as to what the next scene will bring. They need to walk away 
from it. A offered them a room. If a conflict becomes your raison d’être then its 
resolution is a threat of death. I did not say that, as I thought I might be 
assuming too much or sympathising too little, but I think it is true.   
Why am I so self-centred? What is my raison d’être? What theatre am I 
engaged in that I am unwilling to walk away from???  
 
8th April 1994: Nice Meal with A, J,J and A at Jumbo in Leeds. Felt fed up 
walking home. Fed up with how I’ve been. Too much talk, theory and not 
enough practice. What I do seems like so much theatre. Identity Crisis after 
Identity Crisis. Re-running the “I can’t cope” and “I want to die” scenes over 
and over again. I just need to grow up and walk away from all that. Just do 
what I need to do and stop talking about it. I’m like an alchemist searching for 
the philosopher’s stone that will turn my base metal into gold. I need to stop 
studying the maps and start digging. Stop talking and start living. I am fed up 
with my self and all my talk.  
 
10th April 1994: My central problem over the last three and a half years has 
been the “prodigal son” syndrome. I believe my first experience of this was 
when I joined Alcoholics Anonymous at 19 years old after five years of decline 
and fall through heavy drinking. The change was dramatic; I struggled with a 
major problem, and with help, renounced my past life and celebrated the 
prodigal son’s return at weekly meetings. But then what? Getting on with life 
with its routine problems and gradual progress and set backs of concrete 
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everyday reality and being basically o.k. seemed too ‘ordinary’ by comparison. 
I yearned to re-enact the drama of the grand struggle and survival. So from 
time to time I manufactured my own crises.  Not consciously, but habitually. 
My anxieties about my future, my identity crises, my suicidal depressions, my 
feelings of possession, not attending lectures, delaying reading and writing my 
essays until the eleventh hour, dragging up my sexual abuse (which needed 
to come out anyway), joining Sex Addicts Anonymous in Manchester for a 
while, all of these may be my re-enacting the prodigal son role. Rejecting my 
day to day reality of being o.k. and just getting better as a human being 
gradually now, growing impatient with this and hankering after some promised 
land, some spiritual perfection, and when that did not materialise regressing 
into some problem long enough to struggle out of it again with a sense of 
achievement. I need to stop doing this. Accept that basically I am o.k. and just 
do what needs to be done and grow up. 
 
13th April 1994: I fear what I am becoming. Despite my desire to be alright. I 
dislike myself more. I seem to be getting worse. What am I doing? Waiting for 
Goddot? 
 
14th April 1994: I think I am having a prolonged adolescence. My identity Crisis 
is normal. I am looking for some purpose, meaning and direction in my life. I 
am lonely. I would like a partner and some intimacy.  
 
15th  April 1994: I’m accepting I’m o.k. Getting on with Study. Feeling 
connected again. Giving up hyperbolic thinking. Also need to remember I can 
negotiate my boundaries at any point in time.  
 
16th April 1994: I feel a new lease of life. Having walked away from hyperbole 
and accepted I’m o.k. I feel a creative life force rising up within, wanting to get 
out and express itself. God’s Grace perhaps? Anyway its 1:30 a.m. and I’d 
rather get some sleep. This is the new “me” I’ve been praying for. “This week 
piping time of peace”.        
[No / or missing entries for next five months] 
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8th October 1994: I’m feeling much better. I’m confronted by choice. I am able 
to think. How hard do I want to work? I am no longer in the Gulag. Guard in ya 
treasure hunt -  c, Sab a tour de force. 
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Appendix III 
Clinical Notes for Ray Middleton Spanning seven years: (28th May 1993 
to April 2000) 
 
28 May 1993: Letter from psychiatrist (Dr. R) to G.P. re: Session held 14th 
May 1993: 
Dear Dr K, 
Thank you for asking me to see this interesting 22 year old man who told me 
about his alcohol dependence, drug abuse and even compulsive gambling in 
his early teens. He described all of this as self destructive behaviour and that 
even though he has conquered all of these he still has the same feelings. He 
tries to deal with them and usually can come through the bad patches but he 
is having a particularly prolonged one at the moment. He has suicidal thoughts 
and sees himself as being shot, dying or crashing his car. He has noted 
decreased motivation, feeling a bit depressed and feeling emotional pain from 
the past.  
He said he was sexually, physically and emotionally abused by a woman when 
he was 11 and for a prolonged period over the following seven years. He now 
has angry feelings towards many women he meets in different situations. This 
has never been revealed to his parents or anyone else. He said emotional pain 
has always been there but he has been lifted out of it by drugs and alcohol but 
never on a permanent basis. He no longer wants to avoid this – he wants to 
go through this and “come out the other end and enjoy life”.    
 
Personal History 
He was born in Leeds and has always lived in Yorkshire except when he hitch 
hiked around Canada in his late teens. He is currently living at his parents 
address as he has glandular fever and has returned from University. He 
thought his childhood was ok but has recently reassessed this and decided he 
was bored at Junior school even though he was seen as a bright child. He 
always felt an outsider, an observer and cold. He remembers at the age of 
about 6 cutting his hand with a razor blade he had stolen, in order to get in 
from the cold at playtime – he said that he could have asked to go in but he 
did not – instead he displayed this bizarre behaviour and unfortunately “it did 
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not work”. He went to the Senior School where he seemed to be popular but 
he even questioned this as a meaningful interpretation. He obtained ‘A’ levels 
and a place at University but decided instead to go abroad. He returned and 
got several jobs and then another place at Newcastle University to do Business 
Studies. Three weeks into that he left because he was spending several 
hundred pounds on alcohol. He has had no relationships with women since 
the abuse stopped when he was about 19. His friends are mostly those he met 
through alcoholics and narcotics anonymous.   
Family History 
His parents are in their mid forties. He has two younger brothers and a younger 
sister still living at home. 
Social circumstances 
He used to live in a house with some friends but moved back home when he 
was poorly. He is about to purchase his own house. He neither drinks, smokes, 
nor takes illegal drugs. He said that being in a pub is not an issue any more.  
Present Mental State 
Mr Middleton was a casually dressed man and looked his age. He sat sideways 
for most of the interview although he did look directly at me as well as looking 
at the floor and into the distance. He did not seem to be intimidated by me or 
hostile to me although he described how he can feel very aggressive to any 
women who is the right age (between 17 and 24) who goes past him in any 
situation. He was clearly thinking and able to give very thoughtful answers to 
most questions. He was not anxious or agitated and though he said he thought 
he was depressed at times, objectively his mood was euthymic and there were 
times when he could smile appropriately. However, he described not having 
much enjoyment in life and at times feeling weighed down and under 
tremendous emotional stress.  
It seems that he has felt alienated, isolated and distant from other people from 
a very early age. It also seems that he never been completely satisfied with 
his life and his part in it and it may be that his addictive behaviour gave him 
“temporary elevations out  of that” but unfortunately they never lasted. Also 
again his hitch hiking around Canada was something he did again to run away 
but “I was always there at the end of it”. 
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He described his childhood abuse in that the sexual pleasure would lift him out 
of his emotional pain, but the pain would flood back once the sexual acts were 
over. He said this would go on for several weeks, then she would reject him or 
he would explain how it was hurting him and she would give him a break for a 
few weeks and then it would start again and he described this pattern of 
enticement and then rejection which must have occurred 70 or 80 times over 
the seven years. He now feels pain, hurt, guilt, anger and fear.  
He has no abnormal beliefs or experiences but he does get very intense inner 
distressing feelings which he describes as torment. He has on two previous 
occasions, aged 15 and 18 taken overdoses.  
It seemed from his descriptions that he understood quite well the reasons why 
he was feeling the way he was but seemed eager to understand more and 
particularly to look at his childhood, his feelings and his relationships and how 
they developed from being small.  
IMPRESSION 
I do not think that Mr. Middleton has a mental illness. His description suggests 
that he has also felt alienated and has not felt as though he fully fitted in in 
terms of the people around him, both family and friends. He is questioning his 
early life and what he got out of it. He would like to feel differently about that. 
This is all complicated by the abuse which started when he was 11 and it was 
possible in this setting that the other addictive and compulsive behaviours 
occurred. He still has very painful memories and emotions as a result. He 
would like to work towards a better acceptance of this and would also like to 
think that one day he could have a normal and balanced relationship with a 
woman.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER MANAGEMENT 
I suggested two options – one being contact with the therapist who works with 
male victims of abuse; the other being a referral to the psychotherapy 
department. He chose the second option and I will therefore send a copy of 
this letter with a covering letter to my colleagues there who I hope will see him 
with a view to further work. I have not arranged to see him again. 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr. R.  
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1994 to 1995 I attended weekly psychotherapy: Currently no notes sent from 
psychotherapy department, despite my request under the data protection act.  
 
[age: 24] 
04/01/1996: Clinical notes from inpatient psychiatric hospital admission: 
Urgent referral from BRI (A&E) to whom he was referred by GP, Presenting 
Complaint: Overdose.  
On 03/01/1995 took 8 tablets of seroxat + 10 pints. On 04/01/1995 took half 
bottle Kaline and Morphine, 10 pint of alcohol, melted boot polish strained 
through filter paper and cough mixture. Has Good insight. Previous diagnosis 
of Bipolar Disorder MDP. 
Reasons: 1) “sort of suicide attempt only hoping to make it look like an accident 
because I felt guilty about committing suicide due to the affect it has on it has 
on other people”, “I don’t know why?”. 
2) “I have this idea – I have self destructive feelings – to harm myself” 
3) “I was thinking too much – this leads to my psychological problems. I was 
trying to perform a chemical lobotomy so I wouldn’t think as much and I would 
be happier. Although I seem to float in and out of partial insight.  
....Also at Christmas took overdose of ecstasy and amphetamines. Has alcohol 
problem since age 13. Age 19 admitted to Alcohol Rehab Centre. Four and a 
half years sober after this. Drinking now for one year in very destructive 
manner. Had planned to go to rehab again.... 
Previous Psychiatric History: Bipolar Affective Disorder Diagnosed in august 
1995 by G.P. Commenced on Lithium by GP after consulted psychiatrist.  
Prior to this seen by a Psychiatrist 2 years ago at Uni – Thought he had 
Personality Disorder. Suggested Psychotherapy. Going for 2 years. Thought 
he was getting worse. Stopped three months ago. Raymond feels he get 
depressed every 6 months when he would visit G.P. Feel he had BP 
[borderline personality + Depression] since age of 10 when he was being 
sexually abused by older female. Parents did not know. Under lot of stress 
then. Bitten by her. Cut wrist aged 15. Occasionally self harm, e.g. hit fingers 
with hammer when feeling self destructive.  
“I recreate dangerous situations to harm me, but if it does not happen, I harm 
myself.” – “It’s like I want to be punished.”  
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Drug history – Seroxat 20 mg OD – initially June 1994 – takes intermittently.  
Stopped Lithium due to side effects (Aug – Oct 1995).  Also takes illicit drugs 
– MDMA (ecstasy) and amphetamines. Smokes 20 cigs a day, Alcohol – 10 
pints of larger a day. Can go without for a few days.  
“I don’t get angry, Aviod situations, Rationalise it.”  
Aged 20 he told parents about sexual abuse. Gets on well with family. Has 
resentments.  
Pre-morbid Personality: Cleaver, precocious. “Bored to death” at school age 
6-7. Difficulty communicating – did not know how to play games such as 
football but excellent at other areas e.g. in religion class – gave synopsis of 
Darwin’s theory of evolution age 7. Age 7 cut hand with razor blade in 
playground because he wanted to go inside as playground was cold... “I resent 
being clever.” 
Personal history: Age 5 -11 – “Terribly boring” Age 11-18 “ok” (had separate 
worlds e.g. school was one, home was another) Age 18 went to Canada hitch-
hiking, alone, for one year, until no money. Worked as labourer on Channel 
Tunnel. Then Newcastle University – Politics. Stayed three weeks – 
“Breakdown” – Alcohol related, hence Alcohol rehab aged 19. Next 2 years 
worked as drugs councillor. Then assistant chef. Then made chess sets. 
Voluntary and paid work for Oxfam. Bookseller in a Gallery.  Then Degree in 
Sociology and Social Psychology – Graduated with First Class Honours. Then 
Financing his PhD on Addiction by teaching part time at University. Finished 
10 weeks teaching seminars and planning to do Chapter two of PhD.  
Relationships: One week relationship with female 4 months ago. “she wasn’t 
violent or anything, no danger there” - looking for association of danger with 
relationship.  
Mental State: Well dressed.  
Mood – “Subjectively – “Bit detached and harbouring self destructive thoughts” 
Objectively: Low, smiles, laughs, suicidal intent present. “thoughts of being tied 
up by ropes, jumping out widow or from train.”  
Thoughts – “for long time had usual thoughts of suicide, e.g. being shot, 
hanging myself. Often just didn’t take notice of them, they were just there.” 
“Sometimes I feel I am possessed by an evil creature inside me. Struggle going 
on drawing on religious symbolism. Arch angel is struggling inside me with a 
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demonic being.” He is grimacing and curling his body up knowing this is going 
on inside him. Has partial insight. Occurs 4 to 6 months out of 12.  
August 95 - Believed he was Karl Marx, Fredrick Niche, and ‘the new 
Jerusalem’ when manic etc. and paranoia that he was about to be arrested 
and images of hell behind him (6 months ago) as hell falls away at his feet. 
(monthly) - “Two police officers coming to my door to arrest me” (pseudo-
hallucinations).   
 
Feels entrapped to do things by external forces but manages to prevent himself 
from doing these things. E.g. violence towards women or stabbing someone – 
this led to a psychiatric interview at Bradford Uni by female psychiatrist [1993]. 
Never acted on violent thoughts – Never hit anyone - either male or female.  
Perceptions – Visual hallucinations – seeing himself falling out of a window 
whilst tied to a chair screaming – this is now, whilst in this room having this 
interview.   
Insight: present. 
Impression: Psychotic Depression + Alcohol Dependence 
Plan: Admit + Urine drug screen + Symptomatic relief for tonight. 
05/01/1996: Contacted Psychotherapy department – has been client of 
psychotherapist since 1994 – Stopped attending Autumn 1995.  
Referred to psychiatrist R in 1993 – No mental illness present at that time. 
Thought sexual abuse had led to drinking problem. August 1994 seen by 
psychiatrist Dr W – “Depressive illness due to sexual abuse” – referred to and 
commenced psychotherapy. August 1995 – Diagnosed Bipolar Affective 
Disorder. In manic phase. G.P. prescribed haloperidol then lithium – she 
discussed case with a psychiatrist. Old notes from ’93 obtained. Chasing other 
leads.  
 
Interviewed Raymond 05/01/1996: Feeling persecuted by something / vague 
/ ‘a force’ – “I think it is my abuser, also it is more general” – “No one in 
particular at moment” Increased anxiety – ‘wound up’ “feeling like someone 
might approach me and harm me.” (no change from being in hospital from 
being out of hospital)   
370 
 
Feel it is unfair. Get resentful that I feel persecuted because I haven’t harmed 
someone. I was harmed. Things are the wrong way round. Where my abuser 
seems happy and well adjusted. Don’t know this really – haven’t seen her for 
5 years. 
Hence. If I tracked down my abuser and killed her it would be a cathartic 
experience, old testament – ‘eye for an eye’, If I shot her then that would relieve 
me of my suffering. Then I would suffer – I’m quite a moral person really.  
I feel like I’ve been thru a lot of emotional pain since I was 10 – Actually my 
symptoms didn’t start till I was about 12. The point I was getting to – I probably 
feel guilty about not shooting my abuser so I condemn myself to this suffering.  
Main problems today: 1) Anxiety 2) Feeling persecuted 3) Guilt 
Contacted psycho-therapist – story confirmed.  
Plan: haloperidol 10 mg tds, lofepramine 2 nocte Observations: To stay on 
ward.  
 
08/01/96: Interview: Feeling more relaxed in hospital environment. Had bad 
reaction (ESPE) to Haloperidol after 3 doses of 10 mg. Needed P.O. then intra-
muscular Procycladine. Now refusing further neuroleptic. Mood: Calmer 
Thoughts: “Lack of Trust between myself and myself” – “I do not Trust myself 
to do inappropriate behaviour” Insight: Present.  
Plan: Continue.  
 10/01/1996: Last well in July, probably manic – wrote a chapter of his PhD, 
working 12 hours a day – Bipolar problem. Seroxat led to high mood, then 
depressed episode again. Probably a three monthly cycle. This summer being 
“up” was problematic for first time. Believed he was Karl Marx. Mood at 
present: anxious and somewhat depressed. “persecuted and tortured” – 
especially at night. No suicidal plans. Misinterprets illusions at night. Drink and 
Drugs – admits he’s used them. 
15/01/96: “Been alright” except sat night, felt persecuted. People coming to get 
me. Strong sense of guilt. Self destructive feelings then. Feels fine today. No 
suicidal feelings. No psychotic phenomenon.  
Plan: Continue.  
17/01/96: Alcoholic binge yesterday whilst on leave. Regrets this now. Review 
meds. Plan for weekend leave to parents. Hopefully discharge week after next. 
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Mood: Bit low after alcoholic binge. Happy with Chlorpromazine / lofepramine. 
No persecutory ideas / no suicidal ideation.  
19/01/1996: Asked to see. Increase in persecutory ideas. Believes he is being 
persecuted by a sadistic woman, possibly his abuser, possibly from another 
planet via telepathy. However Raymond has partial insight and can see these 
feelings “may be symptom of some sort of mental health problem”. 
Plan: Add 25 mg of PRN Chlorpromazine.  
22/01/1996: Feeling unwell. Persecutory thoughts. “Heterosexual thoughts 
predispose me to feeling down” Conspiracy to get me. Had panic attack. Don’t 
want to eat or see other people. Chlorpromazine helps. Sleep worse. 
Plan: Increase Chlorpromazine.  
24/01/1996: Observed to have visual hallucinations today. Aggressive towards 
inanimate objects yesterday – punched a punch bag. It helped. Increase 
Clorpromazine to 300 mg + PRN 
24/01/1996: Very tense. “Feel I’m being tortured” Instigators? – Imagined. 
Mood fluctuates. Feels grip on reality varies. Doubts at time he is on Ward 
three. Felt ideas of self harm this a.m. “as a way to get out”. No more alcohol. 
Not to leave ward unescorted.  
29/01/96: Well. Wanting overnight leave. To discuss with Consultant. No 
psychotic features, no persecutory ideas, no suicidal ideation. Discharge soon.  
[was then discharged] 
 
23/02/1996:  
ADS Acute Day Hospital assessment: 
What are your main problems?: Homicidal and suicidal thoughts 
(involuntary) + feelings of persecution.  
How is this affecting you?: I get fed up and depressed. Think about suicide.  
How did it begin? I was sexually abused by an older woman for a number of 
years from the age of ten. That’s what seems to have caused my present 
difficulties.  
What do you do now that helps? Go to sleep for an hour.  
Have you had similar problems, how did you handle it? Yes, for past 10 – 
12 years. Used to drink alcoholically as a coping mechanism.  
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Do you have any health problems? I worry about having a heart attack – 
although this is unlikely as I am only 25 years old.  
What medication do you take? Lophepramine, procycladine, 
chlorpromazine. 
How do you usually cope with problems in general? As best I can. I ignore 
them until the last minute.  
At present, how do you see your future? Unavoidable.   
Patient’s presenting problems: 
Raymond complained of various problems including feelings of guilt from being 
abused as a child, alcohol abuse, suicidal ideas, paranoid thoughts, stress 
from being unable to switch off from his PhD work – we talked about other 
community resources which might be more appropriate. Brief history – has 
drank excessively since age of 13, feelings of persecution and sees “visions” 
– unsure if hallucinations or just vivid imagination. Has various emotional 
problems. A doctor once told him he was “manic depressive”. Shows a lot of 
insight into his problems. Lives alone. Has supportive parents.   
 
28/02/1996: Inpatient Hospital Progress Notes: 
Mental state: Feels guilty and restless when sees heterosexual couples. 
Angry, agitated, mood lowered, depressed.  
Goal: To enable Raymond to come to terms with his depression and to work 
through it.  
Intervention: Key worker to form therapeutic relationship with Ray, give 
medication and monitor effects, allow Raymond to ventilate thoughts and 
feelings, Advise stay on ward for first 48 hours, 10 minute checks to maintain 
safety.  
 
29/02/1996: ADS Acute Day Hospital Progress Notes 
Raymond was admitted to ward 3 yesterday. He was extremely distressed and 
presented himself to the police. Ward staff felt it was too early for me to see 
him.  
29/02/1996: Ward (Hospital) Clinical Progress Notes 
Is a little embarrassed that he has had to come back into hospital and feels a 
bit of a failure. Nursed 10 minute checks.  
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01/03/1996: Maintained 10 minute checks. Has not slept throughout the night. 
Complained of images of people every time he closed his eyes. PRN 
procycladine given.  
01/03/1996: Observed to be very agitated at 7 pm, pacing about, with 
bloodshot eyes. I spoke with Raymond who said that he is feeling very tense 
and “angry and resentful”. Raymond questioned whether he would ever get 
better. He said he would sit outside to attempt to calm down. After half an hour 
he was still agitated so duty doctor contacted, PRN 50 mg chlorpromazine 
prescribed following examination.  
07/03/1996: ADS Acute Day Hospital Progress Notes We agreed to a 
programme of pottery initially + he will talk to me if he is not coping. 
08/03/1996: Attended pottery executing excellent work. Mood and interaction 
appropriate.  
13/03/1996: Ward clinical notes: Ray discharged today. Ray to carry on as 
normal as an outpatient. 
[age:25] 
1st April 1996:  
Dear Dr S [GP] 
I reviewed Mr middleton on 22 March 1996 following his recent discharge from 
[the psychiatric hospital]. 
On the whole he has been coping relatively well although he continues to 
complain bitterly akithisia and I have therefore added procyclidine 5 mg. He is 
still attending ADS [Day hospital] with benefit and I will see him in one months 
time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr. J 
Consultant Psychiatrist 
 
18th April 1996: Dicharge summary from psychiatric hospital: 
Date of admission: 28/02/1996 
Date of Discharge: 13/03/1996 
Circumstances on admission: Raymond telephoned the ward and stated 
that he was feeling depressed and having suicidal thoughts. He had been 
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having suicidal thoughts for 5 days, they were very intense and he wanted to 
throw himself in front of a bus or take tablets. He also felt like killing somebody. 
Personal History: Well documented in previous correspondence. 
Mental State examination: Was casually dressed, not very well kempt man. Bit 
anxious and agitated, good eye contact, good rapport, speech clear and 
coherent and occasionally stressful but very cooperative. His mood was low 
and flat, thoughts preoccupied with suicide and to harm someone. Feelings of 
guilt and restlessness to see heterosexuals. His concentration and orientation 
normal, he was anhedonic and had no hallucinations, no delusions. Poor 
appetite and disturbed sleep. Suspicious of being followed and trapped. He 
had suicidal ideation but no active plan. 
 Physical examination: His physical examination was unremarkable. His 
serum bioprofile, Thyroid function and full blood count all fall within normal 
limits. 
Follow up and treatment on the ward: During his stay on the ward...his 
appetite increased and he could sleep well. His disturbed thoughts of suicide 
and agitation disappeared. He started settling, he could communicate well and 
started asking for discharge. Before discharge he was sent on trial leave. He 
had a good leave and had a tendency to remain isolated. There was no suicidal 
ideation and he was discharged on 13th March 1996.  
On discharge he was prescribed lofepramine 210 mg at night, chlorpromazine 
200 mg tds, procyclidene 5 mg tds. 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr. B 
SHO to [Consultant Psychiatrist] 
 
16/05/1996: Day hospital clinical notes: 
Main stress area: Problems due to abuse. He has used avoidance techniques 
previously but is trying to deal with these issues more positively. This causes 
a lot of anxiety which leads to negative thoughts of harming himself which he 
feels he has no control over. 
Lifestyle patterns: Abused alcohol since 13. Avoided looking at personal 
issues. He uses his studies (PhD) as a means of escape from his own thoughts 
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but this causes problems as he puts a lot of pressure on himself and 
expectations.  
What can they do to help themselves?  Raymond has a lot of insight into his 
problems. He has started realising his negative thoughts only last a short time 
and is using diversion coping strategies. He acknowledges that he spends too 
long studying on his PhD but finds it difficult to do activities for “fun”. But is 
attending ADS [day hospital] regularly to develop these skills. 
 
14th June 1996: Letter from consultant psychiatrist to GP: 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Raymond, as previously discussed, on 13th June 1996. 
He was adamant that he now felt considerably better and was merely going 
through a difficult phase when he saw you. He denied any psychotic symptoms 
and seemed relatively settled. I have explained to him that the situation does 
need monitoring and it is important that he does approach staff, for example 
when he attends ADS [day hospital]. For the time being I have not altered his 
dose of chlorpromazine. ADS have kindly agreed to review his programme and 
this may be a way of providing additional support.  
I have provided him with some Uvistock Ultra-block cream as his 
photosensitivity (Chlorpromazine induced) was rather obvious today. 
I will see him again in one months time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Dr J 
Consultant psychiatrist  
 
[age:26] 
13 / 02 /1997: Referral to Social Services Day-care: 
Diagnosis: Manic Depression. 
Reasons for referral: Day-care would reduce isolation and boredom as he 
has nothing to keep him occupied during the day. It would create new interests 
and enable him to make new friends and reduce anxiety.  
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26 / 02 /1997: Student Social worker assessment 
 
Social History: Although he enjoyed University and studying he feels that 
returning to this may be too stressful. He would eventually like to return to 
some form of employment, but not sure what.  
He enjoys the theatre, opera, talking to people, handicrafts, etc. He used to 
enjoy reading, mainly for academia, but finds if he tries this it brings on anxiety 
which he relates to the stress of university life. Ray feels that to combat 
boredom he would like to make new friends, learn new skills, ie, painting, 
drawing, art.   
Care Provided: Ray feels his family have coped and still cope very well with 
his problems, however they find it stressful when he is in hospital. He does not 
feel that they pressurise him, but occasionally through good intentions, i.e. by 
suggesting employment they cause him some stress. .  
Summary of Needs: Ray needs day care. To relieve boredom, isolation, make 
new friends and find new interests. Ray would like to build up his self-
confidence and decrease his isolation in a safe and supportive atmosphere, 
with an awareness of his difficulties forming relationships with women. In the 
future he feels he may like to undertake some voluntary work.  
Psychiatric History and present condition:  When unwell felt persecuted 
that everyone was after him, and depressed. Had two admissions to hospital 
after overdoses and suicidal ideas. Previous to this attending counselling at 
Relate and University of Bradford and Alcoholics Anonymous. Problems 
stemmed from sexual abuse by older woman. He feels very well at the moment 
with occasional bouts of anxiety which he feels when he is under stress.  
Medication:  
Chlorpromazine 200 mg  
Procycladine 5 mg 
Lofepramine 210 mg 
Self medicates. 
Personal Capacities: Can cope very well at home, cooking, cleaning. If anxious 
finds it hard to motivate himself. Ray’s dress and appearance was smart and 
tidy. 
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Personality and relationships: Seems chatty, but states when anxious finds 
it difficult to form relationships. Spends most of time with family and has 1 or 2 
close friends. Has some difficulty forming relationships with women due to the 
abuse.  
Education and employment record: 1st class degree in sociology and social 
psychology and commenced PhD. (1995) but dropped out when he became 
unwell. Voluntary work at OXFAM which led to employment but gave it up 
when ill. Presently attending Cellar [mental health] project on Fridays for 
woodwork. 
- Student Social Worker 
9th January 1998: : Letter from psychiatrist to GP: 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Mr Middleton on 30th Decemeber 1997 on behalf of Dr. J. Due to 
various appointments being cancelled he has not been reviewed for one year 
and in this time he informs me he has reduced the dose of chlorpromazine 
down to 100 mg.three times daily and has stopped the lofepramine. He did this 
about 6 months ago and feels quite well though still prone to violent thoughts 
or thoughts of self harm particularly when in stressful situations with strangers. 
However he has never been violent. 
He has taken to smoking cannabis, roughly 2 mg a day last month and it seems 
in part this is recreational but also to deal with “moods” which he feels it helps. 
In terms of medication the only side effects he is sure of is weight gain although 
wonders if apathy may also be induced by chlorpromazine. I advised that both 
are possible although the latter may also be induced by cannabis use. 
He has agreed to continue with his current medication. I have advised him to 
try reducing the cannabis use and if this does not cause a worsening of his 
mental state it may be possible to consider reducing the chlorpromazine further 
when I review him in 3 months time. 
Your sincerely Dr H, consultant psychiatrist 
 
[age:27] 
3rd March 1998: Clinical progress notes: 
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Suffering from depression for years. Reports has not painted for 2 -3 days 
(usually enjoys this). Last night he was thinking about killing himself (hanging 
or jumping from a bridge). No current plans as he thinks committing suicide is 
morally wrong.  
 
13th March 1998: Letter from psychiatrist to GP: 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Mr Middleton on 10th March. He remains somewhat low in mood 
with marked obsession thoughts about violence and self destruction. He finds 
these obtrusive, recurrent and tries to resist them. He has no plans to harm 
himself deliberately and can distract himself when he has the suicidal ideas. 
His mood is rather low he feels flat and tired. His concentration is poor and he 
has some sleep disturbance. I discussed the relative merits of changing 
Raymond from Lofepramine to Cloripramine which may well be more useful 
for obsessional type thoughts. 
His medication at present is therefore Chlorpromazine, 200 mg three times a 
day, 
Procycladine 5 mg and Clomipramine 150 mg prn nocte. 
He has an appointment to be reviewed in 2 weeks time.  
Yours sincerely  
Dr  W 
Registrar to [Consultant psychiatrist] 
 
31st March 1998: Letter from psychiatrist to GP: 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Mr Middleton on 26th March.  
He was much less paranoid and irritable and he no longer had as many 
intrusive and obsessional thoughts of harm to others. Advised to start reducing 
chlorpromazine down from 200 mg tds and 200 mg nocte to 100 mg bd and 
200 mg nocte. 
I will review him in 2 to 3 weeks but in the meantime Mr Middleton will try to 
make contact with [the day centre] in order to establish some daytime activities 
for himself. 
Yours sincerely  
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Dr  W 
Registrar to [Consultant psychiatrist] 
 
8th April 1998: Clinical Notes: 
Admitted today informally. He is 27 yo. Received care and treatment here 2 
years ago and also outpatient treatment for various “psychiatric” problems, i.e. 
depression, suicidal ideation, self harm, temptations to harm others, all these 
feelings date back to when he was 10 years old. He is unemployed and single. 
Also, had history of drug and alcohol abuse and received supportive input from 
AA. On admission very tense and agitated, expressed feelings of controlled 
anger and seeking reassurance for his present condition. This evening 
Raymond was saying he felt the need to harm someone. Given one to one 
conversation and reassurance and settled. Appears to have settled well onto 
the ward.  
9th April 1998: Clinical Notes: 
Ray spent the morning socialising with other patients. Approached staff and 
described intense thoughts, which he has been suffering from for many years. 
He describes suicidal ideation and plans to hang himself. He stated he also 
had thoughts to harm others, to stab someone. He claims that he would never 
act upon them. He states that because of the intense nature of his cognitions 
he becomes depressed due to the constant battle he has with himself to control 
them. He states that if he could rid himself of the compulsions he would not 
feel depressed. Offered appropriate support and reassurance which appeared 
to alleviate some of his anxiety.  
 
9th April 1998: Clinical Notes: 
Spent the morning socialising with other patients. No observed signs of 
depression. Pleasant and settled in mood. Socialising well with both staff and 
patients. No concerns expressed.  
15th April 1998: Risk Assessment: 
Total risk of suicide: 5 out of 32 
Total risk of violence: 1 out of 17 
Total risk of neglect: 2 out of 16 
Total risk of care in the community: 4 out of 11 
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20th May 1998: Letter from psychiatrist to GP: 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Mr Middleton [in outpatients] on 19th May 1998 following discharge 
from hospital. I saw him with his mother with whom he is temporarily staying. 
He continues to have violent thoughts and according to his mother he had 
been “high” the first week after discharge from hospital but since then the ideas 
of harming other has returned. They both saw this very much in terms of mental 
illness – his mother mentioned a previous diagnosis of Bi-polar disorder, but 
on reviewing his notes it would seem he has had disturbances with loss of self-
confidence and obsessive thoughts from a very early age and it is more likely 
to be personality problems. Frankly I am not sure he would fall into a diagnosis 
of bi-polar disorder and I did not contradict this opinion at the time.  
He asked if his medication could be changed and I agreed to do this though 
advised this would be viewed as a symptomatic measure. I therefore 
substituted Thiorizadine 50 mg to 100 mg three times a day for 
Chlorpromazine. 
Yours sincerely 
Dr H (Consultant psychiatrist) 
 
 Psychiatric Hospital inpatient Discharge Summary, Dated 21st May 1998 
 
Admission Date: 8th April 1998 
Discharge Date: 20th April 1998 
  
Diagnosis: Obsessive Compulsive Disorder with secondary depression and 
anxiety, also Long-term Personality Disorder. 
 
Circumstances on Admission: Raymond was admitted to [the psychiatric 
hospital] complaining of decreased depressed mood and also increase of 
obsessive thoughts of harming other people which have become more intense 
and frequent in recent times. He has also had some ideas of self harm – 
wanting to shoot himself.  
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Past History: his has been well documented in previous correspondence. 
There is evidence suggestive of long term difficulties socialising and 
aggressive thoughts particularly towards women. He also has a past history of 
Alcohol Dependence Syndrome and drug misuse particularly in his teens. 
These problems may have been related to his recollections of being sexually 
abused by an older female. 
Social Circumstances: He lives alone in his own house and is on income 
support. 
Progress on the ward: On admission he was tense and agitated, expressing 
feelings of anger. He became more settled but it was not clear if it was related 
to a small increase in Clomipramine. 
Review: He felt that his thoughts had become less severe and felt well enough 
for discharge though was still prone to violent thoughts and thoughts of self 
harm but he recognised that these thoughts were longstanding. 
Discharge Medication:  
Clomipramine 200 mg nocte. 
Chlorpromazine 200 mg. tds. 
Procycladine 5 mg. tds 
Discharge Plan: He was discharged on minimal CPA with outpatient follow 
up. On 19th May he requested a replacement for Chlorpromazine to see if 
anything else would be more effective. He has been given Thioridazine in place 
of this.  
He has now moved to stay with his mother, at least on a temporary basis.  
Your sincerely, 
Dr H 
Consultant Psychiatrist 
 
26th August 1998 (Letter dated) to GP from Locum Consultant 
Psychiatrist 
 
Dear Dr S, 
 Clinic: 19th June 1998 
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Dr. H reported to you on 20th May. I noted the discharge summary of 21st May 
proposed a diagnostic formulation of “obsessive compulsive disorder 
secondary depression and anxiety...” 
Clinical review: Raymond was most positive as he was feeling “a lot better...a 
lot more focussed.” My objective impression was that he was certainly very 
well. 
I note that he took his first class Social Psychology Degree at Bradford 
University in 1995. He is now planning to take up suitable part time work and 
engage in part time work at Bradford University as a Research Assistant – 
almost commendable. 
Current Medication:  
Clomipramine 150 mg at night (for 3 months) and he wants to come off this 
now 
Thiorizadine 100 mg X 3 times 
Procycladine 5 mg X 3 times 
Overall Conclusions:  
My overall conclusion is that Raymond is clearly very stable at the present 
time.  
Further Management:  
1. [outlined planned reduction in Clomipramine] The Thioridazine could be 
tackled at his next clinic session. 
2. He was due to return to clinic in 4 months time. 
With all good wishes, 
Dr R, 
Locum consultant Psychiatrist 
*We apologise for the delay with this letter. 
 
25th September 1998: Letter from psychiatrist to GP: 
 
Dr Dr S, 
Diagnosis: Recurent Depressive Disorder 
Medication: 
Clomipramine: 150 mg nocte 
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Thioridazine? Dose ? mg tds 
Procycladine 5 mg tds 
Clinical review:  
I reviewed this man in out-patient clinic. Mr Middleton reports that he felt quite 
well at present, bright in his mood, sleeping and eating well with no violent 
thoughts. He hopes to return to work but I have pointed out that this can lead 
to stress and possible risk of relapse, but that on the whole it is a good idea. I 
understand that he had a recent admission this year with depression.  
I spent some time discussing the roles of a mood stabilizer, as I understand 
the consultant who had assessed him in clinic had suggested the possibility of 
this. Although I can’t find any evidence of him having any manic swings he 
certainly has had recurrent depressive episodes,, and LITHIUM has a role both 
in treatment of resistance to pressure and also in prophylaxis of depression. 
However at this stage because he is feeling well I advised that this be kept in 
reserve should he relapse and it be considered then. 
I have advised for him to continue on the current regime, but would advise that 
the THIORIDAZINE be reduced as he is on quite a high dose. There were no 
suicidal ideas today and I have arranged for him to be reviewed in 6 weeks 
time. 
Your sincerely, 
Dr. H 
Consultant Psychiatrist 
 
9th November 1998:  
Assessment of Self Poisoning  
Type: Overdose 
Precipitants: Stress due to a few things such as financial and employment 
factors. Took overdose, then got in a Taxi to A&E at BRI.  
Salient features: Previous overdoses, Has been to [psychiatric hospital] three 
times. Lives on own and tends to drink a lot.  
Mental State examination: No psychotic features, low in mood but not 
suicidal.  
Diagnosis: He thinks the overdose was an impulsive and stupid thing to do 
and does not think he will do it again. Ray said he would try to stop drinking.  
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Management plan: For discharge once medically fit. 
  
3rd December 1998: Clinical notes: 
Took 16 Thorizadine tablets. Had a bad day. Took pills and alcohol. Teetotal 
now. Quite well now. “Fine”. Will review end of Feb. – Consultant psychiatrist.  
 
11th December 1998: Letter from psychiatrist to GP: 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Mr Middleton somewhat earlier than planned after he took a small 
overdose of THIORIDAZINE tablets. I reviewed him on 3rd December at which 
time he was feeling much better and was euthymic.  
He told me that the overdoses had been an impulsive act after he had been 
drinking heavily.  
As he now seems back to his usual self I have not altered his medication and 
will see him again at the end of February. 
Your sincerely, 
Dr. J 
Consultant Psychiatrist   
 
17th December 1999: Clinical progress notes: 
Presenting complaint: “Terrible feelings inside. I feel like I’m being tortured. 
Visual images of being tortured. I’m getting violent thoughts towards 
strangers.” 
Involved with services since 1993. Various different diagnoses: “Persoanlity 
Disorder”, “Recurrent depression.” Psychotic depression.” Past history of 
sexual abuse by older female. Past history of alcohol and drug abuse. Lives in 
own home alone. On benefits. – Duty Doctor on Reception at psychiatric 
hospital.  
 
24th December 1998: Clinical progress notes: 
Is very depressed, suicidal, very low in low self-esteem. Admitted informally 
due to depression and suicidal thoughts. He is single and unemployed and 
received treatment and care on this ward about 6 months ago. Reiterated that 
he used to drink a lot (10 pints a night) but has not drank at all for over two 
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months. He has a past history of overdose, on admission although he was very 
depressed and anxious there was no feeling of suicidal ideation due to being 
on the ward. Soon settled on the ward and pleasant in his approach.  
Goal: To be free from depression, achieve moderate self esteem, to lead 
positive life free from suicidal ideation.  
 
Psychiatric Hospital inpatient Discharge Summary, Dated 3rd February 
1999 
 
Date of admission: 24/12/1998 
Date of discharge: 20/01/1999 
Diagnosis: Recurrent Depressive Disorder 
Presenting Complaint: He was feeling low. He had a feeling that he wanted 
to harm others. 
History of Presenting Complaint: Over the last few weeks he has had violent 
thoughts about hitting others. For the last few months he has been doing 
voluntary work in a cafe but it has closed over Christmas and he has no work 
to do and his routine has been disrupted. There were thoughts of self-harm. 
Suicidal ideation was also present. His sleep and appetite were normal.  
Past Psychiatric History: He has been known to psychiatric services for the 
past six years. He was last admitted to the psychiatric hospital on the 8th 
October 1998 and discharged on 20th October 1998. At that time his Diagnosis 
was: Obsessive Compulsive Disorder with depression and anxiety with long 
term personality disorder.  
Mental state examination at time of admission: 
Appearance and behaviour: He was normally dressed. Anxious. Good eye 
contact. Speech – pressure of speech. Mood: subjectively depressed, 
objectively low. Concentration poor. Thoughts – no thought disorder. 
Perception – no auditory or visual hallucinations. Delusions – No delusions. 
Insight present.  
Progress on the ward:  
In the beginning he was quite low in mood, and had feelings of agitation. No 
suicidal ideation. Within a few days he settled on the ward, he was pleasant 
and interacting with staff and other patients. Within a week he had improved 
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and settled in his mood. He keeps to himself and interacts moderately with 
others, but prefers it that way. He was reviewed on 4th January 1999, his 
depression had lifted, no suicidal ideation. He sleeps a lot with 
CHLORPROMAZINE. He complained that he visualised images that were 
“terrible”. Images like having his foot amputated. 
He is seeing a psychotherapist on a regular basis. An outpatient appointment 
with his consultant psychiatrist has been arranged for one weeks time. 
Psychiatric social worker will continue to see him at his home.  
Yours sincerely, 
Dr K 
SHO to [consultant psychiatrist]  
 
12th March 1999: Clinical notes: 
Has made a number of changes in life (not least cutting his hair!) says he feels 
less fragmented and more whole. Still using prayer as main coping strategy 
when he gets the thoughts... – Clinical psychologist.  
 
12th April 1999:  
Letter from my Clinical Psychologist to my Consultant Psychiatrist: 
Dear Dr J, 
You referred Raymond to me in January 1999 following his admission to [the 
psychiatric hospital]. A psychological assessment was made to see whether a 
cogitative behavioural approach might be helpful in the management of Mr. 
Middleton’s obsessive compulsive ruminations. I met with him... [five times 
between 11th January and 12th March 1999]. 
As already documented, Mr. Middleton reports having obsessive thoughts for 
the last 12 years. Mr. Middleton’s own view linked these thoughts to an early 
history of sexual and emotional abuse by an older woman when he was aged 
11. The abuse last seven years. Mr. Middleton had been referred to a 
psychotherapy assessment in June 1993 after his first contact with Bradford 
Mental Health Services, but I can find no record of the outcome of this referral.  
Mr Middleton’s insight into links with ealy abuse and subsequent self 
destructive behaviour did not seem to provide a buffer against subsequent 
depressive episodes and admissions to [the psychiatric hospital]. Mr Middleton 
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knew at the rational level that he would not act on the thoughts, but the mere 
fact that he had these thoughts made him question his sanity, e.g. “what 
normal person goes around thinking these things?” Mr Middleton also 
questioned his self worth e.g. “I must be a bad person for having these 
thoughts”. When he performed useful or kind actions he found himself 
questioning them along the lines of “this is not the real me”. The real me, I have 
to cover up.” It seemed that the latter thoughts were linked to Mr Middleton’s 
religious background and current Christian beliefs about good and evil. For 
example, one of Mr Middleton’s coping methods was to pray and have others 
pray for him. Mr Middleton and I discussed how he could challenge thoughts 
of good and evil at the rational level and how this approach would not 
necessarily contradict his beliefs that a “purging” of these thoughts could really 
only be accomplished by prayer and God.   
Over the course of four meetings we were able to look at situations where the 
obsessive ruminations were most likely to occur, e.g. on his way to Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings where he was most likely to experience a sense of 
isolation and frustration at not being “normal” i.e. having to go to A.A. when 
other men his age were engaged in relationships and out enjoying themselves. 
It seemed that the added dimension of frustration and bitterness would lead to 
increased physiological arousal levels and hence a lowered ability to control 
these thoughts.  Other situations which led to an increase in the thoughts were 
those where Mr Middleton felt unable to be assertive in as much as he 
associated and standing up for himself and being assertive with being 
unworthy and bad. This was particularly apparent in his voluntary work where 
he felt he had to give a total commitment at some cost to himself and his own 
personal and social spheres. The situational evaluation and restructuring 
enabled Mr Middleton to cut down on his considerable commitment to the 
voluntary project and he began to engage in other and more varied pleasurable 
activities.  
The above gains were small. It was apparent over the weeks of our meetings 
that Mr Middleton felt himself to be much improved in terms of the lifting of his 
depression noted by you at time of discharge on 20th January 1999. He told 
me he was much less plagued by the ruminations. He was finding considerable 
support from his church colleagues and told me he felt as if he had been 
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healed.  Mr Middleton told me that he was able to rebuke any violent thoughts 
(which he saw as originating with the devil) by Christian thoughts. I found these 
coping techniques entirely in keeping with Mr Middleton’s Christian beliefs, and 
while my own preference would have been for Mr Middleton to tolerate the 
thoughts as his own and challenge them on that level, I conceded that Mr 
Middleton’s own methods were proving more than effective at the present time.  
Mr Middleton and I agreed that he would monitor his progress over the 
forthcoming months and that he could contact me again should he wish to do 
so. Mr Middleton remains in contact with [his psychiatric social worker] and 
finds these meetings helpful. I have closed the case at present.  
Your Sincerly 
Clinical Psycholgist 
c.c. G.P., Psychiatric Social Worker 
 
11th May 1999: Letter from my psychiatrist to my G.P.: 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Raymond at Eccleshill Resourse Centre on 4th May. He remains 
euthymic and stable but complained of photosensitivity on Chlorpromazine and 
I have therefore reduced the dose to 50 m.g. at night. He remains on his usual 
Paroxetine i.e. 50 mg daily, and will be seen again in 3 months, 
Your sincerely, 
Dr. J. 
Consultant Psychiatrist 
12th August 1999: letter to GP from consultant psychiatrist 
Dear Dr S, 
I reviewed Mr Middleton on 5th August. He remains extremely well and has 
now stopped CHLORPROMAZINE. He continues on PAROXATINE, 50 mg 
daily. 
I have discharged him back to your care. 
Your sincerely, 
Dr J 
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17th December 1999: Letter from psychiatrist to GP 
Dear Dr S, 
Raymond was reviewed on 16th December. [He had been to Paris] and found 
the experience quite unsettling. His mood has been troubled by a number of 
very distressing thoughts and images. For example, he told me that he felt that 
his mind was in the middle of a hurricane, and that he also had distressing 
visual images of him being tortured. . Associated with this was an 
overwhelming sense of fear and depression. He also told me that he had the 
experience of sentence “they are after you” addressing him, which he found 
very disturbing. This was not a hallucination.  
Raymond was able to talk with a considerable amount of self awareness and 
understanding of his experiences and asked if it were possible for his 
medication to be reviewed. We spent some time discussing this and agreed 
[plan to stop chlorpromazine and start olanzapine, 5 mg]. 
Best Wishes, 
Dr. T 
21st December 1999: Letter from psychiatrist to GP 
Dear Dr. S, 
I reviewed this young gentleman in my capacity as duty doctor on 17th 
December and again on 20th December. He presented to me with a 
deterioration in his mood and in particular violent thoughts towards strangers, 
the feeling that he might drink alcohol and take an overdose, and unbearable 
feeling of inner tension. As you may know Raymond has quite a long history 
of involvement with psychiatric services and looking at the old notes this did 
seem typical of the kind of disturbances he experiences when his mood 
deteriorates. He put this deterioration down to a trip to Paris he had been on a 
few days before which had unsettled him. I was reassured to hear that he was 
battling with these ideas and had no intent as such to kill or harm himself. I 
think he came wanting support to help tied him over a rather difficult patch. He 
assured me that he had good support from his friends in the church and also 
from his parents and I got the impression that he would seek help if things got 
very bad.  
I found him to be a pleasant man with good rapport, not agitated but with a 
worried troubled appearance. His speech was coherent and relevant but 
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somewhat monotonous in tome. I found his mood to be rather un-reactive and 
moderately lowered. His thoughts were as described above and while he was 
not suicidal as such he was quiet about what he might do if things got worse. 
He was not experiencing hallucinations as such, but certainly was 
experiencing words appearing in his mind suggesting that he might kill himself.  
Raymond and I agreed it was a good idea to change over to olanzapine but 
not at a time of turmoil. I therefore suggested that he went back to 
Chlorpromazine and increased the dose. 
I advised him to seek help via the duty doctor at [the psychiatric hospital] to 
request involvement from the Home Treatment team.  
Your sincerely, 
Dr C SHO to [consultant Psychiatrist] 
 
29th December 1999: Clinical progress notes 
Has thoughts to “Destroy” himself but no plans and does not appear suicidal.  
30th December 1999: Raymond phoned, explained he was feeling great, had 
stayed with a friend from church, had been discussing things with vicar, had 
good night’s sleep, not wanting visit. 
31st December 1999: Visited this pm, He seems to be doing well, though 
problems sleeping and he said he took six tablets instead of three. CPN visiting 
with me explained this would not help and would be better to try different ways 
to relax when going to bed. Raymond took this on board and said he would try.  
11th January 2000: Letter from Home Based Treatment psychiatrist to my 
G.P.: 
Dear Dr. S, 
Re: Home Based Treatment service delivered from 29/12/1999 to 06/01/2000. 
Diagnosis: Crisis admission F43 
Medication: I cannot see that this is recorded in his notes but I am led to 
believe from his keyworker that this remains unchanged and is supplied by his 
general practitioner. 
History of presenting complaint: Sadly I have not met Mr. Middleton myself 
as I have been away on leave for the entirety of his admission to the Home 
Treatment. His notes report that his main symptoms include feeling low in 
mood, having self destructive thoughts and the idea that he was being 
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poisoned. He appears to rapidly improve when given the opportunity to talk 
through these thoughts and ideas. 
He will be followed up as an outpatient. 
Your sincerely, 
Dr. K 
 21st January 2000:  
Dear Dr S, 
Ray was reviewed on 20 January 2000. He had a brief spell on Home 
Treatment shortly after Christmas because he was saying he could no longer 
cope with the distress. I am not sure whether my attempts to change his 
medication from chlorpromazine to olanzapine contributed to this but he went 
back onto the Chlorpromazine after a couple of days because things were 
getting out of control.  
Today he told me he was feeling a little better, but was still finding it difficult to 
keep in control of his feelings. He told me that his mood was up and down a 
great deal, and he went on to describe what he called “depression” in which 
he had a feeling of heaviness in his head, a feeling of hopelessness and that 
the future was bleak, on the other hand he described what he called a feeling 
of “destiny” when he had an increased self-confidence, felt that things would 
turn out well, and that he would also write a novel that would win the booker 
prize. On occasion when he has felt this way he has spent without regard to 
his budget, for example buying an art book for £30 when he had only £30 to 
last him for food for the week. He raised the question spontaneously with me 
whether he had a mood disorder, and also asked me whether I thought a mood 
stabilizing agent might help?. 
I told him that I have an open mind about this, but before I would consider 
making any further changes to his medication it would be helpful if he could 
keep a diary of his mood on a daily basis, and I am also planning to get hold 
of his old notes to have a closer look through them to see what has happened 
in the past. I am seeing him again in four weeks to review progress.   
Best wishes, 
Dr T 
Consultant psychiatrist 
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27th January 2000: Assessment / Ward Observations / Progress Notes 
Referred by GP, Feeling low since last week, drinking heavily, 2 bottles of wine 
per day. This afternoon drank 2 bottles then cut wrists with knife. The cuts are 
superficial – not deep. Enjoys painting. Well known to psychiatric services. 6 
previous admissions. Casually dressed, but well kempt, smelling of alcohol, 
smoky. No auditory or visual hallucinations. History of deliberate self harm.  
Plan: spoke to CPN: He will assess tomorrow, tonight – go stay at his mothers, 
stop alcohol, refer to HBT. 
 
30th January 2000: Assessment / Ward Observations / Progress Notes 
No [thought disorder] but describes fleeting illusions whilst in bed of someone 
chopping his foot off. Informally admitted to ward. Currently complaining of 
lowered mood, anxiety and thoughts of taking an overdose, has made 
superficial scratches to his arms. Abused by older woman aged 10 – 18? 
Several previous admissions to [psychiatric hospital] following overdoses and 
also experienced alcohol related problems but states he has not drunk for 3 
days and receives support from A.A. Recently been drinking 3 to 4 bottles of 
wine a day - but had been abstinent for a year prior to this. Smokes 20 
cigarettes a day. No illegal drugs for one year, used to abuse amphetamines 
and cannabis. Drank heavily 14 to 19 then rehab. Off alcohol 19 – 24. On/off 
anti-depressants. Psychotherapy for 2 years. On/off alcohol last few years. 
Seven psychiatric hospital admissions in last four years.  Says his occasional 
“lapses” with alcohol helps with symptoms for 1 hour but then feels worse. 
Shadowy  figures hover over his bed at night “torturing” him, feels pain over 
entire body. Thought of killing his abuser last year, but realised he was not well 
and just went home. Thoughts come into his mind “Destroy yourself Raymond” 
Not his – thought insertion? No thought broadcasting. Thought of taking 
overdoses to escape the pain he feels – not to kill himself. Feels badly served 
by system “because I don’t believe in hurting anyone else and I cooperate and 
I can give a good account of myself so people think I can cope but my coping 
mechanisms are not working.” Cognition insight – excellent. Chronic problems 
related to mood and perceptual disturbances, urges to self harm. Lives alone 
in flat, isolates himself, unemployed, angry about abuse, has supportive family. 
Identified need to structure life. Increase in distress and planning to take tablets 
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(OD) to escape this distress. Tension, anger, pressure in head, anxiety ++, 
sweating, shaking, perceptual disturbances, sleep poor – awake till 4-5 a.m. 
trying to distract self by reading but not working. Self harm – superficial 
scratches at 1 am last night.  
 
31st January 2000: Urine drug sample taken and placed in fridge.  
1st February 2000: Raymond has spent the morning in social areas laughing 
and friendly with fellow clients. Appropriate in mood and behaviour.  
3rd February 2000: Raymond stated he was feeling immense anger, which he 
felt was due to past abuse history. Raymond stated he sometimes finds it 
difficult to cope with feelings of anger and in the past has turned these feelings 
inward in the form of self destruction, e.g. drug and alcohol misuse. Discussed 
using relaxation techniques which Raymond agreed to implement and 
participate in relaxation groups on the ward and discussed Raymond attending 
self-help group for people who had been abused. Raymond stated he felt more 
calm at termination of interview.  
18th Feb 2000:  
Dear Dr. S, 
Just a quick note to let you know Raymond was recently an inpatient with us 
in Lynfield Mount Hospital. He came to see me [in outpatients clinic] on 18th 
February 2000. He is doing well but continues to have episodes of low mood. 
In spite of this he is quite optimistic about the future and present. He is currently 
seeking employment and staying at home with his family. He is sleeping well 
and his appetite is normal. He has no suicidal ideation or intent. While he was 
an inpatient with us we discussed his medication and we agreed that we would 
work towards a period without any psychotropic drugs. [plan of medication 
reduction outlined]. I have arranged to see him again in four weeks, 
Your sincerely, 
Dr. P 
 
Psychiatric Social Worker’s “Closing Summary”, dated 21/09/1999: 
Raymond seen on 12th July 1999 – appeared to be very well. Due to be seen 
in clinic early August. 
Seen by Dr. J on 12th August 1999 – discharged back to G.P. 
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[G.P.] had seen Raymond on 9th September 1999 when he had reported an 
episode of persecutory ideation. Also hostile feelings towards the person who 
abused him as a child have re-emerged – he had thoughts of trying to kill her 
and had taken the train to where she lives. These thoughts had quickly 
subsided and have not re-appeared.  
He has not actually planned how he would kill her but had considered what 
prison sentence he might receive for the crime. 
He had stopped his chlorpromazine and was restarted on this by his G.P. 
I rang Raymond on receipt of this letter [letter from G.P.to psychiatrist – copy 
not received by me] as it was not possible for me to see him immediately in 
clinic. 
Raymond told me that he was not feeling better and was due to be seen in 
clinic next week. Arranged to visit 21st September 1999. 
21st September 1999 – visited – Raymond appeared to be well and settled. 
Attributes recent episode to combination of stress – he had been looking for 
agency work and reducing his chlorpromazine.  
He is due to see his G.P. this week and his psychiatrist next week. 
I do not plan to see him again unless requested to do so by [his psychiatrist.] 
- Psychiatric Social worker 
Psychiatric Social Worker’s note, dated 23/12/1999: 
- Raymond Contacted the Home Based Treatment Team on 17th Dec 1999 
- He had seen Dr. T [psychiatrist] the previous day and felt his coping 
mechanisms were “slipping away” 
- Hearing a voice telling him to “kill yourself Raymond”. Also experiencing 
violent thoughts – towards strangers. 
- T. Arranged for Raymond to be assessed by Dr. C at [the psychiatric 
Hospital] 
- The outcome of that assessment was that Home Based Treatment were 
to be involved and he was to be started on Olanzapine, 
- He will require a new keyworker, ideally a CPN, initially to monitor 
compliance with medication. This case to be reallocated with City Mental 
Health Team [CMHT] 
- Psychiatric Social worker 
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3rd April 2000: Letter from Consultant Psychiatrist to G.P. 
Dear Dr. S., 
I saw Raymond on 21st March 2000. He remains quite well. ...We had a long 
discussion about future plans and Raymond asked to be discharged from 
psychiatric services. I agreed to this...However we have agreed that he would 
get back in touch if his mental health deteriorates. Thus I have discharged him 
from our care today. As noted above he is not on any prescribed medication 
from us. 
With best wishes, 
Dr. B              (Consultant Psychiatrist) 
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Appendix IV: Ethics Checklist 
 
    
 
APPLICANT’S ETHICS CHECKLIST 
 
This checklist is designed to help you to decide whether or not ethics approval is required and, if 
required, to decide on the appropriate ethics review procedure –  
please read guidance on page 5 before you complete the form 
 
Who should use the checklist?      
A checklist should be completed for all empirical research projects involving people, by the 
Principal Investigator [PI] or the Principal Supervisor [PS] in the case of a supervised 
student research project.  
 
Guidance on the 2 different ethics review procedures that together make up the University’s 
Ethics Review System (i.e. ‘University’ and ‘NHS’) is available on the University Ethics 
website 
 
If the project involves human tissue/biological fluids you should contact the University human 
tissue bank for advice in the first instance.  Contact Ethical Tissue on 01274 235897 or 
visit www.ethicaltissue.org  
______________________________________________________________________
_ 
Project Title:……………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Name of Principal Investigator / Principal Supervisor:  
 
Contact Details – email address ………………………………………………………… 
 
Department/School ……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Name of Student (if applicable):.……………………………………… 
 
Contact Details – email address ……………………………………………………… 
 
Summary of Project (max 150 words): 
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Q1 Is the proposed project an empirical research project involving people?    
 will the project include primary data collection from human subjects, their data 
or their tissue?   
 Will it constitute an ‘investigation undertaken in order to gain knowledge and 
understanding’?  
(this includes work of educational value designed to improve understanding of 
the research process)   
A more detailed definition of Research, Audit and Service Evaluation is available on 
the University Ethics website.   
 
If you answer ‘Yes’ to Q1 ethical approval may be required, move to Q2. 
If you answer ‘No’ to Q1 then a research ethics review is not required. 
 
Note:  there may be occasions where a project is not defined as research but still 
raises ethical issues – please submit for review in these cases. 
 
YES/NO 
   
 
Q2 
 
Will the research project involve the NHS?   
See See guidelines on the University Ethics website 
If you answer ‘No’ to Q2 move on to Q3 
If you answer ‘Yes’ to Q2 ethical approval will be required by NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (REC) 
Contact Ethical Tissue on 01274 235897 or visit www.ethicaltissue.org  
 
 
YES/NO 
   
 
Q3 
 
Will the research project involve any of the following in the UK: 
 Testing a medicinal product  
 Investigating a medical device 
 Taking samples of human biological material (e.g. blood, tissue) 
 Prisoners or others in custodial care (e.g. young offenders) as participants 
 Adults with mental incapacity as participants 
 Other vulnerable groups (e.g. vulnerable children) as participants 
 
If you answer ‘Yes’ to Q3 ethical approval will usually be required by Ethical Tissue 
or NHS Research Ethics Committee (REC) or where the project includes participants 
which need approval under the Mental Capacity Act approval will be required by the 
Social Care REC.  
 
See information specific to research in Social Care on the University Ethics website 
 
If you answer ‘No’ to Q3 move on to Q4 
 
 
YES/NO 
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PLEASE COMPLETE and SIGN ONE of the boxes below: 
 
1. I have discussed this project with my student and confirm that there are no ethical 
issues requiring further consideration. 
(Any subsequent changes to the nature of the project will require a review of the ethical 
considerations) 
 
Name (Principal Investigator/Principal Supervisor): 
Signature:      Date: 
 
Name (Student): 
Signature:      Date: 
 
I confirm that there are ethical issues requiring further consideration and will refer the 
proposal either to Ethical Tissue or fill in and submit a full ethics application to be 
considered by the appropriate Research Ethics Panel.. 
Name (Principal Investigator/Principal Supervisor): 
Signature:      Date: 
 
 
Q4 
 
Will the research project involve human participants and/or human data (but not accessed 
through the NHS)? 
 
If you answer ‘Yes’ to Q4 University ethical approval is required unless 
data/participation is uncontentious (see guidance overleaf) 
If you answer ‘No’ to Q4 move on to Q5 
 
Please give brief explanation below of type of data/participation in cases which you 
consider to be uncontentious (see guidance on page 5): 
 
 
YES/NO 
 
   
 
Q5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Will the research project involve human tissue (but not requiring NHS approval – see Q3)? 
 
If you answer ‘Yes’ to Q5 University ethical approval is required 
 
If you require advice on human biological material please contact Human Tissue Act 
(HTA) Designated Individual: Professor Diana Anderson on ext 3569 or email: 
d.anderson1@bradford.ac.uk) 
Contact Ethical Tissue on 01274 235897 or visit www.ethicaltissue.org 
 
If you answered ‘Yes’ to Q5, is the human material over 100 years old and 
archaeological? 
 
If ‘YES’ please refer to the Biological Anthropology Research Centre (BARC) 
guidelines at http://www.barc.brad.ac.uk/BARC_human_remains_policy.pdf 
 
 
YES/NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you answer ‘No’ to Q5 and have answered ‘No’ to Q2, Q3 and Q4 ethical approval is not required. 
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Checked by Chair of Research Ethics Panel 
Annex 1 
 
Ethical Scrutiny by a University Research Ethics Panel is not required if: 
 
 The project is NOT a research project. 
 
 The research project will only involve unlinked or aggregated human data which was 
collected and which was, at the time, subject to relevant research ethics panel approval. 
However, where this is the case the researcher should at least confirm this in an 
email to the Research Support Unit’s Ethics Administrator so that the Ethics 
Administrator has a record and can inform the Chair of the appropriate Research Ethics 
Panel that the researcher plans to go ahead without ethics approval. The email should 
confirm that the research project does not require ethics approval because it only 
involves unlinked or aggregated data, which when originally obtained from people was 
obtained in accordance with the protocol as approved at the time by an appropriate 
research ethics panel. The email should also briefly explain how the researcher now 
plans to use the unlinked or aggregated data.  
 
 The research is Public Domain Data: 
 The Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) Research Ethics Framework 
states that ethics approval may not be required for data sets that exist in the public 
domain (e.g. datasets that are available from the Office for National Statistics or from 
the ESRC’s Data Archive) so long as the appropriate permissions from individuals 
have already been obtained (i.e. informed consent) and where it is not possible to 
identify the individuals from the information provided.  It must be remembered that 
public domain data is still covered by the laws of copyright.  
 
 The research involves Simple Uncontentious Questionnaires: 
If a research project’s only involvement with human subjects is a simple brief 
questionnaire with uncontroversial content it may not require ethical approval.  It is the 
Principal Investigator or Principal Supervisor’s responsibility to decide whether a project 
comes under this category and must indicate this on the form and attach the document 
for information. 
Guidance on supervisor and principal investigator sign off of uncontentious research 
 
Audit and service evaluation are usually uncontentious, and guidance on how to differentiate 
between research, audit and service evaluation is given at: University Ethics website.  
 
Even where a project is clearly research, as a supervisor or principal investigator, you can 
sign off simple, ethically uncontentious projects as not needing further ethical scrutiny.  To 
do this, you should consider the level of risk to participants and researchers, the level of 
effort required by participants, the level of intrusion into participants’ lives and the level of 
sensitivity of both the general subject matter and the information requested of participants. 
Basically, the lower these levels, the more likely the research is to be uncontentious and 
the more confident you should feel about signing off. 
 
The following examples may help.   
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These studies can almost always be signed off by the supervisor or principal investigator: 
 
 Brief questionnaires asking opinions about matters which are clearly not sensitive 
(attitudes to a product, beliefs about the usefulness of a course).   
 Brief interviews about such topic. 
 Observational studies about everyday behaviour in public places which involve no risk 
to subjects or the researcher. 
 
But the following studies almost always need further scrutiny by a University Ethics Panel: 
 
 Long questionnaires (these require considerable potential inconvenience to subjects). 
 Long interviews 
 Any questionnaires which ask subjects about intimate behaviours or issue likely to 
cause distress or would in other ways normally be regarded as contentious or sensitive 
(e.g. illegal activities, attitudes to abortion, capital punishment, immigration, 
euthanasia). 
 Any interviews which examine these matters. 
 Observational studies which involve intimate behaviours, behaviours which are not 
normally public or which might normally be considered contentious or sensitive 
(Activities of ethics committees, appointment committees, etc; professional 
consultations). 
 
Naturally, this list is for illustration only, and should not be considered in any way 
exhaustive, permissive or prescriptive.  For example, there are many categories of research 
not mentioned here which would definitely require ethics approval (e.g. treatment 
research).  Rather the list demonstrates the issue of proportionality.  Thus, even though 
the method may be the same for activities requiring and not requiring further scrutiny, the 
content in some way distinguishes between the two categories. 
 
At the same time, there is obviously some middle ground.  Are ethics committees not 
public?  Is what is discussed so sensitive that the proposal needs further scrutiny?  What 
about asking people about their views on the actions of senior members of staff in their 
organisation?  Probably, it is in these middle ground areas that further advice should be 
sought from a Panel Chair about whether the project can be signed off by the supervisor 
or principal investigator alone.  Given that, in so doing, the supervisor or PI is attesting to 
the ethical probity of the study, it is usually best to err on the side of caution where 
there is uncertainty.  Panel chairs are very happy to advise. 
 
(Dr Martin Brinkworth, Chair, Biomedical, Natural and Physical Sciences Research Ethics 
Panel, m.h.brinkworth@bradford.ac.uk, ext. 3584 
 
Andy Scally, Chair, Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel, 
a.j.scally@bradford.ac.uk, ext. 6431) 
